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Political parties in the United Kingdom are increasingly focusing their constituency-level 
campaigns on marginal seats; such a focus has been echoed by academic researchers 
studying the effectiveness of intense constituency campaigning in boosting local electoral 
outcomes. Yet there has been little investigation into the impact of the redirection of 
campaigning resources on safe constituencies; while existing research suggests that intense 
campaigns are effective in boosting local electoral outcomes, it is possible that a relative lack 
of campaigning may be harmful. This thesis addresses this gap by exploring in detail the 
detrimental impact of low level campaigning on both turnout and vote share in safe 
constituencies by the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats. 
The study is situated within the literature of campaign effectiveness, also drawing on 
theories of voter behaviour. It offers a critical evaluation of existing research into 
constituency campaigning, contending not only that a lack of campaigning can be harmful, 
but also that these effects are impacted by nuances of local incumbency and party 
differentials. To explore this, the thesis conducts a quantitative examination of the effects of 
constituency campaigning conducted at UK general elections from 1987 to 2010. It also 
expands existing literature in two ways; by formulating and applying a refined way in which 
to measure relative levels of campaigning, and also exploring the potential of leader visits as 
a measure of local campaigning for the first time in the UK. 
The focus on rebalancing attention towards safe constituencies places the concept of 
marginality at the core of this thesis. In exploring the concept in detail, potential 
explanations for the origins of marginality are considered, drawing on theories of population 
stability and party support bases. Using a refined measure of relative levels of campaigning, 
a link is established between marginality and campaigning, which also considers the 
important role of incumbency. When exploring the impact of low levels of campaigning, the 
results indicate that in many cases there is a harmful impact on both turnout and vote share, 
although the effects are greater for the latter. The findings suggest that local incumbency is a 
central factor in deciding the detrimental impact of low levels of campaigning, with such 
campaigns run by opposition parties resulting in far greater declines in their vote share when 
compared to equivalent campaigns run by incumbents.  
In an era of increasing focus on marginal constituencies during election campaigns, this 
thesis explicitly considers the impact of a lack of campaigning in safe constituencies, the role 
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of incumbency and also applies new measures. In doing so, new empirical insights are 
produced into the importance of constituency campaigning in the UK, through an approach 
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The quote used in the title of this thesis comes from a voter in an ultra-safe Conservative 
constituency during the 2010 election campaign
1
. It not only reveals her frustration with the 
low level of campaigning in the constituency but also neatly sums up the key theme of this 
thesis. Political parties in the UK spend millions of pounds at election time on local 
campaigning, with the candidates from the three largest parties alone spending in excess of 
£11.1 million during the 2010 election campaign (Electoral Commission, 2011:11). But not 
all constituency campaigns are equal, with parties increasingly strategically directing their 
resources towards marginal constituencies at recent elections. The simple First Past The Post 
(FPTP) majority electoral system used in the UK makes gaining the greatest number of 
constituencies key to winning a general election, and marginal seats with their small 
majorities are perceived to be those most vulnerable to changing hands. Parties increasingly 
target them as the constituencies most likely to help them win an election, publishing lists of 
such constituencies well in advance of the next election
 2
. In these targeted constituencies, 
local election campaigning is tightly controlled and managed by both locally incumbent and 
opposition parties (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008). This focus has been encouraged by the 
success of the strategic targeting of constituency campaigning by Labour (Hands and 
Denver, 2004) during the 1997 campaign and continues into more recent elections. The most 
obvious recent instance of such concentration upon marginal constituencies was the donation 
of millions of pounds to the Conservatives by Lord Ashcroft in the build-up to the 2010 
election (Cutts et al, 2012). These donations were accompanied by a concentrated campaign 
of pre-election canvassing, beginning in 2007 and focused upon large numbers of marginal 
seats.  
 
                                                          
1
 Carole Lovell, Ramsey wrote: ‘Election, what election? I live in Ramsey and have had 
nothing from any party regarding the election, nor have I seen anyone. Don't we matter in 
this part of the county?’ 19 April 2010 (BBC, 2010d). Ramsey is situated in Cambridgeshire 
North West which has been a safe Conservative seat since its foundation in 1997. During the 
2010 election campaign, the incumbent Shailesh Varma was defending a majority of 20 
percentage points, making the constituency ultra-safe. 
2
 see Wintour, 2013 for Labour’s 2015 targets, and although the Conservatives have not yet 
confirmed also Grice, 2012 
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However, the full implications of this focus on marginal constituencies have not been 
appreciated in existing literature. Intense campaigning in marginal constituencies has been 
demonstrated to be effective in boosting local electoral outcomes (operationalised in this 
thesis as turnout and party vote share); parties increasingly target marginal constituencies, 
but existing research has not considered what impact such targeting has on local electoral 
outcomes in safe constituencies. It follows that if campaigning has a positive impact on 
turnout and vote share where it is intense (i.e. in marginal seats), then the relative absence of 
campaigning (i.e. in safe constituencies) may have a negative effect.  
 
This concentration of resources upon marginal constituencies in the hope of a positive effect 
on local results has not been a long-standing phenomenon. For much of the twentieth 
century, constituency campaigning in the UK was considered as nothing more than an 
irrelevant nuisance to voters; a sideshow to the national campaign. In an age in which 
televisions brought the national leaders into the living rooms of voters, the well-regarded 
Nuffield election studies dismissed constituency campaigns as little more than rituals (Butler 
and Kavanagh, 1998) to keep local party members occupied, which had ‘little success in 
changing political attitudes’ (Kavanagh, 1970: 87). This was despite evidence from case 
studies of constituency campaigns in the UK (Holt and Turner, 1968, Bochel and Denver, 
1971, 1972) which offered clear evidence that local campaigning was effective in boosting 
both party vote share and local turnout.  
 
Over the past two decades there has been a dramatic upswing of interest in local 
campaigning by both political parties and academics in the UK. In an attempt to rebalance 
the conversation on the effectiveness of local campaigning in the UK by testing the 
conclusions of the Nuffield studies, empirical examinations of the effectiveness of 
campaigning in altering local outcomes (both vote shares and turnout) have been produced. 
Their operationalisations of campaigning vary between three main groups with Denver and 
Hands (see 1992, 1997b) predominantly using agent survey data, Johnston and Pattie (1995, 
2008 among others) using expenditure data and Seyd and Whiteley (1992, 2002)  using 
member survey data. However, their conclusions remain the same; targeting resources on 
marginal constituencies has been described as ‘rational’ (Pattie and Johnston, 2003b: 388), 
and when parties have not adhered to it (such as the Conservatives in the 1990s, see Denver, 
Hands and Henig, 1998) their campaigns have proved ineffective. Of course, such a focus on 
marginal constituencies is entirely rational; in a FPTP system such as the UK, parties win 
elections by winning constituencies, and marginal seats are those most likely to change 
hands. If constituency campaigning is effective (as research suggests), it makes sense to 
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concentrate it in those constituencies which are most likely to be won or lost. Yet despite 
these conclusions, and amidst the wide-spread adoption of targeting by parties, only a partial 
appreciation of the full impact of such strategic constituency campaigning has been formed.   
 
The departure point of this thesis is the development of  the mirror image of this argument; if 
the existing evidence is that intense campaigns in marginal constituencies positively impact 
electoral outcomes, then do low level campaigns in safe constituencies have a negative 
impact? By exploring the main hypothesis that low level campaigns have a detrimental 
impact upon electoral outcomes in safe constituencies, this thesis portrays a more holistic 
picture of the true impact of constituency campaigning. It does so by building on existing 
evidence from marginal constituencies and shifts the emphasis to consider what happens 
when a constituency is neglected. Three sub-hypotheses (Marginality originates in 
constituency populations, Opposition candidates in safe constituencies are more likely to run 
detrimental low level campaigns and The detrimental impact of low level campaigns varies 
across parties) are also examined to consider why this relationship exists, investigating the 
role that local incumbency and different parties play. Within each of these hypotheses are a 
series of nested hypotheses, exploring the variations introduced by party, incumbency and 
campaigning type. The thesis also proposes the inclusion of a new measure of campaign 
intensity to work alongside expenditure and campaign activity data. This variable is that of 
leader visits: the widely publicised tours that party leaders make during the short election 
campaign to certain constituencies. This is the first work to engage fully with this variable in 
the UK context, drawing on recent evidence from both Canada (Carty and Eagles, 2005) and 
the USA (Holbrook, 2002) that these visits positively affect party vote shares. It also builds 
on existing research in this area by extending the examination of leader visit effectiveness to 
consider whether they affect local turnout, echoing the dual approach taken to electoral 
outcomes elsewhere in this thesis. 
 
Development of project 
 
Elections have always struck me as the chance for political parties to make history; by losing 
spectacularly, winning by a landslide or not quite fulfilling their predicted potential. My 
original intention had been to examine trends in tactical voting over the period to explore 
how parties worked together, taking advantage of campaign effectiveness, by strategically 
deploying resources. Yet the more I read about the tactics and effort involved in such 
campaigns operating in specific constituencies, the more I wondered about those numerous 
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other constituencies which were not discussed. The further I read I could still only find 
cursory references to safe constituencies amid the articles demonstrating that intense 
campaigns were effective. I began to wonder how this redirection of attention to marginal 
constituencies might impact a safe constituency. After all, it is not unknown for safe seats to 
change hands, as demonstrated by the track record of my home constituency. Growing up in 
a small rural village in the Home Counties it was perhaps inevitable that my local 
constituency was safely Conservative throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.  With the local 
voters seemingly swept along with the tide of New Labour in 1997, the Conservative 
incumbent was defeated. It then became a fairly safe Labour constituency (10.6 percentage 
points), before the incumbent’s majority was eroded to 2.8 percentage points (ultra-marginal) 
in 2001. The Conservatives won the seat back in 2005 (with a 13.3 percentage point 
majority, making it fairly safe), before increasing their vote share to over 35 points in 2010 
(thereby becoming an ultra-safe constituency). These swings not only between Labour and 
the Conservatives, but particularly between different degrees of marginality intrigued me: a 
safe Conservative constituency becoming a safe Labour constituency and, when the novelty 
of the brief flirtation with New Labour had worn off, becoming firstly an ultra-marginal 
Labour seat and then an ultra-safe Conservative seat – indeed the seat is presently occupied 
by the Chairman of the Conservative Party and is currently the 16th safest Conservative 
constituency in the UK. This personal history demonstrated to me that parties (and indeed 
academics) should not take safe seats for granted.   
 
Technological developments over recent elections mean that, more so now than ever, UK 
voters can both get involved in and are more exposed to coverage of general election 
campaigns. During the 2010 general election the BBC website covered the campaign with 
rolling text and video
3
, including a facility for members of the public to join in the coverage 
via email or Twitter on any subject which interested them. Amongst opinions on the debates, 
policy announcements and leaders, some voters chose to vocalise their frustration at the lack 
of campaigning in their constituencies, including the voter in the safe seat who provided the 
quote used in the title of this thesis. Another contributing voter felt ‘ignored and 
disenfranchised…living in a constituency that no political party is targeting’
4
.  Naturally, 
                                                          
3
  The BBC has had a dedicated section of its website for elections since 1997, but with the 
rise in the usage of social media since the 2005 election, 2010 was the first election at which 
such a wide range of technology was in use. 
4
 Quote by Yvonne Connell, Bexleyheath and Crayford, 25
th
 April 2010 (BBC, 2010e) 
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political parties have to be rational in regards to where they use their resources at election 
time, but it would appear that their concentration on marginal constituencies has not gone 
unnoticed by some. Partisan dealignment has also increased the potential of campaigning to 
affect vote choice (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002) by transforming the relationship between 
parties and voters over the past half century.  Drawing on Orbell’s (1970) theories regarding 
levels of political interest, those voters with a higher level of political interest would be 
expected to be more aware of the level of campaigning in their constituency. Indeed, the 
growth of social media may have enhanced this awareness; the ability to interact with 
coverage of the campaign on many media offer increasing ways in which voters in safe 
constituencies can compare their local campaign to others.  
 
It was a combination of the lack of attention paid to safe constituencies in the UK by existing 
research, my own experience of volatile ‘safe’ constituencies and a sense that some voters 
are increasingly aware of the level of campaigning in their seat that prompted me to 
investigate the impact of low level campaigns.  While the positive impact of intense 
campaigning in marginal constituencies during UK elections is well-documented, the 
existing literature has failed to investigate the potential detrimental effects of a lack of 
campaigning in safe constituencies. The case studied in this thesis is the UK and 
comparisons are made not only over the 1987 to 2010 period, but also among the three 
largest political parties (the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) in different local 
incumbencies. By examining multiple elections over this period in place of an isolated 
election study, this thesis effectively captures the evolution of this increasingly strategic 
targeting of resources on the most marginal constituencies and examines the potential impact 
this has had on safer constituencies. 
 
The crucial question here is why there should be concern about what happens in safe 
constituencies at all. After all, marginal constituencies are not only where the most 
campaigning takes place but also where the effects of such campaigning can be most 
dramatic (a seat changing hands). The conventional identification of safe and marginal 
constituencies is based upon the size of the majority in a constituency going into an election 
campaign. Constituencies with majorities of 9.99 percentage points and below are identified 
as marginal (Hough and Cracknell, 2013), whereas those with majorities of 10 percentage 
points and above are safe. At the most basic level, safe constituencies are consistently the 
largest proportion of constituencies in the UK, with over two-thirds of all seats being safe at 
elections (see chapter four). In fact, when constituencies at elections between 1987 and 2010 
are divided into conventional five categories of marginality (as used by Pippa Norris, 2009a, 
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2009b) ranging from ultra-marginal to ultra-safe, by far the greatest proportion of 
constituencies falls into the ultra-safe category. The categories used here are a conventional 
way of identifying constituencies with different degrees of marginality. They increase in 
regular increments from ultra-marginal (those with a majority of 4.99 percentage points), 
very marginal, fairly safe, very safe and through to ultra-safe constituencies (those with 
previous majorities of 20 percentage points and above). Not only are the majority of 
constituencies in the UK safe, they are extremely safe. Perhaps as a result they are neglected 
both by parties at election time and academic researchers in favour of marginal 
constituencies. This thesis argues that in order to gain a full appreciation of the true effects of 
constituency campaigning, it makes sense to investigate all potential ramifications of varying 
levels of campaigning, particularly if the vast majority of constituencies are not investigated 
in detail in existing research. However, it is not the aim to shift the focus away from 
marginal constituencies. Rather, what is intended is to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the potential harm being done to safer constituencies.  
 
If there is a detrimental impact upon electoral outcomes in safe seats caused by low level 
campaigning, there is potential for these detrimental effects to be cumulative. A safe 
constituency may be neglected over the course of several elections, leading to a decline in 
the vote share of the incumbent party which may reach the extent that the previously safe 
constituency becomes marginal. Therefore, if continually neglected safe constituencies have 
the potential to become resource-hungry marginal constituencies, parties may be making 




To produce accurate and detailed conclusions in regards to the potentially detrimental impact 
of a lack of campaigning in safe constituencies, detailed methodological considerations have 
been made. To answer the hypothesis and associated research questions, a quantitative 
approach has been employed, incorporating data from a wide range of sources across the 
1987 to 2010 period. Although the full methodology of this thesis will be explored in detail 
in chapter three, there are several key choices made to be discussed here. Two reasons have 
led to the use of a large-scale quantitative study to examine the hypothesis. Firstly, while the 
earlier studies of constituency campaigning were constituency case studies, those conducted 
since the revival of interest in such campaigns have been large-scale quantitative studies. In 
arguing that low level campaigning has a detrimental effect upon electoral outcomes, the 
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mirror image of the existing argument in favour of intense campaign effectiveness is 
presented. It is important, therefore, to make the study as comparable as possible to existing 
studies in the area, which has led to a quantitative approach. Secondly, by proposing leader 
visits as a new addition to the definition of campaigning, a conventional approach was 
undertaken to make the study comparable to the existing literature on campaigns in order to 
reconcile the variable with existing measures.  
 
Such an approach necessitated statistical training from a variety of sources, but often the 
most problematic element was the availability of data (a full discussion is presented in 
chapter three). Agent survey data for 2005 proved particularly hard to find, and the same 
data for 2010 were released in a non-compatible format. Consequently, a decision was made 
to employ spending data as the primary measure of campaigning, supplemented with survey 
data where possible. Primary data on leader visits during the 2010 campaign were also 
collected, necessitating rigorous planning and application on every day of the campaign. The 
result is a comprehensive dataset covering a range of data and bringing them together. 
Indeed, the dataset holds a far wider range of data than have been used in this thesis, with 





The remainder of this thesis is divided into nine chapters, the second and third frame the 
study both theoretically and methodologically, the fourth and fifth analyse the key variables 
of marginality and campaign intensity, the sixth and seventh test the main hypothesis in 
detail, the eighth chapter engages with a new campaigning variable – leader visits, before the 
thesis ends with conclusions drawn from the analysis.  
 
The next chapter examines Voting Behaviour, Campaigns and Effectiveness. This second 
chapter engages in detail with the theory and empirical evidence which have underpinned 
and informed this thesis, and explains the approaches taken. There are differing explanations 
as to why people vote and why they vote the way that they do, originating from sociological 
factors, partisan attachments or simple rationality. Instead of selecting just one of these 
explanations for voter behaviour in the UK over the period, the chapter proposes a combined 
rational/sociological model in which individuals can vote for a variety of reasons. It also 
considers the role that campaigns play in affecting voter decisions, arguing that the most 
important role of campaigns is to provide information to voters. Whether it is the leaflet 
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dropped through the door or a party agent canvassing on the doorstep, campaigns are 
designed to present the voter with the greatest possible amount of information on party 
positions to enable both voter turnout and vote choice. Authors who have argued that 
campaigning is irrelevant (such as Butler and Kavanagh, 1974) have often drawn not only on 
a single dependent variable (i.e. vote share or turnout), but a single theoretical trend. The 
approach presented here argues that campaigns have the ability to affect both whether 
someone votes in the first place (turnout), and if they do, how they vote (vote share). The 
chapter considers empirical evidence in support of the effectiveness of campaigning, 
particularly from the USA and UK, finding that campaigning is effective in boosting both 
turnout and vote share. Finally, the key theme of this thesis, marginality, and the account of 
it in existing literature is presented, particularly engaging with the debate over the 
appropriateness of the conventional definition of marginality in the UK. As a prelude to the 
study that follows, the impact of marginality upon campaigning is detailed, with clear 
empirical evidence of the increased redirection of resources by political parties in the UK.  
 
The third chapter Thesis Methodology sets out the thesis hypothesis and considers the 
various methodological choices made in answering it. The hypotheses nested within this 
overall hypothesis are formulated, before each of the associated variables are explained and 
engaged with, including the two dimensions of the dependent variable of electoral outcomes. 
A quantitative approach has been taken to answer the hypotheses and the justifications of 
using this will be examined here, including arguments in favour of validity and the influence 
of existing research in the area. It also considers why the parameters of the study have been 
set at elections in the UK between 1987 and 2010, arguing that it allows an examination of 
the increasing trend towards campaigning in marginal constituencies over time, yet remains 
manageable enough to engage sufficiently with the thesis hypothesis. As this is a quantitative 
study, care is taken to explain the sources of data and the method of data collection for all 
variables used in analysis, paying particular attention to the collection of original data on 
leader visits. An overview of the analysis methods and techniques is provided, before a 
detailed plan of the analysis to be conducted in later chapters is set out.  
Marginality, the fourth chapter of this thesis is the first that engages empirically with the 
overall thesis hypothesis by investigating the key concept of marginality (whether a seat is 
marginal or safe). It enables the understanding of what it means to be a marginal or safe 
constituency in the UK during the 1987 to 2010 period. By drawing on existing research, two 
primary factors underlying marginality are drawn out; vote proximity (the closer the first two 
parties are, the more marginal the constituency is) and seat turnover (when a seat changes 
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hands). Patterns of constituency marginality over the period of the thesis are studied, finding 
that safe constituencies (particularly the very safest) consistently represent the majority of 
constituencies in the UK, which supports the rebalancing of academic attention in their 
favour. There has also been a lack of understanding and engagement of the reasons behind 
varying levels of constituency safety, so two theories are put forward to fill this gap. The 
first is that population stability is a key element of constituency marginality. High rates of 
population turnover may mean constant fluctuations of party support, preventing the 
establishment of large majorities. The second theory centres on traditional bases of party 
support, suggesting that safe constituencies are more likely than marginal constituencies to 
represent the traditional sources of the incumbent party’s support. This chapter offers an 
opportunity to engage with a concept that is not readily understood and attempts to draw 
some conclusions about marginality and its origins. 
In Campaigning and Marginality, the fifth chapter examines the other key variable of this 
thesis: constituency campaigning. It defines campaigning over the 1987 to 2010 period as 
largely based on campaign expenditure figures with additional variables from Denver and 
Hands’ agent surveys from 1992 to 2001 (leader visits in 2010 are discussed in the eighth 
chapter). The varying trends in campaigning are contrasted between the Conservatives, 
Labour and Liberal Democrats, before factors affecting levels of campaigning are examined. 
By investigating whether socio-demographics, local incumbency or party resource factors 
(such as numbers of local members) affect levels of campaigning, a model is constructed 
examining the true effect of marginality on levels of campaign intensity. While initial 
investigations of the relationship between marginality and campaign intensity appear 
positive, when a model is constructed the relationship is not captured effectively. To counter 
this the chapter develops an original measure of levels of campaigning based upon and 
refined from Denver, Hands and McAllister’s (2004) study based on constituency 
campaigning quartile measures, with the first quartile representing the lowest levels of 
campaigning. Whereas the measure developed in the existing study was not clearly defined 
between parties, this chapter argues that a single measure underestimates campaigning by the 
Liberal Democrats. Incumbency and party factors are instead included here to produce a 
refined measure which assesses relative campaign intensity for all parties. A separate 
measure is developed for the impact on turnout which incorporates levels of campaigning by 
the top two parties in a constituency, thereby enabling the identification of relative levels of 
campaigning. This measure is then tested against constituency marginality, with the results 
demonstrating that campaigns in the first quartile (classified as low level campaigns) are 
significantly related to marginality. This chapter brings together two central concepts for the 
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overall hypothesis, and develops a refined measure of constituency campaign levels which 
are able to act as shorthand for both marginality and campaigning.  
The sixth and seventh chapters examine the impact of low level campaigns on the two 
dimensions of the dependent variable of this thesis: electoral outcomes operationalised as 
vote share and turnout. Chapter six, Campaign Neglect and Turnout: does absence breed 
apathy? examines the impact of low level campaigns on turnout. Patterns in turnout over the 
period of study show that turnout is in decline, but that this is not limited to the UK. This 
chapter focuses on establishing the relationship between levels of campaigning and turnout. 
A model is constructed, incorporating a range of control variables to examine the thesis 
hypotheses both implicitly (campaigning has a positive impact, so by implication the absence 
of it may have a negative impact) and explicitly (using the original measure of low levels of 
campaigning formulated earlier in the thesis). By using the original campaigning measure 
developed in the previous chapter, it is possible to conclude that in many cases low level 
campaigns have a negative impact on turnout, but this varies, particularly when considering 
the impact of incumbency.  
Chapter seven, Campaign Neglect and Vote Share: does absence make the heart grow 
fonder?, considers the impact of low level campaigns on vote share in safe constituencies, 
the second dimension of local electoral outcomes. It engages in detail with the variable, 
considering patterns over the period before considering a range of potential explanatory 
factors including incumbency and socio-demographics which may affect it. As an initial 
testing of the relationship between campaigning and patterns of vote share, a basic model 
with raw campaign figures is examined, drawing on existing theoretical and empirical 
evidence which suggests that campaigning is effective in increasing vote share. This 
relationship is presented under an information theory framework, arguing that local 
campaigning acts as a source of information to constituency populations through which 
voting decisions may be altered or reinforced.  
The seventh chapter, The Effectiveness of Leader Visits at the 2010 General Election, 
proposes the inclusion of a new variable into UK studies of constituency campaigning: visits 
by party leaders to constituencies. Drawing on original data collected by the author which 
has been informed by existing empirical evidence from the USA and Canada that such visits 
are effective in boosting party vote share, the chapter makes a case study of leader visits 
made during the 2010 election campaign.  It considers the political context in which visits 
are made, discerning between offensive and defensive strategies and examining whether 
marginality plays a role in determining whether a constituency is visited. It tests the overall 
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effectiveness of leader visits in boosting vote share and turnout (reflecting the previous two 
chapters) discovering that these visits are not effective in boosting turnout, but those 
constituencies that were visited by David Cameron and Nick Clegg saw boosts in their 
respective local party vote shares, controlling for the social and political context. The relative 
effectiveness of offensive and defensive visits are then contrasted, with the results of the 
model revealing that offensive visits are more effective in boosting party vote share. This 
extended investigation into a new variable in the UK context offers a great deal of scope for 
future studies. 
The concluding chapter considers the implications of the findings from the analysis in the 
preceding chapters and establishes clearly the contribution this thesis makes to the 
understanding of constituency campaigning; not only in examining the implications of a lack 
of campaigning, but also proposing the extension of the definition of campaigning to include 
leader visits. It also suggests clear future routes for research, including continuing the study 









Voting Behaviour, Campaigns and Marginality 
 
 
Around the world political parties spend many millions of pounds on campaigning during 
election campaigns (for a comprehensive account of worldwide election spending see Center 
for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance, 2005). In the UK, the Conservatives, Labour 
and Liberal Democrats spent £29.5 million (Electoral Commission, 2011:11) running their 
campaigns during the 2010 general election (of which the Conservatives alone spent £16.7 
million). Parties are also keen to adopt new technologies enabling them to contact voters 
(from Twitter to Facebook) as well as sophisticated campaign management software. 
Election campaigns are often highly visible through publicity drives, although these can 
backfire. In 2010, for example, spoof versions of election posters featuring David Cameron 
were in the news (Ryan, 2010), and during the 2001 campaign John Prescott memorably 
punched a voter (Jones and Brogan, 2001).  
Initially it would appear that local campaigning is alive and well, but parties do not have 
limitless resources. Constituency campaign expenditure is limited anyway during election 
campaigns in the UK (by the Representation of the People Act 1983: since this Act limits can 
be changed by Order of the Secretary of State: Great Britain, 1983; Kelly, 2005) with an 
increasing move towards strategic deployment. The greatest profit to be had from the local 
campaign in the UK is to win (or retain) control of the seat, so parties focus on those 
constituencies most likely to change hands: marginal constituencies, a factor enhanced by the 
FPTP electoral system. This has, however, left a vast number of safe constituencies 
relatively neglected during election campaigns, and it is the purpose of this thesis to examine 
what impact this has on local outcomes. This chapter sets out the building blocks for the 
study, engaging with the existing literature to construct a theoretical framework for the 
origins of marginality, the effect of marginality upon levels of campaigning, and the impact 
of low levels of campaigning upon local outcomes.   
 
But do campaigns have an impact on voter behaviour, and what role does marginality play in 
affecting campaigning? Drawing on existing literature, this chapter argues that no single 
theoretical model can explain voter behaviour (here operationalised as both vote choice and 
the decision to vote), offering examples from the UK. Instead, there is evidence that while 
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some sections of constituency populations vote according to rational choice theory, others 
vote according to social group memberships. The key role of a campaign is to provide 
information which not only encourages the local population to vote by increasing knowledge 
of the local campaign, but can in some cases alter vote choice. Drawing on the main thesis 
hypothesis, this chapter engages with and constructs a framework around three concepts: 
marginality, campaigning and voter behaviour. In the first section, the three main schools of 
voter behaviour are examined, with this thesis proposing a resolution between rational choice 
and sociological models. In the following section, campaigns are presented as key sources of 
information which affect constituency populations as envisaged by information theory 
(Orbell, 1970). It considers not only key controversies over the effectiveness of local 
campaigning, but also empirical evidence that offers support. In considering the impact of 
campaigns upon voter behaviour, marginality is presented as a key factor affecting the 
intensity of such campaigns. Yet while existing literature in the UK studies the effectiveness 
of campaigning in marginal constituencies, there has been little discussion of safer 
constituencies. The chapter ends by explaining the ways in which theory has affected the 
approach taken by this thesis, the hypotheses proposed and what conclusions can be 
expected. 
The Voting Decision 
In the 2010 UK general election over 29.6 million people voted (BBC, 2010c), resulting in 
the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats winning 36, 29 and 23 percent of the 
national vote respectively.  This statement encapsulates two key puzzles of electoral studies: 
why people choose to vote and why they vote the way that they do. The overall hypothesis of 
this thesis, that low level campaigns have a detrimental impact on electoral outcomes, puts 
these two puzzles at the heart of this study, with electoral outcomes here defined as both 
turnout and vote share. Yet before the impact of an absence of campaigning is examined in 
chapters six and seven, it is logical to consider what the drivers are of voting decisions. After 
all, the changes campaigning may make to this behaviour cannot be explained if there is a 
lack of understanding of the reasoning behind such decisions in the first place. The existing 
research into constituency campaign effectiveness in the UK is not often explicit regarding 
what approach has been taken to voter behaviour (with some notable exceptions: Johnston 
and Pattie, 1998a for example). 
Attempts to explain how and why people vote can be divided into three models: sociological, 
socio-psychological and rational choice theories. The first is based on a series of empirical 
investigations conducted in the first half of the twentieth century and explains the decision 
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on how to vote as dependent upon group and social memberships, such as class and religion. 
Socio-psychological models build on this by suggesting that partisan identity is formed 
through socialisation processes. Rational choice theories of voting, as the name suggests, 
posit voters as rational beings who vote if the costs are not too high and for the party that 
offers them the greatest benefits. Yet each of these models has failings in its explanatory 
power, and none comprehensively explains both the decision to vote and how to vote.  
Sociological theories of voting – group and class membership 
The first theoretical model of voting behaviour is the sociological model, proposing that 
group memberships such as class, religion and race form the decision on how to vote. This 
theory originated from trends discovered in the three early works: The People’s Choice 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944), Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954) 
and Personal Influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). These studies were in-depth 
examinations of election campaigns in specific geographical areas which aimed to gain a 
comprehensive picture of the election campaign. The People’s Choice, for example 
examined voters in Erie county over the course of the 1940 presidential campaign and 
examined at what point their vote choice was made, whereas Voting developed the earlier 
study and transported the study to Elmira county for the 1948 presidential campaign. Yet the 
discovery of the importance of group membership in vote choice formation by Lazarsfeld et 
al. (1944) was unexpected, as the original aim had been to explore voting as an individual 
behaviour affected by exposure to the media. However, the findings of the study instead 
indicated clear links between social group memberships and their vote choice. This was 
echoed by the study of the population of Elmira in Voting where ‘class… ethnic 
and…ecological divisions of the population’ (Berelson, et al., 1954: 75) were found to be of 
high explanatory value. Social groups represent a stable source in explaining voter 
behaviour, being maintained across generations; as such they change only gradually. 
Sociological models not only account for voting according to social group memberships; 
voters under the model actively vote in the interests of their group (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944: 
148).  
 
Lazarsfeld et al. examined the role of opinion leaders in social groups, finding that they are 
the more active members who engaged in political discourse more often than other members 
of the same social group. Ideas and opinions ‘often flow from radio and print to the opinion 
leaders and from them to the less active sections of the population’ (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944: 
151). As such they operate as intermediaries or interpreters of campaign information, with 
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less active members of the group influenced by their interpretation. This was confirmed by 
Berelson et al. (1954:113) who stated that opinion leaders ‘represent or symbolise the given 
group’s norms’.  
 
There is evidence supporting such sociological theories in the UK, particularly considering 
the link between social class and voter behaviour – a relationship deemed to be particularly 
strong in the UK (Alford, 1963). Indicative of this is Pulzer’s (1972:102) oft quoted 
conclusion that class is the central element in British politics, with evidence suggesting that 
other group memberships found in the US studies such as religion and ethnicity are relatively 
weak in the UK. Empirical studies as employed in the USA were transferrable to the UK and 
focused in detail on voting and local context in specific parliamentary constituencies.
5
 There 
was of course a mismatch between the American and British studies in regards to the context 
of the elections studied; whereas the UK studies explored general elections, the two earlier 
seminal American studies focused on presidential campaigns, with the national nature of the 
competition and Electoral College system altering the context. Despite this difference, 
studies in both nations focused on the voting decision, not the electoral outcome, with the 
British studies largely reflecting the American findings (Butler and Stokes, 1969). Class 
membership was found to be the key determinant of voter behaviour in the UK, with the 
campaign having no impact on their final voting decision. The role of class in explaining 
British voter behaviour was widely accepted, although largely in place of the socio-economic 
measures used in the American studies (Rose, 1968) the most effective measure of British 
class was found to be differentiations between occupations; specifically routine and non-
routine (Bonham, 1954). Drawing on criticisms of Lazarsfeld et al. in explaining group 
interactions, British sociological studies (Bealey, Blondel and McCann, 1965) considered the 
impact of groups on others, particularly the adjustment of voter behaviour according to the 
size of the class groups in the locale, with routine workers (traditionally Labour-supporting 
voters) in a predominantly non- routine constituency voting Conservative.  Like the US 
studies, however, group membership could not explain all voting decisions, with some being 
more receptive to the campaign messages.  
 
Sociological theories of voter behaviour have been criticised from both methodological and 
theoretical standpoints. First, the very methodology underpinning the seminal US studies 
                                                          
5
 Benney, Gray and Pear (1956) examined Greenwich, while Milne and Mackenzie (1954 and 1958) 
explored Bristol South East. 
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has been heavily criticised as offering only a ‘partial account of the behaviour of the 
American voter’ (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960: 15); the issue being that 
they focused on case studies and interviews conducted in a small area (Elmira for example). 
Specific criticisms were also raised against The People’s Choice by Rossi (1964) in regards 
to how the authors adapted their study once their original hypotheses had been proved 
invalid. As discussed above, the original intention of the authors of the study was to 
examine the effect of mass media upon voting decisions. Influenced by this hypothesis, the 
study was constructed accordingly, with detailed content analysis of the local media during 
the campaign.  This had implications when the overriding evidence for the importance of 
social groups in the vote decision emerged, with the researchers being forced to adapt their 
study accordingly. Rossi argues that this meant that key factors of the importance of social 
group membership, such as the discovery of the significant differences observed between 
different types of Christianity, were ineffectively explained.  Regarding this as ‘evidence of 
their inability to assimilate its implications properly’ (Rossi, 1964: 317), such failings may 
be attributed to the forced change of direction of the book. 
 
Secondly, various elements of the sociological theories themselves have given rise to 
criticism. Some (in particular Campbell et al., 1960) have argued that the sociological theory 
does not always match reality; particularly the contrasts between social group durability and 
the reality of vote fluctuations between elections.  If social groups are durable predictors of 
voter behaviour, then fluctuations in the vote which occur between elections cannot be 
explained by the model. Instead they can be interpreted as due instead to voter attitudes, with 
the ability for sociological voting theories to make meaningful statements about motivations 
for voting being limited. They argue that ‘voting is an act of individual human beings’ 
(Campbell et al., 1960: 13), so in order to understand voting it is essential to uncover the 
motivations for voting rather than operate along broad sociological theories of group 
homogeneity.  Even Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) admit that not everyone votes according to their 
social groups, but the theory does not offer clear explanations of either  why some people 
vote against their social group, or indeed how an individual’s membership of multiple social 
groups (for example, a 40 year old, white, Catholic manual worker) operates in the voting 
process. 
 
Finally, there is clear evidence (Crewe, Sӓrlvik and Alt, 1977 and Rose, 1974) that the 
influence of class upon voting in the UK has declined rapidly. Indeed, in the updated edition 
of Political Change and Britain, Butler and Stokes (1974:203) perceived the decline of class 
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voting to be ‘one of the most important aspects’ of changes in British voting behaviour in the 
1970s. This ‘indisputable decline in the ability of class, measured by occupation, to structure 
voting choice in Britain’ (Franklin and Mughan, 1978:532) has been presented as the result 
of the changes in the British economy and the effect upon the workforce. The effects of the 
changes in the British workforce mean that between 1945 and 1983, the share of the working 
class voting Labour fell from 62 to 42 percent and the share of the middle class voting 
Conservative fell from 63 to 55 percent (Crewe, 1986). Evidence points to the importance of 
class membership in British voting behaviour declining (Rose and McAllister, 1986) due to 
changes in the structure of society. 
 
The important element to focus on from the research into the decline of class membership 
and voter behaviour is the word decline. The studies do not propose that class voting has 
been eradicated; it continues to play a role in determining voter behaviour albeit at a lower 
level than it once did. Even with the decline demonstrated by Crewe’s (1986) figures above, 
well over a third of the working class (42 percent) continued to vote Labour, and a majority 
of the middle class (55 percent) continued to vote Conservative. Perhaps it is the definition 
of class as used in Britain which presents the problem, with Heath, Jowell and Curtice (1985) 
dismissing the decline of class voting due to the misinterpretation of the meaning of the 
word. Kelley, MacAllister and Mughan (1985) instead propose an extended definition of 
class which includes elements of socio-demographics such as education and home-
ownership. Sociological theories of voter behaviour, which focus on the group memberships 
of the individual, remain valid for parts of British society and deserve a place in 
contemporary explanations of voting behaviour. Under the sociological model of voter 
behaviour campaigns play a key role in mobilising social groups to vote. Although such 
groups are stable determinants of the way in which an individual votes, campaigning acts 
primarily as a conduit through which voter turnout can be encouraged. Campaigning also 
contacts key individuals within social groups such as the opinion leaders through which 
information can be relayed to other group members. In rare cases, campaigning can alter 
vote choice, although this is more likely in sections of the population who are on the 
peripheries of social groups.   
 
 
Socio-psychological theories of voting – partisan identities 
A sense of frustration with the explanatory value of sociological models of voting gave rise 
to a socio-psychological approach to voter behaviour in the USA in the 1950s. This approach 
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was developed at the University of Michigan (and as such is often referred to as the 
Michigan model), the seminal study of which was made by Campbell, Converse, Miller and 
Stokes (1960) in The American Voter. Building on the mismatch between social group 
durability and vote fluctuations in sociological models, this new approach incorporated 
‘individualism, with a focus on the psychological meaning of group membership’ (Harrop 
and Miller, 1987: 132) thereby avoiding the partial account of voter behaviour provided by 
authors such as Lazarsfeld et al. This socio-psychological model takes as its central element 
the idea that identifying with specific political parties ‘is an attachment held widely through 
the… electorate with substantial influence on political cognitions, attitudes and behaviour’ 
(Campbell et al., 1960:146). Voting decisions are based upon identifications with particular 
political parties which are formed through a process of political socialisation in childhood; 
this not only directly affects vote choice, but also the perception of politics. The model 
perceived citizens as largely passive in politics, with their identification forming not only 
part of their self-image (Harrop and Miller, 1987:131) but also as their guide in electoral 
choice and assisting in their interpretation of information. Partisan identifications indirectly 
impact vote choice by shaping the attitudes of the voters to various political constructs such 
as candidates, policies and the benefits they offer, but it can also play a role in directly 
informing vote choice for some.  
These conclusions were based on empirical evidence from the American National Election 
Surveys between the late 1940s and late 1950s. Over this period they found repeated patterns 
of partisan identification - for example, at the 1948 presidential election ‘what feeling there 
was seemed to be governed largely by antecedent attachments to one of the two major 
parties’ (Campbell et al., 1960:532), and the repeated findings in different election years 
suggested party identification was key to understanding American voter behaviour. To 
understand the formation of partisan identifications Campbell et al. began by focusing upon 
those just reaching the legal voting age and found that they already had established partisan 
identifications. As such, partisan identification must begin before voting age and high 
correlations between reported partisan identifications and strengths of identifications of 
parents and children were found, suggesting that these preferences are formed as part of a 
process of socialisation within the family.  
Under the socio-psychological model of voting, partisan identification displays ‘persistent 
adherence and a resistance to contrary influence’ (Campbell et al., 1960: 146), which 
indicate its durability, reflecting the sociological model. The authors demonstrate this 
durability of partisan identification in their study by examining presidential vote choice and 
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found that of ‘those who can remember their first vote for president, two thirds still identify 
with the same party they first voted for’ (Campbell et al., 1960:148). Generational change 
has the potential to affect the strength of partisan attachments, with Beck (1979) positing the 
idea of a three-generational cycle of realignment in which partisan identification declines 
over the space of three generations before realignment creates strong attachments once again. 
Campbell et al. (1960:149) acknowledge that ‘not all members of the electorate form strong 
party attachment’, and it is this section of the population where the potential effectiveness of 
short-term factors can be observed. This clear differentiation between the impact of short and 
long term factors is the key strength of socio-psychological models of voting behaviour. 
Whereas sociological models found it difficult to explain periods of change, socio-
psychological models acknowledge not only that some people do not identify with political 
parties, but also that short-term fluctuations in voting are possible.  
This theory of partisan identification translated well across to the UK, with Butler and 
Stokes (1969, 1974) providing the key evidence-based study of British electoral 
behaviour in Political Change in Britain. The authors found clear evidence of partisan 
identification in the UK with most voters perceiving themselves as ‘supporters of a given 
party in a lasting sense’ which provided them with a sense of a ‘partisan self-image’ 
(Butler and Stokes, 1969: 39). For Butler and Stokes, the family is central to the partisan 
identification an individual possesses during their lifetime. Such identifications have 
‘deep childhood roots’ (Butler and Stokes, 1974: 49) and represent a social inheritance 
from parent to child. The family not only encompasses their own values, but also those of 
the class and culture to which they belong. There was clear empirical evidence, like the 
US studies, of stable and durable identification, with four-fifths of those questioned about 
their party support in 1963 claiming that they had always supported the same party. 
Dramatic events occurring when a voter entered the electorate, such as first time 
election of a majority Labour government in 1945 (McCallum and Readman, 1964) or 
the landslide victory of New Labour in 1997 (Norris, 1997a), may have a lasting 
influence on existing partisan cues and the individual may drop them altogether. Butler 
and Stokes also drew out key elements of the theory developed by Campbell et al. which 
were different in the UK environment, particularly the relationship between partisan 
identification and electoral preference. Whereas Campbell et al. saw American voters as 
keeping the two elements separate (i.e. it was possible to identify with one party yet vote 
for another), Butler and Stokes instead perceived the ’stability of partisan self-images in 
the presence of changing vote preferences’ (1974: 43), which they attributed largely to 
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differences in the electoral context between the two nations, with American voters voting 
more often and at more levels of government.  
The most fundamental challenge to the socio-psychological theories of voter behaviour has 
been the questioning of the continuing importance of partisan identification. Whereas socio-
psychological theories present an image of a stable and peaceful political environment, in the 
1960s, politics in the US was characterised by civil rights marches, protests against Vietnam 
and the landslide victory of Lyndon B Johnson in 1964 which saw the decline of Democrat 
support in the ‘Solid South’ (Grantham, 1988). In such a volatile and changeable political 
environment, it seems difficult to maintain the notion of the population’s involvement in 
politics as ‘remarkably innocent’ (Converse, 1964:255). These upheavals indicated support 
for the assertion that ‘voters are not fools’ (Key, 1966:7); instead they are often engaged 
with and actively involved in the political and social environment. Nie, Verba and Petrocik 
(1976:52) re-examined American voter behaviour in The Changing American Voter, and 
found indications of a ‘clear decline in the importance of party on all political levels’ from 
Congress to Senate and even between elections. Partisan identification was declining in 
influence, with those identifying strongly with a political party dropping considerably from 
38% in 1964 to 26% in 1974 (Nie et al., 1976: 49). More alarmingly perhaps was that by 
1972 more than one in four voters voted for opposition candidates and, by adding this figure 
to independents, this meant that 51% of voters in 1972 were not guided by their supposed 
partisan identifications (Nie et al., 1976: 50).  
This evidence of partisan dealignment in the USA has also been echoed in the UK. Like 
the USA, the UK went through a period of instability in the early 1970s, with an 
uncertain election outcome in 1970, massive swings in by-elections and the rise of 
smaller parties. Politics in the UK had become volatile and not as the peaceful socio-
psychological model had envisaged. Crewe, Sӓrlvik and Alt (1977:161) presented good 
evidence of a ‘crumbling of partisanship’ and offered three hypotheses which were 
supported by their investigations. The first was that the October 1974 election was an 
extraordinary election. It was the second in eight months and was called due to the failure 
of the minority Labour government elected in the February, with rapid dealignment 
particularly among Conservative partisans thereafter. Secondly, they examined whether 
this dealignment had occurred most amongst younger voters as suggested by The 
Changing American Voter which had indicated that younger voters did have weaker 




‘uniform partisan decline across the entire electorate - young, middle-aged 
and old - with no suggestion that it was particularly rapid amongst the 
young. It was everybody who changed - not just the new voters. Partisan 
decline would therefore appear to be attributable to a 'period effect' - to the 
prevailing social and political forces of the times’ (Crewe et al., 1977:164) 
Finally they tested whether class dealignment had played a role in partisan dealignment 
(thereby linking sociological and socio-psychological theories of voting), with a clear long-
term decline in the identification of classes with parties. They attributed this almost entirely 
to ‘the expansion of the Labour middle class, a growth uninterrupted even by Labour's 1970 
defeat’ (Crewe et al., 1977: 169-70). Thus partisan dealignment was not only evident by the 
1970s, but appeared to be speeding up. With this evidence that the important of partisanship 
in explaining voter behaviour has declined in value, this seriously undermines socio-
psychological theories of voting.  
However, once again, the notable word in the discussion of partisan dealignment is decline, 
not absence. As in the case of sociological models of voting, there is some evidence of 
continued partisan identification, even in contemporary Britain. Sanders found, for example, 
when comparing the results of the British Election Studies of 1964 and 2001 that in the latter 
year a ‘large majority’ (Sanders, 2004: 176) of participants classed themselves as identifying 
with a party. Although those identifying with the Conservatives and Labour combined had 
fallen 19 percentage points over the period, this coincided with the rise not only of 
nationalist parties (Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party) but also the Liberal 
Democrats. It is possible that the number of people identifying with the two largest political 
parties has dropped simply because there are more parties for people to identify with. 
 
Under the socio-psychological model, the voting process for the individual depends on their 
partisan identification; a durable phenomenon. Like sociological models, campaigns are 
important under this school as a mobilising force. Partisan identifications are formed in 
childhood and remain durable throughout life, so it is unlikely (although not impossible) that 
campaigning will affect the way in which an individual votes. The funnel of causality is key 
to understanding the role of campaigning in affecting voter behaviour under the socio-
psychological model. This construct incorporates elements of temporality and causality 
(Bartels, 2010) with partisan identification at the centre being influenced from one angle by 
socialisation. This identification affects voting behaviour, but campaigning also offers an 
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important way in which such behaviour can be altered. Fundamentally, campaigning is a 
provider of information, a way in which parties communicate with voters. Under the funnel 
of causality, campaigning affects the way in which voters perceive issues which in turn feeds 
into the voting decision. 
 
Rational choice theories of voting – costs and benefits 
 
In a radical departure from sociological and socio-psychological theories, the third model of 
voting proposes the idea of rationality as the basis of voting behaviour. These rational choice 
theories of voting were extended from economic theory, and the most notable author who 
applied such models to voting behaviour was Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy 
(1957). Downs imposed economic theories onto voting behaviour as he believed that the 
only way in which behaviour, including voting behaviour, could be explained or predicted 
was by imposing order (Downs, 1957:4). The first key difference between rational choice 
theories of voting behaviour and the two socially-driven models discussed already is that 
instead of looking at the means of the voting decision, rational choice takes the end as the 
starting point and works backwards to assess the most rational way of achieving this, 
excluding all psychological and group motivations. 
Downs offers a utility based account of voting, with the voter as the centre of decision-
making. There are two elements of the rational choice theory of voting – firstly the decision 
to vote, and secondly the choice of how to vote. Both are based on the formula: 
pB>C 
Where p is the probability of a vote being decisive, B is the benefits derived from voting and 
C is the costs associated with the vote. Rational choice theory offers an account of vote 
choice not based on any sociological foundation, but solely on voter rationality; where the 
benefits of the decision outweigh the costs, the individual will vote (McLean, 1986; 
Dunleavy 1991), 
The costs associated with the choice to vote can be varied; they may be simple such as the 
cost of petrol to get to a polling station, or they may be the time taken to register to vote. 
Also entered into the equation are the benefits associated with choosing to vote, through 
which the voter enhances the possibility of their preferred party winning, thereby providing 
them with the best utility. The probability value increases the likelihood of an individual 
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voting if their chance of casting the decisive vote is greater – in that the closer the election, 
the more likely an individual is likely to vote.  
These rational choice theories of voter behaviour have often proved to be controversial; with 
some theorists in the area believing that the theory fails empirically on the subject (see 
Brennan and Buchanan, 1984). The primary controversy of rational choice theories of 
electoral behaviour is in explaining voter turnout. People continue to turn out to vote even 
where their vote is not decisive and where costs may far outweigh the benefits. Fiorina even 
goes so far as to describe turnout as ‘the paradox that ate rational choice theory’ (1990:334). 
Arguments by authors such as Green and Shapiro (1994) centre on the p value of the 
equation – in most elections the value of p will be incredibly small as extremely few 
elections are won or lost by one vote. This presents a problem for rational choice theories of 
turnout, as they do not account for the apparently irrational behaviour of continuing to vote 
even when the voter may be aware that the p value is very small. In relation to the themes of 
this thesis, the reason that individuals still turn out to vote at all in very safe constituencies 
must be considered; the turnout figures there are typically lower than in more marginal 
constituencies (see chapter four), but a significant proportion of voters continue to turn out. 
In an attempt to address this paradox, many modifications have been proposed such as 
Aldrich’s (1993) argument that turnout should not fall under the remit of rational choice 
theory at all as it is an activity that offers such low costs and benefits. This suggestion in 
itself is controversial, with Green and Shapiro (1994) questioning the validity of this 
argument, suggesting that Aldrich’s argument undermines the overall value of rational 
choice theories of voter behaviour. Besides setting apart such a major facet of rational choice 
theories, the authors question Aldrich’s reasoning behind presenting voting as a low cost and 
benefit activity, reasoning that African-Americans continued to vote through poll taxes 
during the Jim Crow era. 
An alternative counter to these criticisms of rational choice theory’s applicability to voter 
behaviour was Riker and Ordshook’s (1968) proposed incorporation of a D value into 
Downs’ original equation to represent the direct benefits of civic duty fulfilment derived 
from voting. In this modified equation, D represents an ‘expressive benefit’ (Brennan and 
Lomasky, 1993) of the voting decision in which an individual may vote because they feel it 
is their responsibility as a citizen or to demonstrate support for democracy. Despite these 
various efforts to counter criticisms of the failure of rational choice theory to explain voter 
turnout, Green and Shapiro (1994:48) remain unconvinced of what they term ‘post-hoc 
theorising, slippery predications, and an inability to formulate a cogent null hypothesis’. 
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They observe insufficient matching between data and theory; a spillover from Downs’ 
strategy of taking the ends and trying to find the most rational means to them. Instead 
authors try to examine ‘what must be true of the data in order for some rational choice model 
of voter turnout to be valid’ (Green and Shapiro 1994:50), making empirical facts fit theory 
by working backwards. They consider the incorporation of the D value insufficient to save 
rational choice theory as it still does not explain why turnout fluctuates.  
In regards to vote choice, a rational voter will vote for whichever party ‘he believes will 
provide him with more benefits than any other’ (Downs, 1957:36). A central element of this 
choice is the voter’s assessment of utility income. An individual must assess utility streams 
garnered from the existing administration’s policies and compare these with the perceived 
utility of another party being in power at that time. This relies on the voter being aware of 
utility streams, but this aspect of the theory present certain difficulties; firstly in the voter 
gaining an accurate knowledge of a hypothetical situation of the rival party being in power, 
and secondly, as Downs acknowledges, identifying benefits which may not immediately be 
recognisable as originating from the government (such as water quality). To form vote 
choice, the voter can only factor in utility stream derived benefits they are aware of by 
Election Day. Campaigns play a key role in informing the voter not only of the government’s 
performance, but also the potential utility stream from rival parties, thereby lowering the 
costs of making a voting decision. However, a basic failing of Downs’ model of voting 
behaviour is the vagueness regarding the precise definition and remit of costs to be included 
in the equation, with Olson (1965:164) describing his understanding of costs as ‘insignificant 
and imperceptible’. Other researchers have extended the definition of cost from the 
understandable (the time taken to travel to the polling station), to the absurd, with Goodin 
and Roberts (1975) distilling the cost of voting down to the very shoe leather used to walk 
into the polling station. 
Rational choice theories of voter behaviour, as Green and Shapiro (1994) suggest, have often 
remained difficult to apply to hard empirical evidence. There is, however, some application 
of the theory to empirical data in the UK, specifically in the studies of the impact of 
marginality upon turnout by Denver and Hands (1974, 1985) and Mughan (1986).  These 
researchers consistently found a relationship between how safe a constituency was and the 
proportion of the electorate voting, with marginal constituencies recording higher turnout 
than safer constituencies. Evidence has even been found at the national level, with Heath and 
Taylor (1999) discovering that national turnout was lower when the election result was a 
foregone conclusion. Arguably this is evidence of rational choice theories of voter 
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behaviour, with the probability of casting the decisive vote greater the more marginal the 
constituency. Despite this suggestion of voter rationality in the UK, the picture is a complex 
one; US authors such as Matsusaka (1993) deny the link and question the appropriateness of 
surmising individual voter intentions from the constituency level. In the UK context, Pattie 
and Johnston (1998a), after constructing models to test the relationship between marginality 
and turnout in the UK between 1959 and 1997, found no clear link, although initial 
correlations did suggest voter rationality. However the level of measurement would appear to 
play a key part in the explanatory power of rational choices theories of voter behaviour. 
Whereas articles such as Denver and Hands (1974, 1985) have examined the relationship 
between marginality and turnout from an aggregate level and found positive results, Pattie 
and Johnston (1998a) instead used individual-level data (sourced from the BES) and found 
no relationship. It would appear that there is some ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950) in the 
relationship; people react rationally to the local context collectively, but not individually. In 
an update of their earlier work, Pattie and Johnston (2005) addressed this apparent paradox, 
discovering that if individuals were divided into intentional and accidental abstainers, there 
was an observable relationship between marginality and turnout in the UK. The message is a 
little mixed in the case of the explanatory value of rational choice theories of voter 
behaviour; however, there is some evidence that marginality does indeed have an effect upon 
turnout in the UK. 
Of the three schools examined here, campaigns are of the most importance to voter 
behaviour under rational choice theory. Campaigns serve a vital role of providing 
information which not only mobilises but can play an active role in affecting vote choice. 
Campaigns inform the constituency population of the closeness of the election either by 
explicitly referring to it or implicitly through the quantity of campaigning. Such campaigning 
clarifies the p value to enter into the voting equation, and will boost turnout by indicating 
how likely a vote is to be the deciding one. The information provided also enters calculations 
of the cost and benefits associated with voting, with campaigning bringing the information 
directly to the voter and thereby reducing the associated costs of obtaining it. Campaigning is 
also important under this model in affecting the vote choice as a source of information 
through which voters can calculate their utility streams and consider which party offers them 





A theoretical approach to campaigning 
While it is possible to observe some evidence of the three main schools in contemporary UK 
voting behaviour, this thesis adopts an approach based on rational choice and sociological 
models. What is proposed is an acknowledgement that different people vote for different 
reasons, and no single theory offers a comprehensive explanation: while some people may 
vote according to their group memberships, others may vote according to the expected 
benefits received. By combining these two methods as much voter behaviour can be 
accounted for as possible, with evidence for the presence of both in the UK. 
There are two fundamental tensions between sociological and rational choice models of 
voter behaviour; the ability to account for change and the role of the individual. Rational 
choice theories can easily account for changes in voter behaviour, with the primary 
motivations behind voting being their own interests. In contrast, sociological theories 
represent an account of voter behaviour which is slow to change, with social groups (and 
therefore the voting behaviour of members) changing more slowly over time. There is also 
tension between the two theories in the role of the individual. In rational choice theories the 
individual is the originator of voter behaviour, voting for their own interests and preferences, 
seeking the best utility outcome. Sociological theories are in contrast based on the interests 
of groups, although individuals can play important roles within them, particularly in regards 
to opinion leaders. While there is some continued evidence of partisan identification 
influencing UK voter behaviour, albeit lessened, this school is not adopted in the approach of 
this thesis.  
Primarily the approach taken here is informed by rational choice theories of voter behaviour, 
being intrinsically linked with the key theme of marginality. This theory offers a convincing 
(and explicit) account of how marginality affects the way in which people vote; the more 
marginal the constituency, the higher the turnout is likely to be as the likelihood of casting 
the deciding vote is higher. Drawing links from theory to campaigning is simple; 
constituency populations are consumers of the political information which local campaigning 
provides, using this information to make decisions not only to vote but also how to vote. 
This ability for rational choice theories to account for both turnout and changes in vote share 
fits well with the two dimensions of local electoral outcomes adopted in this thesis. Elements 
of the sociological theory are also adopted, particularly as there is a continued (although 




Do local campaigns matter? 
Understanding the potential effects of campaigning on voter behaviour is vital. After all, the 
thesis hypothesis is founded on the assumption that campaigning is so important in affecting 
voter behaviour that its absence can in fact be harmful to turnout and vote share. The 
question of whether campaigns matter depends largely upon the definition of what it means 
to ‘matter’. Holbrook (1996:18) argues that campaigns are often concluded to be irrelevant 
because ‘too often it is assumed that for campaigns to be effective, they have to determine 
the election outcomes’. Instead campaigns can be effective in alternative ways; from the 
timing, to the level at which the campaign is examined. Timing matters when it comes to 
campaigns, with an election campaign being a limited period of activity during which 
political parties attempt to gain decision-making power. Formally, campaigning is a 
restricted period of time – for example, in the UK, the election campaign (Great Britain, 
2000) refers to the short campaign which is the period of time (most usually six or seven 
weeks) between the dissolution of Parliament by the Queen, requested by the incumbent 
Prime Minister, and the day of the Election. In practice many political parties may maintain 
almost constant campaigning, particularly in marginal constituencies, as indicated by Lord 
Ashcroft’s canvassing prior to the 2010 general election (Cutts et al., 2012) which lasted 
three years.  
Secondly, the level at which the campaign is studied also matters. Although national election 
campaigns are run focusing on the party leaders and national policies, it is campaigning at 
the local level that is the focus of this thesis. After all, a UK political party cannot win an 
election without winning constituencies, and in a First Past The Post electoral system such as 
the UK, the composition of the House of Commons produced by an election is not based 
upon national vote shares (unlike in proportional systems; see Lijphart, 1995) but on how 
many constituencies are won by each party. Constituencies are central in deciding the final 
election result, offering good grounds for concentrating on campaigning at the local level; 
this thesis takes this up by focusing on the harmful effects of a lack of such campaigning.  
 
Campaigns and information theory 
Information is key to an effective democracy (Lipsitz, 2004) and the role of campaigning in 
constituencies is to provide information to voters, enabling them to decide whether to vote 
and also how to vote (Bartels, 1993 and Popkin, 1994 among others). Drawing here on 
Holbrook’s (1996) impression driven model of voter information reception and Orbell’s 
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discussion of information theory (1970), campaigns are information providers, a theory 
which has its origins in rational choice theories of voting. By combining campaigning and 
information theory I follow the example of Nadeau et al. (2008: 242). Yet this thesis goes 
further by specifically reconciling local campaigning and information theory, as well as 
explicitly discussing the impact of voter behaviour theory models and how they might 
interact with information theory.   
The local campaign is a method of lowering the cost of voting by providing information 
about party candidates and the benefits their successful election would offer the rational 
voter. According to rational choice theory, a vote will be cast if the costs are outweighed by 
the benefits, supporting the party that offers the best utility outcome. Voters are informed of 
the positions of each party primarily via the information that campaigns provide on 
candidates, policies and the local context. The individual ‘casts his vote for the party he 
believes will provide him with more benefits than any other’ (Downs, 1957: 36) and it is the 
role of campaigning to act as a source of information through which the calculation of 
expected benefits and the party differential can be made. Such information is presented with 
the aim of affecting both the individual’s choice to vote and vote choice, reflecting the dual 
dimensions of electoral outcomes used in this thesis. As such, the local campaign not only 
enhances turnout by reducing the costs of voting, but also influences vote choice by 
presenting party positions and enabling a utility calculation to be performed.  
However, the origin of this theory in rational choice models of voting does not mean that 
understanding campaigns as sources of information should be limited to rational choice 
theories of voter behaviour. Rather the information that campaigns provide plays a different 
role for those members of the constituency population who vote according to their group 
memberships; in some cases vote choice may be altered, but in most cases the campaign 
offers information about the local context, encouraging turnout. In keeping with the 
resolution of two models of voter behaviour in this thesis, I mirror this by extending 
information theory from explaining how campaigns affect rational voters to consider the 
impact of campaigning on voters as perceived by the second model.  
Sociological theories of voting may incorporate the idea of campaigns as sources of 
information in two ways – firstly that campaigns offer information on the local context and 
candidates (John and Brannan, 2006) which mobilises social groups, and secondly that in 
some cases campaigns can alter vote choice. Berelson et al. (1954: 252) found that ‘the more 
exposure to the campaign in the mass media, the more interested voters become and the 
more strongly they come to feel about their candidate’:  a sign that campaigns act as sources 
39 
 
of information which raise voter interest. This may in turn raise participation, as if a voter 
feels strongly about their candidate, they are more likely to turn out and vote to show their 
support. The effects of campaign activity may be dispersed from an originator (a sender who 
has come into contact with campaign activity) through their social groups. Membership of 
such groups affects the voting behaviour of the individual and this occurs because the group 
enables social interaction and the formation of group cues.  
Conversion in sociological theories of voting is unlikely, as vote choice is ordained by the 
social strata to which an individual voter belongs and to change this is a time-consuming 
prospect. On Election Day in the UK, parties conduct last minute campaigning such as 
‘knocking up’ voters (telephoning or visiting to ensure they have voted) or delivering ‘Good 
Morning’ leaflets in order to ‘stiffen the resolve of the party’s voters’ (Johnston et al., 2012: 
1174) emphasising the mobilising aspect of local campaigns. That is not to say that 
conversion is impossible in sociological models of voting, just that it is not the norm: 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) found 9% of voters changed their positions during the 1940 
presidential campaign. A campaign can therefore both influence and potentially alter vote 
choice through the transmission of information via social groups.  
Information campaigns in action 
Campaigns generate large amounts of information, and for a voter to escape the campaign in 
its entirety – whether they watch the news, pick up the leaflet on the doormat or speak to 
canvassers – would be difficult
6
. Holbrook (1996:45) provides a clear example of the extent 
to which voters are exposed to the presidential campaign, with the American National 
Election Studies Cumulative Data File finding that between 1952 and 1992, ‘more than 97% 
of all voters report some exposure to the…campaign’. This is echoed by the studies of UK 
constituency campaigning using data from the British Electoral Study, such as Johnston et al. 
(2012: 1169) who found that during the 2010 election campaign, 27 percent of respondents 
were contacted by a single party, with 16 percent contacted by all three. 
Most local campaign activities can be classed as sources of information, from leaflets pushed 
through front doors, to posters in windows and canvassers (Norris et al., 1999). Yet one 
potential aspect of the local campaign has remained unstudied in the UK context; leader 
                                                          
6
 Although the quantity of information varies between seats according to marginality, with marginal 
seats likely to be bombarding voters with the most information. However, even in the very safest seats 
there would still be some exposure to local campaign information as will be seen in chapter four. 
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visits. These visits made by party leaders to constituencies bring both local and national 
publicity, and at the local level are likely to feature in local newspapers and news 
programmes. They draw attention to the local campaign and offer information on party 
policies and the local candidate that the leader is visiting. They can offer a variety of 
information to voters, depending on what the purpose of the visit is, from launching a new 
policy, to professing commitment to a key local business area: all offer information about 
where the party stands on key issues, particularly those relevant to the local community. 
Leaving aside what the messages of the parties during these visits are, the symbolism of the 
leader of the national party (a potential Prime Minster) choosing to visit a constituency 
construes a certain benefit to that party’s local candidate. As Carty and Eagles (2005) 
hypothesised in their examination of leader visits during the 2000 Canadian federal election, 
such visits bestow certain kudos on the local candidate, implying and informing the local 
population that they have the leader’s support. This in turn could enhance the party vote 
share for this party as an MP favoured by the party leader may be able to obtain more 
benefits for their constituency.  
A key justification for perceiving local campaigns as sources of information for voters comes 
from the variety of channels through which this information can be disseminated to voters 
and the constant evolution of new contacting methods. If campaigns did not matter as 
information sources, then it makes no sense why parties spend time and money on utilising 
these new technologies. Local campaigns are constantly adapting to the modern political 
environment, with the twentieth century witnessing the introduction of television and the 
expansion of mass media. Over the past decade, the popularity of social networking sites has 
exploded, and they have in many cases been adopted by political parties to provide 
information to voters, notably in the skilled use of social media in the election of Barack 
Obama as President of the United States in 2008. At the 2010 UK general election 
candidates for the three largest parties took advantage of these new platforms, with 42% 
having a Facebook page and 34% using Twitter (Wring and Ward, 2010: 813). While the 
technology is new, the point of the message is an old one; to disseminate information to the 
voter and make them aware of the potential benefits on offer.  
If all campaigns operate as providers of information to voters, then it does not naturally 
follow that local campaigns are effective by themselves. Perhaps the national election 
campaign has become the most important element in influencing voting decisions, at the 
expense of the local campaign. It is not only researchers (Butler and Rose, 1960, Rosenbaum, 
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1997) who have argued the precedence of the national campaign, but even some MPs who 
have argued that 
‘the local campaign is becoming an arcane irrelevance, a background 
noise which distracts from the decisive national campaign coming over 
the box. When canvassers call in the day they deposit rubbish in empty 
houses. At night they interrupt the election by dragging people from the 
TV to the door.’  
Austin Mitchell MP 1987 (quoted in Butler and Kavanagh 1988: 237) 
Some researchers argue that the general election is no longer a series of local campaigns - 
rather that is has become ‘an increasingly cohesive and homogenous countrywide contest 
between national political parties’ (Rosenbaum, 1997: 224), and controlled as such. In fact, 
‘reactions to the activities of leaders and parties at Westminster’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 
1997: 210) are likely to negate any effects of campaigns at constituency level, making them 
irrelevant. Constituency campaigns are now ‘anachronistic local rites… thought not to have 
any real bearing on results’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 211). In the case of the 1997 
election, Butler and Kavanagh (1997:312) concluded that the performance of Labour in 
constituencies which the party targeted were ‘very similar’ to other constituencies where 
Labour were fighting the Conservatives. The spread of modern technology has also 
eliminated many of the barriers between national and local campaigns. Over recent decades 
technological advances and increased access to this new technology has meant that the 
national campaign has been able to reach voters as it never could before. Also technology 
has made significant changes to party campaign strategy by enabling the use of instruments 
such as telephone canvassing, voter databases and text messaging voters (see Ballinger, 
2002). 
 
These conclusions regarding the irrelevance of the local campaign have often fallen into the 
trap of those criticising the theoretical models of voter behaviour; namely that there is a 
misunderstanding over what an effective campaign is. An effective local campaign does not 
imply, as Butler and Rose (1960) suggest, a direct effect upon the national result. Instead 
local campaigns affect local outcomes and this does not only means seat turnover, but also 
increasing vote share and turnout. In extreme cases local campaigning may indeed affect the 
national result if enough constituencies change hands. When considering the impact of 
technology in removing the barriers between local and national campaigns, instead of 
making local campaigns irrelevant extensions of the national campaign, local campaigns are 
42 
 
now better able to reach voters. Political parties and candidates have capitalised on the use of 
new media in contacting voters in the contemporary electoral environment and instead of 
being irrelevant, local campaigns have proved they are up to the challenge of the modern 
political environment. 
 
Levels of interest and information scores 
 
Voters are not equally receptive to the information offered by local campaigns; their level of 
interest in politics impacts the ability for campaigning to affect their behaviour. As Orbell 
(1970) suggests, all individuals build up a store of information on politics, and it is this store 
of information that restricts the effectiveness of campaign activity. Populations can be 
divided into three categories of political interest: low, mid-range and high, with campaign 
activity affecting all three categories in different ways. Those with a high interest in politics 
have firm ideas about whether they are going to vote, and if so, for whom. Any information 
they receive from campaign activity (whether by their preferred party or another) is very 
unlikely to alter their vote choice, as their existing opinions insulate them from such 
information (Converse, 1962). Their decision to vote in the first place can, however be 
affected by campaigning; for this group, a party’s campaign focuses on encouraging them to 
turn out and vote for their party. Those with a low interest store are least likely to vote, with 
any information provided to them by the campaign unlikely to encourage them to turn out to 
vote. However, unlike those with high levels of political interest, those with a lower level of 
interest are susceptible to information on which party to vote for provided as part of the 
campaign,  as long as the cues are ‘clear and unambiguous’ (Orbell, 1970: 334). Despite this, 
these low-interest voters tend to receive little information targeted at them during the 
campaign. 
The remaining mid-range group has comparatively low levels of political information with 
‘which to defend itself against the persuasiveness’ (Cox, 1969: 181) of campaign materials 
when contrasted with the high interest group, but comparatively higher levels of interest than 
the low level group, making them more susceptible to information provided by the 
campaign. As Cox suggests ‘defection will be influenced by any bias inherent 
in…information’ (Cox, 1969:163); and the information contained in campaign activity, 
whether it is a party leaflet or a poster in a window will be biased in favour of the party 
producing it. The large amounts of inherently biased information provided by campaign 
43 
 
activity both encourage the reinforcement of the behaviour of individuals in the mid-range 
who already favour a party (such as through group membership) and converting those who 
do not (rational choice voters). In an empirical application of levels of knowledge and the 
role of campaigning as an information provider, Nadeau et al. (2008) examined the 1997 
Canadian Election Study. By combining both general and campaign specific information 
levels and applying these to the survey, the authors were able to conclude in an empirical 
setting that levels of knowledge did have an impact on voters, particularly the mid-range 
interest group.  
 
During the campaign 
 
Elections are unpredictable; if they were not, then it would be possible to observe the final 
result throughout the campaign period. It is persuasive to suggest that campaigns do have an 
effect because campaign events cause fluctuations in the polls. These fluctuations are 
combined with an equilibrium level of support for a candidate in which ‘forces exogenous to 
the campaign...push (or pull) the level of candidate support to a certain ‘natural’ outcome’ 
(Holbrook, 1996: 48-9) – this is not a deterministic conception of voting behaviour, but 
rather that campaigns are capable of pulling voters away from their equilibrium, and if the 
campaign is effective enough, the equilibrium will be broken. Voters start the campaign with 
a certain impression of the candidates based on their existing political knowledge. The voters 
update their evaluations of the candidates as events unfold (Lodge, McGraw and Stroh, 
1989: 401) and new information is made available over the course of the campaign. If there 
is a great deal of negative publicity for one candidate, the voter’s perception of them will go 
down. This works with both the sociological and rational choice theories of voter behaviour, 
the former of which posits the impression of the candidate as based on group membership 
with the information provided by campaigning adding to it. In some cases the equilibrium 
can be broken and group memberships voted against.  
Impression driven accounts fail to sufficiently address the varying levels of political interest 
and knowledge individuals possess. A key assumption with these theories is that information 
is valuable to voters, whereas in reality, information is more valuable to some than others. In 
a safe seat, the campaign effort by all parties is likely to be minimal, so a low interest voter 
(as well as those in the mid-range) will not receive sufficient information to add to their 
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events tally, and therefore the equilibrium is very unlikely to change. Theoretically the 
equilibrium in a safe seat could be changed by providing knowledge to such voters.  
Information theory would therefore appear to be not only effective in explaining the impact 
of local campaigning on voter behaviour, but also in explaining the potential to affect voting 
decisions during the campaign. The information that a local campaign provides acts as a 
reduction of the costs of the voting decision for some voters and a mobilising force for those 
with group memberships. However, campaigning as a whole is not without controversy; one 
important argument against the importance of campaigning is the influence of electoral 
context on the local results, particularly the track record of the incumbent government. This 
argument originates from theories on retrospective voting developed by Key in The 
Responsible Electorate (1966) and Fiorina in Retrospective Voting in American national 
elections (1981). These works do not deny that campaigning does have important 
mobilisation and conversionary effects, but consider that  
‘other influences doubtless outweigh the campaign in the determination 
of the vote. As voters mark their ballots they may have in their minds 
impressions of the last television spectacular of the campaign, but more 
important, they have in their minds recollections of their experiences of 
the past four years’ (Key, 1966:9).  
 
Voters analyse their own policy preferences and how well the incumbent administration has 
fulfilled them, retrospectively linking partly back to rational choice theories of utility stream 
maximisation. This approach offers a rather deterministic view that in comparison to the 
electoral contest and the record of the government, campaigns can make little, if any, 
difference to the election result.   
Also linked with such individual-level evaluations of performance are theories of issue 
voting which link back to the early studies of voter behaviour; after all it was Lazarsfeld et 
al.’s (1944) original purpose to discover the impact of issues on vote choice and the 
subsequent contradictory findings which resulted in The People’s Choice. Even in the 1960s, 
Converse (1964) questioned the ability of voters to deal with issues and linking them to 
candidates. However, increasing evidence from the USA and UK from the late 1960s 





Nie et al. (1976) found clear evidence of volatility in the electorate and a tendency to vote on 
political issues which they attributed to the decline in partisan identification. Issue voting has 
also been observed in the UK, with Franklin (1985) linking partisan dealignment with issue 
voting by suggesting 
‘the decline in the class basis of voting choice amounts to a reduction in 
the strength of forces that previously inhibited volatility and self-
expression. That consequence has been to open the way to choice 
between parties based on issue preferences rather than class loyalty’ 
(Franklin, 1985: 176) 
A marginally stronger adaptation of this argument was offered by King (1998) who gave a 
rather damning indictment of the effectiveness of both national and local campaigning in the 
1997 UK General Election: 
 
The politicians, as they always do on these occasions, puffed, panted, 
and rushed about the country. They stretched every sinew and strained 
every nerve. They gave speeches, they gave interviews, they gave their 
all. No camera angle was neglected, no photo opportunity was missed. 
At times the politicians resembled those manic characters in the jerky, 
speeded-up film comedies of the 1920s. But nothing happened. The 
audience, for whose benefit all these entertainments were laid on, 
remained almost completely inert. Scarcely a cough or a sneeze could be 
heard from the pit. (King, 1998:179) 
 
He concluded that ‘despite the efforts of the parties, all the evidence suggests that the 
campaign was largely irrelevant’ (King, 1998:179); that voters had already made up their 
mind to oust the Conservative administration primarily due to their poor economic 
management. This had been embodied most clearly by Black Wednesday in September 1992 
and the withdrawal of the Pound from the Exchange Rate Mechanism. At the same time, the 
reinvigoration of the Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair meant that a Labour 
victory in 1997 was inevitable. Therefore all forms of campaigning were irrelevant: Labour 
would have won anyway. King was not alone – Bartle, Crewe and Gosschalk (1998:191) 




These conclusions are not without controversy and I do not believe that they pose a serious 
risk to the importance of local campaigning. Studies that suggest local campaigning does not 
matter are flawed; most campaigns have the ability to influence how and whether an 
individual votes, particularly when they fall into the mid-range level of political interest. 
Furthermore, such critical studies have often bolstered their arguments by suggesting that 
campaigning does not matter because of the timing of the voting decisions leading to the 
predictability of the result. By focusing either on aggregate factors or on Election Day 
decisions, they fail to sufficiently analyse or understand the factors behind this decision. 
Even if arguments regarding the importance of context held in 1997, it does not follow that 
this should be the case for all elections. 1997 was after all a critical election (Key, 1955; 
Norris and Evans, 1999) and may have been a special case where contextual factors did play 
a larger role than usual in determining the election result. It is also difficult to generalise 
from these conclusions as they are so specific to particular elections that it is impossible to 
conclude that context operates as the sole explanatory factor in determining election results. 
Secondly, there is consistent empirically tested evidence that local campaigns are effective, 
even at the 1997 election (see Whiteley and Seyd, 2003). Quite simply, to conclude that 




For a campaign to be effective it should impact either voter turnout or party vote share (or 
even both) through its role as a source of conversion and mobilisation. In terms of aggregate 
evidence, there is also a good amount of evidence from the USA that campaigning has an 
effect on vote share (see Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Patterson and Caldeira, 1984 for 
example). Perhaps the most notable are Jacobson’s series of studies (1978, 1980 etc.) on the 
relative effectiveness of campaign expenditure between incumbent and opposition 
candidates. There was clear evidence that spending, even when controlling for other factors, 
has ‘an independent effect’ (Jacobson, 1980:162) on the success of candidates, particularly 
opposition candidates whose spending was able to bridge the gap of voter familiarity. 
Evidence from the USA (Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Kramer, 1970; Crotty, 1971; and 
Frendreis, Gibson and Vertz, 1990) has demonstrated that campaigns both at the state and 
federal level are also significant in influencing turnout, although their results have been 
modest. Gerber and Green’s study (2000), which was party neutral and focused purely on 
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examining how various methods of campaigning affected turnout, provides good evidence 
that face-to-face campaigning is particularly effective in raising turnout.   
 
For much of the twentieth century, academic researchers, particularly in the UK (Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1988), dismissed local campaigning as ineffective and irrelevant. The earliest 
studies which attempted to test these assumptions and investigate whether campaigning is 
effective were highly localised case studies of campaigns, with Holt and Turner (1968) and 
Bochel and Denver (1971, 1972) being among the first. Holt and Turner’s focused study on 
the campaign experiences of Labour and the Conservatives in the marginal London 
constituency of Barons Court at both the 1964 and the 1966 general elections produced some 
early indications that campaigning was effective. They discovered that ‘organization was an 
important influence in the 1964 election in Baron's Court’ (Holt and Turner, 1968:298) 
particularly canvassing conducted by Labour.  Bochel and Denver went further in their study 
of a Labour campaign in a Dundee ward during the municipal elections of 1970, examining 
the impact of canvassing upon both turnout and vote share. They found, like Holt and 
Turner, that canvassing was effective in raising Labour vote share, but they also found that 
canvassing boosted turnout; with the two symptomatic of the other – turnout was increased 
by an increase in the numbers of Labour voters going to the polls. They conclude that ‘good 
organization and relevant activity can increase the turnout of identified supporters’ (Bochel 
and Denver, 1971:268), although they do concede that the scope for the impact of local 
campaigning is likely to be smaller at a general election.  
 
From these case studies of local campaigns in the UK, and also on the back of aggregate 
evidence from the USA, empirical evidence was produced that suggested campaigning (most 
often operationalised as canvassing) had been effective in raising vote share and also turnout. 
In the late 1980s, as a challenge to the Nuffield studies, a group of researchers began a series 
of aggregate investigations into campaign effectiveness which continue today. The authors 
(among others Whiteley and Seyd, 1994) argued that the evidence from the US in regards to 
campaign effectiveness was good grounds for a similar effect in the UK, particularly as the 
UK electoral system, with its short campaign period and relatively high levels of 
partisanship, suggested the potential of campaign effectiveness may be greater than in the 
USA. Three main groups of authors in this ‘new orthodoxy’ (Pattie and Johnston 2003b: 
382) emerged: Pattie and Johnston who examined campaign expenditure; Denver and Hands 
who examined campaign activity data from party agents; and Seyd and Whiteley who used 
campaign activity data from their studies of party members. As time has progressed and the 
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amounts of data have increased, longitudinal studies (of which this thesis is one) have also 
been possible. These studies have tested the effectiveness of campaigning in detail, relying 
not on correlations, but fully-specified and controlled models which in themselves have 
evolved over time. 
 
Such research has repeatedly found a strong link between campaign spending and the impact 
upon vote share, but this has not always applied to all parties. While Pattie and Johnston 
(2003b) found that Labour and the Liberal Democrats spent according to a rational pattern, 
with more marginal constituencies seeing higher spending, the Conservatives employed a 
less strategic approach to constituency campaigning prior to 2001. The party was limited in 
this ability to rationally apply electoral strategy due to the strong local parties in the party’s 
safer constituencies (this has been observed in other works, see Denver and Hands, 1997a). 
Drawing on the influence from Jacobson’s studies of campaign expenditure effectiveness in 
the USA, UK researchers (Johnston 1987; Johnston and Pattie, 1995; 1997) have 
consistently found that where a party spends more, they do better. For example, Johnston and 
Pattie’s 1995 study of the effectiveness of expenditure found that for every 1 percentage 
point increase in the legal maximum spent by Conservative candidates in 1987, Conservative 
vote share was boosted by .112 points. These UK studies have even given rise to the 
examination of the effectiveness of campaign expenditure in Canadian elections, with Carty 
and Eagles also finding a positive relationship (1999:82).  
There is also good evidence of campaign effectiveness from studies which examine 
campaign activity. Whiteley and Seyd have consistently found support for the effectiveness 
of constituency campaigning through their surveys of party members. In their (1994) study 
of campaigning at the 1987 election, local activism (measured through agent surveys) 
significantly and positively affected Labour vote share in 1987, even when including a 
particularly stringent control variable. Similarly, when contrasting the electoral effectiveness 
of the Liberal Democrat campaign of 1997 (Whiteley and Seyd 2003), they discovered that a 
combination of the member data and spending data meant that Liberal Democrat 
campaigning had a strong impact on the votes received – even bigger than their comparative 
models of Labour and the Conservatives.  
These researchers have also pulled out the relative impact of campaigning by other parties on 
each other’s vote share, with Pattie and Johnston (1995: 974) finding that the more a party 
campaigned, the better it did in constituencies at the expense of its rivals. Fieldhouse and 
Cutts (2008: 388) also find evidence for this in their observation that in 2005 ‘by far the most 
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effective campaign in damaging opponents proved to be the Conservative campaign’. 
Typically when constructing models to examine the effectiveness of multiple parties, 
researchers enter campaign measures for all parties into the same model so these effects can 
be controlled for.  
In contrast, the impact of campaigning upon turnout has been relatively neglected in the UK, 
which is largely symptomatic of the origin of the upswing in attention on constituency 
campaigning. The focus on vote share was partially a reaction to the dismissal of 
campaigning by the Nuffield studies as ‘having no real impact upon election results’ (Butler 
and Kavanagh, 1974:240), and to test whether this assumption was valid, researchers focused 
on party performance variables. This means that studies of turnout in the UK are not as 
numerous as studies of vote share, but those that have tested the relationship have largely 
found evidence that campaigning also impacts turnout. Fisher and Denver (2009) examined 
the effect of campaigning on turnout over the 1992 to 2005 period, dividing their campaign 
methods into two separate indices for traditional methods (posters, leaflets, doorstep 
canvassing) and modern (which includes telephone canvassing). The full differences of 
effectiveness between the two methods of campaigning will be examined in detail later in 
this section, but they discovered that from 1992 until 2001 ‘traditional methods of 
campaigning have a positive effect on turnout’ (Fisher and Denver, 2009: 208) even when 
controlling for previous turnout. In 1992 alone campaigning overall raised turnout by 2.9%.  
 
Despite this revival of interest in constituency campaigning, the subject area is continually 
evolving, with new campaign techniques being utilised by parties and the introduction of the 
internet.  Yet few studies have examined trends over multiple elections, with Fisher and 
Denver (2009), Pattie and Johnston (2009b) and Denver et al. (2004) being notable 
exceptions; this thesis, by covering six elections, extends the study to multiple elections and 
the potential of campaigning to affect local outcomes. There is also clear empirical evidence 
that campaigning has the ability to affect vote choice and voter turnout, yet comparatively 
few studies examine both dimensions in tandem, with the longitudinal studies mentioned 
above being notable exceptions. Building on this evidence, this thesis concentrates on the 
impact of a lack of campaigning on both dimensions across the period. The evidence 
presented above has given a sense of the impact that local campaigns can have on electoral 






Campaigning and incumbency 
 
The most notable examinations of the relative campaign effectiveness of incumbent and 
opposition on candidates are Jacobson’s studies on campaign expenditure in the USA 
(Jacobson ,1978; 1980; 1987; 2006).  His 1978 study discovered that incumbent candidates 
do worse in the polls the more they spend, whereas challenger (non-incumbent) spending is 
far more effective in altering vote share. This factor is attributed to voter familiarity of 
different candidates, with the incumbent beginning from a strong position; they are likely to 
be recognised by some voters and their positions on various policies would be available to 
the voters by reviewing their period in office. The campaign offers ‘relatively little 
additional impact’ (Jacobson, 1978:37) for incumbent candidates This is in contrast to the 
experience of non-incumbent candidates who start at a comparative disadvantage as not only 
they, but also their views, are not widely known. The campaign for them represents ‘the only 
means for grabbing the attention of voters’ (Jacobson, 1980: 146) and for publicising their 
views.  
Even when building upon these initial findings in a later study, which includes control 
variables alongside the incorporation of various elements of candidate familiarity, he still 
finds that expenditure by opposition candidates has a ‘large effect’ (Jacobson, 1987:49) on 
their vote share, in contrast to smaller gains by incumbents. Yet Jacobson’s findings have not 
been without controversy; Green and Krasno (1988) have in particular argued that his 
conclusions are incorrect as incumbents can use spending to defend themselves successfully. 
By examining spend per vote instead, Green and Krasno (1990) conclude that the reward of 
spending by incumbents is ‘both considerable and on par with the yield from challenger 
expenditure’ (Green and Krasno, 1990:363) which would appear to reject Jacobson’s 
argument. These studies have been conducted in the American context where attracting 
funding from private donors is central to many candidate campaigns (Alexander, 1991); this 
in itself may play a large role in how well they do at election time and engenders a 
discussion of how able incumbents and challengers are in attracting funding.  
The impact of incumbency upon campaigning in the UK has also been considered, despite 
the differing campaign spending contexts. Drawing on Jacobson’s ideas of incumbency 
creating voter familiarity (Norris, Vallance, and Lovenduski, 1992; Norton and Wood, 1990; 
Pattie, Fieldhouse, and Johnston, 1994), incumbent MPs can use the campaign to present 
their political positions and voting record to local voters. Johnston and Pattie’s findings 
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(1995; 2008) on the subject of incumbency and constituency spending do appear to support 
Jacobson’s conclusions in the UK context, finding not only that spending increases the 
incumbent’s vote share and diminishes that of their rivals, but also that challenger spending 
had a strong effect on that party’s vote share (Pattie, Johnston and Fieldhouse, 1995: 975). 
These studies provide persuasive evidence that the effectiveness of campaigning differs 
according to whether the candidate is the incumbent or the opponent, and to take this into 
account incumbency plays a central role in measuring campaigning in this thesis. Chapter 
five details the measure utilised to identify low level campaigning in the UK; this measure is 
based around activity quartiles as used by Denver, Hands and McAllister (2004). While their 
model gave candidates scores according to which quartile their campaign activity fell into, it 
was based on all candidate incumbencies. Yet this chapter has shown evidence that 
campaign effectiveness is altered according to whether the candidate is the incumbent, with 
challengers running more successful campaigns. This thesis builds on Denver et al.’s work 
by firstly identifying the incumbency of candidates before producing specific quartile 
measures for both incumbents and opponents.  
 
Campaigns and technology 
 
 
Various methods of campaigning vary in their effectiveness. As technology has advanced, 
new techniques have been introduced; from the more traditional methods of doorstep 
canvassing or leaflet distribution (Gerber and Green, 2000) to modern techniques such as 
telephone canvassing and the use of computers (Fisher and Denver, 2009). Recent 
examinations of constituency campaigning have been able to examine the evolution of such 
techniques (Pattie and Johnston, 2009b, Fisher and Denver, 2009) and have begun to 
compare their relative effectiveness. 
 
Gerber and Green (2000) conducted an experimental Get Out the Vote (GOTV) study into 
the comparative effectiveness of telephone and doorstep canvassing with campaign neutral 
messages. Their conclusions suggest that the face-to-face contact offered by doorstep 
canvassing was significantly more effective than more impersonal telephone calls and leaflet 
distribution. Drawing on information theory, if the purpose of campaigns is to provide 
information to the voters, then perhaps such face-to-face contact is important for an 
individual to retain information. The study concluded (Gerber and Green, 2000:611) that for 
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every $8 spent canvassing on the doorstep, one more voter will turn out, yet it would cost 
$40 to produce the same effect with leaflets. Although the authors were uncertain why 
doorstep canvassing should be more effective, human contact and social interaction may 
make information more memorable. Leaflets may not be personal enough, and the cost of 
processing the information it contains is fairly high. After all, the individual has to 
consciously pick it up, read it and understand the information that it contains. However, with 
canvassing, if the individual answers the door the canvasser provides them with information 
and they are able to ask questions or for clarification. Whilst they can shut the door in the 
canvasser’s face, just as they can put the leaflet in the bin, the transmission of information at 
the door appears to be far more immediate. An out-of-state phone bank decreased turnout in 
by 1%: perhaps the individuals did not like being encouraged to vote by someone not from 
the local area, or the timing of the calls was not best placed to make contact. The telephone 
also removes the personal impact of face to face contact, so while information may be being 
transmitted, the processing of the information by the individual is less effective.  
 
These conclusions have been reinforced by UK studies into relative campaign technique 
effectiveness by studies at both the aggregate (Fisher and Denver, 2009) and individual 
(Pattie and Johnston, 2003a) level. Whereas doorstep canvassing is often seen as an effective 
way of influencing party vote share and turnout, telephone canvassing has so far yielded 
‘little measurable effect’ (Pattie and Johnston, 2003a: 322), with the authors suggesting that 
it is too intrusive and reminiscent of cold-calling. Fisher and Denver’s 2009 study into 
modern and traditional modes of campaigning between 1992 and 2005 conclude that 
‘modern campaign techniques seem to be regularly less effective than traditional ones’ 
(Fisher and Denver, 2009: 207) and only appeared to have an impact for Labour, echoing the 
earlier findings of Pattie and Johnston. Their conclusions are not consistent across the 
parties; for the Conservatives, traditional methods were significantly related to vote share 
only at the 1997 election and modern methods were insignificant for all years. In contrast, 
Labour’s traditional techniques were significant in three of the four elections under study, 
whereas modern campaign techniques were significantly related to Labour vote share in 
1992 and 1997 (but the effects of modern campaign techniques were greater). The Liberal 
Democrats saw a significant relationship between traditional methods at every election, but 
no such relationship for modern techniques.  
 
These repeated findings of the relative ineffectiveness of telephone canvassing compared to 
doorstep canvassing suggest that the impersonal nature of modern techniques might be the 
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root of the problem. This is despite a trend towards a decline in the scale of direct campaign 
activity in recent years due to the technologisation of campaigning, and the use of mass 
media superseding personal contact. Such technologisation has coincided with a general 
trend towards lower turnout, and Gerber and Green (2000:661) suggest that ‘falling rates of 
turnout reflect a decline in face to face contact’, in that personal contact during campaigning 
encourages individuals to vote.  Some even more recent studies (Baxter and Marcella, 2012) 
examine the use of social media, although pinning down the precise effectiveness of such 
techniques is difficult, particularly when the focus of interest is at the local level. In the lead 
up to the 2010 general election, there was much discussion that Twitter would play a key 
role in the campaign (Channel 4 News, 2010), particularly after the successful use of the 
medium during Barack Obama’s 2008 US presidential election bid. Yet this did not prove to 
be the case; if anything it proved to be the television election (Wring and Ward, 2010; Dale, 
2010) due to the focus of the media on the leader debates. 
 
There is clear evidence from both the UK and further afield that campaigns can be effective 
in increasing both vote share and turnout. Not all campaigns are equal however. The 
incumbency of a candidate plays a key role in affecting how much impact a campaign can 
make upon party vote shares, with incumbents having less of an effect than challengers. 
Technology may also affect the impact a campaign can have, although at present there is 
insufficient evidence for definite conclusions to be made.  
 
The importance of marginality 
 
The concept of constituency marginality is central to this thesis, which argues that low level 
campaigns run in safe constituencies are detrimental to electoral outcomes. But what does 
marginality mean? The name itself is perhaps a little misleading, implying a focus on what it 
is to be marginal, but in it refers to the entire spectrum of constituency safety; from the safest 
to the most marginal. The primary alternative of constituency/electoral security (Dropp and 
Peskowitz, 2012) is little better, indicating a focus on safety.  
For a concept which has entered into popular usage, not only by political parties but 
academic researchers and the media, marginality is not often explicitly examined. There has 
been only one extended study into the definition in the UK by Cornford and Dorling (1997). 
Curtice and Steed drew some parallels between changes in the ‘economic geography’ 
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(Curtice and Steed, 1986:216) affecting electoral geography (particularly between urban and 
rural locations) which in turn increased the number of safe constituencies between 1955 and 
1983. Identifying the origins of constituency marginality have also tended to be implicit and 
extended from the theoretical models of voter behaviour discussed previously in this chapter. 
Safe Labour and Conservative seats often have higher levels of working class and middle 
class voters respectively, but there needs to be a clear examination to establish whether this 
relationship between class and constituency marginality is causal or mere coincidence. In 
chapter four, this thesis engages with this idea in some detail. 
 
The meaning of marginality 
 
As Jacobson makes clear in his study of marginality in the USA, measures of marginality are 
‘estimates of vulnerability’ (1987:129) measuring not only marginal seats, but safer ones as 
well. The conventional definition of constituency marginality used in the UK (Lightbown 
and Mellows-Facer, 2009) is based on two key concepts; vote proximity and seat turnover. 
In terms of the proximity of the top two parties in a constituency at the start of an election 
campaign, where these parties have a vote difference of 9.99 percent or below the seat is 
classified as marginal, whereas those where the parties have a distance of 10 percent or 
above are safe (Curtice and Steed, 1986 – although their definition is based primarily on 
two-party constituencies). The time-frame of this proximity also matters, with a constituency 
being described as marginal or safe based on the previous election results (even during an 
election campaign) which can be actual or notional in the case of boundary changes 
(Rallings and Thrasher, 1995; 2007). This simple differentiation between safe and marginal 
can also be disaggregated to measure different degrees of marginality. As used by Norris 
(2009a; 2009b), marginal constituencies can be either ultra-marginal (a previous majority of 
0.1-4.99 percent) or very marginal (5-9.99 percent), while safe constituencies are divided 
into three categories; fairly safe (10-14.99 percent), very safe (15-19.99) and ultra-safe (20 
percent and above). Both definitions are used in this thesis, with the simple safe/marginal 
definition offering easy identification, with the disaggregated version also allowing 
comparison of the relative experiences between safe constituencies. 
The primary characteristic of marginality originates from the closeness of the top two 
parties; when they are close the constituency is marginal and when they are far apart it is 
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safe. The secondary element of the marginality definition is that of seat turnover. Marginality 
is, as Jacobson (1987) describes above, evidence of vulnerability, and the focus on vote 
proximity would appear to reinforce this. But what is it that constituencies are vulnerable to? 
The answer is seat turnover.  A fundamental element of the FPTP electoral system used in 
the UK is the ability to form strong government (Birch, 1972), with the so-called winner’s 
bonus advantaging the largest party by building strong majorities. Under this system, the 
party or parties seeking to form a Government should have the majority of MPs; although it 
is possible to govern in minority, but this relies on the other parties in Parliament not 
forming a majority coalition. As the system has single-member constituencies, they also 
need to hold the majority of constituencies. Arguably, with parties seeking to win the most 
seats, seat turnover is the driving force behind change in FPTP systems. Some authors such 
as Curtice and Steed (1986) have argued that the two are closely linked, with the number of 
safe UK constituencies between 1955 and 1983 rising while the numbers of seats changing 
hands declined. Norris and Crewe build on this argument, concluding that ‘marginality is 
only one, albeit an important, contributor to potential seat turnover’ (1994: 204) alongside 
other elements such as change in swing and incumbency.  
 
There has been limited engagement with the numeric value of the definition of marginality 
used in the UK.  The cut-off point between safe and marginal constituencies has been 
described as an arbitrary one, as Jacobson argues in the US context (1987:126). Cornford 
and Dorling (1997:74) have provided the only concerted effort to test the appropriateness of 
the use of this cut-off in the UK, accusing it of being a measure ‘wholly arbitrary in terms of 
actual performance’. To put the measure of marginality to the test, the authors use the 
electoral triangles method (Upton, 1976; 1994). They base their categorisation of marginality 
solely upon the ‘historical precedent’ (Cornford and Dorling, 1997:78) of seat turnover in a 
constituency. This illustrates the value placed on turnover as a key component of defining 
marginality in their article, which is follows Curtice and Steed’s (1986) perception of 
marginality. A contestable seat is defined as one that ‘one which occupies a position in the 
triangle with a...probability of changing hands at a subsequent election which is 0.1 or 
greater (a one in ten or better chance)’ (Cornford and Dorling, 1997:79), and this definition 
works well for them, with only 1 percent of those constituencies changing hands falling 
outside this limit. There are weaknesses with this narrow focus upon seat turnover, 
particularly as it does not take into account competition within seats or additional factors 
within constituencies (such as those envisaged by Norris and Crewe (1994). This definition 
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also fails to take into account atypical election results, yet I would argue that a major flaw in 
their research is the causality of the relationship. 
No matter what classification is employed, the marginality of a constituency is based upon 
the results from the last election. Where boundaries have changed, notional vote shares are 
used to produce new hypothetical assessments of what the previous election results would 
have been. Yet Cornford and Dorling, perhaps due to their heavy reliance on seat turnover, 
base their measure of probabilistic marginality on election results between 1955 and 1987. 
Such a reliance on results does not acknowledge boundary changes or the marginality of 
constituencies during election campaigns. It is difficult to see how their historic precedence 
of turnover can be relied upon when the constituency may have changed considerably over 
the 32 year period of their study. 
Nevertheless, their examination offers interesting results that the arbitrary ten per cent 
differentiation between safe and marginal constituencies is an effective measure of 
constituencies changing hands. When comparing the results of their study, the areas 
indicating the arbitrary definition matched well with the probabilistic marginal 
constituencies (those identified in the study as most likely to change hands) mapped over 
them.  Although the correlation between the two measures is not perfect (which is impossible 
– there will always be anomalous constituencies), the two measures match reasonably well, 
particularly for constituencies that are either Conservative/Labour or Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat. This representation of an attempt to produce an alternate definition of marginality 
has actually resulted in validation of the conventional measure.  
 
The impact of marginality on local campaigning 
 
Marginal constituencies have increasingly become the focus of recent UK elections, with it 
being common to publicise marginal constituencies to target well in advance of forthcoming 
elections (Wintour, 2013). It is the implications of this increasing diversion of resources 
towards marginal constituencies from safe constituencies that forms the problem addressed 
by this thesis. Of course this is the most rational distribution of resources (Johnston and 
Pattie, 2003b) for the parties (targeting those constituencies they are most likely to win), but 
no researcher in the UK has examined the problem from the alternative perspective presented 
here. If the results are indeed that neglecting safe constituencies negatively impacts both 
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local turnout and party vote share, the rationality of the resources distribution itself may be 
questioned
7
.   
The ‘ruthless emphasis’ (Butler and Rose, 1960: 135) of parties on marginal constituencies is 
not entirely new; some evidence can be found from the 1950s onwards, although this did not 
mean this tactic was successful in affecting the local outcome (Butler and Kavanagh, 
1984:212). Alongside the changes in technology and the value that political parties put on 
local campaigning (Denver, Hands and Henig, 1998) was the rise in interest in constituency 
campaigning by academic researchers. Some early articles contrasted differing campaign 
experiences between marginal and safe constituencies. While Johnston and Pattie (1995) link 
higher levels of spending with marginal constituencies, in the first examination of their 
campaign activity data, Denver and Hands (1992) established that campaigning (amount of 
leaflets delivered, canvassing, posters and polling day activities) was most likely to be 
intense in marginal constituencies. This finding comes despite their use of an unconventional 
differentiation between safe and marginal constituencies (15 percent) which appears not to 
have caught on. 
Since the 1997 general election there has been an increasing concentration of the attention 
both academics and political parties pay to marginal constituencies at the expense of safe 
constituencies, which was a result of the success of targeting such constituencies at the 
election. The Labour Party, in order to secure victory after 18 years in opposition, naturally 
needed to gain the maximum number of seats possible. These were mostly Conservative 
constituencies as Labour and the Liberal Democrats had privately agreed (Rawnsley, 2001) 
to run tactical campaigns in many (predominantly marginal) constituencies; Liberal 
Democrat voters whose local candidate stood no chance of winning were urged instead to 
vote for the local Labour candidate (Evans, Curtice and Norris, 1998). This was part of a 
complex electoral strategy mounted which took advantage of all available technology (down 
to candidates being given pagers to keep abreast of political developments). The campaign 
involved: 
                                                          
7
 This is not to say that campaign levels are the only type of activity that marginality can impact. 
There is also evidence that marginality can have an impact in other areas as well as levels of 
campaigning, with the impact of marginality on the voting record of incumbents (known as the 
marginality hypothesis) being explored in the USA (Cohen and Brunk 1983). Under this hypothesis 
which has been supported by empirical investigations, incumbent politicians whose seats are marginal 
are more likely to be closely attuned to voter interests and the concerns of their constituents. 
58 
 
‘the ruthless targeting of resources upon 91 pre-selected target seats. All other 
seats—dubbed ‘majority seats’—were expected to run high profile but low-
cost and low-resource campaigns. Party members in the majority seats were 
strongly encouraged to help the campaigns in nearby target seats.’  (Hands and 
Denver, 2004: 710) 
This was extremely successful, resulting in the subsequent concentration of resources on 
marginal constituencies in elections thereafter. In practice this meant that these seats 
constantly receive ‘vastly disproportionate attention’ (Denver and Hands, 1992: 541), at the 
expense of safe seats that have been left ‘almost completely …alone’ (Ballinger, 2002: 212). 
Contemporary research, focusing on the experiences of marginal constituencies illustrates 
the increased redirection of resources towards such seats, with clear evidence associating all 
forms of campaigning (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008: 379) with marginal constituencies. These 
targeted operations are often effective (Denver, Hands and Henig, 1998), with clear support 
for the increased flow of resources away from safe constituencies by Pattie and Johnston 
(2010:487) who perceive the prioritising of marginal constituencies over ’dead loss or very 
safe seats’ as an efficient use of resources. Parties also use different campaign techniques in 
constituencies, and as Fisher and Denver (2009) explain, a key factor in deciding where the 
more modern methods are to be utilised is the constituency’s marginality. All three parties 
were most likely to use modern campaign techniques in marginal constituencies.  
Marginal constituencies increasingly receive the attention of political parties and academic 
researchers; yet in doing so researchers have failed to address the full picture of constituency 
campaigning in the UK. Although there are cursory references to safe seats (sometimes 
referred to as ‘not held, not targets’), there has been little engagement with why some 
constituencies are safe, but also what effect neglecting such constituencies may have on local 
outcomes. As an exception, Denver, Hands and McAllister (2004) do examine the relative 
effectiveness of levels of campaign activity in elections between 1992 and 2001. The study 
explores relative effectiveness of campaigning upon both turnout and vote share according to 
the quartile in which the campaigning measure falls. The higher the quartile, the more 
effective campaigning is in raising both turnout and vote share; most interesting in the 
context of this thesis are the results for those campaigns which fall into the first quartile (the 
lowest); a clear decline in both turnout and vote share, offering initial support for our 
hypothesis. Yet they do not factor in candidate incumbency, which as seen above is 
important in determining the effectiveness of campaigning. I develop their original idea in 
chapter five by proposing a quartile-based model of campaign levels which includes not only 
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indications of incumbency, but also values specific to each of the three parties under 
investigation.  
Conclusion 
The theoretical literature on the key themes of marginality, campaigning and vote behaviour 
have been presented here, with the rest of this thesis adopting a largely rational choice 
approach to vote behaviour, although elements of sociological models have been included. 
This is due to the dualistic nature of local electoral outcomes used here, exploring the 
potential for campaigning to both mobilise and convert voters; neither theory offers a 
complete explanation of both aspects. Campaigning matters when observing such outcomes 
because it acts as a source of information through which parties can inform voters of their 
policies. The chapter has built to develop the conclusions of the theoretical literature 
explored above to consider the theoretical origins of this thesis and formation of the 
associated hypotheses.  To investigate the overall thesis hypothesis that low level campaigns 
in safe constituencies have a detrimental impact on local electoral outcomes, disaggregating 
this into three stages is necessary. 
The first stage is to explore marginality as a concept. This thesis draws out the importance of 
sociological explanations for the origins of constituency marginality by testing the first sub-
hypothesis constituency marginality originates in the local population. There has been little 
engagement with the origins of marginality, but there are two key elements of the concept of 
marginality explored in this chapter: vote proximity and seat turnover. Safe constituencies 
have a greater distance in vote share between the two parties, and are less likely to change 
hands than marginal constituencies. It may be that there are some constituency 
characteristics that make them safe or not, and chapter four explores whether social group 
memberships are the foundation of constituency marginality. Nested within this first sub 
hypothesis are two hypotheses exploring i) role of party support and ii) role of population 
stability. Firstly, constituency marginality originates from the presence of party support 
bases, which draws on durability of social group membership. There are strong links 
between bases of party support and group memberships in the UK, particularly in regards to 
class membership and associated class voting. Yet the variation in constituency marginality 
also recognises that not all constituencies will have strong group memberships like this; in 
some there may be more voters who vote according to rational choice theory. The second of 
these nested hypotheses regarding the origins of marginality is constituency marginality 
originates from the stability of the local populations. As with the previous nested hypothesis 
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on party support bases, this hypothesis once again links sociological models of voter 
behaviour to marginality.  The concept of marginality is concerned with seat turnover; the 
safer a constituency gets, the less likely it is to change hands. Therefore there is a link 
between change and marginality, and this can be developed by exploring stability. This has 
its roots in sociological models of voter behaviour, with group memberships providing 
durable bases of party for population. Stable populations, represented by group 
memberships, are therefore linked to safer constituencies. Yet sociological theories do not 
explain change well; arguably therefore such theories offer a better explanation for safe 
constituencies than for marginal seats.  
The second sub hypothesis of the overall hypothesis is constituency marginality affects the 
level of campaigning in a constituency, with safer constituencies seeing less campaigning. 
Within this are nested four sets of hypotheses examining the contrasting links between 
marginality, campaign spending and campaign activities, as well as introducing 
examinations of the relationship between marginality and campaigning according to party 
and incumbency. Existing literature has demonstrated a clear link between marginality and 
campaigning, and going back to the theoretical approach to voter behaviour, this link can be 
interpreted as depending largely upon the nature of marginality itself. Marginality relies on 
vote proximity and the likelihood of seat change, a factor enhanced by the simple majorities 
required by the FPTP electoral system. In marginal constituencies the value of p is larger 
than in safe constituencies; which clearly links marginality and local electoral outcomes. 
Campaigning is used in this thesis as an important intervening variable which reflects the p 
value of the constituency. As the p value rises in a constituency, so does the proximity and 
urgency for the political parties to concentrate on the seat.  
One of the nested hypotheses within the sub hypothesis linking marginality and levels of 
campaigning is that the impact of marginality on campaigning varies across parties. A party 
which campaigns nationwide must target resources, so habitually in recent elections parties 
have targeted marginal constituencies. This means that voters in safe constituencies are 
receiving less information about their local candidate and are therefore less able to make an 
informed decision. The Liberal Democrats who have the most limited resources of the three 
parties studied in this thesis have historically targeted heavily. I expect that the Liberal 
Democrats, as the smallest of the three parties studied, have to target marginal constituencies 
the most and so the information from the party to voters will vary significantly. This is likely 




The final stage of the overall thesis hypothesis, expressed by the third sub-hypothesis is the 
level of campaigning has an impact on local electoral outcomes. Following the example of 
Johnston and Pattie (1995), campaigning has been clearly linked here with information 
theory. The nested hypotheses within this sub-hypothesis compare the impact of low levels 
of campaigning on turnout, vote share and then compare the two. The voting decision under 
rational choice theories of voter behaviour is based on costs and benefits, yet, the benefits 
associated with voting in safe constituencies vary; they can be low as the chance of casting 
the crucial vote is much lower, but they can also be high, as the incumbent candidate who 
they will already have the most information on is likely to win. In more marginal 
constituencies, the costs of processing multiple sources of information on different parties is 
high, but the likelihood of casting the crucial vote and getting your preferred party into 
power means that the benefits of voting are also high. Turnout is likely to be higher in 
marginal constituencies because the chance of casting the decisive vote is far greater in 
constituencies with small majorities and thereby increasing the benefits received. I explore 
whether low levels of campaigning have a detrimental impact on turnout; an outcome likely 
because the chance for the individual voter of casting the decisive vote is significantly 
reduced, thereby reducing the benefits of voting. When the top two parties in a constituency 
run low level campaigns, turnout will be depressed not only as the costs of obtaining 
information are raised considerably, but also because the lack of information does not 
mobilise those who vote according to their social groups.  
Low levels of campaigning have a detrimental impact on party vote share because there is 
less information in regards to party policies and candidate positions. With opposition 
candidates more likely to run low level campaigns in safe constituencies, the costs of finding 
information about their polices to enter into the party differential calculation are increased. 
Conversely, costs associated with voting in safe constituencies may be lower for precisely 
the same reason; low level campaigns offer less information for the voter to process, so the 
decision on how to vote is simplified. This is in contrast to marginal constituencies, where 
both costs and benefits are high. Voters in these constituencies where campaigning is intense 
will have a greater amount of information on party positions to enter into their utility 
calculations. 
This overall hypothesis leads to two more specific hypotheses relating to the effect of 
incumbency and parties. The first is opposition candidates in safe constituencies are more 
likely to run detrimental low level campaigns. Under rational choice theories of voter 
behaviour, to make the voting decision, the voter looks back at the incumbent’s track record 
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in power and considers what the opposition candidate would have offered had they been in 
power over the same period. This enables them to calculate the party differential; estimating 
which candidate provides them with the greatest utility. However, opposition candidates are 
more likely to run low level campaigns than incumbent candidates; I believe that this 
severely impacts the ability for the voter to calculate what benefits they might have received 
from the opposition candidate by limiting the information available to them and increasing 
the costs of obtaining such information.  
 
The next chapter presents the methodology used to explore the hypotheses gathered from the 
theoretical framework above. It points to a new way forward in examining local 
campaigning by understanding the majority of constituencies in the UK. Constituency 
campaigning is effective in those constituencies where it is intense, but what about those 
constituencies where it is not? The following chapter operationalises the thesis hypothesis, 








Intense campaigns in marginal seats have a largely positive impact on local turnout and 
party vote shares (see for example Denver et al., 2002; Johnston et al., 2013; Whiteley and 
Seyd, 2003 among others). Yet the literature has failed to examine the potentially 
detrimental impact such a redirection of resources might have on local electoral outcomes 
(party vote share and turnout) in those constituencies which are increasingly overlooked by 
parties: safe constituencies. This thesis fills this gap by focusing instead on safe 
constituencies and examines whether low level campaigns in safe constituencies are 
detrimental to local electoral outcomes. To answer this hypothesis, it is broken down into 
three sub hypotheses within which are a series of nested hypotheses. These address nuances 
of the relationship including the role of incumbency, party and the origins of marginality. 
This focus on the electoral experiences of safe constituencies does not mean that the thesis 
argues that the study of marginal constituencies should be abandoned; rather it actually 
supports existing research into constituency campaign effectiveness by proposing that the 
relative absence of campaigning can be harmful.  
 
This chapter constructs a detailed methodological framework through which the overall 
hypothesis can be tested. It identifies, defines and measures the key variables associated with 
the hypothesis; namely marginality, campaign intensity and electoral outcomes. The origins 
and framing of the hypothesis are clearly explained, and a series of associated sub-
hypotheses to be answered in later chapters are set out. This study draws on positivist 
research notions, offering a scientific approach to the testing of the hypothesis which will be 
undertaken as a large scale quantitative study. It considers not only the limitations that have 
had to be imposed upon the study (namely time frames, geographical regions and parties) but 
also the data collection techniques that have been used. A clear framework of the analysis to 
be undertaken in this thesis will close the chapter 
 
Thesis hypothesis and research questions 
 
Marginality is the independent variable of this thesis and the dependent variable is local 
electoral outcomes, operationalised in two dimensions as vote share and turnout. 
Campaigning acts as an intervening variable in the relationship between the independent and 
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dependent variables by providing information to voters. The level of such information 
largely depends upon constituency marginality, with voters in safe constituencies receiving 
low levels of information. Campaigning affects local outcomes by influencing the level of 
information that is available to the voter, which enables decisions to be made regarding party 
positions, lowering the costs associated with voting. 
 
The thesis hypotheses give rise to three sub-hypotheses (summarised in Box 3.1) breaking 
down the stages of the overall hypothesis: the origins of marginality, the links between levels 
of campaigning and marginality, and the impact of low level campaigns on electoral 
outcomes. Within these are nested a series of more nuanced hypotheses focusing on more 
specific elements of the research, introducing the new campaign measure of leader visits and 
considering their potential to make an impact on local results. They draw the focus from the 
general relationship to more specific examples. King, Keohane and Verba (1994:15) argued 
that hypotheses should serve two purposes: to answer a question important in the real world 
and also to make ‘a specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature’. My 
hypotheses fit both of these requirements because I am examining constituency 
campaigning, which is not a one-off phenomenon and can affect not only the outcome in a 
constituency (involving questions of voter representation and MP accountability). Also, the 
research is being conducted in an established field. Party resources are redirected to marginal 
constituencies at the expense of safer seats, with intense constituency campaigns effective in 
boosting both vote share and turnout; yet there has been no research on the impact this 
redirection has on safer constituencies. In drawing on existing literature and reinterpreting 
the key arguments, this thesis will make a clear contribution to the literature, leading to a 
piece of work that complements others in the area. 
Box 3.1 details the nested hypotheses to be answered in this thesis. Following the example of 
positivist research each of these ‘intellectual puzzles’ (Mason, 1996) are clearly causal in 











Box 3.1: Sub-hypotheses 
 
Sub-hypotheses 
1) Constituency marginality originates in the local population 
Safe constituencies have a higher proportion of traditional party support bases than marginal 
constituencies 
Safe constituencies have more stable populations than marginal constituencies 
2) Constituency marginality affects the level of campaigning in a constituency, with safer 
constituencies seeing less campaigning 
The safer the constituency the less is spent during a campaign and the less campaign activities are 
conducted. 
The impact of marginality on campaigning varies across parties and incumbency 
                Opposition parties campaign less in safe constituencies than in marginal constituencies 
                Incumbent parties campaign less in safe constituencies than in marginal constituencies 
                Opposition candidates in safe constituencies campaign less than incumbent candidates in 
safe constituencies 
Opposition leaders are more offensive in their pattern of visits 
Opposition leaders are more likely to visit marginal constituencies  
3) The level of campaigning has an impact on local electoral outcomes 
Low levels of campaigning have a detrimental impact on turnout 
Low level campaigns run by opposition parties have a greater negative impact on turnout 
than those run by incumbents. 
When a constituency is visited by a party leader, there is a positive impact on turnout 
There is a greater positive impact on turnout when an opposition leader visits than when the 
incumbent party leader visits. 
Low levels of campaigning have a detrimental impact on party vote share 
Low level campaigns run by opposition parties have a greater negative impact on party vote 
share than those run by incumbents. 
When a constituency is visited by a party leader, there is a positive impact on that party’s 
vote share 
When a constituency is visited by an opposition party leader, there is a greater positive 
impact on party vote share than when the incumbent party leader visits. 




They incorporate relational aspects by comparing the impact of low level campaigns 
between parties and candidate incumbencies and offer a clearly deductive approach to the 
analysis. The sub-hypotheses also incorporate important sub-literatures in the field of 
constituency campaigning (particularly in regards to incumbency) and the examination of 
original data on leader visits for the first time in the UK makes a clear contribution to 
literature on constituency campaigns. 
 
Constituency marginality originates in the local population 
 
 
The first of the sub-hypotheses constituency marginality originates in the local population 
examines the nature and origins of the independent variable used in the thesis hypothesis. As 
explored in the last chapter, constituency marginality is relatively unstudied, with a lack of 
explicit literature identifying why some constituencies are marginal and others are safe. This 
sub-hypothesis attempts to explain the origins of marginality by rooting the concept in the 
constituency population, drawing on theories of party support and population stability to 
explore whether common demographic profiles can be established. Within this are nested 
hypotheses which will be tested in chapter four. The first of these examines whether safe 
constituencies have a higher proportion of traditional party support bases than marginal 
constituencies. Existing literature has drawn links between particular social groups and 
support for particular parties; in the UK context class remains an important explanatory 
variable for Conservative and Labour support, despite dealignment over recent decades, and 
is usually operationalised through occupational classifications. This first nested hypothesis 
explores the links between levels of class-based party support bases and constituency 
marginality. There is relatively little research linking the two concepts, but what research 
there is (Denver, Hands and McAllister, 2003) indicates a link, but only at a single election. 
By studying this hypothesis, this thesis adds to existing literature by establishing the relation 
between party support bases and marginality over multiple elections, and also by exploring 
the role of class in contemporary UK politics.   
 
 The second nested hypothesis explores whether safe constituencies have more stable 
populations than marginal constituencies. Marginality is closely related to seat turnover, 
which is an expression of change; it is plausible to suggest that the driver of change in 
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constituencies is population changes. To measure population stability the thesis draws upon 
Putnam’s (1966) identifications of social stability; signs that investment in the constituency 
has been made through home ownership. Such sections of the population are less likely to 
move from the constituency, encouraging stability in the demographics and therefore 
encouraging larger majorities. 
 
 
Constituency marginality affects the level of campaigning in a constituency, 
with safer constituencies seeing less campaigning 
 
The second stage of the thesis hypothesis engages with the campaigning experiences of safe 
constituencies, bringing together two key concepts of this thesis: marginality and 
campaigning. The sub-hypothesis constituency marginality affects the level of campaigning 
in a constituency, with safer constituencies seeing less campaigning draws on existing 
evidence from existing literature that has demonstrated that parties target their resources 
towards marginal constituencies. In this hypothesis, a clear association is also established 
between safe constituencies and low levels of campaigning. It is possible that parties are 
indeed increasing their campaigning in marginal constituencies, but the hypothesis clearly 
establishes whether at the same time safe constituencies are being comparatively neglected. 
Within this second sub-hypothesis are nested a series of associated hypotheses which bring 
in a range of considerations from existing literature, all of which are investigated in chapter 
five. Firstly existing literature is divided in the measurement of campaigning, whether using 
measures of campaign activity or campaign spending. There is a nested hypothesis for each 
of these measures, which consider whether safe constituencies experience lower levels of 
spending and canvassing during election campaigns. 
 
Two nuances of the relationship between marginality and campaigning are investigated by 
exploring the differences introduced by parties and incumbencies. By examining whether the 
impact of marginality on campaigning varies across parties findings from existing literature 
are incorporated which clearly show that some parties are more effective in their local 
campaigning than others. Before 2001, the Conservatives ran the least effective local 
campaigns (Pattie and Johnston, 2003b), whereas in subsequent elections they have 
displayed increasingly rational and effective campaign strategies. The two other parties 
strategically targeted their resources and therefore reaped electoral rewards far earlier than 
the Conservatives, with Labour’s landslide victory in 1997 demonstrating the success of 
68 
 
strategic targeting under Operation Victory (Wring, 2001). Despite losing the 2010 general 
election, Labour’s local campaign was still proved to be effective (Fisher, Cutts and 
Fieldhouse, 2011). The Liberal Democrats have strategically targeted constituencies 
throughout the period (Rennard, 2011), largely due to their limited resources in comparison 
to the two larger parties. Such evidence all indicates that the effectiveness of intense 
campaigns does vary according to the different parties; it is entirely plausible that such 
differences between the parties may be observed when studying low level campaigns.  
Another sub-field of the literature on campaigning is drawn on by considering the hypothesis 
that the impact of marginality on campaigning varies across incumbencies. Jacobson’s 
(1978) study into the effectiveness of campaign expenditure proved a link between intense 
spending and an improvement in candidate vote share. However, spending by opposition 
candidates was found to be considerably more effective than that by incumbent candidates. 
This has been reflected in the UK (Norton and Wood, 1990; Wood and Norton, 1992) with 
additional indications that incumbency boosts vote share irrespective of the level of 
campaigning. By examining incumbency and low level campaigns, this thesis considers 
whether low level campaigning is more harmful when run by incumbents or opposition. 
Nested within this hypothesis are two others which contrast the impact of campaigning 
according to incumbency. The first argues that both incumbent and opposition candidates 
campaign less in safe constituencies as the priorities of parties are different to those in 
marginal constituencies. The next nested hypothesis considers how incumbency impacts on 
campaigning levels within safe constituencies by exploring whether opposition candidates in 
safe constituencies campaign less than incumbent candidates in safe constituencies. Whereas 
the distance to power for an opposition party in a marginal constituency is relatively small, it 
is much larger the safer the constituency, making it more likely that opposition candidates 
will campaign less than incumbents. 
The final three nested hypotheses in the relationship between marginality and campaigning 
explore the impact of incumbency on leader visits, a case study of which is made in chapter 
eight.  Here, incumbency is discussed in terms of national incumbency, and the hypotheses 
not only contrast whether opposition leaders are more active than governing leaders, but 
also whether opposition leaders are more offensive in their pattern of visits and if opposition 





The level of campaigning has an impact on local electoral outcomes 
The last of the three sub-hypotheses addresses the second stage of the thesis hypothesis by 
considering whether the level of campaigning has an impact on local electoral outcomes. It 
establishes whether campaigning levels play a central role in affecting behaviour by 
considering what occurs in constituencies where campaigning (and the information it 
provides) is minimal. It also addresses a gap in the existing literature by explicitly 
considering the harmful potential effects that a lack of campaigning may have. 
 
The first set of sub-hypotheses examines whether low levels of campaigning have a 
detrimental impact on turnout. In comparison to studies on the potential of constituency 
campaigns to affect vote share, there have been fewer studies examining the impact of 
campaigning on turnout (Denver, Hands and MacAllister, 2004); nevertheless, such studies 
do link rises in turnout with intense campaigns. As with the previous question, this thesis 
extends the conventional findings by exploring whether the impact of low level campaigns 
may be detrimental to turnout levels. Incumbency is once again central to the nested 
hypotheses, which contrast whether low level campaigns run by opposition parties have a 
greater negative impact on turnout than those run by incumbents. There are also two nested 
hypotheses for leader visits which consider whether they have a positive impact on turnout, 
and whether when a constituency is visited by an opposition party leader, there is a greater 
positive impact on turnout than when the incumbent party leader visits. 
 
The second set of nested hypothesis within this final stage explore whether low levels of 
campaigning have a detrimental impact on party vote share. If intense local campaigns in 
marginal constituencies boost vote share, then it is possible that low levels of campaigning 
may reduce vote share.  Nested within this sub-hypothesis are three others that explore how 
incumbency affects the relationship between campaigning and vote share. By examining 
whether low level campaigns run by opposition parties have a greater negative impact on 
party vote share than those run by incumbents, the relative impact of low level campaigns 
between the two types of candidate can be contrasted. The second and third nested 
hypotheses also deal with the impact of leader visits on party vote share. Evidence indicates 
that when a constituency is visited by a party leader, there is a positive impact on that 
party’s vote share; this thesis tests this directly. The third brings in incumbency by 





Local electoral outcomes 
 
The overall thesis hypothesis takes marginality as the independent variable and explores its 
impact on local electoral outcomes (the dependent variable) via the intervening variable of 
campaign levels. As the dependent variable in this thesis, local electoral outcomes have been 
operationalised in two dimensions: vote share and turnout. Therefore, when detrimental 
effects are referred to, what this study explores is whether a lack of campaigning leads to a 
decline in vote share and turnout in the constituency. These two dimensions have been 
chosen to reflect the dualistic mobilisation and conversion potential of campaigning under 
the rational choice/sociological approach proposed in the previous chapter. As vote share and 
turnout are two dimensions of the same dependent variable, they have been measured in a 
very similar way. To measure vote share, I will use election results at the constituency level 
for each election during the period, with vote share measured as the percentage of the total 
vote in that constituency gained by a party.  Where there have been changes in constituency 
boundaries, notional data on previous vote share in the constituency will be used. Turnout is 
operationalised in a similar manner; as the percentage of registered voters who voted in the 





As a reaction to the increasing attention parties, researchers and the media pay to marginal 
constituencies, this thesis places the identification of safe constituencies at the heart of its 
analysis, with marginality as the independent variable of the overall hypothesis. To do this I 
have taken cues from other authors (Lightbown and Mellows-Facer, 2009) by using the 
conventional division between marginal and safe constituencies. This measure is based on 
the vote proximity of the top two parties in a constituency (Norris and Crewe, 1994); the 
closer the parties are, the more marginal the constituency and vice versa. Closely connected 
to this definition and the concept of marginality is seat turnover (Curtice and Steed, 1986), 
with marginal constituencies seen as more likely to change hands. The division between 
marginal and safe constituencies falls at 9.99 percentage points; seats with a vote proximity 
below this are marginal, and seats above are safe, with Cornford and Dorling’s research 
(1997) confirming the validity of the construct.  This simple dual definition can also be 
disaggregated into a conventional five category classification of constituency marginality, 
again dividing safe and marginal constituencies according to the 9.99 percentage point vote 
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proximity, which enables researchers to identify a spectrum of constituencies from ultra-safe 
(majority of 4.99 or below) in 5 percentage point increments to ultra-safe seats (majorities of 
20 percentage points and above). This more detailed measure facilitates comparisons to be 
made between different types of safe constituency. 
 
Campaign Intensity  
 
Campaigning acts as an important intervening variable between marginality and local 
electoral outcomes; measuring campaigning is therefore vital in the identification of levels of 
campaigning. There are two measures of campaign intensity in use by existing researchers: 
campaign expenditure (Johnston and Pattie, 1997; 2008) and campaign activity (using data 
from party members and party agents: Denver et al., 2002; Whiteley, Seyd and Billinghurst, 
2006). This thesis makes use of both measures and also supplements them with an additional 
measure of leader visits. 
 
One of the chief measures of campaigning has been the examination of campaign spending 
data. Studies using campaign expenditure to measure the effects of campaigning on both 
votes and turnout first originated in the 1970s in the USA, where reforms of campaign 
finance had created reliable data for examination. Campaign expenditure has been used as a 
proxy for campaigning in a variety of studies examining a range of contests from state 
legislature races (Welch, 1981) to congressional elections (Jacobson, 1978; 1980). Palda 
(1973; 1975) also used campaign spending to measure advertising and its effectiveness in 
Canadian elections. The first study in the UK was Taylor’s (1972) examination of 
campaigning spending and votes at the 1970 election, and the research grew with Denver 
and Hands (1974; 1985) examining the impact of campaign spending on turnout. However, 
Johnston (1979) was the first to engage in detail with campaign expenditure, and subsequent 
research has indicated ‘the more spent – almost all of it on “advertising” the party and its 
candidate – the better the return’ (Johnston and Pattie 2008:129). Yet this measure has not 
been without controversy. 
A key issue in the use of campaign spending as an operationalisation of campaigning is 
validity. In response to an article by Johnston (1979) linking advertising and campaign 
expenditure, Gordon and Whiteley (1980:293) countered that ‘anyone who has been directly 
involved in electioneering knows that expenditures incurred and expenditures declared are 
only weakly related, and the latter is almost completely unrelated to the campaign effort’. 
These are two different points, and it is worth considering them in turn. Firstly, they raise 
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the objection that the spending figures incurred and actually reported are ‘only weakly 
related’ and that this conclusion is based on personal experiences both as a prospective 
parliamentary candidate and an election agent. This raises a few important issues. In relying 
on inaccurate spending figures to measure campaigning, then it follows that any conclusions 
drawn in regards to the effectiveness of campaign spending are invalid. Johnston, however, 
raises issue with this on the basis that ‘presumably, election agents are filing false returns’ 
(Johnston, 1979:113) which is not only dishonest, but illegal. In a later article Pattie and 
Johnston do partially admit reservations over this issue by concluding that ‘many party 
organizations probably manage their expenditure so that more is spent than reported;’ (Pattie 
and Johnston, 1998c: 678). Yet they present the case that even if figures are slightly 
manipulated by parties in order to conform to legal restrictions, ‘the pattern of reported 
spending is consistent with expectations derived from rational choice theory’ (Pattie and 
Johnston, 1998c: 678). As such, even though reported figures may not definitively represent 
exactly what has been spent, the spending distributions do appear to fit in with theoretical 
underpinnings so any false reporting would appear to have a minor effect upon spending 
distributions. 
The second point of Gordon and Whiteley’s statement is their declaration that campaign 
effort and declared spending figures are ‘completely unrelated’. This, if it was entirely true, 
might cause it to be considered whether campaign spending represents a valid measure of 
campaign effort. However, Pattie and Johnston defend their use of campaign expenditure 
data whilst acknowledging that they are ‘not a perfect measure’ (Pattie and Johnston, 2003b: 
386) and cannot capture all activities of a constituency campaign. Evidence from other 
studies (see in particular Gerber and Green, 2000) has indicated that canvassing is effective 
in not only mobilising the vote, but also in affecting vote choice, yet it costs comparatively 
little. In the UK constituency campaigns are run ‘almost entirely’ (Gordon and Whiteley, 
1980:293) by party volunteers who are not paid for their time and therefore would not show 
up on the recorded campaign spending figures, despite potentially making a difference to the 
final vote. The costs associated with activities such as canvassing are more likely to be time 
costs for volunteer workers, rather than formal expenditure to be recorded on the final 
balance sheet. Campaign spending as a proxy for campaigning can only provide a partial 
picture of the local campaign, with costs largely going on leaflets and posters (Denver, 
Hands and McAllister, 2004:291). Therefore, a constituency party could canvass heavily 
with the potential of making a significant difference to the local vote, yet this campaign 
effort would not be accounted for by the campaign expenditure figures. As such, campaign 
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expenditure figures may only represent a rough picture of the effort that was put into the 
campaign.  
Pattie and Johnston (1998c) counter such criticisms by offering two key explanations; the 
validity of the campaign spending measure is very much dependent upon what is being 
measured and also that evidence supports the usefulness of campaign expenditure as a proxy 
for local campaigning. In regards to the first point, Johnston (1979) was analysing the 
effectiveness of advertising which is predominantly comprised of printing costs (traceable 
expenditure). Therefore, as he was measuring campaign activity that was directly represented 
on the balance sheet, campaign expenditure was an appropriate measure to use. Indeed in 
their 1998 work, Pattie and Johnston (1998c: 678) found that in excess of 80 per cent of 
constituency expenditure is spent on printing leaflets and posters. Secondly, there is a good 
amount of supporting evidence that campaign spending is an effective operationalisation of 
campaign intensity. The development of alternative aggregate data sources on constituency 
campaigning (from agent and member surveys) has enabled researchers to examine the 
appropriateness of campaign expenditure as a proxy for campaigning. Good levels of 
correlation between campaign expenditure and data from the party agent surveys (measuring 
at least seven dimensions of a local campaign, including data not captured by campaign 
expenditure such as the number of campaign workers) have been found by existing studies 
(namely Pattie, Whiteley, Johnston and Seyd, 1994; Denver and Hands, 1997; Fieldhouse 
and Cutts, 2008). This indicates that at some level campaign expenditure is the ‘best 
indicator of the underlying latent construct, campaign effort’ (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 
2008:381), providing a good justification for examining spending.  
Considering the alternative data sources, the major benefit of operationalising campaigning 
through campaign expenditure is the comprehensiveness that the UK data provide. The data 
are required by law (since 2000 by the Electoral Commission) for all candidates in all 
constituencies and the Electoral Commission publishes the full results. Despite reservations 
over the usage of campaign spending to operationalise campaign effort, Denver, Hands and 
McAllister admit that the comprehensiveness of the data is advantageous (Denver et al., 
2004:291). As such, campaign spending figures represent not only an easily accessible 
source of data, but in comparison to alternative data sources, it is the only one which 
provides data for all constituencies. This thesis uses campaign expenditure as its primary 
measure of campaigning, specifically examining the percentage of the legal maximum spent 
by each of the three parties in a constituency. 
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The second group of authors operationalising campaign intensity in the UK are those who 
use measures of campaign activity derived from surveys of party members and party agents. 
Seyd and Whiteley use measures of campaign activity originating from their surveys of party 
members in their studies of constituency campaign effectiveness in the UK. During the 
1990s they conducted a series of surveys of party members of the three main parties in the 
UK to form detailed accounts of the member’s characteristics, activism levels and 
participation (for the Conservatives see Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson, 1994; for Labour 
see Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; 2002; for the Liberal Democrats see Whiteley, Seyd and 
Billingshurst, 2006). For each survey, the researchers contacted party headquarters and asked 
them to distribute the surveys to a random sample of party members. A range of questions 
was asked on different aspects of the campaign to capture an accurate account of local 
campaigning. The results from the surveys were then combined via Principal Components 
Analysis into an index of campaign intensity which could be entered into regression models 
as the independent variable. 
Denver and Hands are the principal researchers in using data collected from surveys of party 
election agents (see Denver and Hands, 1997a), but often work with other researchers, 
(Fisher and Denver, 2009). They sent postal questionnaires to election agents in each 
constituency immediately after each election from 1992 onwards which contained a range of 
questions regarding the organisation and activities of the campaign: the first survey formed 
the basis for Modern Constituency Electioneering (1997b). Like Seyd and Whiteley they 
asked a range of questions regarding the election campaign, but focused slightly differently 
on the overall organisation of the campaign, such as an estimate of the average number of 
polling day workers and the number of leaflets distributed.  
When relying on any survey response there are likely to be questions regarding recall and 
self-reporting by respondents. It is important to consider what implications these may have 
for the use of both agent and member data. Seyd and Whiteley have not always collected 
data immediately post-election; there are some considerable gaps between elections and the 
member surveys (in the case of the Liberal Democrat sample, almost two years: Whiteley 
and Seyd, 2003: 322) which raises issues in regards to respondent recall. It is possible that 
this affects the validity of the data, with party members be unable to accurately remember 
their involvement in the campaign (particularly in those questions regarding the frequency of 
campaign activism) nearly two years after the events.  It may also mean that the results of the 
election may influence their recollections; if their party won they may overstate their role in 
the campaign (Whiteley and Seyd, 1998) and vice versa. The validity of Denver and Hands’ 
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data also rely on ‘respondents remembering the details and being honest, for example, and to 
concentrate mainly on activities during the ‘short’ campaign’ (Denver et al., 2001: 82) plus 
the fact that these campaign activities would have occurred a number of weeks previously. 
As (presumably) these agents had no prior knowledge that they were to be surveyed on such 
activities, it is unlikely that they would have given the recording of such activities much 
thought, making recalling them more difficult. Similarly, even if respondents had good 
powers of recall, the difficulty of providing an estimate on ‘the numbers of election posters 
given out’ (Denver and Hands, 1992: 536) at a later date with any degree of accuracy may be 
difficult. It is also a considered possibility that agents may be being wilfully untruthful. They 
may feel that they did not do as much campaigning as was expected or distribute enough 
literature, which may lead to them reporting false figures. As is inevitably the case with 
surveys, the validity of the answers lies with the honesty of the respondents, but Denver and 
Hands take this into account, and whilst admitting that some inaccuracy is inevitable, believe 
that their measure still represents the activities of a local campaign. 
Seyd and Whiteley defend their concentration on local party members as they consider them 
to play the important role of ‘mobilising the vote’  (Whiteley and Seyd 2003:320) through a 
wide range of formal and informal campaign activities such as delivering campaign 
literature, and as such can provide a good idea of the intensity of the campaign. The most 
appealing aspect of the data is that it ‘has the advantage of focusing on what at least some of 
the potential foot-soldiers in campaigns actually do on the ground’ (Denver et al., 2004:291). 
The data produced by Denver and Hands’ surveys of party agents are ‘based on what 
actually happens on the ground in a constituency campaign – rather than surrogates’ (Denver 
et al., 2001:82) such as campaign spending. One of the key strengths of Denver and Hands’ 
use of party agent surveys is that they are surveying ‘the people who organise and direct 
constituency campaigns’ Denver et al 2001:82) whereas Seyd and Whiteley are asking only 
some party members. Arguably, as those in charge of the campaign, party agents would be 
more able to give a rounded picture of it, in comparison to party members who would very 
likely only be able to give a partial account of the overall campaign. As the secondary 
measure of campaigning, this thesis uses data produced by Denver and Hands at elections 








This thesis proposes the inclusion of an additional variable to measure local campaigning: 
leader visits. UK party leaders spend a great deal of time and resources travelling the country 
and visiting constituencies (Denver and Hands, 1992) during election campaigns, with such 
visits typically being well-publicised in both local and national media. Recent research in 
Canada (Carty and Eagles 2005) and the USA (Holbrook 2002) has empirically investigated 
these visits to explore whether they have an impact on local election results, finding that they 
are often effective in raising party vote share
8
. Yet there has been no substantive study into 
leader visits in the UK; a gap filled by original data collected by the present author during 
the 2010 election campaign, measuring which constituencies were visited by party leaders, 
on what date and for what purpose.  I was also able to measure whether a constituency had 
been visited multiple times either by the same leader or by more than one. These data were 
collected initially through identifying visits on the rolling news coverage on the BBC 
website and supplementing this by other news reports. Constituencies were identified by 
allocating postcodes to the location through web research, and entering them into the BBC’s 
Constituency Finder (BBC 2010b).  
This operationalisation of constituency campaigning represents a valid new source, in terms 
of data collection and confirmation from external sources. The account of visits collected in 
this project were cross-referenced with those by the media (the Guardian were running a 
similar, less detailed project – see Torpey and Sax, 2010) and the parties themselves, to 
confirm that the data were accurate (my records were found to be the most comprehensive 
data held). There is also a good degree of external validity, linking back to the core 
principles of the positivist approach adopted for this thesis, with the data collection being 
simple to replicate at future elections.  
The measure of campaign intensity utilised in this thesis draws on a range of the sources 
presented above. The primary measure of campaigning will be campaign expenditure, as 
data are available for all constituencies at all elections during the period. Where available, 
these data will be supplemented by selected additional measures from Denver and Hands’ 
agent surveys (the selected variables and the grounds for choosing them will be explored in 
                                                          
8
 They were effective for three of the five parties contesting the 2000 Canadian election, and 
effective for Truman in 1948 
77 
 
chapter five). Data on leader visits offer the potential to be incorporated alongside existing 
measures of local campaigning, but as a new source of data in the UK an initial case study 
will be made in chapter eight.  
 




This thesis adopts a foundationalist ontological approach, which argues that there is a world 
‘independent of our knowledge’ (Furlong and Marsh, 2002:18) and there are fundamental 
differences of existence within it that create the bases of society. In addressing the thesis 
hypothesis and associated sub-hypotheses set out above, this work adopts a positivist 
epistemology, utilising quantitative data to pursue a scientific approach. The key features of 
positivist research are clear causality, validity of conclusions and wide data coverage 
enabling a large-scale statistical study to take place. As a positivist study, there is a clear 
causal hypothesis, and it is empirically tested in the rest of this thesis with quantitative 
methods to gather ‘information, knowledge and understanding’ (Black, 1999:3) from direct 
data observation. Such quantitative studies offer easy inference due to the ‘abstract…nature 
of statistical models’ (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994:6); this study uses causal inference in 
both stages of the hypothesis by not only examining the effect of marginality on levels of 
campaigning, but also examining the impact of such campaigning on local electoral 
outcomes. A key feature of the quantitative approach is replicability; by using data which 
are largely widely available and detailing the collection methods used when gathering 
original data on leader visits, this thesis is replicable at future elections.   
 
Drawing heavily on the influence of the natural sciences, quantitative studies are usually 
deductive in that hypotheses originate from theory. The previous chapter explored theories 
regarding voter behaviour and the potential of campaigns as information providers, which 
formed the hypothesis. In a deductive study, as in this thesis, this is then tested, before the 
conclusions feed back into theory (inductivism) by providing knowledge. Reality is viewed 
objectively and knowledge is only confirmed by evidence that the senses provide 
(phenomenalism). Positivist hypotheses offer clear definitions of causality, clearly set out by 
Davis (1985) and Little (1991), which have been adhered to in this study. In the hypothesis 
laid out above, there is a clear causality between the effect of marginality and the level of 
campaigning, as well as another between levels of campaigning and local electoral 
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outcomes. In each stage of the two-step hypothesis the direction of the relationship is clear, 
yet it could be argued that there is an issue with causality. Constituency marginality is based 
upon the proximity of the top two parties at the last election (n-1); the closer they are, the 
more marginal the constituency and the greater the effect on campaign levels at the current 
election (n). This campaigning in turn affects local electoral outcomes (one dimension of 
which is vote share) at n which forms the marginality of the constituency at the next election 
(n+1). The cyclical nature of such causality would seem to complicate the simple causality 
envisaged by positivism, yet here each election between 1987 and 2010 is treated in relative 
isolation, considering the impact of marginality (n-1) on campaign levels, and their effect on 
vote share at that election only (n). It is also impossible for it to be a constant cycle, as there 
have been considerable boundary changes over the period, meaning that the vote share from 
an election does not always create the constituency marginality for the following election. 
However, the hypothesis does not assume empirical support and remains falsifiable by 
keeping this uncertainty in view. Even if the hypothesis remains unproven after analysis, 
conclusions may be drawn in regards to its failure. 
 
A key element of positivist approaches to research is the idea that the researcher approaches 
data without values. In comparison to more qualitative approaches (such as interviews) a 
positivist approach means that it is possible for a researcher to objectively treat data in the 
scientific manner and there is little risk of transferring your own values onto the results. This 
is not uncontroversial, with proponents of qualitative research (Quine, 1961) arguing that the 
idea of researcher neutrality is a myth. The researcher, no matter what kind of data they are 
working with will bring their own values and be constantly interpreting knowledge through 
them, and the idea of total value-abstraction (as suggested by Durkheim, 1938) is 
impossible. Yet it is possible in some cases to significantly abstract ones values from the 
research, particularly when the data themselves are value-free. In this thesis, all data 
originate from the aggregate level and there are limited subjective answers (the exceptions 
being the self-reporting by party agents for the elections between 1992 and 2001). There are 
of course inherent inescapable values in all researchers, but in this case the validity of the 
conclusions will be unaffected.  
 
Quantitative research strategies are not without criticism; particularly in regards to the 
application of a scientific approach to the social environment. By using a strategy akin to the 
natural sciences, according to some researchers (see Blumer, 1956), the quantitative 
researcher fails to appreciate the difference between the ‘world of nature’ (Schutz 1963:232) 
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and society with its many nuances and fluidity. I argue that a quantitative research strategy is 
the most suitable way of approaching the hypothesis of this thesis for four main reasons; data 
availability, replicability, convention and validity. The volume of aggregate data available 
permits quantitative analysis to be undertaken, with a large amount of data available for each 
constituency at each election: it seems logical to use available resources.  
A key justification in pursuing a quantitative study to test the hypothesis is the creation of a 
measure of levels of campaigning. This thesis argues that there are lower levels of campaign 
activity in safe constituencies and that this lack of activity is potentially harmful to election 
results in those constituencies. In order to create a measure of campaign levels, a wide range 
of data are required to allow the classification of ‘low levels’ to be positioned in the 
appropriate place. Following the example of Denver et al. (2004) this measure is based on 
quartiles of campaign effort
 
(a more detailed description will be given in chapter five), with 
campaigns in the first quartile classified as low level. To provide an accurate figure for the 
quartile divisions it is vital that as wide a range of data as possible are used. 
Another central element of such research is the replicability of the study, and the current 
study is easily replicable by using quantitative data. The research will also be generalisable 
to other elections in the identification of trends in the data (Hempel, 1960). Also, the 
majority of modern existing research in the field of constituency campaigning in the United 
Kingdom has been based upon large-scale quantitative data analysis in the positivist 
tradition. This is not to say that all of the research follows this pattern - in the earlier days of 
research into constituency campaigning, qualitative data on case study constituencies was 
used, most memorably by Bochel and Denver (1971) in their experimental study on 
canvassing and turnout in Dundee. Sanders (2002:56) offers up a study by Seyd and 
Whiteley, one of the main groups of researchers in the field (although strictly Sanders is 
referring to a study of party activism, not their studies of campaigning, but the same 
epistemological approach is employed) as an example of the ‘strengths of good behavioural 
analysis’. 
 
Quantitative data are the best option for answering the hypotheses due to the desire for both 
external and internal validity. Not only is most of the comparable research in the area based 
on quantitative data, it is also far easier to generalise and replicate conclusions drawn from 
quantitative analysis. The hypotheses also possess a good level of internal validity as they 
are consistent with other theories tested by people working in the same area – for example, 
existing research suggests that intense campaigning is effective in altering constituency 
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outcomes. Confirming the positivist approach taken in this thesis, the hypotheses also 
generate testable predictions with clear causality between campaigning and constituency 
outcomes. The conclusions drawn shall be based on large-scale empirical analyses with clear 
replicability, generating a good degree of external hypothesis validity. This replicability was 
enhanced by retesting to ensure that the results were correct and reliable. To fail to be 
replicable would raise ‘serious questions’ (Bryman, 2008:77) in regards to the validity of the 
conclusions drawn, particularly due to the potential intrusion of values, no matter how hard 
objectivity is desired. 
 
 




This is a study of low level campaigns in safe constituencies and their effect in UK general 
elections. It uses the UK as a case study within which the impact of low level campaigns in 
FPTP electoral systems can be examined. Specifically, I examine constituency level 
campaigns in the UK over the period 1987 to 2010 (the reasons behind this timeframe are 
explained in the next section). Case study research has a long history in the social sciences
9
, 
yet fundamental elements of the method remain contested by many researchers, particularly 
over the type of research the method should be applied to. Typically a case study has been 
seen as a qualitative examination of a research problem undertaken with an inductive 
purpose and the generation of theory. Some authors view the strategy as even more 
restrictive, limiting it to narrow fields such as ethnography (Fetterman, 1989). Whereas some 
authors (Yin, 1984; Blaikie, 2000) have a rather strict definition of a case study as 
organisationally or temporally bounded, others such as Mitchell (1983) offer a more relaxed 
definition equating to wherever the researcher decides to define boundaries. Much case study 
research has been characterised by a poor engagement with the concept, particularly (as 
suggested by Yin, 1994:2) in regards to the research design. Yet the case study method is 
easily applicable to quantitative research when providing clearly defined boundaries within 
which research may take place.  
 
                                                          
9
 In politics some of the seminal works in voter behaviour have been case studies (Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). 
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In avoiding the poor engagement with research design as criticised by Yin (1984:8), this 
study largely conforms to his three conditions for case studies; the type of research questions 
asked, the control the researcher is able to exert and the contemporary nature of the study. 
The hypotheses of this thesis, particularly those nested within the three sub-hypotheses, fit 
well with employing the UK as a case, enabling the researcher to make focused statements 
and engage with the concepts involved. ‘How’ and ‘why’ questions are most typically 
associated with case study research, and although the hypotheses of this thesis are not framed 
with such phrases, their motivations are the same. Both how and why questions, and the 
hypotheses examined here are explanatory; seeking to make sense of a research problem, in 
this case exploring the impact of low level campaigning on electoral outcomes. In the present 
case study of local campaigning in the UK, as envisaged by Yin, there is no ability to have 
control over behaviour in the case; patterns and trends in the data are simply being 
examined. However, there are key issues with the restrictive way in which Yin interprets this 
lack of control, with emphasis being placed on observation and interviewing strategies (Yin 
1994:8). Such qualitative skills are not part of this thesis. In this case study it is impossible to 
control behaviour and execute an experimental model (as envisaged by Campbell and 
Stanley, 1966); it merely observes. A degree of control is able to be exerted by deciding on 
where the boundaries of the data will be. Lastly, the focus is largely contemporary, in 
particular the detailed original data collection on leader visits at the 2010 general election, 
the data collection of which is in the next section. This thesis takes the case study method 
and applies it to a large-scale quantitative study with a deductive purpose to test whether low 
level campaigns are detrimental to local electoral outcomes.  
 
By using a case study to test the hypothesis of this thesis, a focused examination of the true 
impact of campaigning in FPTP systems can be produced. The case study as used here 
allows a deductive approach to be undertaken by offering clear boundaries within which data 
may be sourced and analysed. As Bryman suggests (2008), such studies are best understood 
as an examination of a unique or extreme example of phenomena. In applying this to the use 
of the UK as a case study in examining the effects of low level campaigning, there are three 
contextual features that lend themselves to the research process and need to be taken into 
account, but they do not alter the relevance of the phenomenon being observed: legislation 
on expenditure limits, the length of the campaign and the context of the period under 
examination. 
Firstly, unlike many other countries where FPTP is in use, the UK has strict legal restrictions 
on expenditure during campaigning. Spending limits at the constituency level are laid down 
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by law and are periodically reviewed in order not only to keep the purchasing power fairly 
constant, but also to reflect the constituency population (Gay, 2009).  A basic flat-rate for all 
constituencies (Great Britain, 1983 and since this Act under Order of the Secretary of State) 
is allocated (in 2010 it was £7,150) before the limit is boosted according to the population 
and the location of the constituency, with urban constituencies receiving an additional 5p per 
voter and rural constituencies receiving 7p per voter (Johnston and Pattie, 2007) due to the 
differing travel costs for candidates. Similar limits are also used in Canada (Carty and 
Eagles, 1999; Eagles, 2004). Despite the objections raised by some authors (Gordon and 
Whiteley, 1980) about the accuracy of spending reporting by candidates and their agents, the 
limits on campaign expenditure are legal requirements. There are two ways in which limits 
may be imposed on spending at elections; limiting contributions and restricting expenditure 
(Milligan and Rekkas, 2008). While legislation in the USA concentrates on contribution 
limits, the Canadian experience is more similar to the UK, where limits are imposed on 
spending during the campaign. The calculations of Canadian spending restrictions are 
slightly different; based on the area covered by the constituency and the number of voters 
resident.  
 
The second contextual feature of the UK is the short campaign period, which lasts from the 
day that the election is called (when the Queen dissolves Parliament) until Election Day 
which is held approximately a month later (in 2010, Parliament was dissolved on 6
th
 April 
and the election was held on 6
th
 May). This intense burst of campaigning differentiates it 
from other elections; particularly the USA presidential race which takes ten months (McKay, 
2005). Stevenson and Vavrek (2000) conducted cross-national research examining the 
impact of campaign length on the ability of voters to process information. Their study of 
elections in 13 countries between 1960 and 1990 revealed that the average length of 
unscheduled elections (where parties had no formal warning that an election was to take 
place) in the UK was 21.8 days, a figure comparable to Denmark (Party List Proportional 
Representation) and Ireland (Single Transferable Vote). However, when examining 
campaign length in other systems using FPTP, the UK was unique in having such a short 
campaign. In Germany’s mixed electoral system (which partially utilises FPTP) the average 
length of the campaign was 114 days, whereas the only country in the study apart from the 
UK exclusively using FPTP was Canada, with an average election campaign of 61.25 days. 
The legislation change in 2009 meant that the UK now has two clearly defined campaign 
periods for which data on expenditure is collected; the long and the short campaign.  
However, short intense campaigning may have already passed into history, with the Fixed-
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Term Parliaments Act introducing a five year limit on parliamentary terms in 2011. This Act 
means that unscheduled elections are no longer possible (in most circumstances) so the date 
of the election will be known well in advance. Lastly, the political and party context in the 
UK should be taken into account. Although there will be evidence of general trends across 
FPTP systems in this period (particularly in regards to the adoption of modern campaign 
techniques and the global context) no other nation precisely replicated the UK context over 
the period of study. 
Nonetheless, the case offers good potential for generalisations to be made. Although 
generalising from case studies is not easy (Kennedy, 1979) it is possible, although it must be 
carefully considered what generalisations from the conclusions are intended. As Yin argues, 
case studies can only be ‘generalisable to theoretical propositions…not to populations or 
universes’ (1994:10). So this statement indicates that this case study offers the opportunity to 
make theoretical generalisations in regards to the impact of campaigning on voter behaviour 
in FPTP systems, considering in particular the effect when it is lacking.  This offers good 
potential for generalisation, not least as majoritarian electoral systems such as the FPTP 
model is the second most widely used voting system in the world (Norris, 1997b). The 
conclusions from existing literature on the effectiveness of local campaigning from the UK 
are reflected by similar findings in the USA, and Canadian research into local campaigning 
has drawn heavily on UK-based findings (as summarised in the previous chapter). The 
similarity of the findings of such studies across different nations using the electoral system 
indicates that the FPTP electoral system enhances the potential of local campaigning to have 
an impact on local results. So the case offers a good opportunity to generalise theoretically in 
regards to the impact of low level campaigning in such electoral systems, as many 




By conducting a case study of the effects of low level campaigning on voter behaviour in the 
UK, a tight focus on key relationships is possible. However, key decisions have had to be 
made to define the boundaries of the case. This study is temporally bound, looking 
specifically at local campaigning in the UK between the period of 1987 and 2010 for two 
main reasons; a varied political context and the fit with existing research into the area of 
constituency campaign effectiveness.  
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The spread of six elections offers an interesting variety of national incumbency which is 
likely to impact on the local campaign strategies of the parties over the period. Offensive and 
defensive local campaign strategies are easy to discern (Fisher, Cutts and Fieldhouse, 2011), 
with nationally incumbent parties typically mounting largely defensive campaigns to retain 
power whilst opposition parties seek to expand their number of seats. The 1987 to 2010 
period not only covers two changes of government (1997 and 2010), five Prime Ministers 
from two parties, but the end of a long Conservative administration, the entire lifecycle of 
the New Labour government and the first coalition government since the Second World War. 
The 1987 to 2010 period is also a neat fit with existing studies and available data. Even 
though the study of constituency campaign effectiveness (in case study constituencies) dates 
back to the 1960s and 1970s, it was not until 1987 (see Pattie, Whiteley, Johnston and Seyd, 
1994) that large-scale aggregate studies gained in popularity amongst researchers. This led to 
the use of already available data on campaign expenditure, but also in the collection of new 
aggregate data sources such as the agent and member surveys already discussed. This means 
that the period of time selected for this study coincides not only with the increased aggregate 
focus by existing researchers, but also with the increase in data available to study campaign 
effectiveness. 
One alternative to this coverage of six elections to explain the effects of low level campaigns 
could have been to extend the temporal boundaries of the study to cover the entire post-war 
period. This would have provided a far larger source of data from which the evolution of 
strategic campaigning and the potential impact on safe constituencies could have been 
analysed. However, such an extended period of study, covering 65 years and 18 elections 
would have raised two major issues; political context and practicality. The development of 
the mass media and technology has meant that campaigning has evolved (Hands and Denver, 
2002; Pattie and Johnston, 2009b), with traditional methods (such as doorstep canvassing) 
being used alongside more modern techniques (campaign software). Such developments 
have also changed much of the way in which parties can contact voters to provide 
information through which their voting behaviour may be altered. In parallel has been 
widespread partisan dealignment in the UK electorate (Crewe, Sӓrlvik and Alt, 1977), 
increasing the potential for campaigning to act as a conversionary force instead of a more 
mobilisationary one. There have also been a series of boundary changes between 1987 and 
2010, and to extend the study historically would result in the need to collect additional data 
on notional results. 
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To cover the evolution of the mass media, partisan dealignment, the introduction of 
computerised campaigning and recent developments such as social media campaigning in a 
single study risks detracting from answering the thesis hypothesis.  At best what could be 
produced would be a very general picture of the state of campaigning, which would 
additionally be limited by the availability of campaign data.  As will be seen in the next 
section, early expenditure data are difficult to source and data on campaign activity were 
only available between 1992 and 2001. The emphasis of the thesis hypothesis on the impact 
of low level campaigns in safe constituencies would also appear to preclude the extension of 
this study historically. Marginal constituencies have historically received more attention than 
their safer counterparts (Denver and Hands, 1985), but it was in the aftermath of the success 
of Labour’s Operation Victory in 1997 that the targeting of marginal constituencies became 
feverish (Denver, Hands and Henig, 1998).  
Practicality also makes extending the study difficult. The master dataset created for this 
thesis (titled and referred to throughout as Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-
2010) provides the researcher with a comprehensive account of election results over the 
period. It also includes candidate expenditure records for all elections and additional 
campaign indicators (leader visits included) for three elections, as well as contextual data 
(including incumbency and census data) throughout the period (the details of variables 
collected and sources of data are examined in the next section).  This single dataset alone 
contains data on 3804 constituencies and with a minimum of 195 variables per constituency 
equates to almost 750,000 separate pieces of data. To extend this historically would not only 
be unwieldy, but it would be unfeasible to explore the data in sufficient detail to form 
anything beyond a general exploration of the relationship between neglect and marginality, 
let alone a coherent, focused investigation at the constituency level.  
Conversely, the temporal boundaries of the study could be restricted further by reducing the 
number of elections covered by the study. This would fit well with the majority of studies 
into constituency campaigning, which tend to be aggregate analyses of single elections (see 
Pattie et al., 1994; Whiteley and Seyd, 2003), and would enable a focused study to be 
conducted of the impact of low level campaigns
10
. However, a single-election study would 
hamper the ability to decisively answer the thesis hypothesis as it would not be possible to 
                                                          
10
 there have been several UK studies which have considered constituency campaign effectiveness 
over multiple elections: see Wood and Norton (1992) for an examination of 1983 and 1987; Cutts, 




tell if the impact of low level campaigning was a specific feature of a particular election, or 
indicative of a wider trend. By comparing the trends over these six elections the thesis can 
not only to examine the increased neglect of safe constituencies, but also establish trends in 
the effects of low level campaigning.  
Organisation and spatial limits are also incorporated here, focusing on the three largest 
parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) standing in England, Scotland and 
Wales over the period. The majority of the literature focuses on these three parties together 
(for example Fisher, Cutts and Fieldhouse, 2011), comparing and contrasting their campaign 
experiences and finding a great deal of variation. There are, of course, single-party studies 
(Pattie et al., 1994), but even in Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson’s focused study of 
individual parties (1994) other parties are brought in as comparators. By studying the three 
parties in place of a single party case study, a more comprehensive view of the relative 
effectiveness of constituency campaigning in the United Kingdom will be attained, 
particularly as the existing literature (for a summary, see Fisher and Denver, 2009) has often 
demonstrated that effectiveness varies between the parties. There could also be variation in 
the negative impact of low level campaigning between parties, particularly as the 
Conservatives historically spent a higher proportion in their safe constituencies than the 
other two parties (Pattie and Johnston, 2003b). Such organisational limitations were imposed 
not only for reasons of simplicity, but also due to constituency coverage. It would have been 
possible to include more parties such as the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru and the 
Green Party, but equally would have introduced many complicating factors to the study, not 
least that these smaller parties stand in relatively few constituencies (the SNP and Plaid 
Cymru only stand in Scotland and Wales respectively, and the Green Party stood in over 300 
at the last election) 
There are two categories of constituency to be excluded from this analysis; those in Northern 
Ireland and the Speaker of the House of Common’s constituency. For Northern Irish 
constituencies, there are issues in regards to comparison with constituencies elsewhere in the 
United Kingdom. The party system in Northern Ireland is entirely dominated by parties that 
stand in Northern Ireland only; Labour and the Liberal Democrats did not stand in Northern 
Ireland at any point the period under study, and whilst the Conservatives did stand in four of 
the six elections studied (excluding their link-up with the Unionists in 2010), they remained 
very much a minority party, standing only in selected seats. This makes it difficult to include 
Northern Ireland in a study which focuses on the largest parties in the UK as a whole. 
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Secondly, the Speaker’s constituency has been excluded from analysis in but one of the 
election years. The only year in the period under investigation where there was no ‘Speaker 
constituency’ was 1992 as Bernard Wetherill had stood down from his constituency prior to 
the election on 9
th
 April but was not succeeded by Betty Boothroyd until 27th April. The role 
of the Speaker is politically neutral, and they must resign from their political party (House of 
Commons Information Office, 2010) when they assume their position. In the context of 
elections, the Speaker is conventionally unopposed by other major political parties and they 
only campaign for re-election, not on any political issues. It would therefore not make any 
sense in a study of low levels of constituency campaigning to include a constituency which 
experiences no campaigning by any party at all. 
 
Application of comparative method within UK study 
 
 
This study also draws on the principles of comparative research when exploring the differing 
experiences of parties, incumbency and constituencies with different marginalities. Like case 
study research, the precise definition of comparative research is a contested concept in itself; 
some authors adopt a restrictive version (Andreski, 1965) limited to cross-societal 
comparisons, while other researchers (Almond, 1966; Lieberson, 1985; Smelser, 1976) apply 
the term widely, considering all political research to be inherently comparative. Lijphart 
(1971), in the definitive article on the method, offers a position between the two extremes as 
‘one of the basic methods…of establishing general empirical propositions’ (1971:682) which 
has been adopted for this thesis. The comparative method represents a distinct approach 
(Swanson, 1971), with close links between comparison and scientific approaches to politics, 
fitting well with the positivist approach adopted here. It offers a method through which 
trends in the analysis can be systematised and sorted, allowing ‘suggestive similarities and 
contrasts’ (Collier, 1993:105) to be identified.  
By examining voter behaviour on a large scale through statistical methods, this study fits in 
well with the macro social element of comparative research as envisaged by Ragin (1992) by 
concentrating on aggregate levels of behaviour. This thesis incorporates key elements of the 
comparative method in its focus on macro social phenomena in four areas: intermarginality, 
interelectoral, interparty and interincumbency. 
As part of the desire to rebalance the attention of constituency campaign research by paying 
attention to safe constituencies, this thesis compares different constituency marginalities 
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throughout the analysis. The clearest source of comparison between different constituency 
marginalities is that of marginal and safe seats. Although the primary focus is on safe 
constituencies, to assess whether a constituency is being neglected it is vital to have a sense 
of campaign levels overall, including those in marginal constituencies. The quartile-based 
measure of the levels of campaigning used in this thesis (based on one derived from Denver 
et al., 2004) relies upon data from constituencies of all marginalities to identify those which 
experience low levels of campaigning. It is not only the comparison between safe and 
marginal constituencies that will characterise the analysis; where possible the five category 
disaggregation of marginality will be employed, enabling not only the identification of 
varying levels of safety but also allowing comparisons to be made between safe 
constituencies Secondly, this thesis presents an interelectoral element through the 
comparison of trends across the elections from 1987 to 2010. This allows the increasing 
attention paid to marginal constituencies (and the increasing neglect of safe constituencies) 
to be measured, as well as considering the implications of such activity for local outcomes 
over the period.  
By examining how incumbency affects the impact of low level campaigns on local electoral 
outcomes, the thesis considers not only how incumbency may enhance the level of 
campaigning, but whether it exaggerates the effects such campaigning has on local results. 
The effect of low level campaigning is also compared between the three largest parties in the 
UK. A key feature of this thesis is interparty comparison, drawing on much of the existing 
literature which compares campaign effectiveness across parties. It compares the different 
campaign strategies taken by each party, expecting that the Conservatives will have the least 
rational campaigning of the three parties (Pattie and Johnston, 2003b) early in the period. Of 
course such strategies, particularly in the case of the Liberal Democrats, are largely due to 
necessity: as a smaller party they do not have large resources, so have to consider carefully 
where they spend their money. Labour’s spectacular success with targeting constituencies at 
the 1997 general election impacted upon their ability to rationally target their resources once 
they had attained power as they had such a large number of constituencies to defend.  
 
Sources of Data 
 
  
To test the hypothesis that low level campaigns are detrimental to local electoral outcomes, 
a variety of data sources were used. The measurements of the key concepts involved in the 
hypothesis (marginality, campaigning and local electoral outcomes) have already been 
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discussed, but here the process through which data were obtained is examined to 
demonstrate a lack of bias (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994:23). The reporting of the 
sources of the data also link to positivist ideas of replicability (Dewald, Thursby and 
Anderson, 1986), with the aim being to provide sufficient information that another 
researcher could track down and utilise (or in the case of original data collect) the sources. 
 
Marginality and local electoral outcomes 
 
The core sources of data enabling the measurement and tracking of both marginality 
(operationalised as previous vote share) and local electoral outcomes (vote share and 
turnout) for the period are datasets containing election results. The data come from four 
sources; an official record, two datasets by Pippa Norris and the work of Rallings and 
Thrasher.  
For the 1987 election, results were obtained from Wood (1987), including full breakdowns 
of the vote, turnout and marginality of a constituency both going into and resulting from the 
election. All figures from this source were typed into SPSS from the hard copy as no other 
reliable data source could be found. This manual transfer of data to a dataset runs the risk of 
producing unintended errors. To counter this possibility, all data from this source were 
checked and cleaned thoroughly by running basic descriptive analyses and randomly testing 
constituency results. 
For the 1992 to 2005 elections inclusive the source of marginality and outcome data was a 
constituency dataset compiled by Norris (2009), which is publicly available online and 
provides a breakdown of constituency results at each election as well as measures of the 
constituency going into each election (i.e. marginality). A separate dataset by the same 
author (Norris, 2010) including detailed constituency-level election results was available for 
the 2010 election. There were several variables from both Norris datasets that were relevant 
to the measurement of marginality used in this thesis, not only the figures for previous 
majority, but also in the inclusion of a categorical variable measuring degrees of marginality 
which proved to be useful in the analysis in enabling the quick identification of the safest 
constituencies. By disaggregating the conventional 9.99 percentage point differentiation 
between safe and marginal constituencies, the dataset identified a full range of marginality 
from ultra-marginal (a majority under 4.99 percentage points, codified as 1) to ultra-safe (a 
majority of 20 percentage points and above, codified as 5). Both datasets also included not 
only the actual vote share and turnout figures for each election between 1992 and 2005, but 
also gave us the raw figures for the data. I believe that these data from the two Norris 
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datasets offer good validity for two reasons; that other sources use them as valid data and 
that they represent a valid construct. Firstly, these data have a good degree of face validity 
and reliability as they are widely used both by other researchers as the basis for their 
research. The data have also been externally checked by other experts in the field; in 
particularly the 2010 election dataset was circulated after the election to the Elections, Public 
Opinion and Parties specialist group of the Political Studies Association for comments and 
was amended where data were found to be inaccurate.  
Between 1987 and 2010 there were three major constituency boundary revisions and one 
minor revision (major revisions for 1997, Scottish revisions for 2005, English revisions for 
2010 and a division of Milton Keynes for 1992). It is essential that data are obtained on these 
revisions as they impact the ability to trace constituency marginality, which is measured by 
examining the proximity of the two top parties going into an election; the closer the parties 
are, the more marginal the constituency. When there are boundary changes, it is not possible 
to get an actual figure for constituency marginality as the population has changed (even 
when constituencies retain their names, there can be a considerable degree of population 
change; for a discussion of levels of change in populations and the measurements of such see 
Rallings and Thrasher, 2007). Instead I use notional election results, following conventions 
of the existing literature which consider them to be ‘widely accepted as accurate, not least by 
the political parties’ (Johnston, Pattie, Cutts and Fisher, 2012:320). Notional figures are 
based on the contributory populations of the new constituency and provide a theoretical 
previous election result and marginality for the new boundary. These figures have been 
produced throughout the period by Rallings and Thrasher (1995), Denver, Rallings and 
Thrasher (2004), and Rallings and Thrasher (2007), and all have been incorporated into the 
thesis dataset. They have a good degree of face validity as they are widely used by 
researchers, and the media ‘as the basis for determining which parties hold which seats and 
what change in share of the vote is required for seats to change hands’ (University of 




Levels of campaigning 
 
 
Campaigns have the ability to alter voter behaviour (whether through mobilisation or 
conversion) by providing information. As seen already in this chapter, existing studies of 
campaign effectiveness have often disagreed over the best way to measure campaigning, 
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whether through spending data, activity data or (as proposed in this thesis) by looking at 
where the leaders visit. As the thesis combines all three sources to obtain an accurate picture 
of what it means to run a low level campaign in UK elections, the data to measure 






For the 1987, 1992 and 1997 general elections, candidate expenditure was published after 
each election in a report to Parliament laid down jointly by the Home Office and by the 
Scottish, Welsh & Northern Ireland Offices. These reports are not readily accessible, so 
Charles Pattie kindly supplied the data for these years. Data for the latter three elections of 
the period were easier to find as they occurred after the creation of the Electoral 
Commission; the remit of the Commission being defined in the Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendums Act 2000 (Great Britain, 2000). Since 2001, the Commission has collected 
candidate expenditure data, and provides them in detailed public reports into campaign 
finance (Electoral Commission, 2002; 2006; 2011) in the year after an election was held. 
These reports hold data on the legal maximums for each constituency, the total spending for 
all those standing in a constituency and breakdowns of their expenditure. The 2010 reports 
even provide data on donations to candidates. As comprehensive as these reports are, the 
accompanying datasets were not in an appropriate format to be synchronised with the master 
dataset used here. This entailed a full manual transcription of all candidate expenditure data 
for these three elections. To prevent errors, the data were once again cleaned and random 
comparisons and frequencies were run until their reliability was certain. 
As constituencies have different spending limits according to their size and location, the raw 
continuous-level data of spending by candidates supplied by both Pattie and the Electoral 
Commission needed to be expressed differently to account for the different legal maximums 
in operation. Following the example of existing constituency campaigning studies (Pattie, 
Johnston and Fieldhouse, 1995 for example), the spending data were expressed as the 









This thesis also uses selected variables taken from the party agent surveys as part of the 
measurement of constituency campaign levels. Agent survey data were chosen over party 
member data for two reasons; firstly, the agent survey data were publicly accessible, and 
secondly, the agent surveys were conducted in much closer proximity to the election 
campaign, offering better grounds for participant recall. 
 
The surveys of constituency party agents were conducted by Denver and Hands in 1992 
(1996: SN 3587) and 1997 (1999: SN 3922) and Denver, Hands and Fisher in 2001 (2002: 
SN 4508) to investigate various aspects of the constituency campaign before, during and 
after the election. The results are publically available and are available for download from 
the Data Archive. The datasets for each of the three years were downloaded and divided 
according to which of the three main parties the agents belonged to, making using the data 
simpler. The names of variables were changed to identify the parties (i.e. Canvass became 
CCanvass, LCanvass and LDCanvass) and the data from the agent surveys were combined 
into the master dataset. The Press Association number was the only way of identifying the 
constituency, so this was used as the basis for identifying responding constituencies. Data 
were available for both the 2005 and 2010 elections, but there were issues regarding data 
access and attribution. The 2005 data were not publicly accessible and attempts to obtain the 
data from the researchers did not come to any fruition. The 2010 data are publicly 
accessible, once again via Data Archive, but they were unable to be used in this thesis 
because the Press Association numbers were removed. This meant that there was now no 
way of identifying constituencies of responding agents, which made the incorporation of the 
data into the dataset impossible. 
 
These surveys provided a mixture of nominal, ordinal and ratio and interval level data which 
identified a wide range of information about the local campaign; from the level of support 
they felt they had received to a detailed account of the levels of various campaign activities. 
A wide range of such activities were measured, including the number of polling day helpers, 
the number of locally-produced leaflets distributed and the percentage of the constituency 







Party Leader Visits 
 
As an additional variable measuring constituency campaigning, proposed here for the first 
time in the UK, leader visits offered an opportunity to collect original data. The main source 
was the BBC rolling news coverage during the 2010 general election campaign which 
offered detailed 24-hour coverage of the campaign including a news ticker. The newsfeed on 
the BBC website was regularly (several times a day) checked for mentions of any visits 
being made by the three main party leaders. Often when there was mention of a visit the 
details were vague – for example ‘David Cameron visited a school in Brighton’ – which 
necessitated a degree of background research. Initially the data obtained from the BBC were 
cross-referenced against other sources including official party websites and other media 
outlets such as local and national newspapers to identify the precise location of the visit. 
Postcodes for the locations were generated (if required) from the Royal Mail’s ‘Postcode 
Finder’ before the constituency was identified through the BBC website which offered a 
‘Find your Constituency’ search function (BBC 2010b). It would be simple to replicate this 
data collection at future elections. 
 
Data were collected for the short campaign, using the day Gordon Brown asked the Queen to 
dissolve Parliament and call an election (6 April) as the start, and the day prior to Election 
Day as the end (5 May) as no campaigning can take place on Election Day itself. Various 
elements of the campaign involving the leaders were excluded from my data collection 
because they were not visits as such – for example, press conferences from party 
headquarters or the location of the televised leader debates were not classified as visits. I also 
noted the type of location each party leader was visiting, dividing them into basic categories. 
This resulted in data on 166 visits by the three main party leaders over the short election 
campaign. The data collection during the campaign provided a range of both nominal and 
interval level data. Three binary variables were created to identify constituencies visited by 
each of the three party leaders; a nominal measure was also created which codified the type 











To accurately test the relationships between marginality and campaign intensity and 
campaign intensity and electoral outcomes in the two stages of the hypothesis, sufficient 
controls should be incorporated into the models used. The previous chapter has explored 
theoretical explanations for voter behaviour and presented evidence for the presence not 
only of rational choice models, but also sociological and socio-psychological models in UK 
voter behaviour. To control for other explanations of local electoral outcomes aside from the 
impact of campaigning, a series of socio-demographic variables are included in the models 
(the full selection of which is presented in later chapters).  
 
To sufficiently control for constituency socio-demographics, census data which represent 
comprehensive coverage of the UK population (and therefore an accurate picture of the 
social composition of constituencies) were utilised as a data source. Census data were 
collected and collated from three main sources for the period; the Norris datasets (2009; 
2010), the Office for National Statistics (2003) and the Census Dissemination Unit (UK 
Data Service Census Support, 2011).  Data applying to to constituency boundaries from 
1997 to 2010 (drawing on data from the closest preceding census: here 1991 and 2001) were 
already included in the Norris datasets, which have already been discussed in the section on 
marginality and local electoral outcomes above. There were, however, no socio-
demographic data on Scottish and Welsh constituencies included, so the data were 
supplemented by constituency profiles from the Office for National Statistics (2003).  
 
This left missing census data relating only to the 1987 and 1992 constituency boundaries. 
The Census Dissemination Unit stores census data for the United Kingdom from the 1971 
census onwards. To obtain the relevant census data for 1987 and 1992 I used the Casweb 
interface (UK Data Service Census Support, 2011), which allows bespoke census data to be 
selected for each census year. In the 1991 and 1981 census data available (i.e. those most 
relevant to the 1987 and 1992 elections) here, it is not possible to select data on a 
constituency basis – the only way of collecting data is on a ward by ward basis. This 
therefore necessitated the identification of the wards constituting the constituencies in 1987 
and 1992, which originated from a constituency boundary change prior to the 1983 election. 
Crewe and Fox (1984) produced a comprehensive account of the 1983 constituency 
boundary changes, including notional results and a full breakdown of the wards that made up 
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each constituency, which enabled the selection of relevant wards from Casweb. Once these 
had been selected, the interface enables the researcher to download a range of variables of 
interest from the census. The selection chosen reflected the variables that had already been 
collected by Norris (2009, 2010) for the later results to enable comparisons to be made 
across the period. The data were then downloaded and came in a ward-by-ward form, so the 
sum for each variable was calculated across the wards for the constituency before being 
transferred to the master dataset. 
The data collection for the census data has resulted in a series of continuous variables on a 
wide range of demographics, from basic population size to employment figures, social class 
to migration. From these data, the figures have been calculated as a percentage of the total 
population. By doing this the size differences between constituencies are neutralised and as a 
result it is possible to compare demographics. I believe that these census data offer a good 
degree of validity as they are widely used, not only in the examination of voting behaviour, 
but in many applications. A census is ‘a complete and individual enumeration of all persons 
in a fixed geographical area at a single point in time carried out by a central government’ 
(Marsh, 1982: 5), which I believe greatly enhances its reliability. The completion of the 
census return is a legal requirement, enforceable by fines, and as such the data collected are 
very comprehensive. Also, the census data incorporated into the Norris dataset have been 
utilised by other researchers in the field.  
 
Candidate Incumbency and Tenure 
 
As set out in Box 3.1, the nested hypotheses explore the impact of candidate incumbency on 
the effects of low level campaigns. Using the premise that the incumbent candidate was the 
candidate with the largest vote share at the last instance of electoral competition, whether 
this was at an election or a by-election, the data on incumbency came from two sources. The 
first group were the Times Guides to the House of Commons (Wood, 1987; 1992; 1997) 
which between 1987 and 1997 collected biographies listing the career history of all 
candidates that stood in all constituencies. The second group of sources were Dod’s 
Parliamentary Companions (Cox, 1988; Bedford, 1993; 1998; 2002; 2005; 2010) which 
provide annual biographies of all MPs.  
Once the incumbent candidate at the last competition had been identified, this was compared 
to the candidate standing at the subsequent election to see whether the incumbent had retired. 
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If they had not, the biographies contained in the two sources were referred to in order to 
identify firstly how long they had been the incumbent in the constituency, and secondly how 
long in total they had been an incumbent. It is important to differentiate between these two 
types of tenure because of the complications of boundary changes. The seat tenure variable 
created measures the length of time an incumbent has been in place in that seat with the same 
boundaries, whereas the career tenure variable measures the total length of the incumbent 
candidate’s career. The ability to differentiate between seat and career tenure is vital because 
although many boundary changes were minor (see Rallings and Thrasher, 2007) and MPs 
often remained in their largely unchanged constituencies, there are frequent examples where 
changes are more extreme – MPs changing seats or even fighting each other for the same 
seat in the case of Sarah Teather and Dawn Butler in Brent in 2010. The biographies also 
listed all preceding constituencies that incumbents had represented, thereby enabling career 
tenures to be calculated. Therefore I not only have the measure of seat tenure, but also a 
measure of the incumbent MP’s total career encompassing all boundary changes. An 
additional incumbency variable identifying all candidates who are fighting their first election 
as incumbent (first-termers) was also created. 
The data collected to measure incumbency and tenure were at both the ordinal and interval 
level. Dummy variables were collected which measured whether the incumbent candidate 
won, what gender they were, whether the sitting incumbent had retired, whether the 
candidate was fighting the election as a first-term MP and whether there had been a by-
election. Ordinal level variables were also created which indicated which party the 
incumbent belonged to. These data offer a good level of validity, as there is a range of 
different measures to examine as many facets of the concept as possible. There is also a good 
level of external validity as it is possible to replicate the data from the sources easily. These 
data on candidate incumbency and tenure also offer a reliable source for data which can later 
be used effectively as a control because of the reputation of the data sources and the 
representativeness of the data. Both sources are highly regarded as good-quality sources of 
information about Parliament and elections, and print short biographies of each candidate, 













SPSS, one of the main statistical programmes used in both academic and business 
environments, has been used to both build the master dataset from a wide range of sources 
and to analyse these data. To effectively handle these data and produce a sophisticated 
statistical response to the hypotheses, training was undertaken; this comprised not only of 
university run courses (Core Quantitative Data Analysis), but also online tutorials (Edx, 
2011) and additional specific training on advanced techniques. The thesis research questions 
(see Box 3.1) compare general trends in low level campaign effects (on vote share and 
turnout) over the period, but also specifically compare parties and candidate incumbency. 
These factors influenced the construction of the master dataset, creating one that combined 
data for all years, enabling direct comparisons to be made across the period, alongside a 
more focused engagement with relationships and election years as necessary. It was designed 
so analyses could be run across the entire period, enabling the identification of trends and 
potential relationships to be investigated in more detail.  
 
Chapter Analysis Structure 
 
Chapter four begins by exploring the variable of marginality descriptively, examining 
patterns in the data along with mean values and standard deviations. These descriptive 
findings are primarily presented in graph format, providing a visual introduction to the 
variable. The chapter ends with a series of bivariate correlations and a regression between 
variables representing stability and party support bases in order to gather information 
regarding the origins of marginality. The fifth chapter, on campaigns, also begins by 
exploring the various measures of campaigning descriptively, before progressing to a 
bivariate analysis of the relationship between marginality and campaigning, as well as other 
variables which could affect campaigning drawn from existing literature. By using bivariate 
correlations in examining the relationship between these continuous variables, it has been 
possible to discern the shape, direction and significance of potential relationships. Although 
these correlations are only a rough estimate of such a relationship, they have been used to 
draw attention to variables which may need to be controlled for in a more detailed analysis 
of campaigning. This not only provides an idea of the basic trends in the dependent variables 
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over the period and ideas regarding what variables might affect them, but also gives a broad 
indication of whether there is a relationship between the marginality and campaigning. A 
multivariate regression model is then constructed to examine the relationship between 
marginality and campaigning, incorporating additional variables which were found to be 
significantly correlated with campaigning at the bivariate level. These extra variables act as 
controls, ensuring the variation in the dependent variable (campaigning) originates from the 
independent variable (marginality).  
 
Alternative combinations of control variables were tested, informed by the literature, and the 
model which provided the best explanatory power was chosen. Throughout the thesis, when 
referring to levels of significance, I shall be working to p<.05* and p<.01** which will be 
indicated as such throughout the analysis. These levels of significance are appropriate as 
they are the conventionally accepted standards (Argyrous, 2005) in the social sciences for 
proving significant relationships. By working to high levels of significance the reliability of 
the data can be improved by ensuring that the relationships observed are not occurring by 
chance. Tests of significance ‘estimate…the likelihood that a particular sample result differs 
from an assumed population level due to sampling error’ (De Vaus, 2002:169). Such tests 
enable inferences to be made from a sample to the wider population. However, there is a 
complication in the application of tests of significance in the context of this study. Whereas 
such tests are designed to indicate the likelihood that the results of a sample result from an 
error in sampling, in this thesis data are available for the entire population. Of the 
operationalisations of campaigning explored earlier in this chapter, this study relies primarily 
on expenditure data. Such data are available for all constituencies at all elections and there is 
no need to rely on a sample. Therefore, it could be argued that tests of significance are not 
required in the present study.  
Existing studies operationalising campaigning through the use of expenditure data continue 
to employ tests of statistical significance (see Johnston and Pattie, 2008; Pattie, Johnston and 
Fieldhouse, 1995). As this study extends the conventional hypothesis regarding the impact of 
campaigning, using expenditure data as the primary operationalization of campaigning, it is 
important for the findings to be as comparable with existing literature as possible. This has 
led to the retention of tests of significance in the present study. 
It is also vital in establishing a sound quantitative research design to incorporate elements of 
uncertainty (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994); so the regressions produced aim to explain as 
much of the variation in the dependent variable as possible with the independent variable, 
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but it is unlikely (as in most statistical studies, and certainly in the case of research into UK 
constituency campaigning) that a full 100 percent of variation will be able to be explained, 
thus establishing a degree of uncertainty. The quartile-based measure of campaigning based 
on Denver et al’s 2004 study (discussed in section one above) is also tested against 
marginality.  
 
Multiplicative interaction terms are also included in the models formulated for this thesis. 
Such terms indicate interactions between two independent variables, which alter the effect 
upon the dependent variable. This is particularly important in the context of this thesis, 
which binds together marginality, campaigning and local electoral outcomes. There are two 
separate groups of interaction terms included in the analysis in the chapters ahead. In chapter 
five, which links marginality and levels of campaigning, an interaction term has been 
included between marginality and the length of the incumbent’s career. More centrally in 
regards to the thesis hypothesis, the models tested in chapters six and seven include 
interaction terms between marginality and the various campaigning variables when 
examining the relationship between campaigning levels and local electoral outcomes 
(turnout and vote share). This interaction term is central to this thesis, not least because of 
the argument that marginality is an important determinant in campaigning levels, by linking 
safe constituencies with lower levels of campaigning. Therefore, in these models examining 
the impact of campaigning levels on local electoral outcomes (which are going to differ 
according to constituency safety), the interacting effect of constituency marginality will be 
accounted for. Further explanations of the rationale behind these two sets of interaction 
terms will be considered in the forthcoming chapters. 
Such terms will be employed following best practice in empirical analysis as established by 
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005). They are calculated simply by multiplying the 
interacting variables together, and where these terms are used in models, both constituent 
variables are also entered into the model to prevent bias. Only on the basis of sound 
theoretical probability that one of the constituent variables ‘has no effect on the dependent 
variable in the absence of the other modifying variable’ (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005:6) 
may a constituent variable be excluded from the regression model. Each chapter using 
interaction terms in the models explores the relationship of both constituent terms to the 
dependent variable, and in each case there are no grounds for exclusion. 
The interpretation of models also changes when using interaction effects. When they are 
utilised, the regression coefficients for the independent variable (one of the constituent 
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terms) adjust to capture the effect of this variable on the dependent variable when the 
interacting variable is zero, and the discussions of these variables in the forthcoming 
chapters should be interpreted as such.  This complicates the interpretation of the results 
from the tables, and it is possible for the impact of the interacting variable to be significant 
without it being indicated by the regression coefficient. All interaction effects will be 
explored and discussed in more detail in the text. 
 
Chapters six, seven and eight all follow similar analytical frameworks, with a funnelling of 
analysis from descriptive to multivariate models. Turnout and vote share are engaged with 
descriptively in chapter six and seven, before drawing on existing literature to examine 
variables other than campaigning which might explain variation in them. These theories are 
tested with bivariate correlations, before the relationship between campaigning (a continuous 
measure and the low level classification) and the dependent variable of the chapter is 
developed into a multivariate model. This model is kept consistent between all three chapters 
to increase comparability, incorporating control variables as established in the bivariate 
analysis. Leader visits are treated slightly differently, establishing a link between these visits 
as the independent variable and local electoral outcomes as the dependent variable. This 
funnelling of analysis from descriptive to bivariate to multivariate allows campaigning, vote 
share, turnout and leader visits to be engaged with in some detail before constructing a 







This thesis attempts to investigate whether a relative lack of campaigning in safe 
constituencies is detrimental to constituency outcomes. As such, this chapter has clearly 
defined not only what the research questions are, but also the best strategy for answering 
them and with what data. The interrelated hypotheses have been set out, firstly establishing 
the origins of marginality, considering then whether there is a link between constituency 
safety and campaign intensity, and finally by examining what impact a relative lack of 
campaigning has on two dimensions of electoral outcomes (vote share and turnout). This 
thesis is rooted in the positivist tradition, with its emphasis on empirical testing, establishing 
causality and replicability. A quantitative data analysis has been undertaken as it offers the 
most appropriate approach with which to answer the thesis hypotheses, and traditionally fits 
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well with a positivist strategy. A range of data originating from a wide range of sources have 
been used in this study, including election results, census data, leader visit data and data on 
candidate incumbency.  The origin and collection of these data in each case has been clearly 
explained to make this study as replicable as possible. The data have provided many forms 
of variables, from nominal to continuous, and where appropriate, transformations have been 
conducted to make the data more useable.  Finally, this chapter explored the ways in which 
these data have been analysed, including why some data were being excluded. Trends in 
independent and dependent variables are investigated thoroughly, before a variety of 
variables with the potential to affect the dependent variable are tested. A detailed plan for 
the data analysis to be undertaken in this thesis was made clear, and as such the conclusions 
that are drawn from the analytical techniques used in this thesis offer a good level of both 
validity and reliability. The next chapter begins the empirical analysis of the thesis by 
measuring and testing marginality in order to understand what it means to be a safe 








As explained in chapter one, both the media and academic researchers of constituency 
campaigning in the UK habitually focus upon marginal constituencies.  Political parties in 
the UK have limited resources to use at election time (whether physical or financial), which 
necessitates careful consideration of where best to deploy them. Much is made of marginal 
seats by the media both in the lead up to (for example Wintour, 2013) and during (Chivers, 
2010) election campaigns; although this is understandable as these constituencies are those 
most vulnerable to changing hands (and ultimately the party with the most seats wins power, 
Gallagher and Mitchell 2005). Existing research into the effectiveness of constituency 
campaigning (see Hands and Denver, 2004; Pattie and Johnston, 2009a) has echoed this, 
with researchers using marginal constituencies as their primary point of interest.  
This attention on marginal constituencies indicates the importance of marginality as a 
concept in contemporary UK general elections. It is also of vital importance to this thesis as 
it enables the identification of safe and marginal constituencies, central in a thesis that 
considers the potential impact of a lack of campaigning in safe constituencies. But what does 
marginality actually mean? Constituency marginality measures the relative degree of 
vulnerability to seat turnover. Jacobson (1987) operationalised it as the distance in vote share 
between the winning party and the party (or parties) in second place. The further apart the 
two parties are (i.e. the larger the majority), the safer the constituency, and vice versa. An 
important point to note is that the concept does not only refer to marginal constituencies, but 
rather to the full spectrum of vote proximity, from the most marginal to the safest. 
Conventionally the differentiation between safe and marginal constituencies (i.e. those more 
or less vulnerable to turnover) is simple in the UK context, with constituencies holding a 
majority of 9.99 percentage points and below classed as marginal, and those with a majority 
of 10 percentage points and above classified as safe. This cut-off was empirically tested by 
Cornford and Dorling (1997), and it was found to be remarkably accurate in identifying 
constituencies with a greater probability of changing hands.  
This chapter engages with not only what marginality means, but also offers evidence of its 
character, including its fluidity and origins. In short, this chapter provides the foundation for 
the rest of the analysis in this thesis by attempting to understand what types of constituencies 
are safe and marginal. It begins by considering the fundamental elements of marginality; in 
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defining the concept as a measure of vulnerability, the two operationalisations of marginality 
(vote proximity and seat turnover) are discussed with particular emphasis on seat turnover. 
Drawing on the (limited) existing literature, the merits of each element are appraised, before 
being applied to the data. The next section engages in detail with marginality in the UK 
between 1987 and 2010, using the conventional 9.99 percentage point cut-off to identify safe 
and marginal seats, with an additional five category disaggregation around it identifying 
degrees of marginality from ultra-marginal (4.99 or below) to ultra-safe (20 and above). By 
studying marginality over the period, this chapter argues that safe constituencies deserve 
greater attention from political parties and academic researchers because they consistently 
represent approximately the majority of all constituencies. When looking specifically at the 
ultra-safe constituencies (the safest category of all), this category alone represents around 
half of all seats.  
The third section of this chapter examines the fluid nature of marginality as a concept; an 
aspect which has remained implicit in existing research. As explained in the introduction to 
this thesis, the changing nature of marginality in my home constituency first excited my 
interest in safe seats: marginal constituencies do not always remain marginal, and safe 
constituencies are not always safe. This section traces marginality between 1987 and 2010 in 
two constituencies (the Isle of Wight and the Western Isles) not affected by boundary 
changes, demonstrating that constituencies quite often move between safe and marginal.  
The research here enables a more detailed understanding to be made of marginality by 
bringing together the limited research on marginality and applying empirical analysis to 
answer the first thesis sub-hypothesis that constituency marginality originates in the local 
population. In answering this, two additional hypotheses in regards to constituency 
characteristics associated with marginality are explored. The first, safe constituencies have a 
higher proportion of traditional party support bases than marginal constituencies, takes its 
influence from sociological theories of voter behaviour as set out in chapter two. Even in 
contemporary UK politics, it is possible to trace elements of sociological voter behaviour, 
with working class voters being more likely to vote Labour, whereas home-owners are more 
likely to vote Conservative (Dunleavy, 1979). These theories have been extended in this 
chapter to explain the origins of marginality by indicating that constituencies which contain 
the largest proportions of social groups traditionally associated with support for a particular 
party are more likely to be safe for that party. The second, safe constituencies have more 
stable populations than marginal constituencies, draws on the idea that regularly fluctuating 
levels of party support increase the likelihood of a seat being marginal. Safe constituencies 
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would therefore have largely stable populations, ensuring that levels of party support remain 
fairly constant. By using the influence of Putnam (1966) social groups which represent stable 




Marginality is a concept which can be used in many different ways in the social sciences, but 
particularly in measuring exclusion; from investigating social groups side-lined by society 
(Sibley, 1995) to the distance between centre and periphery in outlying regions (Huskey and 
Morehouse, 1992). In electoral politics, the concept means something quite different – 
instead of expressing exclusion, marginality measures the spectrum of constituency 
vulnerability to turnover (changing hands between parties) at an election (Jacobson, 1987), 
operationalised as the distance between the top two parties. The vote proximity of these 
parties enables a differentiation to be made between constituencies more vulnerable to 
turnover (marginal) and those which are perceived of as less likely to change hands (safe). 
This differentiation is based upon a conventional split of vote proximity, with constituencies 
where the previous majority is 9.99 percentage points or below classed as marginal, and 
constituencies where the majority is 10 percentage points or above are safe (Curtice and 
Steed, 1986:213; Lightbown and Mellows-Facer, 2009). If the top three parties are all within 
20% of each other, then a constituency is classed as a three-way marginal (Lightbown, 
2008). The conventional binary classification using the 9.99 percentage point cut-off has 
been extended by parties and researchers (Norris, 2009; 2010) to provide more detail, most 
commonly into a five category classification once again based on the vote proximity of the 
top two parties. These categories range from ultra-marginal (seats with a majority of 4.99 
percentage points and below), progressing in regular increments (with 9.99 retained as the 
cut-off between marginal and safe constituencies) to ultra-safe seats (those with a majority of 
20 percentage points and above). For example, going into the 2010 general election, the most 
marginal constituency (ultra-marginal) was Gillingham and Rainham with a majority of 0.03 
percentage points (15 votes), whereas the safest seat (ultra-safe) was Easington with a 
majority of 58.39 (equating to 18,874 votes).  Marginality not only identifies if a 
constituency is safe, but indicates exactly how safe it is and consequently what impact this 
might have on the campaign – a constituency facing an election with a majority of 15 votes 





Testing the role of seat turnover in the definition of marginality 
 
Seat turnover is vital to change in a FPTP system which relies on simple majorities, which is 
why it forms such an important part of the concept of marginality. As Lutz (1991:721) 
argues, it is the ‘local nature of competition’ in the UK which makes marginality so 
important in FPTP systems. Whereas in proportional systems, the election result is decided 
on the basis of the national vote share (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005), in simple majority 
systems like the UK, winning at the local level matters as the party who wins the most 
constituencies wins power. However, this is not to say that marginality does not exist in 
other systems, just that it does not have the same impact. For example, in the 2002 general 
election in Ireland (Kavanagh, 2005:5) in which a Single Transferable Vote  system is in use, 
there were seven constituencies where the candidate won by an extremely small margin (in 
Limerick West there was a single vote).  
Curtice and Steed (1986:216) attributed marginality to electoral geography, with the 
migration of social classes from urban to rural environments making constituencies more 
likely to be safe. This migration was ‘class selective’ (Curtice and Steed 1982: 261) and 
created territorial cleavages which they linked to the drop in constituencies changing hands 
at elections. Norris and Crewe challenged this, proposing that marginality was one important 
element, but not the sole factor in causing a constituency to change hands; rather it was a 
combination of factors including incumbency and swing. They also provided evidence that 
despite the decline in marginal constituencies, constituencies continued to change hands.  
 
This thesis draws links between marginality and seat turnover; marginality is a measure of 
vulnerability and seats are vulnerable to seat turnover.  To demonstrate the salience of seat 
turnover as a component of marginality, a dataset for all six elections under was created 
which included a binary variable indicating whether a constituency had changed hands. This 
variable was entered into an independent samples t-test as the grouping variable, with the test 
variable being previous majority (i.e. a measure of the proximity of the first and second 
parties). The results of this independent samples t-test demonstrate a significant difference in 
the mean previous vote shares between constituencies that changed hands at elections 
between 1987 and 2010.  For constituencies which had changed hands, the average vote 
proximity was 9.87%, which interestingly fits well into the arbitrary definition of marginal 
constituencies. In contrast, the average vote share for constituencies that did not change 
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hands over the period was considerably higher at 23.14%. The t-test statistic (28.99**) 
demonstrates that this difference in vote proximity between seats that changed hands and 
those that did not is significant. Therefore, the evidence indicates that constituencies which 
changed hands at elections between 1987 and 2010 tended to be significantly more marginal 
than those that did not.  
 
To examine this in more detail, the continuous measure of marginality (previous majorities) 
used above was divided into the five disaggregated categories of marginality from ultra-
marginal (up to 4.99 majority) to ultra-safe (20 majority and above). This enables an 
examination to be made of how marginal or safe the constituencies changing hands are. 
Table 4.1 displays the cross tabulations between these five categories and the binary variable 
indicating seat turnover, with the expectation, drawing on the role of vote proximity in the 
concept of marginality, that ultra-marginal constituencies had the highest rate of seat 
turnover and ultra-safe constituencies had the lowest rate.  As expected, the results from the 
table show that the safer the seat, the lower the proportion of constituencies that changed 
hands. For ultra-marginal constituencies, 30.8% of constituencies over the entire period 
changed hands, against 5.1% of ultra-safe constituencies. The results of a chi-square 
conducted for the variables (x
2
= 294.311**) also indicates that these differences between the 
five categories are significant. 
Table 4.1: Seat turnover and five categories of marginality 1987-2010 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
 
As the table makes clear, it is not possible to state that all constituencies that change hands 
are marginal. Even though in comparison to more marginal categories of constituency the 
figure of 5.1% of ultra-safe constituencies changing hands is miniscule, this still means that 
between 1987 and 2010, 96 constituencies in the safest possible category changed hands,  






Fairly safe Very safe Ultra-safe 
Turnover 30.8% (134) 24.1% (112) 13.5% (67) 10.4% (54) 5.1% (96) 
No Change 69.2% (301) 75.9% (352) 86.5% (428) 89.6% (465) 
94.9% 
(1792) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
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these results indicate that seat turnover is an important factor in defining constituency 
marginality, with marginal constituencies significantly more likely to change hands.  
 
The concept of marginality encompasses measures of how vulnerable constituencies are to 
changing hands during elections by measuring the vote proximity of the top two parties. It is 
clear that marginal constituencies are more likely than safe constituencies to change hands, 
particularly when looking at the extremes of the spectrum of marginality. Following the 
example of conventional differentiations between marginal and safe seats, as well as 
different categories of marginality, this thesis uses the 9.99 percentage point cut-off to 
identify safe constituencies, as well as the associated five category disaggregation. The use 
of this data is influenced by the testing of Cornford and Dorling (1997) as well as a desire to 
make this study comparable to existing research into constituency campaigning. 
 
The state of marginality in the UK 1987-2010 
 
Historically, safe constituencies have comprised the majority of seats in the UK, with Curtice 
and Steed (1986:214) concluding that at elections between 1955 and 1983, not only were the 
majority of constituencies safe, but their numbers were increasing. Over this time period the 
percentage of constituencies classified as safe had actually risen from 72.8% and peaked at 
86.8 percent going into the 1983 election. They concluded as ‘extremely unlikely’ (1986: 
216) the prospect of any reversal of this decline in the number of marginal seats. This was 
echoed by studies on Congressional Elections in the USA, where authors (Mayhew, 1974; 
Cover and Mayhew, 1977) discovered that the number of competitive Congressional districts 
had declined considerably. These conclusions should be interpreted with some caution 
however; as discussed above, Curtice and Steed use a slightly different definition of 
marginality more appropriate for two party politics and the American studies also rely on a 
two-party definition. Norris and Crewe (1994:216) examined the growth in safe 
constituencies using the more conventional 9.99 percentage point cut-off used in this thesis, 
discovering that between 1983 and 1992 the number of safe constituencies had risen by five 
percentage points. Nevertheless, the basis of the argument is clear: safe constituencies have 
historically represented the majority of constituencies in the UK.  
 
Graph 4.1 examines the frequency of safe and marginal constituencies at elections between 
1987 and 2010 by using a binary variable identifying safe and marginal constituencies 
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according to the 9.99 percentage point cut-off. Once again, where there had been large-scale 
boundary changes prior to the 1997, 2005 and 2010 general elections, notional majorities 
were used.  
Graph 4.1: Marginal and safe constituencies 1987-2010 
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Results are % 
The results show that safe constituencies have consistently comprised the vast majority of 
constituencies in the UK at each election during the period.  During all election campaigns 
except 1997 and 2010, safe constituencies represented over three-quarters of all UK 
constituencies, and for those two years they still represented over 73% of constituencies. The 
peak in the number of safe seats was going into the 2005 election campaign when they 
comprised 80.4% of all constituencies, but at the 2010 campaign there was a drop of 7.3 
percentage points in the number of safe seats to 73.1%, the lowest percentage of safe seats 
over the period. Nevertheless, in 2010 there were still 291 more safe constituencies than 
marginal, despite this fall in the number of safe seats. Curtice and Steed (1986:218) observed 
patterns in marginality between 1955 and 1983 and had seen a significant rise in the number 
of safe seats to a peak of 86.8% during the 1983 campaign. They believed that the number of 
marginal constituencies would continue to decline from 1983 onwards until early in the 21
st
 
century when they would comprise no more than 5 percent of seats. This is not borne out by 
the evidence, with the proportion of marginal and safe constituencies remaining generally 
stable and reinforced by evidence from the USA (Jacobson, 1987). Caution should be taken 
here as the definition of safe and marginal constituencies as used by the authors is slightly 
different from the one used in this thesis, referring as it does to an era of two-party politics.  
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That the decline in marginal constituencies has not been as steep as Curtice and Steed 
envisaged could also be attributed to another factor: the growth of third party politics. What 
were the relatively small Social Democrat and Liberal parties at the time of their writing 
have grown considerably, firstly under the banner of the SDP-Liberal Alliance before their 
merger which created the Liberal Democrats in March 1988 (Whiteley, Seyd and 
Billingshurst, 2006), in addition to Plaid Cymru, the Scottish National Party and the Green 
Party, who gained their first MP Caroline Lucas in 2010 (BBC, 2010a). It would be 
reasonable to assume that the increased popularity of these smaller parties has divided the 
old two-party support amongst a greater number of parties, and would therefore increase the 
number of marginal constituencies. There is more scope for seats to change hands in 
multiparty systems, as multiple parties presents voters with a wider range of policy positions 
to pick from (as envisaged by Downs, 1957), dispersing the vote. This would make it far 
more difficult for constituencies to be safe, yet this is difficult to assess as parties may not 
compete across a multiparty system (Linzer, 2012: 402). In the UK, safe seats still represent 
the majority of constituencies, and this proportion has been relatively stable between 1987 
and 2010. One explanation for this is that the relative stability observed in the numbers of 
safe and marginal constituencies could actually be interpreted as an arrested decline in the 
number of marginal constituencies. Researchers like Curtice and Steed predicted the 
continuing fall in the number of marginal constituencies, but the growth of smaller parties 
has offset this and kept the numbers relatively stable.  
 
Despite the vast majority of constituencies in the UK being safe, this is not reflected in the 
attention paid to them by existing literature on constituency campaigning (see Cutts, 2011; 
Fisher and Denver, 2009); rather it is the comparatively small number of marginal 
constituencies that receive disproportionate attention. This of course, is logical; if a study is 
seeking to examine whether campaigning is effective, then it is reasonable to concentrate on 
those seats where it is intense. Yet the sheer volume of safe constituencies at elections over 
the period offers persuasive evidence for why they deserve more attention.  To examine the 
proportions of safe and marginal constituencies in further detail, table 4.2 takes the basic 
data distinguishing safe and marginal constituencies set out in graph  4.1 above  with the 
9.99 percentage point cut-off between the definitions and disaggregates the data into the five 







Table 4.2: Constituencies in the five categories of marginality 1987-2010  
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804. N in parentheses 
 
 
The data reveal that not only are the vast majority of constituencies in the UK consistently 
safe, the majority of constituencies are ultra-safe (highlighted in the table). Therefore, during 
election campaigns between 1987 and 2010, most constituencies in the UK had a majority of 
20 percentage points and above. Indeed during the period many constituencies had majorities 
well above this; going into the 2010 election alone, Rhondda had a majority of 52.14 
percentage points (16,242 votes), and Barnsley East’s majority was 56.94 percentage points 
(18,298 votes) for example. Of the six elections under examination, ultra-safe constituencies 
represented over half of all constituencies at four of them. The highest proportion of ultra-
safe constituencies was found at the 1992 election at 51.7%, and the lowest during the 2010 
campaign at 42.3% which still represents the largest number of constituencies in the five 
categories by twofold.   
Vote proximity is important to the concept of marginality, and it is interesting to explore the 
type of competition between the parties in first and second place. Table 4.3 displays 
battleground categories codified for the period. These categories cover all types of 
competition – from safe constituencies, to two and three-way marginal seats. Types of 
political battlegrounds in marginal constituencies have some continuity and fluctuation over 
the period. Overall, a marginal constituency in the period 1987 to 2010 was most likely to be 
a battleground between the Conservatives and Labour (with either party first or second). This 
is unsurprising - it not only confirms their status as the two major political parties in the 









11.9 (75) 11.2 (71) 13.4 (86) 12.6 (83) 11.8 (74) 11.9 (75) 
Fairly safe 
(10-14.99%) 
12.5 (79) 12.5 (79) 11.1 (71) 12.9 (85) 15.8 (99) 13.0 (82) 
Very safe 
(15-19.99%) 
13.1 (83) 12.5 (79) 14.1 (90) 11.1 (73) 13.1 (82) 17.7 (112) 
Ultra safe 
(20% +) 
50.5 (319) 51.7 (328) 49.7 (318) 50.6 (333) 51.5 (323) 42.3 (267) 
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United Kingdom, but also reflects trends in national incumbency. For example, marginal 
seats in which the Conservatives held first place and Labour were second peaked at the 1992 
election. This peak, combined with the retrospective knowledge that the Conservatives were 
to lose the following election, suggests that some constituencies which had previously been 
safe (which as the Conservatives were the nationally incumbent party, were more likely to be 
Conservative held) had become marginal. 
Table 4.3: Types of constituency battlegrounds  
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Safe 76.1 (1.5) 76.8 (4) 74.7 (19.7) 76.7 (1.2) 78.8 (2.8) 73.1 (7.6) 
      Marginal 
Con/Lab 4.0 (12.0) 7.2 (40) 10.2 (100) 5.8 (0) 4.1 (0) 4.0 (0) 
Con/Lib 1.9 ( (16.7) 2.3 (26.7) 1.7 (100) 2.5 (18.8) 2.6 (18.8) 2.4 (20) 
Con/Other 0.6 (100) 0.2 (0) 0.5 (100) N/A 0.2 (0) N/A 
Lab/Con 4.9 (6.5) 6.1 (2.5) 9.4 (0) 8.0 (11.8) 7.8 (53.1) 9.4 (84.7) 
Lab/Lib N/A 0.5 (0) 0.3 (0) 0.3 (0) 0.5 (66.7) 1.0 (0) 
Lab/Other N/A 0.2 (0) N/A 0.3 (50) 0.3 (100) 0.3 (50) 
Lib/Con 0.9 (33.3) 0.8 (0) 0.8 (0) 2.0 (15.4) 2.1 (15.4) 2.4 (26.7) 
Lib/Lab N/A 0.5 (0) 0.2 (100) 0.2 (0) 0.2 (0) 1.1 (14.3) 
Lib/Other 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 0.2 (0) 
Other 
N/A 0.11 (14.2) 
0.3 (0) 0.2 (0) 0.2 (0) .06 (50) 
3-way marginal 11.6 (32.9) 4.5 (27.6) 2.0 (46.2) 4.1 (7.7) 3.3 (28.6) 5.7 (47.2) 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note: 9.99% cut-off point between safe and marginal constituencies used. Percentage 
changing hands in parentheses 
 
Going into the 1987 election, marginal seats were most likely to be three-way, making up 
11.6% of seats, with Lab/Con and Con/Lab seats in second and third place. However, by the 
1992 election, the percentage of three-way marginal seats had more than halved to 4.5%. 
Instead, marginal constituencies were most likely to be either Con/Lab (7.2%) or Lab/Con 
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(6.2%) seats. This pattern of three-way marginal seats being the third most likely category of 
marginal constituencies behind constituencies battling between Labour and Conservative 
holds for the rest of the period. 
 
Tracing marginality over time 
 
Safe seats should not be taken for granted by political parties or researchers; an 
underappreciated aspect of marginality is its fluidity, with constituencies not only changing 
hands, but also varying in their degree of marginality over time. To illustrate this fluidity in 
more detail, the marginality histories of two constituencies have been tracked across the 
1987 to 2010 period.  
Between 1987 and 2010 there have been several major boundary changes (prior to the 1997, 
2005 and 2010 elections) which dramatically reduce the number of constituencies in which 
it was possible to trace marginality. These changes mean that very few constituency 
populations have covered identical geographical areas over the entire period. Some changes 
have been relatively minor (such as the movement of a single ward to another constituency), 
while others have rendered existing constituencies unrecognisable (for example York Outer, 
a major restructuring of three constituencies for the 2010 election); a measure of degrees of 
change has been calculated for all boundary changes over the period by Rallings and 
Thrasher (1995, 2007) and Denver, Rallings and Thrasher (2004). Constituency boundaries 
are changed to reflect the ‘continuing population movement from the cities into more rural 
areas’ (Rallings and Thrasher, 2007:3), and they matter when tracing marginality because 
they offer a defined space in which to measure voter behaviour. To illustrate the fluidity of 
marginality over time, two constituencies that have seen their boundaries remain unchanged 
between 1987 and 2010 have been selected: the Isle of Wight and Na H-Eileanan An Iar 
(formerly the Western Isles).  
The Isle of Wight constituency, off the south coast of England, has existed unchanged since 
the Great Reform Act of 1832. As part of recent proposals by the coalition government to 
review constituency boundaries, the Boundary Commission proposed that the constituency 
be divided into two, with part joining up with the mainland (Boundary Commission, 2013). 
After a concerted effort by the current MP Andrew Turner supported by the ‘One Wight’ 
campaign (BBC, 2011), the proposals were adjusted to give the Isle of Wight two MPs and 
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no sharing with the mainland. These changes have now been postponed until 2018 at the 
earliest (BBC, 2013). Attempts have been made over the years to divide the Isle into two 
constituencies, particularly as it has often deviated significantly from the imposed 
population quotas. Indeed, after the 2010 boundary revisions, it was the only constituency in 
the UK with a deviation of above 15% from the quota (Rallings and Thrasher, 2007). 
The constituency has historically changed hands between the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats. At the start of the period covered by this thesis, the Liberal MP Stephen Ross 
had been the incumbent since 1974, but going into the 1987 election he was defending a 
majority of just 4.65 percent, making the constituency ultra-marginal. The Conservatives 
gained the seat at the 1987 election, making it a fairly marginal constituency with a majority 
of 8.20 percentage points, before seeing the seat once more become an ultra-marginal seat at 
the 1992 election. The Liberal Democrats gained the seat once again at the 1997 election, but 
the constituency still remained marginal. The patterns in the latter three elections of the 
period are particularly interesting, however; the Conservatives gained the seat at the 2001 
election with a 4.50 percentage point majority, making it an ultra-marginal seat. 2005 saw 
the Conservatives retain the seat, but with a massively increased majority of 19.42 
percentage points. In a single election, the constituency had gone from an ultra-marginal to a 
very safe Conservative seat, and despite a slight fall to 14.98 at the 2010 election, the seat 
remains safe. So, in four of the six elections over the period under study, the Isle of Wight 
had been a marginal constituency changing hands between two parties, but in the latter two 
elections, the formerly marginal seat has become a safe seat. 
 
While the Isle of Wight is the largest constituency in the UK under current constituency 
boundaries, the other selected constituency which has remained unchanged throughout the 
1987 to 2010 period is the smallest (and also an island constituency). The Western Isles 
(renamed Na H-Eileanan An Iar in 2005) has existed in its present form since 1918 and has 
alternated between the Scottish National Party and Labour since 1935. Like the Isle of 
Wight, the constituency has also moved between being marginal and safe. Going into the 
1987 election, the incumbent SNP MP Donald Stewart was defending a majority of 24.47 
percentage points, making the Western Isles an ultra-safe constituency. However, Calum 
MacDonald gained the seat for Labour at the 1987 election and held it until the 2005 general 
election when Angus MacNeil won it for the SNP. The seat was fairly safe going into both 
the 1992 and 1997 elections, although in the latter, the majority was only .63 percentage 
points away from the cut-off point between marginal and safe seats. Calum MacDonald had 
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gained a 22.2 percentage point majority at the 1997 election, which meant that the 
constituency was once more ultra-safe; this did not last, with a rapid drop to become a fairly 
marginal seat (8.20) going into the 2005 election. The constituency once more became fairly 
safe after the 2005 and 2010 elections. 
 
The origins of marginality 
 
Although safe constituencies have consistently represented the vast majority of 
constituencies in the UK, the reason why constituencies have different degrees of 
marginality is not explained in detail by existing research. Constituencies are classified as 
marginal or safe according to their degree of vulnerability; i.e. how large their majority is 
going into an election campaign. As a constituency’s marginality depends entirely on the 
percentage majority, it would be reasonable to trace the origins of marginality directly back 
to the voters themselves. Existing research also links voters and constituency marginality, 
with Curtice and Steed (1986:216) arguing that the reasons for an increase in safe 
constituencies were changes in the local population, specifically population migration from 
cities to rural areas, with Denver, Hands and MacAllister (2003) also drawing clear links 
between marginality and socio-demographics. 
This section examines the first sub-hypothesis of this thesis that constituency marginality 
originates in the local population. As seen in chapter one, there are three schools of thought 
(sociological, socio-psychological and rational choice) that try to explain voter behaviour, 
evidence for all of which can be observed in the UK, although in this thesis sociological and 
rational choice theories of voting are favoured. By linking population composition with 
percentage majority, social group membership offers two potential explanations for 
marginality. The first nested hypothesis to be explored in this section is safe constituencies 
have a higher proportion of traditional party support bases than marginal constituencies. 
This question considers whether the presence of certain social groups in a constituency are 
more likely to make it safe or marginal for particular parties. Historically there have been 
links drawn between social groups and the likelihood of voting for certain parties, 
particularly in the case of class voting in the UK (Evans, 2000). It follows that if there is a 
significant proportion of a social group with ties to support for a specific party in a seat, it is 
more likely to be safe for that party. 
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The second nested hypothesis explored in this section is safe constituencies have more stable 
populations than marginal constituencies. By identifying key social groups associated with 
population stability, using the influence of theories of social integration by Putnam (1966), 
the likelihood that safe constituencies have more stable populations can be examined. If 
social groups (in the UK context, particularly class) matter when determining voter 
behaviour, then perhaps a high turnover of certain groups impacts the ability of a secure 
basis of party support to be maintained. After all, Curtice and Steed saw changes in 
constituency populations to be responsible for fluctuations in national patterns of 
marginality. 
 
Social bases for the vote in safe constituencies 
 
By linking levels of traditional social bases of parties support with marginality, sociological 
theories of voter behaviour are drawn upon. If social groups are so important in determining 
how people vote, and certain social groups are associated with support for particular parties, 
then it follows that if people in group x vote for party x, then constituencies with higher 
proportions of group x are likely to be safe for party x. Bealey, Blondel and McCann (1965) 
considered the influence of locally dominant (in numbers) classes on the minority class, 
discovering that in a constituency, the larger class group changes the behaviour of the 
smaller class group, with routine workers (a Labour support indicator) in a non- routine 
constituency (indicating Conservative support) adjusting their voting behaviour and being 
more likely to vote Conservative.  
The question is how best to define social group membership in the UK, as it has been shown 
to be markedly different from the USA (Andersen and Heath, 2000). In Butler and Stokes’ 
seminal work (1969) on UK voter behaviour, the authors examined the bases of Labour and 
Conservative party support. They found that social bases of voting had ‘frozen’ in the inter-
war period, with working class voters typically voting Labour and middle class voters voting 
Conservative, with some interaction between party policy and sources of support (Clarke, 
Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, 2004: 31). Class proved to be the primary social base for 
voting in the UK context, as Pulzer (1972:102). memorably states that 'class is the basis of 
British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail' Further research confirmed this 
view, with Kelley, MacAllister and Mughan (1985:720) concluding that ‘the British system 
is the proto- typical example of class-based politics’. 
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There is some disagreement in regards to the continued importance of class as an explanation 
for voter behaviour.  Since the 1960s, the class system has changed considerably with a 
decline in manufacture (and therefore routine workers) accompanying a rise in white-collar 
jobs and the growth of the middle class (Crewe, Särlvik and Alt, 1977). These changes have 
affected the ability of class to explain voter behaviour, with Butler and Stokes (1974:203) 
considering this trend to be ‘one of the most important aspects of political change’ in the 
1970s. These changes in the class system have arguably affected the explanatory power of 
class on voter behaviour in the UK, impacting on the argument that safer constituencies are 
more likely to represent traditional (class) bases of party support. 
 
There is some disagreement with the decline in importance of class in UK voter behaviour. 
While some authors (Evans, 2000) argue that class itself has been miss-specified and the true 
impact of class on contemporary political choice has been underestimated, others argue that 
the influence of class remains key. Kelley et al., (1985:721) suggest that to capture class 
sufficiently, a mixture of dimensions are important, not only drawing on traditional 
occupational indicators, but also other indicators such as education, and home-ownership. By 
restricting class to a single aspect of class like occupational classifications, studies are 
neglecting ‘important aspects of class’ (Kelley et al., 1985:721) leading to biased results.  
Such redefinitions have ‘saved the relationship’ (Clark and Lipset, 2001: 6; also see Clarke 
and Lipset 1993) between class and voter behaviour by extending the concept beyond the 
division between non-routine and routine labour (creating what Dunleavy, 1979: 412 refers 
to as ‘core classes’), making it relevant to contemporary UK voter behaviour. Home 
ownership has been proven to have a strong link to class (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Garrahan, 
1977), with middle class home owners tending to vote Conservative and working class 
council tenants tending to vote Labour. If the older occupation-driven definition of class is 
utilised, class still holds resonance in influencing voter behaviour, even though it may be less 
important than before. This is indicated by Crewe’s (1986) figures on class dealignment 
which demonstrate that even amidst the decline of class voting between 1945 and 1983, it 
continued to explain around half of voter behaviour. 
 
Following the example of Kelley et al. (1985), three variables have been identified to 
measure the relationship between social groups (operationalised as class) and safe 
constituencies. Two (the proportions of professionals and routine workers) are traditional 
class indicators, and if there is a link between bases of party support and marginality a higher 
proportion of routine workers in safe Labour constituencies and higher proportions of 
professionals in Conservative (and to a slightly lesser extent Liberal Democrat) safe 
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constituencies would be expected. Also drawing on the influence of Kelley et al. (1985) a 
third variable measuring the proportion of owner-occupiers in a constituency is also studied 
and higher proportions of owner-occupiers in Conservative and Liberal Democrat safe 
constituencies would be expected. 
To test this, the datasets for each year were divided according to which party was incumbent 
going into each election. Bivariate correlations were run (see table 4.4) between the class 
indicators for each incumbency and percentage majority at the previous election (to measure 
marginality).  By doing this it is possible to examine whether the indicators coincide with 
safer constituencies held by particular parties and whether these echo traditional support 
sources for those parties. From the results, the hypothesis on higher levels of traditional party 
support bases in safe constituencies is partly supported for Conservative constituencies. In 
regards to traditional occupation-derived measures of class, the variables for routine workers 
in the majority of the elections over the period appear to support the expected relationships. 
The safer the Conservative constituency became, the lower the number of routine workers. 
These results suggest that at the majority of elections during the period, safe Conservative 
constituencies followed traditional social bases of the vote more closely than their marginal 
constituencies, having lower proportions of routine workers. When exploring the proportion 
of owner occupiers, in Conservative constituencies the correlation is significant for half of 
the elections under study and in the expected direction. This indicates that at the 1992, 1997 
and 2010 election campaigns, safer Conservative constituencies were more likely to have 
higher proportions of owner occupiers than more marginal Conservative-held constituencies, 











Table 4.4: Bivariate correlations between social class and previous majority according 




1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Conservative        
Owner 
Occupiers 
.082** .079 .135* .271** .042 -.059 .148* 
Routine -.152** -.180** -.074 -.453** -.071 -.226** -.253** 
Labour        
Owner 
Occupiers 
-.069** -.040 .027 -.251** -.251** -.368** -.303** 
Routine .283** .038 .168* .522** .165* .232** .422** 
Liberal Democrat     
Owner 
Occupiers 
-.156* -.235 .136 -.167 -.275 -.374** -.082 
Routine .056 -0.57 -.204 -.066 -.143 -.033 .281* 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
These social bases of party support also appear to hold for the Labour Party. In a mirror-
image of Conservative constituencies, the table shows that over the entire period safe Labour 
constituencies had higher proportions of routine workers than more marginal Labour 
constituencies, with significant results recorded in all elections except 1987. However, like 
the results for the Conservative, none of these correlations are particularly strong. Indeed, 
only the results for 1997 and 2010 are moderately correlated, with all others weakly 
correlated. The additional measure of owner-occupiers in the constituency also follows the 
expected direction in all elections except 1992. A negative relationship was expected as 
historically Labour supporters have low levels of home ownership (Seyd and Whiteley, 
1992), although the relationship was significant only from 1997 onwards (and moderate in 
2005 alone).  
This delineation of class politics leaves little room for a middle party such as the Liberal 
Democrats especially when that party is ‘relatively classless’ (Whiteley, Seyd and 
Billingshurst, 2006:7). As Whiteley, Seyd and Billingshurst argue, the basis of Liberal 
Democrat support is not necessarily class, but rather geography, with concentrations of 
Liberal Democrat constituencies in both the South West of England in Scotland. There has 
been no constant class link in regards to policies as the party’s policy positions have shifted 
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historically from right to left. While Liberal Democrat party members have high incomes 
and high levels of education (Whiteley et al., 2006: 36), there has always been a mismatch 
between people who chose to be members of parties and those who are not members but vote 
for the party (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson, 1994). Using data 
from the British Election Study of 1997, 23% of Liberal Democrat voters are in routine 
occupations and the party is supported particularly by younger voters. Due to the classless 
nature of Liberal Democrat support, the correlations were not expected to reflect any 
particular trends. This proved to be the case, with only two significant results over the entire 
period. 
Overall, safe constituencies were more likely to have higher levels of traditional social bases 
of the votes for each party than more marginal constituencies. Safer Conservative 
constituencies have lower levels of routine workers than in their marginal constituencies and 
the relationship is mirrored in safer Labour constituencies which tend to have higher levels 
of routine workers. These conclusions reflect the findings of Johnston, Pattie, Cutts and 
Fisher, (2012) who in their examination of party contacting in 2010 found that traditional 
social bases continued to matter in UK politics. 
 
Population stability and constituency security 
 
Once again drawing on the centrality of social groups in the sociological model of voter 
behaviour, this section examines whether population stability is key in explaining 
constituency marginality. A high level of change in the population, indicated by a high 
proportion of mobile social groups, may make a constituency more marginal because levels 
of party support are continually fluctuating beyond a natural variation in support. Safe 
constituencies are therefore more likely to have a stable population, whereas marginal 
constituencies are more likely to have a changeable population. To explore this, Putnam’s 
research (1966) on social integration is used to identify social groups which can be examined 
for signs of population stability. His research argued that integration is key to stability.  An 
individual who has created ties to the local area and is well integrated into the local 
community is more likely to remain in the area than someone who has not engaged with the 
area. Therefore, members of less well-integrated groups are more likely to comprise the non-
permanent population. Putnam suggests operationalising social integration through various 
measures including directly examining the levels of migration in the area, as well as more 
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indirect ones. These include measuring the enrolment of children in local schools (parents 
are unlikely to seek to move from the local area once their child is attending school) and 
whether the respondent is a homeowner instead of a tenant (on the assumption that tenants 
can move relatively easily).  
Taking influence from Putnam’s operationalisation of social integration, three variables 
were selected to measure population stability: the proportion of owner occupiers, the 
proportion of under 18 year olds and the proportion of migrants. To initially examine 
whether safe constituencies are more likely to have stable populations, bivariate correlations 
were run to examine general trends across the period.  
Table 4.5: Bivariate correlations between social integration and marginality 
 1987-2010 
Owner occupiers -.080** 
Under 18s .010 
Migrants -.115** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
The results of the correlations for the social integration indicators display significant results 
for those two which are in the direction expected. The proportion of migrants (defined as 
those with a different address 12 months previously) in a constituency was correlated with 
percentage majority to examine the relationship between population stability and marginality 
directly. Putnam’s research indicated that a high proportion of migrants would equal a less 
integrated (and by extension less stable) population, which would be expected to be 
associated with more marginal constituencies (i.e. as the percentage majority decreases). The 
results show a negative correlation of -.115 significant to p<0.01, which although very weak 
is in the expected direction; so safe constituencies have a lower proportion of migrants than 
marginal seats. Putnam’s research also suggested that home owners were more integrated 
into the constituency as they had actively invested in it, making it more difficult to move; 
applying this to the present research would mean that safe constituencies were more likely to 
have higher proportions of owner occupiers. The data does not support this (-.080 significant 
at p<0.01), showing that the variable is weakly and negatively correlated with previous 
majority. This section hypothesised that higher levels of under 18s would indicate a more 
settled population, as it would identify school-age children (variables directly examining 
school attendance were absent) whose parents may be less likely to move due to their school 
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attendance. The results do appear to support this, albeit with only a marginally positive 
correlation of .010, this is not a significant correlation however.  
Of these correlations, only two are in the expected direction and all are very weak. 
Considering why the relationship between population stability and marginality has not 
produced more conclusive results, it would appear that there are two main factors inhibiting 
the relationship. The first is the mismatch between theory and the actual UK context which 
presents significant complicating factors. As seen in the previous section, class plays a key 
role not only in determining voter behaviour, but also seems to be related to constituency 
marginality, with safe constituencies representing typical sources of party support. The 
traditional indicator for class is occupation, specifically the difference between non-routine 
and routine workers. However, in maintaining the relevance of class as a concept in 
contemporary UK voter behaviour the concept has been extended by authors such as (Kelley, 
MacAllister and Mughan, 1985) to consider additional variables including home-ownership. 
Butler and Stokes (1969) discovered links between those in non-routine jobs, home 
ownership and voting for the Conservatives.  
This link between owner-occupiers and Conservative support in the UK presents a 
fundamental obstacle in applying Putnam’s theories of social integration to understanding 
marginality. Consistently through the period, the very safest constituencies have been held 
by Labour – the very safest being Bootle at the 1997 general election which was held with a 
majority of 74.36. However, when analysing the typology of Labour support, Labour voters 
are more likely to be tenants as Dunleavy (1979) suggests, with Bootle’s population of 
owner occupiers 18.5 percentage points lower than the average at the 1997 election. 
Therefore there is a mismatch between Putnam’s theory of social integration and theories on 
party support; it is not possible to say that higher levels of home ownership cause 
constituencies to be safer.    
To explore the explanatory power of socio-demographic variables in explaining marginality 
in the UK a linear regression was undertaken with marginality as the dependent variable, 
while the demographic variables examined in both the section on party support and 
population stability were added in stages. This was undertaken over the entire period from 
1987 to 2010, with four variables in total entered; owner occupiers, routine workers, 
migrants and under 18s. As table 4.4 indicated, incumbency affects the relationship between 
socio-demographics and marginality. To counter this, binary control variables indicating 
which of the three parties are incumbent in the constituencies have also been entered, with 
the results are shown in table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6: Regression examining the impact of socio-demographic variables on 
marginality 
 1987-2010 
Owner occupiers -.200** (021) 
Routine workers .301** (.061) 
Under 18s -.390** (.057) 
Migrants -.602** (.071) 
Conservative-held 2.873 (2.531) 
Labour-held 6.027* (2.5256) 




Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
All demographic variables entered into the regression had a significant effect on variations in 
marginality. Migrants explained the highest proportion of such variation at 1.8 percentage 
points, followed by under 18s (1.7 percentage points), routine workers (.08 percentage 
points) and owner occupiers (.07 percentage points). Of the four variables, three are 
negative, which indicates that as the proportion of owners migrants and under 18s increased, 
marginality (i.e. previous majority) decreases – therefore safe constituencies have lower 
proportions of these groups than marginal seats. In contrast, safe seats have higher 
proportions of routine workers, echoing the link above between Labour (with their traditional 
support bases in such workers) and the safest seats. The control indicating Labour-held seats 
is also significantly related to marginality, with the direction indicating that Labour-held 
constituencies have significantly higher majorities than seats held by other parties. However, 
the explanatory power of the variables was low, explaining only five percentage points of 
marginality, with the incumbency controls adding another 2.2 percentage points. This is most 
likely due to the narrow focus of the regression on the origin of marginality in the 
constituency population; the regression has therefore discounted other factors including 
historical marginality as investigated by Cornford and Dorling (1997) as well as the majority 
from the previous election. Nevertheless, the regression indicates that five percent of 







Marginality and local electoral outcomes 
 
Campaigning is an important intervening variable between marginality and local electoral 
outcomes. It is not only affected by constituency marginality, but also has an impact on local 
electoral outcomes. It is therefore important, before campaigning is introduced in the next 
chapter, to consider the theoretical origins and empirical evidence of the direct relationship 
between marginality and local electoral outcomes, operationalised in two dimensions as 
turnout and vote share.  
The relationship between marginality and turnout has its roots in rational choice theories of 
voting behaviour. Based on the balance between costs and benefits, turnout will increase 
where the costs associated with voting are outweighed by the benefits it provides to citizens. 
Marginality is important when discussing the benefits of voting in the rational choice model; 
the closer the top two parties are (i.e. the more marginal the constituency) the greater the 
likelihood of casting the decisive vote, so higher levels of turnout should correspond with 
more marginal constituencies. There is empirical evidence, particularly from the USA, 
Canada and the UK, indicating that there is a relationship between marginality and turnout at 
the constituency level. Various American authors have presented persuasive evidence that 
the closer the election is, the higher the resulting turnout is across the US electoral system, 
including Congress (Caldera, Patterson and Markko, 1985) and the House of Representatives 
(Gillam Jr., 1985; Cox and Munger, 1989). In the UK context, Denver and Hands (1974, 
1985) examined in detail the relationship between marginality and turnout in the UK during 
the 1970s, clearly linking the two variables as far back as their studies would allow (1966). 
Several studies have built on these fluctuations, with many recording a weaker relationship 
between marginality and turnout in the early 1990s (Denver, 1995; Pattie and Johnston, 
1998a; 1998b), although by the late 1990s the relationship was once again strong.  
The link between the two variables between 1987 and 2010 was established for this thesis by 
carrying out bivariate correlations between marginality and turnout. A negative relationship 
is expected, with turnout declining as the percentage majority rises. The results of these 
correlations show a significant relationship (p<.001) in the expected direction, although at -
.325 it is fairly modest, which is consistent with the comparative weakness already observed 
by literature in both 1987 and 1992. To explore whether this may be the case, I ran 
correlations for the individual election years (the results are shown in table 4.7), with the 
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results for all years being significant to .001 and in the expected direction, with 
constituencies with higher turnout having lower previous majorities.  
 
Table 4.7: Bivariate correlations between marginality and turnout  
 1987-2010 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Marginality -.325** -.121** -.113** -.253** -.679** -.694** -.480** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
 
There is a considerable degree of variation in the strength of the relationship over the 
elections, with the results for 1987 and 1992 being particularly weak, corresponding to 
Denver and Hands’ findings. In the latter four elections of the period, the correlations 
between marginality and turnout strengthen, being particularly strong in 2001 and 2005 (-
.679 and -.694 respectively).   
To examine this in more detail, ANOVA tests were conducted in the combined dataset to 
explore if turnout varied significantly across the five categories of constituency marginality. 
Drawing on rational choice theories, the lowest turnouts should correspond to ultra-safe 
constituencies where the costs of voting are high and the benefits received minimal. The 
results of the ANOVA in table 4.8 do indeed show a significant difference in turnout 
between the five categories of marginality, with a clear drop in turnout in ultra-safe 
constituencies.  
 
Table 4.8: ANOVA results comparing turnout across five categories of marginality  
 Mean SD n F 
Ultra-Marginal 71.38 (.32) 6.64 435 42.572** 
Fairly Marginal 69.78 (.33) 7.10 464  
Fairly Safe 69.56 (.32) 7.24 495  
Very Safe 69.75 (.32) 7.39 520  
Ultra-safe 66.49 (.24) 10.27 1890  
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 







Whereas the middle three categories (very marginal, fairly safe and very safe) have almost 
identical turnout figures across the period, all within a small range of 0.22 percentage points 
of each other, there are clear differences in the two extreme categories (ultra-marginal and 
ultra-safe). Ultra-marginal constituencies see a significant increase in mean turnout of 1.6 
percentage points over the next closest category, whereas ultra-safe constituencies have 
turnouts on average 3.26 percentage points lower than the next safest category. Interestingly, 
the highest standard deviation figures are for the ultra-safe category at 10.27, with ultra-
marginal constituencies having the smallest deviations. On average ultra-safe constituencies 
have significantly lower turnouts than other categories of marginality, although there is a 
great deal of variation within the category. 
 
The indications from this analysis are that the two variables are indeed correlated. Turnout 
declines the safer a constituency is as the benefits associated with voting are reduced. In this 
thesis, however, campaigning is the key intervening variable, which is in itself often closely 
related to marginality. This is because the relationships between marginality and both 
campaigning and turnout are not perfect; there are elements of both campaigning and turnout 
that are not captured by marginality. Denver and Hands (1974) explain the relationship 
between marginality and turnout as being evidence of the ‘parties' efforts to stimulate turnout 
in more marginal seats’ (Denver and Hands, 1974:35) once again linking campaigning 
closely with marginality.  
 
The relationship between marginality and vote share is a little less obvious, although still 
key. Constituency marginality, as explored above, is measured according to the majority held 
by the party in first place over the party in second place at an election; the closer these two 
parties are, the more marginal the seat at a subsequent election. Therefore marginality is very 
closely related in a causal relationship to vote share; vote share creates constituency 











Marginality partially originates in the local population, with the most persuasive explanation 
being that it originates from the party support bases in a constituency. Class remains one of 
the defining concepts in British politics, and variables centred on the traditional occupational 
classifications were significantly related to Conservative and Labour vote share, although 
they were relatively weak. As constituency marginality increases (i.e. the seat became safer) 
Conservative-held constituencies often have far higher levels of home-ownership, whereas 
Labour-held constituencies had significantly higher levels of routine workers. Applying 
Putnam’s (1996) theory of population stability to marginality in the UK proved more 
problematic, with indicators of stability being closely linked to those of party support bases 
and often working in the opposite direction to what was expected. 
Marginality is the underpinning variable of this thesis, as it enables the identification of and 
distinctions between safe and marginal constituencies to be made. Safe constituencies are not 
well understood by researchers, despite representing over two-thirds of all seats in the UK.  
Yet researchers pay safe constituencies comparatively little attention, focusing on the 
ramifications of constituency campaigning in a minority of constituencies. Instead, this thesis 
focuses on how campaigning affects local electoral outcomes in safe constituencies. 
Although safe constituencies are considered to be less vulnerable to seat turnover than 
marginal seats, it is not unheard of for even ultra-safe constituencies to change hands, with 
an average of sixteen changing hands at each election between 1987 and 2010. Marginality 
can be fluid: some constituencies (particularly island ones) have remained unaltered 
throughout the period, offering an opportunity to examine fluctuations in constituency 
marginality. In both the cases (the Isle of Wight and the Western Isles) the constituencies 
fluctuated not only between different party incumbencies, but also different degrees of 
marginality. Marginality should not be treated as a static concept; safe constituencies should 
interest parties and researchers because there is quite simply no guarantee that they will 
remain safe. The next chapter takes the concept of marginality and considers what impact it 
has on levels of campaigning. Research already referred to indicates that there is a growing 
trend towards disproportionate campaigning in marginal constituencies, and the next chapter 
identifies which constituencies are being neglected (whether it is all safe constituencies or 
only the safest) and by whom (depending upon the party, and more importantly the 








Campaigning acts as a source of information for voters, not only reducing the costs of 
obtaining such information, but also providing detail on party policy positions, all of which 
feeds into the cost/benefit calculation associated with rational choice theories of voting.  
However, campaigning can vary in intensity, and evidence from existing literature indicates 
that marginality is an important influence on campaign levels (Evans, Curtice and Norris, 
1998), thereby affecting the information given to voters, particularly in safe constituencies. 
This chapter addresses the second sub-hypothesis of the thesis, by examining whether 
constituency marginality affects the level of campaigning in a constituency, with safer 
constituencies seeing less campaigning, as well as its associated nested hypotheses which 
will be indicated throughout. As part of this examination, patterns in both campaign 
spending and campaign activity are examined where possible over the period of analysis.  
Drawing on existing literature, potential explanations for variation in campaigning are 
explored to create a model through which the relationship between marginality and levels of 
campaigning can be tested. The relationship is firstly explored using aggregate figures for 
the campaign variables at the constituency level to examine overall trends. These aggregate 
data enable us to look at the general relationship between marginality and campaigning 
before refining it to look at the variations introduced by disaggregating according to party 
and incumbencies. The chapter ends by proposing a new way of measuring relative levels of 
campaigning through the creation of a variable identifying low level campaigning to 




Election campaigns are a defined period of time during which political parties offer voters 
information, with the aim of gaining power and thereby having the ability to put their 
policies into action. Information is provided in a range of ways by campaigns; from televised 
party political broadcasts to leaflets (Rosenbaum, 1997). Campaigns are important because 
the information that they provide can affect voter behaviour; mobilising people to vote and 
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also affecting the way in which they vote. Campaigning is important for rational voters 
because it provides information which lowers the costs of voting. By explaining candidates’ 
positions on policy the voter can choose which party would offer the best benefits. For 
sociological voters, the information provided by campaigns encourages voter turnout by 
reaffirming the vote choices of the social groups they belong to. While the phrase 
campaigning can refer to different types and levels of elections, this thesis specifically 
examines campaigning at the constituency level in the UK for three reasons; the ability to 
focus on a specific area, the research design and the origins of the hypotheses.  
The thesis hypothesis examines whether low level campaigns have a detrimental effect on 
local electoral outcomes in safe constituencies. To make this argument, there needs to be a 
certain level of comparison between the studies from which I am drawing my influence, and 
all of the existing studies examine constituency campaigning; it makes sense, therefore, to 
also examine campaigning at this level. It also offers a defined geographical area within 
which not only to observe campaigning but also to examine campaign influence. This thesis 
also adopts a quantitative methodological approach, and studying the campaign at the 
constituency level provides a spread of data which make a quantitative approach possible. 
The constituency is also the fundamental unit of analysis, so it makes sense to examine data 
at this level.  
As set out in chapter three, there are discernible groups of researchers using three different 
ways to measure campaigning; those using expenditure data, those using party agent survey 
data and those using party member survey data. However, the divisions between the groups 
of researchers have become increasingly blurred, and it is now considerably more common 
to combine different measures in a single study. This chapter draws on two data sources: 




Despite the core aims of voter conversion and mobilisation remaining constant, campaigning 
has changed considerably between 1987 and 2010, not only in terms of the available 
technology, but also in the increasingly strategic nature of campaigning concentration. The 
1997 general election saw Labour conduct a technologically adept and effective campaign 
(Kavanagh 1997:540), demonstrating the potential of exploiting new technology not only to 
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contact voters, but to present an effective front to other parties. Technology has developed 
rapidly over this period, with the growth in internet usage and from pagers to mobile phones, 
to smart phones and social media, and parties have adapted alongside, using these new media 
to contact voters. Campaigning strategies have also altered over the course of the period, 
with political parties increasingly focusing their attention on marginal constituencies; the 
landslide Labour victory in 1997 once again proving to be the turning point.  
Graph 5.1 shows average spending data in constituencies at elections between 1987 and 
2010. The maximum average spend by the three parties in constituencies has remained fairly 
constant, despite some candidates exceeding the legal maximum permitted in both 1992 and 
1997; otherwise the maximums have remained very close to the highest possible figure. This 
has been accompanied by a particularly steep decrease in the minimum spent by parties over 
the period. Whereas in the first two elections of the period, the average minimum spend was 
between 23 and 24 percent of the legal maximum, there was a significant decline in 1997 to 
17.44; in the latter three elections, the drop in minimum spend was even greater, falling to a 
low of 3.02 percentage points in 2005. That these figures have declined considerably over 
the period of study, accompanied by a fairly constant level of maximum spending indicates 
that some constituencies are experiencing a much lower level of campaign spending than 
others.  
Graph 5.1: Trends in average campaign spending 
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
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This, along with the increasingly strategic approach by parties to campaigning is reflected 
particularly by variations in the standard deviations for aggregate expenditure over the 
period. While the figures fluctuate, there is an overall rise (from 16.14 percentage points in 
1987 to 17.96 percentage points in 2010) indicating some support for the increased targeting 
of constituencies. The larger standard deviations signify that there is greater variation in the 
amount of money spent, which means that while some constituencies are seeing high 
spending, others are seeing much lower levels. The likely explanation, based on existing 
literature, is that parties have become increasingly strategic in their spending, focusing on 
marginal seats.  
Examining the aggregate figures for the two campaign activity variables used in this thesis 
(the proportion of the constituency canvassed via doorstep and telephone) presents several 
problems; namely the number of cases available through which patterns may be investigated. 
These variables originate from Denver and Hands’ studies of party agents, and while overall 
response rates were good (Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006a), the responses were 
infrequently from the same constituency. Rather than calculate average figures for 
constituencies where data on doorstep and telephone canvassing were missing for one or 
more parties (underestimating the level of campaigning), average figures were only 
calculated for constituencies in which all three parties had responded. This resulted in 454 
and 179 cases for average doorstep and telephone canvassing respectively over the period 
(full descriptive results for both variables can be found in Appendix 1).   
The maximum level of doorstep canvassing reported by parties ranged from 66.33 
percentage points in 1992 to 60 percentage points in 1997. The maximum figures are fairly 
constant, which reflects the findings of the expenditure figures. Like the spending figures, 
the average minimum percentage of the constituency drops over the period, from 1.67 
percentage points in 1992 to nothing at all in the subsequent two elections. This means that 
while the maximum percentage of the constituency being canvassed on the doorstep was 
remaining fairly constant at over 60 percentage points, there were constituencies in 1997 and 
2001 where none of the three main parties canvassed on the doorstep. However, there was a 
steady decline in standard deviations for doorstep canvassing; this indicates that there was 
increasingly less variation in rates of doorstep canvassing. Such a decrease could be 
attributed to various factors, but as it is also accompanied by a fall in the mean implies an 
overall fall in popularity. Caution should be used with these results, however, due to the 
calculation of the average. It is possible that there may be common features amongst such 
131 
 
constituencies which skew the results. Later in this chapter, campaigning will be explored on 
a party-by-party basis which may reveal more regarding these data. 
It is difficult to read too much into the patterns in telephone canvassing over the period, as 
data are only available for two years; 1997 and 2001, particularly as the same problems 
regarding responses as seen in the doorstep canvassing figures apply. Over the two years, the 
mean aggregate score for the proportion of a constituency canvassed by the three parties fell 
by over seven percentage points to 7.44 percent in 2001. However, in some constituencies, it 
was continuing to be used highly, with an increase in the maximum score by two percentage 
points between 1997 and 2001. If an increase were to be seen in targeted telephone 
canvassing, an increase in the standard deviations for the aggregate scores between the two 
elections would be expected, as this would indicate more variation in the data. What is 
actually seen in the telephone canvassing data is a decline between the two elections. These 
figures should be interpreted with a note of caution, however. For telephone canvassing, 
there are only data for two election years, which only gives a snapshot of the variable. Also, 
because of the stringent way in which the aggregate data have been calculated, by excluding 
constituencies that do not have data for all three parties, the number of cases is reduced. This 
then introduces an element of considering the types of constituencies that had responses for 
telephone canvassing from all parties between the two elections.  
 
Variations in levels of campaigning 
 
To produce a model to effectively test whether low level campaigns are most often run in 
safe constituencies, other potential variables which might affect the level of campaigning 
must be incorporated. Such controls ensure that the maximum amount of variation in levels 
of campaigning can be accounted for by marginality alone. Hints on potential control 
variables can be found in existing literature to identify three key groups other than 
marginality which may also account for variations in the level of campaigning: tenure, party 







Tenure and campaigning 
 
Whereas constituency visits by British MPs were something of a rarity in the UK in the 
1950s, (with some incumbents visiting only annually and normally living outside the 
constituency), during the 1960s, increasing importance was placed on the incumbent having 
links to the constituency. The closer links between a constituency and its MP facilitated 
personal votes by building recognition of the incumbent, their policies and standpoints on 
key local issues; isolating these personal votes for established MPs, they could amount to 
approximately 1500 votes (Curtice and Steed, 1980). Closely linked to this is the life-cycle 
of incumbency (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1983:90), during which a newly elected MP 
defends their constituency by establishing a personal vote through intense campaigning. 
These personal votes gained will then act (theoretically) as a cushion at future elections once 
the incumbent’s interests has been turned away from their constituency to national politics 
(Wood and Norton, 1992:228), negating the need for continued intense campaigning.  
To examine this, bivariate correlations were run between aggregate data on campaigning and 
three measures of length of tenure; there is also likely to be an association with marginality, 
with longer tenures being more probable in safe seats. As explored in chapter three, length of 
tenure has been measured in three ways using information from Dods and The Times Guide 
to the House of Commons: seat tenure, career tenure and first-term incumbents. The first two 
are continuous measures which measure, respectively, the period of time in which an 
incumbent has served in the most recent permutation of constituency boundaries and the total 
period of time in which they have served as incumbents. Seat tenure follows more closely on 
from the measure used by Wood and Norton, which only measured tenure accumulated in 
‘the most recent locality’ (1992:231). As Norton and Wood argue (1990: 201), constituency 
boundary changes have made the process of tracing length of tenure difficult, but by creating 
continuous measures for both seat and career tenure these are able to be accounted for. If 
their conclusions are to be reflected here, a negative relationship would be expected – that is 







Table 5.1: Bivariate correlations between tenure and campaigning variables 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Seat       
Spend .015 -.036 -.019 -.125** -.090** -.014 
Doorstep  -.010 -.021 -.015   
Telephone   .050 -.060   
Career       
Spend -.103** -.055 -.071* -.227** -.179** -.128** 
Doorstep  -.052 .088* -.047   
Telephone   -.044 -.159**   
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
Table 5.1 shows the results of the bivariate correlations between the two continuous 
measures of tenure: seat incumbency and career incumbency. Looking firstly at how these 
measures are associated with aggregate campaign spending, there appears to be some support 
for the expected association. For both continuous tenure measures, the correlations with 
aggregate spending are almost all negative as expected. However, the significance varies 
substantially: while seat incumbency and spending have significant correlations in 2001 and 
2005 only, for career incumbency there are significant (but weak) results for all election 
years except 1992. These results are echoed by the correlations for aggregate doorstep 
canvassing with negative correlations for all except the career incumbency measure in 1997, 
which is not only positive, but also the only significant value for doorstep canvassing. 
Correlating telephone canvassing with the two measures offers similar results, with both 
values for the career measure being negative as expected, although only the value for 2001 is 
significant. 
The third measure of tenure is a binary variable identifying whether the incumbent is 
defending their constituency for the first time. A simple binary classification was created, 
enabling fast identification of which constituencies were being defended by first-term MPs at 
each election. Such MPs are most likely to run intense campaigns to build up their personal 
vote; this level of campaigning is not sustained at later elections, with the incumbent relying 
on their personal vote. The binary variable identifying first-term MPs was entered into an 
independent samples t-test alongside the three campaigning variables to examine whether 
there were significant differences between the mean levels of campaigning carried out by 
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first-term MPs compared to other candidates. If Wood and Norton’s results were to be 
reflected here, significantly higher campaigning in constituencies being defended by first-
term MPs would be expected. This would not only be due to the building of a personal vote 
to rely on later in their career as they build their national political profile, but also by 
opposing parties seeking to exploit an incumbent candidate who had not yet built up such a 
vote. To support this, the bivariate correlations should show a negative correlation between 
campaigning and length of tenure.  
At each election during the period under study, there were significant differences in the 
amount of money spent between constituencies with first-term incumbents and those in 
which the incumbent was not a first-termer. For all years, spending and doorstep canvassing 
were significantly higher in constituencies where the incumbent was a first-term MP. In 
1992, where a first-term MP was incumbent, doorstep canvassing was 13.61 percentage 
points higher than in other constituencies. The picture from telephone canvassing is a little 
more mixed, with significant results, but in opposing directions. In 1997, constituencies with 
first-term MPs canvassed on average 0.18 percentage points less than other seats, whereas in 
2001, the difference was 4.73 percentage points. This may be due to telephone canvassing 
not being used optimally in 1997 as a new method of campaigning, leading to first-term MPs 
canvassing less.  
There are three conclusions to be taken from these results: evidence for the association, the 
merits of the measures and the effect of party. There does indeed appear to be an association 
between tenure length and levels of campaigning, supporting Wood and Norton’s 
conclusions. The correlations for the continuous variables are mostly in the expected 
direction, with longer tenures (whether seat or career) more likely to be associated with 
lower levels of campaigning. This supports the idea of an intense initial campaign by first-
termers to defend their seat, falling away over time as the incumbent’s interest turns towards 
national politics. This pattern is reflected when examining first-term MPs, with these 
incumbents being associated with significantly higher average campaigning figures than non 
first-term MPs. Secondly, of the two continuous variables, career tenure seems to be the 
better measure, which is likely to be attributable to boundary changes over the period; 
boundaries change, but these changes are often relatively slight. I believe that by using seat 
tenure, the measure underestimates the personal vote that a candidate may have built up in a 
preceding tributary constituency, despite Wood and Norton placing importance on 
experience in the immediate locality. Finally, the campaign variables used above are 
aggregate, not party specific. Once campaigning is disaggregated according to parties later in 
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this chapter, some variation may be found which indicates party tactics and priorities which 
have been obscured by or underestimated by these aggregate results.   
It is not only campaigning that tenure may be related to; it is likely that there is also an 
interaction with previous majority, with incumbents who have served multiple terms more 
likely to be in safe constituencies. Such constituencies are less likely to change hands, as 
shown in the previous chapter, so it is easier for an incumbent to build up longer career 
tenures than in marginal constituencies where the likelihood of the seat changing hands is 
greater. Bivariate correlations between the two variables at each election (as shown in table 
5.2) indicate some support for interactions between marginality and career tenure.  
Table 5.2: Bivariate correlations between career tenure and previous majority 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Marginality .237** .110** .194** .181** .158** .207** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
 
At each election, not only are all the correlations positive, they are all significant, indicating 
that higher majorities are significantly correlated with longer serving MPs. These initial 
results indicate that when constructing the multivariate model to examine the relationship 
between levels of campaigning and marginality, it would be a prudent option to incorporate 
an interaction term between marginality and tenure.  
 
Party members and campaigning 
 
Over the past fifty years (Webb, 1995; Fisher, 2000) there has been a steep decline in party 
membership in the UK; not least during the period covered by this thesis, with the 
Conservatives in particular suffering a sharp drop in membership during the 1990s (Fisher, 
Denver and Hands 2006b). In addition to the two canvassing measures used throughout this 
thesis, the party agent surveys conducted by Denver and Hands (1992-2001) offer estimates 
of local party memberships which have validated by comparisons to other data (see Fisher et 
al., 2006b for a comparison with the Committee on Standards in Public Life; also Fieldhouse 
and Cutts, 2008:381) with party agents able to give an accurate assessment of the local party 
capacity. These figures enable the ‘significant association’ (Fisher et al., 2006b:509) 
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between party membership and levels of campaigning to be explored. More members may 
mean more resources to call on during election campaigns for campaign activities and 
organisation. This is reflected in existing literature on party members which demonstrates 
that there is ‘recognition of the importance of party members’ (Whiteley and Seyd, 1994:6) 
during election campaigns. It is possible that higher numbers of party members enable higher 
levels of campaigning to take place as there is more capacity to do so, although this may 
vary according to the type of campaigning being examined. Spending figures have been 
shown to comprise mostly printing costs of leaflets and other campaign literature (Johnston, 
1979); constituencies where there are high numbers of leaflets being printed (i.e. where 
spending is high) may be associated with higher levels of party members as there are more 
members to facilitate their distribution. The link between levels of doorstep canvassing and 
party membership levels is clear – the greater the number of party members, the greater the 
capacity for the parties to cover larger proportions of constituencies by doorstep canvassing. 
The link between telephone canvassing and party membership is less clear, with many 
parties relying on national or regional phone banks ‘staffed by paid workers to canvass 
voters in particular constituencies’ (Denver, Hands and MacAllister, 2004:304), therefore not 
directly linking party membership in specific geographical areas with telephone canvassing.  
If these ideas are to be supported, when comparing aggregate party membership with levels 
of the three campaign variables a positive correlation should be seen; higher levels of 
campaigning coinciding with higher numbers of party members. To explore the data, 
bivariate correlations were run between candidate expenditure, doorstep canvassing, 
telephone canvassing and the number of party members in the constituency for the available 
years, with the results shown in table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Bivariate correlations between number of party members and campaigning 
variables 
 1992 1997 2001 
Spend .132 .452** .355** 
Doorstep -.253 .370** .348** 
Telephone  .072 .034 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 1911 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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The results for bivariate correlations between the overall number of party members and the 
three campaign variables are mixed. For spending, while the correlations are positive in all 
years, they are only significant in 1997 and 2001, peaking in 1997 and remain fairly modest. 
Surprisingly the correlation for doorstep canvassing is actually negative in 1992, although 
not significant, but is in the expected direction and significant in the latter two years. There 
are very weak and insignificant correlations for telephone canvassing in both years, which 
were expected. It is not necessarily conducted by the local party members themselves and 
can often be conducted entirely from national telephone banks or, in the case of Whiteley 
and Seyd (2002), firstly conducted by local telephone banks with follow-up canvassing 
conducted by national telephone banks. It should be remembered, however, that these 
correlations have been conducted on aggregate data – as will be see later it may be that 
individual parties have stronger correlations.  
This relationship between levels of party membership and campaigning is ‘far from perfect’ 
(Fisher et al., 2006b: 509); a great deal depends not only on the willingness of party 
members to help with the local campaign, but also the local context. It is important to note 
that being a party member does not guarantee that an individual helps with the local 
campaign. Party members can be active (by helping out during campaigns), inactive (largely 
paper members) or even ‘sporadic interventionists’ (Dowse and Hughes, 1977) who may 
assist in campaigning, but not on a regular basis. What the results of the data may be 
revealing are the concerted efforts of a minority of members. Therefore, to equate large 
numbers of members with higher levels of campaigning is too simplistic.  
Marginality also complicates the relationship between party membership levels and 
campaigning, with safe constituencies likely to have higher membership numbers for the 
incumbent party, which refers back to Seyd and Whiteley’s earlier observations on success 
incentivising membership. Marginal constituencies may have relatively small membership 
numbers compared to safe constituencies, but in these constituencies campaigning is at a 
high level. The incumbency history of the constituency is likely to impact on party 
membership, with losing parties likely to see a ‘spiral of demobilisation’ (Whiteley and Seyd 
1998:135) accompanied by a decrease in members as the incentives to participate drop. The 
evidence regarding the relationship between party membership and campaign activity, 
although initially seeming positive, is actually a complex one incorporating misleading 
sources of campaign activity and a declining membership. However, the correlations are 
moderate and the relationship is a believable one; more members mean a greater ability to 







Marginality and campaign intensity 
 
 
The relationship between marginality and campaigning has its roots in rational choice 
theories of party behaviour; particularly those on vote-seeking parties. Under Downs’ 
original model, parties are ‘not only vote seekers but vote maximisers’ (Strom 1990:566). 
This has implicitly influenced studies of constituency campaigning in the UK, with clear 
distinctions drawn between rational and irrational campaign expenditure (Johnston et al., 
2013:116). It is rationality which underpins the relationship between marginality and 
campaign intensity, based on the nature of marginality itself. The concept is one of 
constituency vulnerability to changing hands, with marginal constituencies more likely than 
safe constituencies to do so at election time. It is rational for parties to concentrate their 
resources on those constituencies which are more likely to change hands and where parties 
have the most to gain or lose; there is a greater return for mobilising and converting voters. 
Denver, Hands and MacAllister (2003:136) discovered evidence from as far back as the 
1950s for the relationship between marginality and campaigning, with marginal 
constituencies receiving higher levels of campaigning. More evidence was found for the 
relationship in the 1970s, with Denver and Hands (1985:382) discovering that ‘parties were 
becoming more sophisticated…increasingly concentrating their local campaign efforts upon 
critical seats’. The Liberal Party revived the importance of local activism in election 
campaigns (Rennard, 2011), with Denver and Hands finding that ‘only the much smaller 
Liberal Party focuses its efforts, which apparently pay off to some extent, on advertising in 
the marginal constituencies’ (1997b:119). During the early part of the period under 
investigation in this thesis, Labour and the Liberal Democrats adopted a rational 
campaigning pattern, focusing their resources on the most marginal constituencies (for a 
discussion see Pattie and Johnston, 2003b). However, the Conservatives tended to use a 
substantial amount of resources in seats they were expected to win, with the party 
‘struggl[ing] to rationally organise their campaigning’ (Fisher, Cutts and Fieldhouse, 2011: 
820).  
This relationship has intensified over the period covered by the present study, particularly 
since the success of strategic targeting by Labour at the 1997 general election. The party 
mounted a targeted electoral strategy utilising all available technology, known as Operation 
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Victory. This intense strategy was extremely effective for Labour, playing a key role in their 
landslide victory and increasing the adoption of targeting in subsequent elections by other 
parties.  By 2001, Labour were defending a large majority, so a largely defensive campaign 
in which ‘every priority seat had the services of a special organiser’ (Fisher Denver and 
Hands, 2006a: 573) was adopted in the face of the rational resource targeting strategy 
operated by the Conservatives. The preparations that are undertaken even before official 
election campaigns (Denver, 2010:598) also indicate that the relationship between campaign 
intensity and marginality remains strong. Prior to the 2010 general election, a long-term 
donor to the Conservative Party, Lord Ashcroft, had donated large sums which were being 
used to kick-start a pre-election targeting campaign of marginal constituencies (Newman, 
2010). In the six months prior to the election, voters in the constituencies receiving Ashcroft 
funding were ‘twice as likely to be contacted as those living elsewhere’ (Johnston, Pattie, 
Cutts and Fisher, 2012:320). It was not only the Conservatives who were instigating pre-
election targeting of marginal constituencies; Gordon Brown took over from Tony Blair as 
Prime Minister in 2007 and was swiftly confronted by attempted terror attacks, receiving a 
poll boost for his decisive action. There was widespread speculation that he would call a 
snap election, as the polls indicated that he would win easily, and preparations got underway 
with Saatchi and Saatchi designing the ‘Not Flash, Just Gordon’ (BBC, 2007) slogan, and the 
identification of target marginal seats. During the 2010 election campaign, with the 
Conservatives running an expansionist campaign and Labour running a defensive one, 
‘marginality still mattered and marginal constituencies received the most attention’ 
(Johnston et al., 2012:318); Labour concentrated particularly on very marginal constituencies 
(those with a previous majority of between 5 and 9.99%). Indeed in ultra-safe constituencies 
not held by Labour, only 25% of voters reported any contact from Labour at all.  
 
It also appears from Labour’s preparations for the 2015 election that the relationship between 
marginality and campaign intensity remains strong. In early 2013, Labour publicised their 
list of target constituencies, more than two years before the 2015 election. Such advance 
preparation is ‘typical of recent British general elections’ (Johnston et al., 2012: 317) and it 
is this planning of the strategic allocation of resources which demonstrates the continued 
importance of marginality in modern UK elections. Such strategic campaigning also occurs 
in modern American election campaigns, as described by Cann and Cole (2011) who give 
the example of John Kerry expected to win all the New England states except New 
Hampshire and where ‘campaign appearances and advertisements will not change these 
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outcomes…it is not in the best interest of either candidate to campaign there’ (Cann and 
Cole, 2011:346). 
There is evidence from existing literature of the relationship between marginality and 
campaigning, particularly increased targeting of marginal constituencies, over the period. To 
gain a sense of this relationship from the data, bivariate correlations were conducted between 
the two variables in the combined dataset, and the relationship was indeed negative at -.424 
(significant to p<.001). ANOVA tests were also conducted over the period between the five 
categories of marginality (as the independent variable) and each campaigning variable (as 
the dependent) to examine whether the marginality category of a constituency significantly 
affected the level of campaigning there. The expected relationship would be that as 
constituencies become safer, campaigning declines significantly, with the largest differences 
likely to be observed in the ultra-safe constituencies.  
Table 5.4: ANOVA results comparing campaigning levels across five categories of 
marginality (post-hoc testing in Appendix 2) 
 Mean SD n F 
Spending     
Ultra-Marginal 69.80 13.98 435 175.547** 
Fairly Marginal 68.06 14.11 464  
Fairly Safe 64.65 16.37 495  
Very Safe 60.96 15.68 519  
Ultra-safe 52.32 17.78 1889  
Doorstep canvassing 
Ultra-Marginal 26.63 14.82 55 3.040* 
Fairly Marginal 23.89 13.98 67  
Fairly Safe 23.39 12.85 51  
Very Safe 23.79 13.34 74  
Ultra-safe 20.06 14.75 207  
Telephone canvassing 
Ultra-Marginal 13.43 11.08 20 9.331** 
Fairly Marginal 12.92 9.19 25  
Fairly Safe 11.82 8.95 20  
Very Safe 6.85 9.04 28  
Ultra-safe 4.89 5.84 86  
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Spending n = 3804, doorstep n 
= 454, telephone n = 179. Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05.  
 
The ANOVA results for all three campaigning variables shown in table 5.4 have significant 
differences, but greater detail can be found in the associated descriptive statistics and Tukey 
post-hoc testing (appendix 2), which indicates precisely which groups differ significantly 
from each other. For all three campaigning types the expected relationship can be observed; 
as constituencies become safer, the level of campaigning falls. There is a noticeably larger 
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fall in campaign expenditure for ultra-safe constituencies than for the other categories, with 
the mean figure of 53.90 percent of the legal maximum being 7.62 percentage points lower 
than the very safe category. The post-hoc testing also reveals that in ultra-safe constituencies 
spending was significantly lower than all other categories of marginality over the period. The 
results for doorstep canvassing are also significant, with the descriptive statistics 
demonstrating that as constituencies became safer, there was a decrease in the level of such 
canvassing, although the means for the middle three categories are all within 0.10 percentage 
points of each other. The only significant differences in the post-hoc testing are between 
ultra-marginal and ultra-safe constituencies. The results for telephone canvassing reflect the 
same trends, with an increase in previous majority leading to a gradual decline in mean 
telephone canvassing, from 13.43 percent coverage in ultra-marginal seats, to just 4.89 
percent in ultra-safe constituencies. The post-hoc tests also show ultra-safe and all other 
categories (except very safe seats) of constituencies saw a significant difference in mean 
telephone canvassing. These results offer support for the relationship between marginality 
and campaigning for all three campaigning variables, with ultra-safe constituencies seeing 
significantly lower levels of campaigning than ultra-marginal seats. 
This initial testing has indicated that lower levels of campaigning are associated with higher 
percentage majorities. However, in order to answer the chapter hypothesis that constituency 
marginality affects the level of campaigning in a constituency, with safer constituencies 
seeing less campaigning, a multivariate model is required. The model created for this chapter 
has been constructed with marginality (operationalised as previous majority) as the 
independent variable, and aggregate campaigning variables (spend, doorstep canvass and 
telephone canvass) as the dependent variables. A mixture of six political and social control 
variables were selected from the literature to produce the most effective explanatory model, 
with alternate models trialled by adding the control variables in blocks. 
The first control variable is the length of the incumbent’s career tenure, with the correlations 
conducted earlier in the chapter indicating that campaigning declines the longer an 
incumbent’s tenure. Three measures of tenure (seat, career and first-termers) were produced, 
and of the three, the continuous variable measuring the length of the incumbent’s career was 
most effective. It also performed best of the three variables when trialling alternative models 
for this section. There were significant bivariate correlations between marginality and career 
tenure, with safer constituencies being associated with longer tenures. To control for this 
interaction, a variable measuring it was created by multiplying marginality and career tenure 
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together and entering it into the model. To ensure consistency and eliminate bias, tenure was 
also retained in the models alongside marginality and the interaction.  
 
A variable measuring the aggregate number of party members in a constituency was also 
entered into the trials on the basis of the initial examinations above which linked higher 
levels of canvassing with higher numbers of party members. Interestingly, this variable 
offered no explanatory boost to the model when controlling for the other variables, even 
when the dependent variable was doorstep canvassing which ‘required large numbers of 
committed party workers in each constituency’ (Pattie and Johnston, 2003a:304). It was 
therefore excluded from the final model. 
 
The final control variables are those accounting for various measures of constituency socio-
demographics. The association between socio-demographics and campaigning is important, 
but complicated. Although the variables examined in the last chapter were found to have an 
impact on marginality, they are also likely to impact the level of campaigning so were also 
considered alongside a range of additional demographic variables. The analysis began with 
sixteen socio-demographic variables, including those explored in the previous chapter. These 
were correlated together across the period, and those with correlations of greater than .600 
were removed, leaving seven socio-demographic variables to explore in relation to aggregate 
levels of the three measures of campaigning. Higher levels of spending were associated with 
constituencies with higher proportions of migrants, whereas lower spends were associated 
with higher proportions of owner occupiers, students, retired and routine workers. It is 
interesting to note that looking particularly at the class nature of some of these variables; it 
would appear that more affluent constituencies (Conservatives) are more likely to have 
higher levels of spending. This is perhaps unsurprising, in that the Conservatives not only 
have the greatest resources, but generally spend more overall. The correlations were all 
weak, which is probably due to the multiple elections covered and as such are likely to mask 
fluctuations, particularly when there has been a change of government.  
Different combinations of the remaining variables (the proportions of owner occupiers, 
retired people, routine workers and migrants) were tested to see which offered the best 
results, and the model which included all four was found to offer the best explanatory power. 
To support the relationship between marginality and campaigning, marginality should be 
significantly and negatively related to campaigning; the higher the percentage majority (i.e. 
the safer the constituency) the lower the level of campaigning.  In addition to a regression 
examining the overall relationship between marginality and campaigning between 1987 and 
143 
 
2010, individual regressions were conducted for each election year. This was due to the 
likely variation in the relationship over the period, with a stronger negative relationship 
likely in the latter elections, reflecting the increasing concentration by political parties on 
marginal constituencies after the 1997 election.  
The relationship between marginality and campaign spending was expected to be negative 
and significant, both of which are supported by the results of the regressions in table 5.5, 
with a negative and significant relationship between the two variables both over the period as 
a whole and for all individual elections during the period. This indicates that at each election 
between 1987 and 2010, marginality significantly affected levels of campaigning; moreover 
the direction of the relationship indicates that as constituencies became safer (their previous 
majority increased), the overall level of campaign spending fell. It would therefore appear 
that marginality is an important influence on candidate expenditure. 





















































































































   .304 .221 .095 .457 .436 .412 .427 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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The coefficient for marginality over the entire period indicates that for every percentage 
point rise in previous majority there was a drop of .617 percentage points in the average 
spent in a constituency. Yet disaggregating this into individual election years, the 
relationship is not of a constant strength. It was expected to increase over the period, 
particularly from 1997 onwards, with the success of Labour’s targeting strategy and the 
adoption of targeted campaigning by the Conservatives in 2001. This is partially supported, 
with a notable increase in the coefficients of .198 percentage points between 1997 and 2001 
and increases in both 2005 and 2010. The strongest coefficient for marginality can be 
observed in 2010, when for every percentage point increase in a constituency’s majority, 
overall campaign spending fell by almost the same magnitude. However, the relationship is 
not quite as expected, with the second highest coefficient in 1987 (.771), an election where 
the lowest value was expected, with a drop in 1992 to .369. Looking at the national context, 
there was a landslide victory for Labour in 1997, and there was a strengthening of the 
relationship in 1997 from 1992, although as referred to above, the individual party figures 
are likely to reveal exactly which parties were doing the most strategic campaigning. It may 
be that in the context of the period, the overall relationship between marginality and 
campaign spending is high, with 1992 and 1997 actually being the exceptions with lower 
coefficients. 
Although none of the regression coefficients for the interaction terms between tenure and 
marginality are significant, this does not mean that the interaction between the two variables 
themselves is not of interest. To explore in more depth, the interaction terms for each 
election year and the period as a whole were interpreted graphically. Over the period as a 
whole, and particularly in 1987 and 1992, the longer the incumbent’s career tenure, the less 
impact marginality had upon overall campaign spending. In 2001 and 2005, the interaction 
indicates that the longer an incumbent’s career, the lesser the impact of marginality on 
spending. However, there is more of a disparity according to how long the incumbent’s 
tenure was. Although in 2005 in ultra-marginal constituencies, it was not the longest serving 
but those who had served between 8 and 12.5 years (corresponding to the 1997 intake) who 
had the shallowest line, implying that marginality had less of an impact on spending for this 
group. 
The picture for 2010 is interesting, and more similar to 1997, coinciding with a change in 
government. The general direction indicates that as constituencies became safer, overall 
campaign spending fell. In the ultra-safe category, no matter how long the incumbent’s 
career, spending was lower. However, in contrast to the previous election years, it does not 
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follow that the longer you serve, the lesser the impact of marginality on overall campaigning. 
In ultra-marginal constituencies, those with the longest tenures (13 years and above – the 
1997 intake and previous) saw the highest overall levels of spending. This could potentially 
be a combination of Labour’s defensive campaign plus an expansionist campaign strategy by 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. This indicates that in 2010, the longer the career, 
the greater the impact of marginality on campaign spending, perhaps due to the uncertain 
electoral outcome. 
The increasing redirection of resources away from safe constituencies from 1997 onwards is 
supported when observing the adjusted r
2
 values for the models.  Whereas in 1992, the model 
only explained 9.5% of variation in campaign spending, at elections from 1997 onwards it 
explained at least 41.2%. Therefore marginality accounts for a larger and increasing 
proportion of campaign spending variation in the latter part of the period than in the earlier 
elections, which is in line with expectations. The variations in the explanatory power of the 
model over the period are also likely to be attributable to the aggregate nature of the 
campaigning data. 
For the control variables the relationships are likely to vary over the period according to 
party targeting their campaign spending; a clear example can be observed in owner 
occupiers. As seen in the previous chapter, higher levels of owner occupiers in a 
constituency have been associated with support for the Conservatives. Looking at the period 
as a whole, for every percentage point increase in the proportion of owner occupiers in a 
constituency overall spending fell by .128 percentage points. This could be due to more 
expansionist campaigning by the Conservatives later in the period, which is reinforced in the 
individual election years by a constantly negative relationship at elections from 2001 
onwards. The coefficients for routine workers over the period support this, with a negative 
relationship over the 1987 and 2010 period; a percentage rise in the proportion of such 
workers leading to a drop in spending of almost the same amount. Disaggregating this into 
individual election years, the coefficient is negative and large in 1987, 1997, 2005 and 2010, 
yet positive in 1992 and 2005.  The large coefficient for 1997 indicates that constituencies 
with higher proportions of routine workers (i.e. traditionally Labour constituencies) saw 
significantly lower overall levels of spending, probably as a result of targeting of other 
constituencies by Labour and a more defensive campaign by the Conservatives. For 
migrants, there are positive coefficients over the entire period and for all individual elections, 
three of which are significant. These indicate that overall between 1987 and 2010 the 
proportion of migrants in a constituency was significantly related to campaign spending, as 
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when the proportion of migrants in a constituency increased, so did the level of spending. 
These variations in the strength of the model and the coefficients indicate some instability in 
the relationship between marginality and spending, with parties varying their campaigning in 
marginal constituencies according to their local and national incumbency. The effect of local 
incumbency will be explored later in this chapter. 
The model was rerun to examine the impact that marginality had on the two campaign 
measures. As before, marginality is the independent variable, overall levels of doorstep and 
telephone canvassing are the dependent variables, with all control variables retained to 
ensure that the conclusions were comparable. If marginality affects levels of canvassing, 
negative and significant results would be expected, indicating that as the previous majority 
increases, the level of telephone and doorstep canvassing falls. However, the relationship is 
likely to be more complicated than that for spending, as it may be easier for parties to 
canvass in their safe constituencies. The data are also far more limited than for spending, 
with far fewer constituencies having data for all three parties. 
Table 5.6: Regression examining the effect of marginality on overall levels of doorstep 
and telephone canvassing  
 Doorstep canvassing 
Telephone 
canvassing 
Previous majority -.013  (.089) -.334** (.113) 
Career tenure .560** (.191)         -.329 (.263) 
Marginality and career 
tenure interaction 
-.015* (.007) .006 (.010) 
Owner -.082*    (.036)          -.052 (.146) 
Retired .241**    (.085) -.001 (.351) 
Routine workers -.1.038** (.283) -.326 (.513) 
Migrant .022 (.133)           -.212 (.700) 
Adjusted r
2
 .096 .193 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 1911 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Although the adjusted r
2
 results for both types of canvassing are low compared to the 
equivalent period in table 5.5, the model still explains 9.6% of variation in doorstep 
canvassing and 19.3% of variation in telephone canvassing. For both canvassing variables, a 
higher previous majority was related to lower levels of constituency coverage, although the 
coefficient was only significant for telephone canvassing. Career tenure was significantly 
related to doorstep canvassing, with longer tenures associated with higher levels of doorstep 
canvassing. Surprisingly, considering the reduced physical contact of telephone canvassing, 
it offers the better results, with the model having a better explanatory power. The marginality 
coefficient indicates that for every percentage point rise in previous majority, there was a 
significant drop in telephone canvassing of .334 percentage points. The relative strength of 
the coefficients between marginality and the respective measures of canvassing are 
interesting and offer support to Fisher and Denver (2009) who discovered that modern 
modes of campaigning (of which telephone canvassing was one) were far more likely to be 
used in marginal constituencies. 
The interaction term between tenure and marginality offers a little more insight into the 
impact of marginality upon levels of canvassing. Looking firstly at doorstep canvassing, 
there is little variation in levels of such canvassing in constituencies of different 
marginalities where the incumbent’s tenure is less than nine years. However, in 
constituencies with incumbents serving over nine years, the level of doorstep canvassing 
decreases the safer the seat becomes. Not only do longer tenures have a greater impact on the 
relationship between marginality and overall doorstep canvassing, but the levels of such 
canvassing are also far higher the longer the tenure. This conclusion is perhaps a little 
surprising and would seem to go against the spending data, which indicated that longer 
tenures lead to lower spends - instead the doorstep canvassing figures suggest that the longer 
the tenure, the higher the level of doorstep canvassing and the greater the impact of 
marginality. One possible explanation for this relationship may be the consideration of the 
resources required for doorstep canvassing. Such canvassing is hard to conduct without 
committed members and activists in the constituency. Although the figures only indicate 
overall levels of such canvassing, it may be that longer serving incumbents have built an 
activist base galvanised by their repeated electoral success (Seyd and Whiteley, 1998). In 
short, longer tenures may be associated with greater resources enabling higher levels of 
doorstep canvassing. 
For telephone canvassing, no matter how long the tenure of the incumbent, the safer the 
constituency, the lower the level of telephone canvassing. However, in contrast to doorstep 
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canvassing, the longer the incumbent’s tenure, the lower the level of such canvassing. The 
shorter the time the incumbent has served, the greater the impact of marginality on telephone 
canvassing, with the highest levels seen in ultra-marginal constituencies held by those in 
their first term.  
These results indicate that the model is a far better fit for spending data in the latter part of 
the period than for the two canvassing variables, which have far lower explanatory values 
(except for spending in 1992); it could be that there are particular factors affecting 
canvassing levels but not spending levels in constituencies that the model does not cover. 
The fact that existing literature has demonstrated an association between campaign spending 
and the data from the agent surveys (from which the canvassing variables originate) 
(Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008) on a party-by-party basis could mean that the aggregate data 
used are creating the issue. As reported above, only constituencies where all three parties had 
recorded responses for the canvassing variables were included in the aggregate figures to 
ensure fairness and an accurate record. However, this has dramatically restricted the number 
of available cases to examine in the model, and it may be that there are characteristics in 
constituencies where all three parties responded that could influence the results. 
 
Different parties, different campaigns 
 
Although encouraging results regarding the overall hypothesis have been found so far, this 
section examines the nested hypothesis of whether the impact of marginality on campaigning 
varies across parties. By disaggregating the data examined previously the different 
campaign strategies of the three main parties over the period can be examined. The aggregate 
nature of the data studied so far means that it is possible that some conclusions in regards to 
individual party activity have been obscured, particularly in respect of the canvassing data. 
By exploring individual party responses, there are more data to test. Variation in levels of 
campaigning and its relationship with marginality should be observable between the parties 
for two reasons; available resources and national incumbency. The Conservatives, compared 
to the other two parties, were slowest to catch onto the potential of targeting campaigning on 
safe constituencies, with Pattie and Johnston (2003b) attributing this largely due to the strong 
nature of the local associations in Conservative safe constituencies. Labour in contrast have 
habitually run constituency campaigns targeted on marginal seats, utilised to greatest effect 
in their 1997 election victory. Once in power, the simplicity of the relationship became more 
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complicated, particularly as Labour had won many seats that they had not expected to. . In 
regards to available resources, the Liberal Democrats are the smallest party of the three and 
therefore have the smallest resources. Out of necessity, the party has ‘husband[ed] its scarce 
resources’ (Pattie and Johnston, 2003b: 392) by campaigning in marginal seats as the party 
has relatively few safe constituencies to rely on, unlike the other parties. 
 
Trends in campaigning between the parties 
 
To illustrate the variation in campaigning between the parties, graph 5.2 compares the mean 
spending figures for the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats at elections between 
1987 and 2010. The Conservatives have, on average, spent the most at each election during 
the period. Their spending has, however, shown an overall decline over the period, from a 
high of 78.24 percent of the legal maximum in 1987 to a low of 63.88 percent in 2005 (with 
a slight rise in 2010). The next highest mean candidate spending was by Labour, peaking at 
72.38 percent in 1997, before a slow decline at subsequent elections, reaching a low of 50.70 
percent in 2010. It is interesting that the peak average spend was found in the election at 
which they won a landslide victory, with a slow decline during their term in power.  
Graph 5.2: Mean candidate spending  
 





Of the three parties, the Liberal Democrats have on average spent the least over the period, 
with a particular contrast at the 1997 and 2001 elections. Indeed at the 2001 general election, 
the Liberal Democrats spent on average just over 32 percent of the legal maximum 
 
Aside from the means, the standard deviations of the data (table 5.7) are an important way of 
examining variation around the mean
11
. A redirection of resources away from some 
(ostensibly safe) constituencies towards other (more marginal) constituencies could be 
indicated by larger standard deviation figures which would indicate greater variation in 
spending by each party. The smallest variation would be expected for the Conservatives, due 
to their early habit of spending highly in their own safe constituencies, and the greatest 
variation for the Liberal Democrats who have the least resources and therefore have to target 
their spending. Also, if an increase is to be seen in targeted campaigning by all parties, a 
general rise in the standard deviation figures for the period would be expected. 
Table 5.7: Standard deviation figures for party campaign spending 
 
1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Conservative 22.85 22.86 26.3 29.38 28.42 29.27 
Labour 24.33 24.94 21.83 26.27 28.22 31.46 
Lib Dem 28.85 32.35 31.2 29.58 29.79 33.76 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
 
As expected, at each election during the period, Liberal Democrat spending has consistently 
had the largest standard deviations of the three parties, indicating that there is greater 
variation in their spending, with particularly low spends in some seats and particular high 
ones in others. This fits in well with the idea that they are the party targeting the most, due to 
their limited resources. The difference between Liberal Democrat standard deviations and 
the other parties are particularly large in the earlier elections, reinforcing the idea that the 
                                                          
11
 Due to multiple standard deviation figures for each year, it has not been possible to present them in 
a clear format on the graph. For this graph and future occurrences where detailed discussion is needed, 




Liberal Democrats were the earliest adopters of strategic spending in the UK. The 
relationship for the two other parties is a little more complicated, however, with the 
Conservatives having the largest standard deviations of the two in 1997, 2001 and 2005 and 
Labour in 1987, 1992 and 2010. These smaller deviations accompanied by high means for 
the Conservatives in the earliest two elections of the period ties in with the evidence that the 
party generally spent highly with little variation amongst different constituency 
marginalities. Therefore there are indeed signs that the association between marginality and 
campaigning varies across parties. 
Examining the variation between the parties for the two campaign activity variables (results 
in appendix 3) there are several key trends to extract. Firstly, there was a considerable 
decrease in doorstep canvassing between 1992 and 2001 for all three parties. Although the 
Conservatives ran the highest average doorstep canvassing over the period, they saw a fall 
from an average of 41.58 percent of a constituency covered in 1992 to 27 percent covered in 
2001. Their higher levels of doorstep canvassing are likely to be due to their stronger local 
organisations which typically have higher active members than the other parties; there is 
more capacity for greater levels of doorstep canvassing to take place. Labour ran the second 
highest levels of doorstep canvassing, but saw the steepest falls of all, with a drop of over 8 
percentage points at each election. Unsurprisingly given their relatively small size, the 
Liberal Democrats ran the lowest level doorstep canvassing, with on average 7.86 percent of 
a constituency canvassed on the doorstep in 2001. The standard deviations can tell us the 
degree of variation in levels of such canvassing, and an increase in targeted campaigning 
would be shown by an increased disparity in levels of canvassing. The figures for doorstep 
canvassing are mixed, with Labour showing a decrease in standard deviation for the 
canvassing data over the three elections from 26.80 to 19.98. There is a lack of consistency 
in the figures for the other two parties, with the Conservatives seeing a fall at the first two 
elections before a rise in the standard deviations in 2001 and the Liberal Democrats saw a 
rise in the standard deviation of their doorstep canvassing figures between 1992 and 1997, 
but a fall in 2001. This is interesting as it echoes not only the results from the spending 
figures, but also from existing literature that 2001 marked the first election at which the 
Conservatives adopted a concerted rational approach to campaigning.   
 
These results are echoed by the telephone canvassing figures, which although only covering 
two elections provide some interesting results. For all three parties, the mean proportion of a 
constituency covered by telephone canvassing fell between 1997 and 2001, which may be 
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attributable to the growth in the use of the internet between elections, or indeed due to 
different constituencies responding to the survey. Of the three parties, Labour have run the 
highest level of telephone canvassing, with an average coverage of 19.36 percent in 1997, 
although they saw the largest drop of the parties of almost 8 points in 2001. It may be their 
proactivity in adopting new technology to contact voters coupled with their resources 
enabling them to carry it out. Indeed in 1997, they were the only party who managed to 
canvass 100% of a constituency via telephone. When looking at the standard deviations of 
the figures, there are falls between the two elections for both Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, indicating not only were these parties canvassing less by telephone between the 
two elections, there was less variation, so there was an overall decline. In contrast, for the 
Conservatives, the standard deviations for the telephone canvassing figures actually 
increased between the elections, which imply an increase in targeted canvassing, with some 
constituencies receiving much higher levels than others. 
 
Parties, marginality and campaigning 
 
The last section has indicated some evidence of variation in constituency campaigns run by 
the three main political parties in the UK, with the standard deviation figures revealing that 
some constituencies saw a far lower level of campaigning than others. This section takes the 
aggregate multivariate relationship already explored in the chapter and disaggregates it into 
individual campaigning variables for each of the three parties under investigation, to 
examine whether there is variation in the rate at which marginality affects campaigning 
amongst them. The general trends in variation should be observable; that is a general 
increase in the influence of marginality on Conservative campaigning, a dip for Labour in 
2001 and 2005 as they struggled to defend their massive landslide and an overall 
intensification by the Liberal Democrats. 
To gain an initial sense of the patterns of the relationship between marginality and 
campaigning across the parties, bivariate correlations between the campaigning variables for 
each party and constituency marginality were conducted using the combined dataset. 
Spending by all three parties over the 1987 to 2010 period was both negatively and 
significantly correlated with marginality, supporting the idea that lower levels of 
campaigning are associated with constituencies with higher majorities. Of the three parties, 
the Conservatives have the strongest correlation at -.428, with Labour and the Liberal 
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Democrats having weak correlations. These results are reflected by the results of the 
correlations for the two canvassing variables which are once again negative and significant 
for all parties, although much weaker. Once again the Conservatives have the strongest 
correlations (-.204 for door and -.263 for telephone) of the three parties and the Liberal 
Democrats have the weakest. To illustrate how the campaigning variables and marginality 
are associated between the parties across the five categories of marginality, ANOVA tests 
were conducted in the combined dataset. This enables the means in the five categories to be 
examined to see whether they differ significantly from each other. Significant differences 
were found for spending with a significant fall in the ultra-safe category for all three parties. 
For the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, spending consistently falls as seats become 
safer, with the highest spend in ultra-marginal seats and lowest  in ultra-safe seats (in the 
case of the Conservatives, there was a drop of over 13 percentage points between the two 
extreme categories). Labour, in contrast, spent most highly in their very marginal seats (5-
9.99, the upper limit of marginal seats) over the period. These results were reflected by the 
ANOVA results using the two canvassing variables as dependent variables, with significant 
results for both the Conservatives and Labour. The anomaly here is the Liberal Democrats, 
where there were found to be no significant differences in the average doorstep and 
telephone canvassing across the categories. This may be due to the relatively small number 
of local Liberal Democrat activists in constituencies. 
These correlations offer generally promising results associating marginality with 
campaigning by the three main parties, but to test this more thoroughly, multivariate 
regression analyses were conducted. To produce clear results comparable with the previous 
analysis, a near identical model was retained. Marginality is again the independent variable 
with the individual party campaign variables as dependents, running individual regressions 
for each variable for each party (so nine in total, three campaign variables for each of the 
three parties). The political controls are those identifying the length of the incumbent’s 
career tenure and an interaction term between this and marginality as there is an association 
between the two. Four socio-demographic variables have been controlled for as previously. 
Table 5.8 below displays the summary regression coefficients between previous majority and 
campaign spending. 
The coefficients for marginality from the results of the spending regressions in table 5.8 are 
in the expected direction for all three parties, both over the period and for all individual 
elections, but not all the results are significant. Of the three parties the Conservatives are the 
only party where previous majority is negatively and significantly related to their candidate 
154 
 
spending at each election during the period. The safer a constituency was between 1987 and 
2010, the less money spent there by the Conservatives, controlling for other factors.  
Table 5.8: Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationship between 
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 .113 .080 .062 .249 .202 .170 .221 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients for the selected variables only with 
standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
The coefficients for the relationship between marginality and Conservative campaign 
spending between 1987 and 1997 are relatively low in comparison to later elections, which 
indicate that marginality had a comparatively lesser influence on campaign spending at these 
elections. However, even at its weakest in 1992, for every percentage point increase in a 
constituency’s previous majority, Conservative candidates reduced their spending by .422 
percentage points. This is likely to be due to the impact of incumbency, which, as explored 
in the next section, is an important influence on the relationship between marginality and 
campaigning levels. It was Conservative spending in their own safely held constituencies 
which was described as irrational by Pattie and Johnston (2003b), and the regression 




Pattie and Johnston (2003b) suggested that 2001 was the first election at which the 
Conservatives started to campaign strategically, and results from the table would appear to 
reinforce this with considerable jumps in the coefficients for the relationship to be very 
strongly negative in the last three elections. For example, in 2005, (the largest coefficient for 
Conservative spending over the entire period) for every percentage point increase in previous 
majority, campaign expenditure fell by 1.319 percentage points, Indeed, at all three elections 
from 2001, the difference to Conservative spending made by a percentage point increase in 
previous majority has been a decrease of over one percentage point. 
 
Over the 1987 to 2010 period marginality has consistently has a strong impact on the amount 
of money spent by the Conservatives in constituencies, with safer seats seeing lower 
spending by party candidates, strengthening over the period. However, the r
2
 values for these 
regressions are not always strong; the lowest value is 1992 when the equation explained only 
8.3% of variation in Conservative spending. The coincidence of the lowest coefficient for the 
Conservatives over the period and the lowest explanatory power is interesting and might 
indicate that the coefficient could be boosted if different variables were incorporated into the 
model for this year. The explanatory power did rise considerably throughout the period (with 
a small dip in 2010), which reflects the increasing role of marginality in affecting spending.  
The interaction terms between tenure and marginality offer a clear negative relationship with 
tenure having relatively little impact across the period on the relationship between 
marginality and Conservative spending. A key factor to point out in this assessment is that 
although length of tenure is being accounted for, the model does not identify the party the 
incumbent belongs to. While the next section explores the impact of local incumbency upon 
the relationship between marginality and spending in more detail, the interactions in table 5.8 
can offer a brief insight. Over the period as a whole the interactions indicate that higher 
Conservative spending is associated with incumbents serving 14 years and above.  
The interactions between tenure and marginality appear minimal in both 1987 and 1992, 
with longer serving incumbents seeing less impact on the relationship between marginality 
and Conservative spending than shorter tenures. Some support for less rational Conservative 
spending in 1987 may be that in the ultra-safe seats, the highest overall level of spending was 
by the longest serving incumbents (17 years and above). By breaking down the figures 




In the elections spanning 1997 to 2005, the relationship between previous majority and 
Conservative spending grows steeper, with tenure having a minimal impact upon the 
relationship. In 2010, however, tenure appears to be having more of an impact upon the 
relationship between marginality and Conservative spending. With the exception of ultra-
safe constituencies, those seats with the longest serving incumbents at this election saw 
higher levels of spending than shorter tenures. This may indicate a more expansionist 
Conservative campaign strategy, with 59.9% of these seats held by Labour (versus 32% held 
by the Conservatives). 
  
The largest coefficient for the relationship between marginality and Labour spending over 
the period occurs in 1987, with a single percentage point increase in majority decreasing 
Labour candidate expenditure by over one percentage point.  The relationship between the 
two variables is both negative and significant in 1992 and 1997, with campaigns run under 
1997’s Operation Victory showing the second highest coefficient, with a .794 percentage 
point decrease in Labour candidate spending for every percentage point the previous 
majority rose. As expected, the coefficients are insignificant in both 2001 and 2005, 
reflecting the earlier findings of the bivariate correlations, indicating that the large-scale 
defence of seats won in 1997 had affected the relationship. The electoral context of these 
elections is likely to have played a part in these results. Labour won a landslide victory in 
1997, gaining 145 seats, many unexpectedly (previously safe Conservative seats) and 
defending such a large number of diverse seats necessitated a more defensive strategy at the 
2001 election. This might account for the insignificance of the expected relationship, with 
Labour spreading their resources more evenly over a larger number of constituencies.  
Over the period as a whole, tenure does have an impact on the relationship between 
marginality and Labour spending. The longest serving incumbents (those serving 14 years or 
more) have the greatest impact upon the relationship between marginality and spending by 
Labour, with a far steeper decline in spending the safer the constituency. However, as 
indicated by the coefficients for marginality discussed in the last paragraph, this does not 
necessarily follow for all elections over the period. The general impact of tenure in both 
1987 and 1992 indicates that as an incumbents tenure increased, the previous majority had a 
greater impact on Labour spending, with safer constituencies seeing lower spending by the 
party the longer the incumbent had served. In 1997, the relationship between marginality and 
campaigning still suggests that the safer the constituency the lower the level of spend. 
However, observing the impact of tenure length upon this relationship offers interesting 
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results. In a change from the previous two elections, it is now those serving the longest 
tenures (of 14 years and above) who have the higher overall level of spending by Labour 
candidates. Of the seats occupied by these long serving incumbents, 60.82% of them are 
occupied by the Conservatives, which indicates expansionist campaign spending by Labour. 
As table 5.8 has illustrated, Labour spending in 2001 and 2005 is not straightforward, and 
thus the impact of tenure upon the relationship between it and marginality is also complex. 
Compared to the overall downward trend observed in earlier elections (where the longer the 
tenure, the greater the impact on the relationship between marginality and campaigning), the 
results for 2001 and 2005 indicate that although the level of Labour spending dropped the 
longer an incumbent had been in a seat, marginality did not affect this. In 2010, however, the 
downward trend between marginality and Labour spending was tempered by tenure length 
returns. For the shortest serving incumbents (59.6% of whom were Labour) in constituencies 
with previous majorities up to 14.99% there is a distinct drop in Labour spending the safer 
the constituency is. Yet spending rises in the two safest categories by these same 
incumbents, which could indicate a defensive campaign strategy.  
The r
2
 values for Labour are much lower than those for the Conservatives, with the model 
only explaining 9.2 percent of variation in spending in 1992. The coefficients for both 2001 
and 2005 are also lower at 16.9 and 12.0 percent of variation respectively; results of the 
specific electoral context that Labour were in at the time. In the remaining three elections the 
model explains between 25.9 and 31.8 percent of variation. This sharp fall in 2001 and 2005 
reflects the findings of the correlations in the previous section and suggests that marginality 
provides only a partial account for variations in campaign spending for Labour candidates in 
these years. Yet these years appear to be exceptions to the general relationship however, as 
by 2010 the coefficient was once again significant. 
The results for the multiple regressions for Liberal Democrat candidates also support the 
relationship between marginality and campaign spending. Across the period covered in this 
analysis, the coefficients for Liberal Democrat candidate spending were all negative as 
expected, indicating that as the percentage majority increased, the level of campaigning fell, 
controlling for other factors. However, of these six values, those for 1992 and 1997 are both 
insignificant, which could be explained by 1992 being the first election at which the Liberal 
Democrats had fought as a single party (previously it had been the Alliance) which may have 
impacted upon the relationship. Also, in 1997, Labour and the Liberal Democrats operated a 
series of tactical campaigns in some constituencies which may have diminished the 
relationship between marginality and campaign spending for this year; the incumbency of 
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constituency is not identified, and it may be that in marginal constituencies held by the 
Conservatives where Labour were second, the Liberal Democrats campaigned less to give a 
tactical advantage to Labour. Excluding these two insignificant values, the remainder appear 
fairly stable, reaching a peak in 2005 when a single percentage increase in previous majority 
led to Liberal Democrat spending declining by .714 percentage points. The relative stability 
of the coefficients for all years except 1992 and 1997 implies that the Liberal Democrats 
established targeted campaigning early on in their life cycle and have applied it at elections 
since. Although these are lower than the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats have fewer 
resources. Like Labour, the r
2
 values are weak, explaining between six and 27 percent of 
variation in campaign spending by Liberal Democrat candidates. 
None of the interaction terms between tenure and marginality are significant, but they shall 
be examined in a little more detail. It could be expected that in the case of the Liberal 
Democrats, tenure may be less likely to have an impact on the relationship between 
marginality and campaign spending. Although the figures do not indicate party incumbency, 
the party have held comparatively few seats, but have been very rational in their spending 
approach. This implies that there should be a fairly clear relationship between marginality 
and Liberal Democrat spending because the party does not have to be concerned about the 
impact of incumbency. The 1987 election saw a greater impact of tenure on the relationship 
between marginality and Liberal Democrat (then Alliance) spending where the incumbent 
had served up to eight years, a trend echoed again in both 1992 and 1997. More so than in 
the previous elections, tenure has a clear impact in 2001, with the shorter the incumbency, 
the greater the impact of marginality on Liberal Democrat spending. A new incumbent in an 
ultra-safe seat saw a drop in the party’s spending of almost 30 percentage points compared to 
the equivalent incumbent in an ultra-marginal seat. This implies a careful targeting of seats 
where an incumbent has had relatively little time to create their personal support base.  
 
In 2005, the safer the constituency, the lower the Liberal Democrat spending, but this 
depended upon how long the incumbent had served. Where the incumbent had served 13 
years and above (i.e. elected in 1987 or before) spending dropped quickly the safer the seat 
became. In seats where the incumbent had served 4 years or less (i.e. had been elected in 
2001) Liberal Democrat spending dropped slightly less as the seat became safer, perhaps 
because there was a chance of seat change. In 2010, tenure had no impact on the relationship 
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between marginality and turnout where a constituency was safe. However, marginal seats 
saw a drop in spending the longer the incumbent had served.  
 
The same model was run for the two selected campaign activity variables of telephone and 
doorstep canvassing to examine how the relationship between marginality and these 
variables varied between the parties. As before, the relationship should be negative, although 
more variation in the relationship is likely. The results for doorstep canvassing may be 
particularly variable for the Conservatives who have traditionally had the stronger local 
associations, which may enable a greater amount of such canvassing to be conducted.  
Labour were also at the forefront of using telephone canvassing, particularly in national or 
regional phone banks in 1997 so the relationships for that variable would be expected to be 
strong for the party in that year.  Table 5.9 displays the coefficients for marginality in 
summary. 
Table 5.9: Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationship between 
marginality and canvassing on a party-by-party basis (full results in Appendix 5) 
 1992-2001 1997-2001 
 Doorstep canvassing Telephone canvassing 
Conservative -.140 (.102) -.312** (.079) 
Adjusted r
2
 .052 .059 
Labour -.085 (.096) -.317** (.102) 
Adjusted r
2
 .051 .089 
Liberal Democrats -.028 (.063) -.012 (.051) 
Adjusted r
2
 .024 .052 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 1911 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients for the selected variables only with 
standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
 
The results for the marginality and canvassing variables across the three parties offer some 
guidance to the relationship with all relationships negative as expected. For the 
Conservatives, the coefficients between marginality and doorstep canvassing were negative 
over the period, although the result was insignificant. Marginality is significantly related to 
the proportion of constituencies covered by telephone canvassing, with a single percentage 
point increase in the previous majority leading to a drop of .312 percentage points in the 
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coverage. For Labour, the results are similar, with a negative but insignificant relationship 
between marginality and doorstep canvassing. The results for telephone canvassing in 
contrast indicate that the proportion of a constituency covered by telephone canvassing is 
significantly affected by the marginality of a constituency; the coefficient for this measure is 
slightly larger than for the Conservatives. For the Liberal Democrats, once again the results 
are varied with no significant results for either telephone or doorstep canvassing. A common 
feature for all of these regressions are the very weak r
2
 values, with the highest value 
explaining just 8.9% of variation in Labour telephone canvassing in 1997. This was also a 
feature of the aggregate regression of the campaign activity variables. 
The impact of tenure on the relationship between marginality and doorstep canvassing 
differs by party. For the Conservatives, the overall trend of safer constituencies seeing lower 
levels of such canvassing is reflected, but incumbents who have served four years or less 
show little discernable difference between different constituency marginalities. For those 
incumbents with tenures above four years, it does appear that the longer the incumbent’s 
tenure, the greater the impact of marginality on Conservative canvassing. This is similar to 
doorstep canvassing by the Liberal Democrats, with marginality making little impact on the 
proportion of the constituency canvassed by the Liberal Democrats. As a general observation 
though, seats with longer tenures tend to see higher levels of doorstep canvassing by the 
party. 
 
For Labour, tenure has a clear an impact upon the relationship between marginality and the 
proportion of the constituency canvassed by door. Incumbents with tenures longer than nine 
years show higher levels of doorstep canvassing by Labour, as well as a clear drop in 
doorstep canvassing across the marginality categories. In contrast, incumbents with tenures 
up to nine years show no relationship between marginality and L canvassing. 
Both the interaction terms for the Conservatives and Labour show the relationship between 
marginality and levels of telephone canvassing by the parties altering according to different 
incumbent tenures. The shorter the tenure, the sharper the fall in the level of telephone 
canvassing as a constituency gets safer. However, for the Liberal Democrats, although 
constituencies with shorter tenures tend to have higher levels of telephone canvassing, there 




These results indicate that marginality has a mostly significant impact on levels of spending, 
and that this varies across parties, with the Conservatives seeing the most consistent results 
during the period. The results for campaign activities are a little weaker, although a few key 
trends can be indicated. The key theme, which has emerged not only from the exploration of 
party differentials on the marginality and campaigning relationship but also in the earlier 
study into aggregate data, is the fit of the model.  
Looking at the adjusted r
2 
values for tables 5.8 and 5.9, the model best fits the spending data 
(particularly in the case of the Conservatives), with poor results for the two canvassing 
variables. There are five points to be made in regards to the fit of the model in this section; 
the first is the maintenance of a near identical model between the aggregate data of the last 
section and the party-specific data of this section. The only substantive change that was 
made to the model in this section was to introduce the party-specific dependent variables 
measuring campaigning: the changes were restricted in order that the results could be 
comparable to those from the aggregate regressions. Perhaps the model needed to be adapted 
for the comparison across parties. Secondly, the same model was retained for all three 
parties, so maybe this needed adjusting on a party by party basis, introducing different 
variables in order for the explanatory power to be kept more constant. However, the point of 
this section was to examine how the relationship between marginality and campaigning 
varied across parties and by creating essentially different models for each party would limit 
comparability. The parsimony of the existing model was also attractive, encompassing seven 
control variables covering a range of socio-demographics. It is possible that another reason 
that the model did not fit well across the period is that it was designed to examine the 
relationship between marginality and campaigning over a period of six elections. Lastly, the 
appropriateness of applying a multiple regression to the relationship should be considered. 
Looking back at existing research into the relationship, it is difficult to find any such model 
being created for the relationship. Pattie and Johnston (2009b) offer a simple regression not 
controlling for other factors, whereas authors often use a simple split of data into target 
status (Fisher and Denver, 2009:202) or marginality categories to describe the relationship. 
However, this does not take into account the incumbency of each party, which is important 






Incumbency, opposition and marginality 
 
The relationship between marginality and campaigning varies across the three parties studied 
in this thesis, although there is overall evidence of a decline of campaigning in safer 
constituencies. In this section, the hypothesis that the impact of marginality on campaigning 
varies across incumbencies is considered, using two nested hypotheses to explore the impact 
of incumbency on the relationship between marginality and campaigning. Levels of 
incumbent and opponent campaigning are contrasted between safe and marginal seats, with 
the expectation that campaigning by both types of candidate declines as constituencies 
become safer. Incumbency here refers to local incumbency, not national, utilising a party-
based measure of incumbency accounting for both retiring MPs and constituency boundary 
changes. When the sitting MP (i.e. the one previously elected) has retired prior to an 
election, the candidate representing the same party will be classified as the incumbent, 
thereby enabling the examination of constituencies where the sitting MP has retired. There is 
a question in regards to what happens to a retiring MP’s personal support (Curtice, Fisher 
and Ford, 2011), but mostly MPs retire after multiple elections, so the support base for the 
party would be relatively stable. The focus on party incumbency also allows for constituency 
boundary changes; when boundaries are changed, notional previous election results are 
created which identify the party which would have won the seat. The candidate belonging to 
this party is the incumbent. An opposition candidate has here been restricted only to those in 
second place – that is the party who came second in the previous election (whether actual or 
notional). 
Incumbency matters when studying campaigning, with evidence (see Jacobson, 1978; Benoit 
and Marsh, 2010) that campaigning by non-incumbent candidates is considerably more 
effective than campaigns run by incumbents, even in different types of electoral system. Yet 
other research suggests that challengers spend highly in campaigns ‘regardless of perceived 
marginality’ (Erikson and Palfrey, 2000:603), which the authors attribute not only to a lack 
of experience, but also an overestimation of their likelihood of victory. The importance of 
incumbency in the UK has been examined by Johnston and Pattie (1995) in their study of 
campaign expenditure at the 1992 general election, with spending proving more effective for 
opposition candidates than for incumbents. These differences in campaign effectiveness by 
may be explained by candidate recognition. During an election campaign, incumbent 
candidates start from an advantage as they are likely to have a degree of recognition in the 
locality; many people may know their name, their record in Parliament and their positions on 
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policy issues. This is in contrast to opposition candidates, who are likely to be comparatively 
unknown and have a large amount of ground to make up to attain the same level of 
recognition as the incumbent.  
Local incumbency is a vital consideration in a study focusing on safe constituencies as it 
affects campaigning levels to a far greater extent than in marginal seats, also altering the 
strategies of candidates. The interaction of incumbency on the relationship between 
marginality and campaign intensity is key, with ostensibly greater (easier) returns to be made 
from campaigning in marginal seats by opposition candidates. Marginal seats are more likely 
to change hands, so both the incumbent (defending their seat) and the opposition candidate 
(trying to gain the seat) are likely to campaign at similar levels. In contrast campaigning is 
likely to be of a generally lower level in safe constituencies, but the gap between incumbent 
and opposition campaigning will be greater as the incentives for opposition candidates to 
campaign are less.  
To illustrate the impact of local incumbency on campaigning, all incumbents and opposition 
candidates were identified and aggregate spends for each category were calculated. Graph 
5.3 illustrates the differences in campaign spending by incumbent and opposition candidates 
across the period. Even though the figures included in the graph do not take into account 
constituency marginality, a clear difference can be seen in campaign spending between 
incumbent and opposition candidates.   
Graph 5.3: Incumbent and opposition spending  
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
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Opposition candidates spend considerably less than incumbent candidates, and the difference 
increases over the period. Whereas incumbent spending varies by 9.90 percentage points 
over the period, opposition spending varies by 21.77 percentage points. Incumbent spending 
remains high over the period, falling below 80% of the permitted legal maximum in 2010 
alone. However in both 2005 and 2010, opposition candidates spend on average just over 
half the legal maximum. Early indications of the impact of marginality on the incumbency 
relationship are revealed by the standard deviation figures (see Appendix 6), with 
consistently larger standard deviations for opposition candidates. These larger figures 
indicate that there is greater variation in opposition candidate spending, which could be 
explained by constituency marginality. 
By introducing marginality into the examination of campaigning between incumbents and 
opposition candidates, the results of ANOVA testing enables comparisons of mean levels of 
campaigning to be made across the five categories of constituency. Dividing the 
campaigning variables into incumbents and opponents, ANOVA tests were run for each of 
the three campaigning variables to examine whether variation in campaigning across the 
marginality categories was more marked in opposition candidates. The full results can be 
seen in Appendix 7. 
The results for incumbent candidates vary across parties in significance. For Conservative 
and Labour incumbents, there were significant differences in the amount spent across the 
five categories, with a particularly marked drop in ultra-safe seats. However, for Liberal 
Democrat incumbents, the variation in mean spending was not significant, although the two 
safest categories (very safe and ultra-safe) were over eight percentage points lower than the 
other three. For the two campaigning variables, there were insignificant variations for both 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats; indeed telephone canvassing by incumbent 
Liberal Democrat MPs in ultra-safe constituencies was only higher in ultra-marginal 
constituencies. There were significant results for both canvassing variables for Labour, with 
large drops in the ultra-safe category.  
In contrast, the spending figures for opposition candidates are clear in their support for the 
importance of incumbency in the relationship between campaigning and marginality. The 
variation in spending by opposition candidates across the five categories was significant for 
all three parties, with large drops (of 17.2 and 16.3 percentage points) respectively in 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat spending between the very safe and ultra-safe category, 
whereas Labour spending drops between fairly safe and very safe). There are mixed results 
for the activity variables, with the Conservatives being the only party with significant results 
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for both doorstep and telephone canvassing, with the largest drops in the ultra-safe category. 
While there are significant variations in telephone canvassing by Labour opposition 
candidates, the results for doorstep canvassing are insignificant, with such canvassing second 
highest in the ultra-safe category. Neither campaign activity variable is significant for 
Liberal Democrat opposition candidates. 
 
Identifying low level campaigns 
 
So far, when examining the relationship between marginality and campaigning (and the 
effects of party and incumbency), this chapter has utilised continuous measures of the 
campaigning variables. These allow us to identify lower levels of campaigning, but they do 
not indicate relative levels of campaigning; as seen in graph 5.2, the Liberal Democrats 
spend less overall, but the continuous measure does not enable this to be taken into 
consideration. An explicit measure has been developed to offer an easy way of identifying 
low level campaigns for this thesis, influenced by existing literature. Measures of levels of 
campaigning are infrequently part of constituency campaigning studies, with Pattie et al. 
(1994) and Denver, Hands and McAllister (2004) offering two examples. In their 
examination of the 1987 general election, Pattie et al. (1994:474) define relative levels of 
campaign effort by using scores from an index combining campaign spending and activity 
variables. With the scores centred on zero, a campaign registering a value greater than zero 
signifies ‘above average constituency campaign effort’ (Pattie et al. 1994:474), while those 
below zero indicate lower levels of campaigning. These scores apply only to a single party 
(Labour), and they are partly (in addition to spending data) based both on the results of Seyd 
and Whiteley’s party member survey and self-reported data from the British Election Study, 
so there are issues of data access and coverage. Denver et al.’s (2004) comparative study of 
constituency campaign effectiveness covered the three elections between 1992 and 2001. In 
this study, scores of campaigning derived from the party agent surveys were divided into 

















The study found that the quartiles alter the effectiveness of constituency campaigning with 
Labour campaigns in the first quartile in 1992 actually reducing Labour vote share by 1.5 
percentage points (p 298). This study is important for this thesis, as it is the only one which 
clearly links low levels of campaigning and a detrimental impact on vote share. Using this 
idea of a quartile-based measure of campaign levels, a more refined measure incorporating 
both party and incumbency differentials has been created for this thesis (fig 5.2), with the 
first quartile identifying low level campaigns. 
 








































The first alteration that has been made is the production of party-specific measures. 
Campaigning varies between parties, with the Liberal Democrats spending considerably less 
than both Labour and the Conservatives. Creating a single measure for all three parties risks 
skewing the measure: for example, whereas the average spend across all constituencies for 
Labour and the Conservatives differs by a maximum of 17 percentage points in 2010, the 
mean difference between the Liberal Democrats and Labour (the next closest party) was 
23.56 percentage points. A measure clearly specific to each party enables comparisons to be 
made of levels of campaigning in regards to that party’s individual capacities. The second 
key alteration made to the existing measure is the incorporation of incumbency identifiers. 
The last section demonstrated that incumbency affects the level of campaigning, with 
opposition candidates more likely to run lower level campaigns, particularly in safe seats. It 
is therefore important that this is identified when measuring levels of campaigning, as not to 
do so could lead to over-estimation of the levels of opponent campaigning by raising the 
mean. Quartile measures were produced for all three of the campaign variables. 
In each constituency, the local incumbent and opposition (the party in second place) parties 
were identified. This meant that there were six possible incumbency scenarios for the parties: 
Conservative incumbent, Conservative opponent, Labour incumbent, Labour opponent, 
Liberal Democrat incumbent and Liberal Democrat opponent. In all constituencies, each 
party-specific measure of campaigning was sorted into these scenarios in turn. Quartiles 
were then able to be calculated for each scenario, and codified as binary variables. These 
variables were created to speedily identify the incumbency, party and quartile of a campaign: 
for example Conservative Incumbent Quartile 1 (shortened to CIQ1). This provided party-
specific measures able to be used in exploring the impact of such campaigns on vote share.  
This thesis examines the effects of low level campaigns on local electoral outcomes; 
operationalised as turnout and vote share. The key difference between these two variables is 
the ability to trace the results for each party. Party vote share gives an idea of party support 
in the constituency, and linking this to campaigning (with the ability to control for other 
parties campaigning in the same constituency) is fairly straightforward; the simple binary 
variables created can be used in analysis. Yet the relationship between campaigning and 
turnout is more complex as turnout is a non-party-specific figure, so adjustments need to be 
made. 
In using the binary variables to examine turnout (fig 5.3) , influence is taken from Denver et 
al. (2004), who combined the figures for the top two parties and used the result as the basis 
for analysis. The measure developed here is based on the party-specific binary identifications 
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described above, but it combines the quartiles for the incumbent and opposition in a 
constituency. This turnout measure combining the levels of campaigning by the top two 
parties means that unequal levels of campaigning and their effect on turnout can be 
investigated; for example it is possible to isolate those campaigns where both the incumbent 
and opposition ran low level campaigns (1:1). Campaigns where the levels of campaigning 
are unequal can also be explored, such as where either the incumbent or opponent 
campaigned at a higher level than the other. All possible scenarios may be seen in the matrix 
displayed in table 5.10. 












1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4 
Incumbent 
Quartile 2 
2:1 2:2 2:3 2:4 
Incumbent 
Quartile 3 
3:1 3:2 3:3 3:4 
Incumbent 
Quartile 4 
4:1 4:2 4:3 4:4 
 
As shorthand, the relative levels of campaigning by the top two candidates are indicated with 
I for incumbent and O for the opposition. So a constituency in which both the incumbent and 
opponent ran a campaign in the first quartile was assigned a combined measure of I1O1. 
Each scenario in this table has been codified as a binary variable. 
To explore whether low level campaigns were most likely to be run in safe constituencies, 
independent samples t-tests were conducted with percentage majority as the test variable, 
and either the combined measure of campaign levels (for turnout) or the single measure (for 
vote share) as the grouping variable. Lower levels of campaigning are expected in 
constituencies with higher previous majorities. Tables 5.11 and 5.12 show the abbreviated 
results for the singular party measure to be used in examining the impact of low level 
campaigns on vote share (full results for both tables are in appendix 8). If the link between 
low level campaigns and safe constituencies is to be borne out, negative values for the t-test 
statistics are to be expected which indicate that low level campaigns are run in constituencies 
with higher previous majorities than those with higher levels of campaigning. 
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Table 5.11: T-testing low level campaign spending (single measure) and previous 
majority (full results in Appendix 8) 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Incumbent spend 
Conservative -4.337** -1.299 -3.290** -.455 -1.276 -3.147** 
Labour -2.769** -2.384* -5.498** -9.585** -7.569** -5.964** 
Liberal 
Democrat 
.829 .247 -.916 -1.189 -1.686 -2.587* 
Opponent spend 
Conservative -7.574** -5.291** -10.131** -17.251** -15.400** -10.951** 
Labour -5.882** -1.122 -8.916** -1.549 -2.761** -4.344** 
Liberal 
Democrat 
-8.043** -3.300** -6.847** -6.504** -4.508** -8.460** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N=3804. Relationships where 
significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
The results shown in both tables mostly support the link between safe constituencies and low 
level campaigns, particularly for opposition candidates. The results for Conservative 
incumbent candidates are in the expected direction in all but two cases, with four significant. 
All t-test values for low level campaigns for Conservative opposition candidates are negative 
which indicates that the constituencies with these types of campaigns (whether low spending, 
doorstep canvassing or telephone canvassing) are safer than other constituencies. 
Importantly, almost all are significant, except the telephone canvassing result for 1997, with 
particularly strong values for spending in 2001 and 2005. In 2001, the mean previous 
majority for constituencies running higher level spending campaigns by Conservatives 
candidates in second place was 20.15%, whereas for constituencies where such candidates 
were running low level campaigns was 46.33%. Existing literature indicates that 
Conservatives spend highly in their safe constituencies, but table 5.10 demonstrates that 
Conservative incumbents running lower level campaigns were in constituencies 4.77 
percentage points safer on average than those running more intense campaigns. Literature 
attributes this higher spending to the stronger local associations in Conservative safe 
constituencies, and the indications from the doorstep canvassing results for Conservative 
incumbents offer this some support. In 1992 and 1997, although insignificant, lower-level 
doorstep canvassing campaigns by the party were run in safer constituencies than higher 
levels of campaigning. 
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Table 5.12: T-testing low level canvassing (single measure) and previous majority (full 
results in Appendix 8) 
 1992 1997 2001 
Proportion of constituency canvassed on the doorstep by incumbent 
Conservative .417 .096 -1.155 
Labour -3.324** -4.603** -5.634** 
Liberal Democrat .508 -.010 -1.771 
Proportion of constituency canvassed on the doorstep by opposition 
Conservative -3.771** -3.902** -6.085** 
Labour -3.835** -.811 -2.888** 
Liberal Democrat -.714 -1.181 -2.381* 
Proportion of constituency canvassed via telephone by incumbent 
Conservative  -2.055* -.677 
Labour  -1.991* -7.248** 
Liberal Democrat  -2.091 -1.565 
Proportion of constituency canvassed via telephone by opposition 
Conservative  -.121 -9.172** 
Labour  -2.818** -4.431** 
Liberal Democrat  -1.054 -3.522** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N= 1911. Relationships where 
significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
The results for Labour in the majority of cases support the claim that low level campaigns 
are run in safe constituencies. The relationship is as expected, with negative values, for 
incumbent candidates, whereas the values for their opposition candidates are in the expected 
direction for all three campaign variables. Variations in spending peaked in 2001, with 
constituencies running lower levels of campaign spending having average majorities of 42.1 
percent versus 26.58 percent in those running higher level campaign spends. For opposition 
candidates, the values are all in expected direction, although only four are significant for 
spend and one is insignificant for doorstep canvassing. The largest variation in campaign 
spending by Labour opposition candidates is in 1997, which is to be expected due to the 
targeted nature of that year’s campaign. The results of Liberal Democrat incumbents and low 
level campaigns are mixed, with the results for spending only negative for three elections 
and only the value for 2010 significant; there are similar results for the two canvassing 
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variables, with no significant results. It would appear that there is little evidence that low 
level campaigns are being run by Liberal Democrat incumbents.  This may be due to the fact 
that relatively few constituencies held by the Lib Dems are safe, so most of their 
incumbencies are marginal constituencies, necessitating a defensive strategy. In contrast, the 
results for low level spending and Liberal Democrat opposition candidates are striking, with 
all in the expected direction at each election for all campaign variables. This is not 
unexpected, with the Liberal Democrats having far fewer resources than the other parties, 
necessitating targeted campaigning; it would appear that Liberal Democrat opposition 
candidates are targeting hard. 
Next the combined measure for the top two parties was tested, with the modifications 
enabling relative levels of campaigning by incumbent and opposition parties to be studied 
alongside the overall level. Independent samples t-tests were run between previous majority 
and a binary variable indicating the combined quartile measure, when at least one party was 
running a low level campaign. The relative levels of campaigning are indicated in the table 
with I identifying the quartile of the incumbent’s campaign and O identifying the 















Table 5.13: T-Testing low level campaign spending (combined measure) and previous 
majority 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Spending       
I1, O1 -6.263** -3.679** -8.525** -10.541** -9.363** -9.011** 
I1, O2 -1.508 -1.422 -4.175** -2.447* -2.496* -1.791 
I1, O3 -.548 1.408 1.196 5.418** 4.197** -.472 
I1, O4 2.894** .796 4.086** 3.638** 2.549* 2.089* 
I2, O1 -5.752** -2.057* -4.872** -7.275** -6.045** -6.216** 
I3, O1 -3.327** -2.633** -6.667** -3.947** -3.548** -2.160* 
14, O1 -3.619** -1.627 -4.256** -1.576 -1.856 -2.240* 
Doorstep       
I1, O1  -1.587 -3.618** -2.838**   
I1, O2  1.242 -1.942 1.051   
I1, O3  -1.791 -.710 -.138   
I1, O4  -.390 .318 -.633   
I2, O1  -1.154 1.068 -4.259**   
I3, O1  -1.033 .997 -2.745**   
I4, O1  -3.497** -1.143 .362   
Telephone       
I1, O1   -.705   -5.747**   
I1, O2   -.613 -.456   
I1, O3   -1.902 .005   
I1, O4      5.182** -.237   
I2, O1   -.276 -1.231   
I3, O1   .237   -2.877**   
14, O1   .758 1.082   
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Incumbent candidate 
score indicated with I and opposition candidate score indicated with O. 
All constituencies where both the opposition and incumbent candidate ran low level 
spending campaigns (I1O1) are negative and significant, which indicates that these 
constituencies are significantly safer than those with other levels of campaigning. The peak 
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in this variation was in 2001 when constituencies where both parties ran low level campaigns 
having an average majority of 43.22 percentage points versus an average majority of 21.24 
percentage points for constituencies that ran higher level campaigns. When the incumbent 
campaign spend remains low level and the opposition candidate spend increases (I1O2-4) the 
number of significant results gradually drops off to three in I1O2, although the results for the 
other years are in the expected direction. However, when incumbents are running low level 
campaigns and opposition candidates run campaigns in the third and fourth quartiles (I1O3 
and I1O4), there is a considerable change not only in the number of significant results, but 
also in the direction of the results. Interestingly, when comparing these results to 
constituencies where opposition candidate spend remained in the first quartile and incumbent 
spending was in higher quartiles (I2O1, I3O1, I4O1), all results are negative and most the 
variations are significant. It would appear from these results that for the combined measure 
to be significantly correlated with marginality relies a great deal on whether the opposition 




Existing literature has often indicated that campaigning and marginality are closely related, 
with parties concentrating their campaigning on marginal constituencies. The evidence from 
this chapter would appear to support this; safer constituencies often see significantly lower 
spends than more marginal constituencies. This relationship varies over the period covered 
by this thesis, but even when taking other factors into account marginality remains a 
significant explanation for constituency campaign spending. It also affects the amount of 
doorstep and telephone canvassing conducted in constituencies, although this relationship is 
less clear. 
This relationship between marginality and campaigning is also more complex than it first 
appears, varying according to parties and incumbencies. Of the three parties, the Liberal 
Democrats target their campaign spending most strategically, attributable partially to their 
relatively small resources compared to Labour and the Conservatives. The Conservatives are 
strategic in their campaign spend even in the earlier part of the period, perhaps more so than 
they are often given credit for. Ultimately different parties not only have different priorities 
at elections (retaining/attaining power), but also different capabilities (the strength of local 
associations for example). 
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A new explicit measure of low levels of campaigning has also been developed, which 
enables the identification of the level of campaigning in a constituency, relative not only to 
other parties, but also in relation to other constituencies as well. This measure builds and 
improves on an earlier model proposed by Denver et al by including both party and 
incumbency differentials. When examining how this measure relates to the campaigning 
measures, low level campaigns were run in safer constituencies, particularly by opposition 
candidates. Incumbency is a vital factor in understanding the relationship between 
marginality and campaigning. Being the opposing candidate in a constituency has a 
significant impact on the relationship between marginality and campaigning, with such 
candidates showing significantly lower levels of spending than incumbent candidates. These 
differences occur between marginal and safe constituencies, but also within safe seats. Both 
opposition and incumbent parties campaign less in safe constituencies, particularly when that 
constituency is ultra-safe. Within safe seats, opposition candidates are more likely to run low 
level spending campaigns.  
Linking campaigning and marginality is the first step in examining the potential impact of a 
lack of campaigning in safe constituencies. I argue that parties should consider the 
repercussions of their campaign strategies in safer constituencies; by running low level 
campaigns they run the risk of not only harming turnout, but their own share of the vote. The 
next two chapters explore this proposition in some detail by looking at the impact of low 









Marginality and campaigning levels are closely related, with the previous chapter 
establishing a clear link between low levels of campaigning and safe constituencies. This 
chapter addresses turnout at UK general elections, putting it into context by considering 
explanations for variation in turnout levels and examining whether campaigning plays a role 
in affecting it. The relationship between campaigning and turnout as understood here 
originates from rational choice theories of voter behaviour. Here campaigning acts as a 
conduit through which parties can contact voters and provide them with information on 
policies and candidate positions. Such information reduces the costs of voting, with intense 
campaigns increasing turnout. Existing research on constituency campaign effectiveness in 
the UK largely utilises measures of party performance (including vote share) while a 
relatively small number examine the impact of campaigning upon turnout (often in tandem 
with party performance – see Denver et al., 2004; Fisher and Denver, 2009). This can be 
attributed to the arguments by the Nuffield studies that local campaigning was ineffective 
because it failed to affect party performance. In offering a counter to this argument, the focus 
of researchers has tended to be on party performance. Yet those studies which have 
investigated the impact of campaigning upon turnout have often found that local 
campaigning is effective in raising the proportion of voters turning out.  
This chapter begins the exploration of the third sub-hypothesis of the thesis; that the level of 
campaigning has an impact of local electoral outcomes, here concentrating on whether low 
levels of campaigning have a detrimental impact on turnout, with the next two chapters 
considering vote share and leader visits. As part of this, the role of incumbency in affecting 
the relationship between campaigning and turnout is also considered. 
Voter turnout at UK general elections from 1987 to 2010 is explored, focusing particularly 
on the potentially detrimental effects of low level campaigns upon constituency turnout. The 
chapter offers an overview of trends in turnout over the period, placing the figures in 
historical and international context. With the aim of constructing a multivariate model, 
potential explanations for variation in turnout other than campaigning are examined, drawing 
on existing literature; these include tenure and constituency demographic profiles. Once the 
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model has been constructed, considering the implications of interactions and selecting the 
best variables, the relationship between low levels of campaigning and falls in turnout is 
tested both implicitly (with continuous measures of campaigning) and explicitly (using the 
low level identifiers as constructed in the last chapter). 
Turnout 1987-2010 
To understand turnout, a series of descriptive analyses were conducted, exploring not only 
the average constituency turnout over the period, but also the amount of variation in turnout 
levels. Electoral context is likely to affect turnout levels, with peaks at elections where there 
is a change of government and lower turnout figures when the result of the election was 
widely anticipated. Prior to the period covered by this thesis voter turnout in the UK ranged 
between 70 and 80 percent, with the average across elections between 1928 and 1983 being 
77.19 percent, although in 1950 and 1951 mean turnout rose above 80 percent. Graph 6.1 
displays the results of the descriptive turnout data from 1987 to 2010.  
 
 




Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
 
The story of turnout between 1987 and 2010 is one of steep decline and slight recovery; 
while mean turnout in 1987 compared favourably to historic trends at 75.42 percent, by 2010 
turnout had fallen over ten percentage points to 65.23 percent. However, this decline has not 
been constant over the period; there was a slight increase of 2.16 percentage points in 1992, 
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before a dramatic drop in turnout by 12.47 percentage points in 2001, although there has 
been a gradual increase at each of the two subsequent elections. 
Turnout may have been expected to peak at elections where there was a change of 
government because of the increased incentive to vote offered, but this has not clearly been 
shown by graph 6.1. Although there was a rise in mean turnout of 4.16 percentage points at 
the 2010 election, in 1997 turnout actually fell by 6.1 percentage points from 1992. These 
differing figures are also likely to be complicated by the widespread anticipation of result of 
the 1997 election was, which may have depressed turnout. However, in 2010 the result was 
far more uncertain, with many commentators predicting a hung parliament.  
The steep fall in turnout at the 2001 election is interesting, particularly as it was this election 
at which the incumbent Labour government launched Operation Turnout to secure a second 
term in power. This was a clear statement of ‘a central strategic concern’ (Wring, 2001: 913) 
to mobilise weak Labour supporters (those who had voted for Labour for the first time in 
1997, and that the party believed would stay at home) fearing apathy could drive them from 
office (Seyd, 2001: 618). Despite these efforts, turnout figures fell dramatically in 2001, with 
the average reaching just 59.01 percent, the lowest turnout since universal suffrage. This 
could be attributed to three key factors; the failure of Operation Turnout to engage new 
Labour voters, the failure of the Labour administration to deliver their policy programme or 
the likelihood of Labour winning power. Perhaps recent Labour supporters, the target of the 
Operation, were actually mobilised to turn out and vote, but it was apathy by other groups, 
such as (disaffected) supporters of other parties and floating voters that may have depressed 
the mean figure. Alternatively Clarke et al. (2004) attribute the drop in 2001 largely to the 
failure of the incumbent Labour administration to deliver election promises, but also due to 
the neglect of their heartlands. In areas which strongly supported Labour, voters had been 
alienated by the lack of dramatic policy changes during the Labour’s government’s first term 
in power. As Clarke et al. argue, turnout dropped in 2001 because dissatisfied Labour 
supporters predominantly chose to stay at home, with higher Labour vote shares being 
correlated with lower turnouts.  
The result of the 1992 election was close, with polls fluctuating between a Conservative and 
Labour victory after a long Conservative incumbency, and turnout was high. The 1997 
election was an important election as it heralded a new government, and even though turnout 
had declined, it was still above 70 percent. 1997 could be seen as a critical election (see Key, 
1955), which induced more people to vote, and therefore, once this critical time period had 
passed, this motivation to turn out and vote in elections decreased.  In contrast, the 2001 
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election was seen by many to be a foregone conclusion, with Labour widely expected to 
retain power; a sense enhanced and reinforced by the media (Clarke et al., 2004: 9). Perhaps 
by 2001, the urgency for people to turn out was not quite there as it had been in 1997. 
Turnout subsequently recovered slightly in 2005 (up 1.88 percentage points) and again in 
2010 (up 3.91 percentage points). The larger increase in 2010 could be attributed to the more 
critical nature of the election where the polls had indicated an uncertain outcome. 
The minimum turnout figures for the period are particularly interesting as, according to 
rational choice theories of voting, the safer a constituency is the lower the turnout figures as 
there is less to gain by voting. Most striking is the dramatic drop in 2001 from a minimum 
turnout of 51.90% to 34.10%. This low figure of minimum turnout pulls down the average 
turnout for 2001 to 59.01% which is striking, considering that at the previous election the 
minimum turnout was just 7.11 percentage points below this figure at 51.90%. The 
constituencies with the lowest turnout figures were identified at each election. In five out of 
the six elections, the constituency with the lowest turnout was held by Labour, and they were 
typically inner-city constituencies. The only election at which the constituency with the 
lowest turnout was held by another party was in 2005 when South Staffordshire recorded a 
turnout of just 37.21%, although the context there was slightly different as the election was 
postponed due to the death of a candidate, not taking place until 23
rd
 June. Discounting this 
constituency, all six elections saw the lowest turnouts in Labour constituencies, with 
Liverpool Riverside having the lowest turnout in 1997, 2001 and 2005. The figures for 
maximum turnout vary across the period, but a similar pattern to the mean figures can be 
observed, with one clear difference; a peak in turnout in 1997. Whereas mean turnout peaked 
at 77.58 percent in 1992, maximum turnout peaked at 87.8 percent in 1997. 
Table 6.1: Standard deviations in turnout 1987-2010 
1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
4.48 5.41 5.57 6.36 6.41 5.57 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
 
The standard deviation figures are at their lowest in 1987 at 4.48 percentage points. This 
deviation increases at each subsequent election before peaking at 6.41 percentage points in 
2005. This suggests, along with the accompanied drop in the mean, that constituency 
turnouts varied increasingly over the period, with some seeing particularly high turnouts and 
other seeing very low figures. The growing variation in the figures indicates that most 
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constituencies have experienced falls in turnout, but it is the aim of this chapter to examine 
whether this increasing variation in turnout can be attributed to a combination of 
constituency marginality and associated campaign targeting strategies.  
Constituency turnout in the latter part of the period under study is not only low, but 
historically lower than at any point since universal suffrage in the UK. It is possible that this 
decline is not confined to the UK, but is a more widespread fall in political engagement. 
Gray and Caul (2000), in their examination of turnout trends in 18 nations between the 1950s 
and 2000 found a general pattern of decline over the period.  Of the nations examined as part 
of this study, the UK’s decline in turnout sits at 9
th 
(-6.3), with greater falls in turnout in the 
USA, Germany, France and the Netherlands. Switzerland saw the largest fall in turnout of     
-23.8, which Gray and Caul attributed to the tripling of the voting population over the period 
of study. Therefore turnout in the UK fell at a comparable level to other industrialised 
nations between the 1950s and 2000, indicating a wider trend of declining participation, but 
this study does not cover the dramatic drop of 2001. To examine whether this fall was also 
symptomatic of a wider trend of declining turnout, national turnout figures have been taken 
from Eurostat (2011). For each UK general election year, Eurostat was used to source data 
on turnout at national elections occurring in other EU member states to explore whether the 
sharp drop in turnout post 1997 was reflected in other EU nations.  
Two sets of data from Eurostat were calculated and entered into graph 6.2 which shows the 
mean turnout figures for the EU including and excluding the UK. In both 1992 and 1997, EU 
turnout was higher when including UK figures which boosted them by 5.78 and 9.46 
percentage points respectively. However, in 2001, the low turnout in that year’s general 
election supressed the EU average by 5.07 percentage points. In the last two elections 
covered by the graph turnout in the EU and the EU minus the UK is far more similar. These 
results indicate that UK turnout is generally comparable with figures for other European 








Graph 6.2: EU mean turnout including and excluding UK 1992-2010  
 
Source: Eurostat 2011 
The initial investigations into turnout patterns in the UK over the 1987 to 2010 elections 
have demonstrated that turnout fell dramatically in 2001, with a slight recovery in 
subsequent elections. This occurred despite Labour’s Operation Turnout which was their 
concerted effort to retain power by encouraging their supporters to turn out and vote.  The 
standard deviations for turnout also rose throughout the period, peaking in 2005, indicating 
that there is much variation in turnout across the UK. Turnout dropped from 1997 onwards, 
and the 2001 mean turnout of 58.99% was significantly lower than any other election since 
universal suffrage, including the 1945 general election when many soldiers were yet to 
return. The decline in turnout in the UK in the period between 1950 and 1997 appears 
average when compared with other countries, but when examining data in turnout for the 
post-1997 period in EU countries, it would appear that UK turnout has been below the EU 








Variations in turnout 
 
While overall turnout dropped sharply in 2001, before recovering slightly, there has been a 
great deal of variation in turnout between constituencies. In 2001 for example, while 
Winchester saw a turnout of 72.3 percent, Liverpool Riverside had a turnout of just 34.1 
percent. This section considers competing contextual and compositional explanations for 
variations in turnout by drawing on existing literature. This analysis is undertaken not only to 
initially explore the relationship between campaign levels and levels of turnout, but also to 
consider the roles of other variables which may also account for variation in turnout, with the 
aim of constructing a model to be used to examine the relationship at a multivariate level 
later in this chapter. 
 
Length of tenure 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated the importance of tenure length in affecting levels of 
campaigning, with an initial burst of campaigning by first-term MPs to retain their seat and 
establish a personal vote, but lessening the longer the tenure. Similarly, the length of an 
incumbent MP’s tenure is also likely to be related to turnout: as the incumbent campaigns 
less and relies on their personal vote, local voters are not being engaged by the campaign 
raising the costs of finding information with which to make their decision to vote. Jacobson 
explored this in his examination of Congressional elections (1980) in which he identified a 
definite ‘first term effect’ when new candidates are elected.  First-term incumbents were 
associated with higher levels of turnout than other types of incumbents. However, after this 
first term, there was indeed a considerable fall in turnout the longer the incumbent served; 
the longer the incumbent’s tenure, the lower the turnout in that constituency is likely to be. 
The previous chapter also illustrated that opposition candidates in safe constituencies were 
more likely to run significantly lower level campaigns than those in marginal constituencies. 
This means that in safe constituencies, where MPs are more likely to be serving longer 
tenures, voters will also be receiving minimal cues from the opposition candidates, leading to 
a decline in turnout.  
 
To consider whether this might be the case, the three measures of tenure (seat, career and 
first-term tenure) as created in the previous chapter, were compared to percentage changes in 
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turnout between elections. Seat tenure and career tenure were continuous measures and the 
first-term incumbent variable was a simple binary, offering a range of ways in which tenure 
can be measured across boundary changes. The two continuous measures were entered into a 
bivariate correlation with figures measuring the percentage change in turnout for each 
election to investigate the direction and significance of their correlations. If the results are to 
indicate a similar relationship to Wood and Norton’s (1992) research a negative and 
significant relationship is expected which indicates that as length of tenure increases, turnout 
figures decrease. 
Table 6.2: Correlations between tenure and turnout change 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Seat tenure -.054 .049 -.125** -.031 -.100* -.091* 
Career tenure -.077 .055 .016 .042 -.104** -.015 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
The results in table 6.2 for the two continuous measures of tenure offer little support for the 
expected decline in turnout as tenure increases. Looking firstly at the results for seat tenure, 
the results for all years except 1992 are negative and therefore in the expected direction. 
However, the correlations are significant, albeit weakly, in 1997, 2005 and 2010. A likely 
explanation is that these significant results are an effect of boundary changes prior to each of 
these elections (UK-wide for 1997, Scottish constituencies for 2005, English and Welsh 
constituencies for 2010). The seat tenure measure is only able to record the incumbent’s 
occupation of that particular permutation of boundaries, so any boundary change wipes out 
the ability to account for longer tenures in predecessor seats. The results of the correlations 
between turnout and the career tenure variable, which accounts for tenure beyond boundary 
changes by using historical career biographies (see chapter three), are less promising, with 
only two negative correlations and a single significant result in 2005. The correlations are 
still weak, but this is only a bivariate correlation, and does not control for other factors which 
may boost the values of tenure. 
Finally, the binary variable indicating first-term incumbents was entered into an independent 
samples t-test for each election to examine whether the figures for average change in turnout 
varied significantly according to whether the incumbent was a first-term MP or not. A 
negative t-test statistic indicates that the mean turnout figures for first-term MPs are higher 
than other incumbents. The results, shown in table 6.3, show partial support for this proposed 
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relationship, with negative t-test statistics for half of the elections (1987, 2001 and 2005), but 
only the result for 1987 is significant and in the expected direction. 





     
1987 3.24 (2.94) 2.67 (2.26)  -2.194* 219.745 
1992 1.58 (3.39) 2.34 (3.65)   2.219* 629 
1997 -6.47 (2.57) -5.80 (2.65)    2.576** 638 
2001 -12.40 (2.57) -12.42 (2.43) -.089 471 
2005 2.20 (3.51) 2.05 (3.47) -.370 625 
2010 3.94 (2.97) 4.35 (3.17) 1.260 625 
     
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
The 2005 result is the largest in the expected direction of the period, with mean turnout 
change for first-term MPs being on average 0.15 percentage points higher than in other 
constituencies. However, in both 1992 and 1997, constituencies with first-term incumbents 
had significantly lower turnouts than other types of constituency. One possible explanation is 
the nature of the first-term variable itself. It records an incumbent defending their first 
election, so the incumbent would actually have been elected in the preceding election (or by-
election). It may be that there were simply fewer first-term incumbents in 1992 (elected in 
1987) and 1997 (elected in 1992). Exploring the percentage of seats that changed hands at 
each election, 1987 and 1992 did indeed see fewer seats change hands than at any other 
elections during the period except 2001. Overall, the results indicate that there is little 
relationship between change in turnout and length of tenure 
 
Constituency socio-demographics and turnout 
 
The first in-depth examination of socio-demographic variables and their relationship with 
turnout in the UK was conducted by Crewe and Payne (1971) at the 1970 general election, 
with socio-demographics offering a context within which voting decisions can be influenced 
(Pattie and Johnston, 2000). There are three main groups of constituency socio-demographic 
characteristics operating on a contextual level with turnout; age, education and integration, 
with evidence from both the individual and aggregate levels.  
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The conventional view of the individual-level relationship between age and voter turnout is a 
curvilinear relationship. The youngest and oldest voters are least likely to vote, while 
middle-aged voters are most likely to vote (Bhatti, Hansen, and Wass, 2012). However, in 
the UK, there is evidence from existing research that older voters are the group most likely to 
vote, findings which are in contrast to Milbrath (1965:135). Age has been found to have a 
significant impact on voter turnout in the UK, with Crewe (1981) drawing the linking age 
and likelihood of voting in the UK, with older voters particularly more likely to vote than 
younger voters.  
At the aggregate level, there is no single variable available for all census returns across the 
period allowing the identification of all age group proportions; instead proxies need to be 
utilised. A variable which identifies one age group in a constituency population is that 
identifying the proportion of under 18s, but this does not work as it is not available for all 
years, and also does not sit well in a study of turnout, as under 18s are unable to vote. At the 
other end of the scale, there is a potential proxy variable available for all elections which 
enables the identification of constituencies with higher percentages of older people: the 
proportion of the population of retirement age, with Crewe and Payne (1971) clearly 
identifying higher proportions of retired people with high turnouts. Drawing on this existing 
evidence, constituencies with higher levels of older voters would be expected to have higher 
turnouts. This is supported by Clarke et al.’s findings (2004:342) which indicated that it was 
voters aged 66 and over (i.e. over retirement age) who were most likely to vote in 2001. 
The existing literature also examines the relationship between education and voting, finding 
that constituencies with higher populations of those with further education are typically 
associated with higher turnouts. Even in the earliest individual-level studies of voter 
behaviour, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944:42) drew the link, describing education as 
‘a direct creator of interest’ in politics, echoed also by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee’s 
belief in the link between political interest and the education (1954:25). Less directly, Nie, 
Verba and Petrocik (1976:6) saw education being ‘the driving force in the development of 
citizenship qualities’ in that it creates a sense of civic responsibility in the individual, one 
manifestation of which is the desire to engage actively with society by voting. Education 
therefore not only enables an individual to understand societal expectations regarding voting, 
but also to be able to understand politics. 
In aggregate studies, education has been observed to have a ‘very substantial’ effect 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980:34), with the better educated being more likely to vote. 
This is attributed to theories of rational choice and the balance between costs and benefits in 
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the decision to vote, with education lowering the cost of voting to the individual and 
increasing the capacity to understand politics. Ideally, to examine whether constituencies 
with higher proportions of highly educated individuals have higher turnouts, variables in the 
census data measuring the highest level of education attained by the constituency population 
would be available, but there are no such variables available for all years. Instead proxies 
need to be identified that would enable the examination of the link between higher levels of 
education and higher levels of turnout. One potential proxy would be to measure the 
proportion of those employed in particular occupations; occupations which typically require 
a varying level of education. Two occupational variables at the two extremes of the spectrum 
have been selected here; those employed in professional occupations and those employed in 
routine jobs. This is not a perfect measure, but constituencies with a higher proportion of 
people in professional occupations would be expected to have higher turnouts than 
constituencies with higher levels of routine workers, echoing the findings of Crewe and 
Payne (1971). 
Putnam (1966) explores the links between socio-demographics and turnout by examining the 
role of social integration; those constituencies with higher proportions of integrated voters 
will have higher levels of turnout. When a constituency population has integrated into the 
local area, as Putnam hypothesises, turnout increases as the population will desire to play an 
active role in the community. To explore the link between integration and turnout, variables 
measuring elements of integration need to be identified. Drawing on existing literature, two 
have been identified: the proportion of owner occupiers in a constituency and the level of 
migration. There is a range of empirical evidence which supports the link between owner 
occupiers and turnout (Denver and Hands, 1974; Crewe and Payne, 1971). Lutz (1991:722) 
finds that higher levels of both owner occupiers and professionals were related to higher 
levels of turnout; this is also supported by the findings of Crewe, Sӓrlvik and Alt (1977) in 
their study of turnout in the UK, who considered home ownership and residential mobility 
the two most important indicators of turnout, alongside age. The relationship between 
migration and turnout is a little more complex, with Denver and Halfacree (1992) finding 
contrasting results in their aggregate study for in-migrants and out-migrants; while the 
former had little impact on turnout, the latter had an independent effect even when 
controlling for other variables. 
To explore the types of constituencies that have higher and lower levels of turnout, five 
variables were selected based on the research discussed above, including measures of the 
retired population, the proportion of professionals, the percentage of routine workers, the 
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migrant population and the percentage of owner occupiers. However, it is likely that many of 
these variables are closely related which brings in issues of collinearity; to ascertain this, all 
five socio-demographic variables were examined in a correlation matrix, seen in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Bivariate correlations between constituency socio-demographic variables 
 Owner Retired Professional Routine Migrants 
Owner  -.191** -.049** .148** -.224** 
Retired -.191**  .562** .385** -.126** 
Professional -.049** .562**  .511** .123** 
Routine .148** .385** .511**  -.128** 
Migrants -.224** -.126** .123** -.128**  
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
The proportion of professionals was significantly negatively correlated with the proportion 
of both retired people and routine workers to a high degree, so the former was removed from 
analysis.  This left four variables as potential control variables: the number of owner 
occupiers in a constituency, the percentage of the population which is retired, the proportion 
of routine workers and the percentage of migrants. Initial bivariate correlations were run 
between these variables and turnout, with the results shown in table 6.4.   
Table 6.5: Bivariate correlations between constituency socio-demographics and 
turnout 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Owner .263** .544** .754** .409** .501** .654** 
Retired -.320** -.107* .186** .360** .282** .280** 
Routine -.186** -.166** -.609** -.184** -.273** -.493** 
Migrants -.080 -.218** -.183** -.246** -.097* -.187** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
It was expected that constituencies in which there are higher proportions of retired people to 
be correlated positively with turnout, as evidence has drawn a link between constituencies 
with higher proportions of older age groups and higher levels of turnout. However, in both 
1987 and 1992, the correlations are negative and significant indicating that constituencies 
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with higher proportions of retired people were associated with lower turnout figures for these 
elections. The remaining four elections of the period offer clearer support for existing 
evidence by also showing a significant positive correlation between the two variables. The 
strongest (although only moderate) result is in 2001. 
 
Following Putnam’s expectations regarding community integration, a positive relationship 
between constituencies with higher percentages of owner occupiers and turnout is expected, 
as owner occupiers have actively invested in the local community (by buying property), 
making this population less mobile than tenants. The results in table 6.5 offer support for 
this, with constituencies with higher populations of owner occupiers significantly correlated 
with higher turnout at each election over the period. While the correlation between the two 
variables in 1987 is weak, all other years have correlations ranging from .409 in 2001 to .754 
in 1997. 
In terms of the occupational proxy for education level of a constituency’s population, for the 
proportion of routine workers in a constituency, the results are also as expected, with 
constituencies with higher proportions of such workers associated negatively and 
significantly with turnout at all elections. The strength of these correlations varies across the 
election years, but is strongest in 1997 at .609. For migrants, the correlations were as 
expected negative, but they are also weak, particularly in 2005, and insignificant in 1987. 
 
Campaigning and Turnout 
 
Although fewer in number than studies of the effect of campaigning on vote share, the 
relationship between campaigning and turnout has been explored by existing research from 
the UK and the USA, providing empirical evidence in support of the relationship. From 
experimental studies (Bochel and Denver, 1971; Gerber and Green, 2000) to aggregate-level 
investigations (Cox and Munger, 1989; Denver et al., 2004) using a range of campaigning 
measures, repeated evidence has found a generally positive relationship between higher 
levels of campaigning and higher voter turnout. Fisher and Denver (2009), for example, 
contrasted the effect of traditional and modern types of campaigning on turnout between 
1992 and 2005, discovering that in three of the four elections, traditional methods of 
campaigning had a positive effect on turnout. It may be that the UK context enhances the 
ability of campaigning to affect turnout (Whiteley and Seyd, 1994), with stronger 
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partisanship than the USA as well as advertising laws raising voter contact and the short 
campaign period. 
Initial bivariate correlations were conducted between turnout figures and aggregate figures of 
the three measures of campaigning (shown in table 6.6). Following existing research, 
significant and positive correlations are expected between the two variables, indicating that 
higher levels of campaigning are associated with higher levels of turnout. This initial testing 
is vital as it provides justification for examining this relationship at a more detailed level 
later in the chapter. Examining the results of these correlations, there are indications that 
higher levels of turnout are associated with higher levels of campaigning for all three 
campaigning variables.  
Table 6.6: Bivariate correlations between campaigning variables and turnout 
 1987-2010 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Spending .438** .171** .150** .456** .489** .382** .252** 
Doorstep .358**  .075 .326** .293**   
Telephone .279**   .019 .202**   
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
All correlations are in the expected direction over the period as a whole, showing both 
positive and significant correlations with the turnout figures. Of the three measures of 
campaigning, the strongest (albeit moderate) correlation is for aggregate levels of spending 
(.362), followed by doorstep canvassing (.358). Telephone canvassing shows a positive but 
weak result at .279, which indicates initial support for Fisher and Denver’s (2009) findings 
that modern methods of campaigning (such as telephone canvassing) were less effective in 
boosting turnout than traditional methods (including doorstep canvassing). Considering the 
correlations separately for each election enables variations in their strength to be observed. 
For campaign spending, the correlations for each individual election year are positive and 
significant. However, the results are weak for the first two elections in the period. 1997 saw 
the widespread adoption of strategic constituency campaigning in the UK, and it is 
interesting that it is at this election where there is a considerable jump in the strength of the 
correlations, firstly to .456, then to .624 in 2001. The correlations fall a little in strength, 
dropping back to .252 in 2010. Doorstep canvassing has positive correlations with turnout at 
all three elections, but this was only significant at .326 in 1997 (moderate) and .293 in 2001. 
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For the two elections at which data on telephone canvassing were collected, only the result 
for 2001 (.202) is significant, although both values are (just) positive, indicating that in some 
elections higher levels of telephone canvassing are associated with higher levels of turnout.  
 
Creating the model  
 
The correlations indicate promising results for the effectiveness of campaigning, but they 
only represent a simple analysis of the two variables, without taking other factors into 
consideration. To produce a more accurate account of the impact that campaigning has on 
turnout, a multivariate model controlling for other variables affecting turnout variations has 
been constructed. To examine the chapter hypothesis that low levels of campaigning have a 
detrimental impact on turnout in safe constituencies, two set of regressions using an identical 
model will be conducted; the first using continuous measures of campaigning, and the 
second using the binary identification of low level campaigning developed at the end of the 
last chapter. The model developed to examine this hypothesis incorporates a series of both 
political and social controls to offer a comprehensive account of changes in turnout. 
There are other factors outside the remit of this study which can also affect turnout; in 
particular macro-institutional factors such as voting legislation and differing electoral 
systems. In many cases this impact can be considerable, with Powell (1986) estimating that 
such factors reduced turnout in American elections by up to 13 percentage points. Voting 
laws have a considerable impact on turnout, particularly when compulsory voting is in force 
in countries such as Australia and Belgium. Naturally, countries with such voting have 
considerably higher levels of turnout than countries where voting is optional (Jackman, 
1986; Blais and Carty, 1990), although Blais (2006) concludes that compulsory voting is 
only effective in increasing turnout when sanctions are present. Turnout is also affected by 
the electoral system, with Blais and Carty (1990) demonstrating that proportional 
representation systems encourage higher turnout figures as they provide more options for 
voters, are fairer and are more competitive; turnout in such systems is on average (Blais and 
Dobrzynska, 1998:251) three percentage points higher than in other systems. However, as 
the present study is entirely based on UK constituency campaigning at the national level, 
which used FPTP over the entire period, these factors do not come under its remit.  
Drawing on the analysis of variables affecting turnout so far, a model was developed by 
adding control variables in stages and examining their effect. The final model adopted 
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includes eight controls measuring both local political context and constituency demographics 
(the step-by-step creation of the model and application to aggregate spending and turnout is 
detailed in table 6.7, with model six selected as the final model). 
Table 6.7: Creating a model testing the effect of campaigning on turnout 1987-2010 


















































































 .069 .192 .194 .217 .432 .686 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
The first control variable entered into the model is marginality. Chapter four demonstrated 
that marginal constituencies see significantly higher turnout than safe constituencies. The 
inclusion of this control marks a departure from existing studies into the effectiveness of 
local campaign effectiveness, which typically do not control for marginality, arguing that the 
measure of campaigning is ‘strongly related’ (Denver et al., 2004:293) to marginality. As 
explored in the last chapter, this is often true, but not always. The model trialled here 
incorporates both marginality and measures of campaigning into the multivariate model to 
determine whether each exerts an independent effect. It is clear from the table that, even with 
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the gradual addition of other controls, marginality remains an important explanatory factor in 
turnout, maintaining an independent effect throughout. Even when entered by itself, it 
explains 6.9 percent of variation in turnout. Extending this, the effect of campaigning upon 
turnout is likely to vary according to constituency marginality, so to counter this an 
interaction term between the two variables was also entered into the model and found to 
boost the explanatory power.  
The exploration of the association between tenure and turnout earlier in this chapter 
indicated some significant associations with turnout. All three tenure measures were trialled 
when creating the final model, but career tenure offered the greatest explanatory power, 
although its significance was negated when the interaction between marginality and spending 
was included. Denver et al. (2002:86) also include a measure of tenure in their model, 
although an indicator of first-term MPs was used instead.  
Four demographics controls were also included, informed by the results of the bivariate 
correlations with turnout conducted earlier in this chapter: the proportions of owner 
occupiers, retired people, routine workers and migrants. The results of these correlations 
indicated that constituencies with different demographic profiles have different levels of 
turnout.  
The final control entered into the model is a measure of previous turnout. By including this 
variable the nature of the model is altered; instead of examining turnout as a static concept, 
the model is able to account for the change in turnout at the election caused by campaigning. 
This enables the examination of a hypothesised decline in turnout in constituencies where 
campaigning is at a low level. To examine how closely linked turnout before and after an 
election are, bivariate correlations were carried out between the two variables at each 
election over the period. As expected, they were very strongly and significantly correlated at 
.717. The inclusion of previous measures of turnout are a relatively recent development in 
the modelling of constituency campaign effectiveness, with Fisher and Denver (2009) using 
a particularly parsimonious model for their study controlling only for previous turnout. 
Denver at al. (2004), in another major longitudinal study of constituency campaign 
effectiveness, when modelling the effectiveness of campaigning on turnout also included a 
historic measure of turnout. Despite Denver et al.’s (2004:295) argument that ‘there are no 
estimates of what 1992 turnout would have been in the new 1997 constituencies’, notional 
previous turnout figures have been created (Rallings and Thrasher, 1995; Norris, 2009) for 
each boundary revision over the period. Using such a stringent control boosted the 
explanatory power of the model during trials, but also depressed the results for the effects of 
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campaigning; any results which remain significant are promising. Interestingly, once 
previous turnout is controlled for, the coefficients for the retired population and migrants 
change direction. It is likely that this is previous turnout controlling for other unexplained 
variations in the resulting turnout figures. One of the key arguments for controlling for 
previous measures of the dependent variable (here turnout) is that they also control 
effectively for constituency socio-demographics. When trialling the model, the stage which 
controlled for both demographics and previous turnout offered the best explanatory value, so 
both sets of variables have been retained. 
 
Models two to five show positive coefficients between aggregate spending and turnout. 
These results are as expected: spending increases turnout. However, the coefficient for 
aggregate spending in model six is negative and insignificant. This could be attributed to 
several factors. Firstly, as stated above, the addition of previous turnout into the model has 
dampened the impact of spending. Secondly, the aggregate nature of the spending variable 
may also affect this; it might be concealing the disproportionate spending between parties 
observed in the previous chapter. To explore this, regressions will also be run examining the 
effect of individual party spend. Finally, this model covers data from all elections between 
1987 and 2010, so may conceal significant results for aggregate spending in particular 
election years.  
For each model which includes an interaction term between marginality and spending, 
marginality has an impact on the relationship between spending and turnout. In model four, 
the safer the constituency, the lower the average spend, with ultra-safe constituencies seeing 
the lowest of all. Interestingly, for this model, the impact of spending upon turnout is greater 
the safer the constituency. In model 5, once constituency socio-demographics are factored in, 
marginality has a less marked impact. However, where the average spent is 45% or less of 
the total legal maximum, there is a drop in spending the safer they become. In the final 
model, spending has a greater impact on turnout the safer the constituency. Yet, as the 
previous chapter has indicated, it is these constituencies where spending is at its lowest.  
The model was rerun for each election. Initially aggregate measures of all three campaigning 
variables were entered into a single regression model, but this encountered significant 
problems with multicollinearity. Instead, three sets of regression were conducted; one for 
each of the campaigning variables. The results for the final model testing the effect of 
aggregate spending on turnout can be seen in table 6.8.  
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Table 6.8: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship between 
aggregate spending and turnout 


























































































































 .748 .622 .858 .858 .764 .851 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
The explanatory power of each of the models is good, with between 62.8 percent and 85.8 
percent of variation in turnout change accounted at individual elections between 1987 and 
2010. Aggregate levels of spending are positively related to turnout change at each of the 
elections from 1992 onwards, and of these positive results, all but 2005 are significant, 
holding all else constant. The insignificant result for 2005 could be linked to the drop in 
turnout in 2001 as indicated in graph 6.1; it may be that as turnout levels normalised after the 
historic low in 2001, there was a natural rise in turnout. When comparing the coefficients for 
average spending and marginality, there is no consistent pattern. For example in 2001 and 
2010, spending had a greater effect on turnout than marginality did. The lack of consistency 
between these two variables also offers support for including both in the final model. The 
significant coefficients for spending reveal that although aggregate levels do affect turnout 
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change, the impact is very small; in 1997, for example, a one percentage point increase in 
aggregate spending leads to an increase of .096 percentage points in turnout. The size of 
these results is likely to be attributable to the model being particularly stringent, depressing 
the results for the campaigning variables.  
The interaction terms between marginality and average spending show little of interest over 
the period, particularly in 1987 and 1992 when there was little consistent variation in the 
relationship between spending and turnout according to marginality. However, in 1997 the 
results indicate that as constituencies become safer, average spending has a greater, more 
positive impact upon turnout. Yet in the subsequent elections the interaction has little impact, 
only demonstrating that as seats become safer average spending falls considerably. The 
analysis in table 6.7 indicated that average spending had a negative impact across the period 
as a whole, which is not supported in five of the six elections in the year by year breakdown 
in table 6.8. It is likely that the changing interactions between marginality and spending was 
concealed by the overall figure. 
The model was then run using aggregate levels of the two canvassing variables as the 
independent variables. For doorstep canvassing, the explanatory power of the model was 
once again good, with at least 73.3 percent of variation in turnout change explained at each 
of the three elections. At all three elections, higher levels of doorstep canvassing increased 
turnout, although this was only significant in 1992 when a single percentage point rise in the 
constituency covered by such canvassing led to a rise of .098 percentage points in turnout. In 
1992, there was little evidence of an interaction between marginality and average levels of 
doorstep canvassing, with a pretty flat relationship between doorstep canvassing and turnout 
anyway. However, in 1997, the results indicated that the safer the constituency, the greater 
the boost from doorstep canvassing upon turnout, which is indicative of the increased 
targeting of resources at this election. The picture in 2001 is a little more complicated, with 
marginal constituencies (those with a previous majority of 9.99 percentage points and below) 
seeing a negative impact of higher levels of doorstep canvassing upon turnout. In contrast, 
although levels of doorstep canvassing declined in constituencies with higher previous 






Table 6.9: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship between 
aggregate canvassing and turnout 
 1992 1997 2001 
Doorstep canvassing    
Marginality .146 (.075) -.018 (.024) .019 (.055) 
% doorstep canvassing .098* (.046) .011 (.025) .043 (.059) 
Career tenure .060 (.042) -.012 (.022) .050 (.053) 
Marginality/spend 
interaction 
-.004 (.002) .000 (.001) -.002 (.002) 
Owner Occupiers .263** (.065) .061* (.029) -.018 (.049) 
Retired  .071 (.067) .062 (.054) .336** (.112) 
Routine  -.325 (.244) -.456** (.159) -.104 (.178) 
Migrants .042 (.034) .185 (.103) .049 (2.73) 
Previous turnout .580** (.078) .729** (.057) .783** (.109) 
Adjusted r
2 
.733 .822 .758 
Telephone canvassing    
Marginality  .258 (.208) -.030(.036) 
% telephone canvassing  .204 (.164) .036 (.077) 
Career tenure  -.123 (.110) .024 (.056) 
Marginality/spend 
interaction 
 -.014 (.013) -.005 (.005) 
Owner Occupiers  -.061 (.126) -.014 (.046) 
Retired   .016 (.207) .462** (.138) 
Routine   -.157 (1.046) .033 (.275) 
Migrants  .578 (.370) .285 (.307) 
Previous turnout  .954* (.240) .712** (.097) 
Adjusted r
2 
 .759 .797 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N =1911 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 




Both coefficients for telephone canvassing are also in the expected direction, indicating that 
it raised turnout, although not significantly. The interaction terms between marginality and 
telephone canvassing is particularly interesting in 1997. What is clear from this election is 
the concentration of such targeting upon marginal seats, with high levels of telephone 
canvassing concentrated in constituencies with previous majorities of 14.99 percentage 
points and below. In seats with previous majorities of between and 9.99 percentage points, as 
the level of overall telephone canvassing rises, so does turnout. However, this is not borne 
out by constituencies with other previous majorities, where the interaction indicates that the 
more telephone canvassing, the lower the turnout.  
The individual relationships between campaigning by the three parties and turnout are worth 
investigating as it may be that in certain election years, campaigning by one party is more 
effective in boosting turnout than others. Table 6.10 shows the results for the regressions 
examining whether party-specific campaigning increases turnout. By entering all parties into 
the same regression the model isolates the impact of spending by individual parties. The 
models explain a good degree of variation in turnout for every election year, ranging from 
65.2% in 1992 to 95.1% over the entire period as a whole. 
Over the 1987 to 2010 period as a whole, spending by both the Liberal Democrats and the 
Conservatives significantly boosts turnout. Liberal Democrat spending had the greater effect, 
with a single percentage point increase in the party’s spending increasing turnout by .022 
percentage points. For Labour, spending by the party actually decreases turnout 
insignificantly. Yet these cross-period results conceal fluctuations in the relationship 
between party spending and turnout at individual elections. Labour, starting the period as the 
opposition before winning a landslide in 1997 and losing in 2010, have been through a 
variety of different contexts. To consider their spending as a whole across the period is likely 








Table 6.10: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship 


















































































































































































































 .951 .736 .652 .859 .862 .777 .857 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 




Conservative candidate spending, controlling for spending by the other parties, is positively 
related to turnout in each of the elections. However, the coefficient for 1997 is the only one 
which is significant, indicating that a single percentage point rise in spending by 
Conservative candidates saw an increase in turnout of .037 percentage points. The impact of 
marginality upon the relationship between spending and turnout was minimal, although 
between 1987 and 1997 differences were observable at the extremes where the safer a 
constituency was, both the party spend and turnout were lower. In 2001 and 2005, there was 
a move from Conservative candidates towards more strategic patterns of spending, with 
constituency marginality having a clear impact upon the relationship between spending and 
turnout. The safer the constituency was, the more positive the impact of spending by the 
Conservatives upon turnout.  
 
Evidence that Labour campaign spending is related to turnout is also mixed, with the 
coefficients for spending negative in 1992 and 2005 but only significant in the former. This 
is in contrast to the other four elections, all of which saw positive coefficients between 
Labour spending and turnout. In both 1997 and 2010 such spending made a significant 
difference to turnout figures, even when controlling for spending by other parties. The 
biggest payoff in terms of turnout boost by Labour candidate spending was in 1997 when a 
percentage point increase in candidate spending increased turnout by .045 percentage points. 
Comparing these results to the coefficients for Conservative spending, it would seem that the 
effect of Labour spending on turnout is more erratic than spending by the Conservatives. 
Looking at the impact that marginality has upon the relationship between spending by 
Labour candidates and turnout in constituencies, the biggest differences can be seen at the 
two extremes. In constituencies where the previous majority was below 20 percentage 
points, spending of between 42 and 89 percent of the legal maximum had no impact upon 
turnout. However, where spending was above or below these figures, marginality did have 
an impact. Here, the safer the constituency, the lesser the positive impact of Labour spending 
upon turnout, with the most positive results in ultra-marginal seats. There is also a negative 
impact for higher levels of spending on turnout in ultra-safe constituencies, which is echoed 
throughout the period under study. 
 
The values for the Liberal Democrats in individual election years are positive for all except 
1992, when it is just negative. All other years saw a positive relationship between Liberal 
Democrat spending and turnout, although the relationship was only significant in 1997 and 
2010. The safer a constituency was, the greater the positive impact of spending by Liberal 
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Democrat candidates upon turnout. However, as the smallest of the three parties, the Liberal 
Democrats have run more consistently strategic campaigns focusing their resources upon 
more marginal seats. This appears to be a feature of Liberal Democrats spending particularly 
from 1997 onwards, with very sharp falls in spending in ultra-safe constituencies. Therefore 
although Liberal Democrat spending is effective in increasing turnout, it is not focused 
where it could have the greatest impact upon turnout.  
 
The results are mixed when examining the effectiveness of doorstep canvassing in boosting 
turnout, controlling for canvassing by other parties, (results in appendix 9). For both the 
Conservatives and Labour, none of the coefficients are significant, although all are positive 
except for Conservative doorstep canvassing in 1997. Doorstep canvassing by the Liberal 
Democrats significantly boosted turnout in both 1992 and 1997 by .101 and .060 percentage 
points respectively for every percentage point increase in coverage of the constituency. 
Telephone canvassing only boosted turnout when it was conducted by the Conservatives in 
2001, with a .070 boost in turnout for every percentage increase in the constituency covered 
by telephone canvassing. However, none of the remaining coefficients are significant, and 
they are negative for the Conservative in 1997 and for both Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats in 2001, despite the models once again accounting for a good degree of variation 
in the dependent variable at between 84.7 and 92.7% of variation in turnout explained. There 
were no significant interactions, and examining the impact of marginality upon the 
relationship between the canvassing measures and turnout showed little of interest. However, 
the safer the constituency, the more positive the impact of Conservative doorstep canvassing 
in 1997 upon turnout, and a considerable difference in both spending and turnout could be 
observed for the Liberal Democrats in ultra-safe constituencies in 2001. The impact of 
telephone canvassing conducted by Labour in 1997 on turnout was affected by constituency 
marginality, with ultra-safe constituencies seeing a decline in turnout as the proportion of the 
constituency canvassed via telephone increased. This was in contrast to ultra-marginal 
constituencies, where higher levels of telephone canvassing boosted turnout. 
These results demonstrate that campaign spending has an impact on turnout, with mostly 
positive and significant values for all three parties even when controlling for spending by 
others. The results for the two campaign activity variables are more mixed. Of the two 
measures, doorstep canvassing would appear to be more effective in boosting turnout than 
telephone canvassing, with a greater number of positive and significant results. This is line 
with both the findings of Gerber and Green’s experimental study (2000) and Fisher and 
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Denver’s (2009) comparison of the effectiveness of traditional methods (which includes 
doorstep canvassing) and modern methods (telephone canvassing) in boosting turnout. This 
may be, as Gerber and Green suggest, down to the more personal nature of doorstep 
canvassing.  
 
Low levels of campaigning and the impact on turnout 
 
The regressions above have testing the relationship between campaign neglect and turnout 
implicitly (by considering the positive impact that campaigning may have on turnout). The 
findings indicate a relationship between campaigning and turnout which suggests that in 
many cases, when parties spend more, turnout is boosted. This section extends this by 
explicitly examining whether low level campaigns depress turnout. Denver et al. (2004) 
suggest support for the hypothesis that campaign neglect has a detrimental impact upon 
turnout, with weak campaigns (those in the first quartile, equivalent to low level campaigns) 
reducing turnout by up to 4.6 percentage points in 2001. To test this, the model constructed 
in the previous section has been maintained for consistency and comparability, but now 
includes as the independent variable the binary variable indicating the combined levels of 
campaigning for the top two parties in a constituency, as constructed in the last chapter.  
Table 6.11 shows a summary of the unstandardized coefficients for each combination with 
low level campaign spending. If the hypothesis that campaign neglect depresses turnout is 
supported, negative values in those constituencies would be expected particularly where both 
parties run low level campaigns (in the first quartile). However of the 42 scenarios over the 









Table 6.11: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship 
between low levels of spending and turnout (full results in Appendix 10) 




























































































Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients for the selected variables only with 
standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
 
The model explains a good degree of variation (between 62% and 86%) in turnout for all 
years. Focusing firstly on constituencies with low level spending campaigns run by both 
incumbents and opposition (1:1), there is some support for the hypothesis that low level 
campaigns reduce turnout, although the results are not as decisive as expected. Of the six 
elections covered, the relationship is indeed negative for three out of the six elections. In 
1992, 2005 and 2010, however, the value is positive. Only one of the negative coefficients is 
significant, with low level campaigns in 1997 depressing turnout. In this year, when the top 
two parties in a constituency ran low level spending campaigns, turnout was reduced by 2.77 
percentage points when compared to other levels of campaign spending. Looking at the 
impact of marginality on the relationship between such campaigns and turnout offers some 
interesting results. For those constituencies where 1:1 campaigns were run, marginality had a 
clear impact upon turnout from 2001 onwards, with considerably lower turnout in ultra-safe 
constituencies. Interestingly, these campaigns had a negative impact on turnout in the safest 
constituencies from 1997 onwards, particularly where the previous majority was at least 15 




This table also reveals whether low level campaigns run by opposition parties have a greater 
negative impact on turnout than those run by incumbents. For this to be supported, it is 
expected that those constituencies where the opposition party runs a low level spending 
campaign and the incumbent candidate runs a more intense campaign (i.e. 2:1, 3:1 and 4:1) 
there should be more significant results than those where the opposite is true (i.e. 1:2, 1:3 
and 1:4). For those in which the opposition party ran low level campaigns (which fits with 
safe constituencies), of the eighteen scenarios, only ten are in the expected direction. In seats 
where 2:1 scenarios were run, there are only two negative coefficients, with a single 
significant result in 1987, when running such a campaign reduced turnout by 4.17 percentage 
points. The interactions for these scenarios indicate that from 2001 onwards marginality was 
key in altering levels of turnout, but it only had an impact on the relationship between 2:1 
scenarios and turnout from 2005 onwards, when the safer the constituency was, the greater 
the negative impact of such campaigns on turnout, with the largest impact being in ultra-safe 
constituencies. There were no significant coefficients for 3:1 scenarios, and only half were in 
the expected direction. As before, in 2005 the negative impact of 3:1 campaigns increased 
the safer a constituency became, although constituency marginality was central in explaining 
levels of turnout from 2001 onwards. None of the coefficients were significant for seats in 
which 4:1 campaigns were run, although most were in the expected direction, indicating that 
these campaigns reduced turnout. In these scenarios, marginality was the key driver of 
change in turnout, with ultra-safe constituencies seeing clearly lower turnout figures than 
more marginal constituencies. However, marginality does appear to have had an impact on 
the relationship between 4:1 scenarios and turnout in 2005, with a more detrimental impact 
on turnout the safer the constituency. 
For scenarios in which the incumbent party ran low level spending campaigns and the 
opponent party spent more intensely (1:2, 1:3, and 1:4) eleven of the eighteen scenarios are 
in the expected direction; one more than scenarios in which the opposition party were 
running low level spending campaigns and with three significant coefficients compared to 
one. Therefore, the idea that opposition low level campaigns were more harmful to turnout 
does not appear to be supported. In scenarios where the incumbent party ran a low level 
spending campaign and the opposition candidate spent in the second quartile, four 
coefficients of the six were negative. In 1997, in constituencies where the top two parties 
campaigned in this way, turnout was significantly reduced by 3.67 percentage points. When 
the opponent spent in the third quartile, only half of the coefficients were negative, compared 
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to four where opponents spent in the fourth quartile. In both 2005 and 2010 these 1:4 
scenarios had a significant negative impact on turnout, reducing it by 10.14 and 3.38 
percentage points respectively. The interactions reveal that the impact of marginality on the 
relationship between low level spending by incumbents and turnout is inconsistent. 
However, in 2005, no matter how highly the opposition candidate spent, low level spending 
campaigns by the incumbent had a negative impact on turnout, which increased as 
constituencies became safer. 
Table 6.12: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship 
between low levels of canvassing and turnout (full results in Appendix 11) 
                       Doorstep Telephone 
 1992 1997 2001 1997 2001 
1:1 3.131  
(1.968) 
.027    
(1.039) 
.843    
(1.796) 
.728    
(1.850) 
.016       
(1.591) 
1:2 -.879   
(1.556) 





































3:1 4.515  
(4.084) 


















Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients for the selected variables only with 
standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. No constituencies in 2001 were found to have 1:2 telephone canvassing campaigns. 
The model was run for the two canvassing variables, but the results were very mixed with no 
significant values. For doorstep canvassing, low level campaigns run by both incumbent and 
opposition candidates were not negatively related to turnout. The interactions between 
marginality and the impact of such campaigns on turnout also offered mixed results. In 1997, 
such campaigns had a detrimental impact upon turnout but only in constituencies with 
majorities of 20 percentage points and above. However, in 2001 such campaigns had a 
positive impact on turnout in seats of the same majority. For constituencies where the 
incumbent candidates ran low levels of doorstep canvassing and the opposition candidates 
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canvassed more, the values were negative for 1:2. In 1997, the interaction indicates that the 
safer the constituency, the more detrimental running such campaigns was on constituency 
turnout. Where opposition candidates ran low levels of doorstep canvassing and the 
incumbent candidate canvassed harder, there were negative results only in the case of 3:1 
scenarios. The interaction terms gave inconsistent results, although there were indications 
that in 1997, the safer the constituency the more negative the impact of running 2:1 doorstep 
canvassing campaigns on turnout was. The results for telephone canvassing are equally 
mixed, with no scenario offering negative coefficients for both years covered. The 
interactions did indicate that low level telephone canvassing campaigns run by both the 
incumbent and opponent (1:1) had a detrimental impact on turnout, but only when 
constituencies had previous majorities of 20 percentage points and above. These rather 
mixed results for both spending and canvassing indicate that there is no consistent evidence 




Low level campaigns often have a detrimental impact on turnout, but this is inconsistent. In 
half of the election years low level campaign spending by the top two parties had a negative 
impact on turnout, although this was only found to be significant in 1997. When the levels of 
campaigning differed between incumbent and opposition, the results are interesting; low 
level campaigns by incumbent parties were more likely to be negatively related to turnout, 
although few of these relationships were significant. The interactions do indicate that the 
safer the constituency, the greater the negative impact of low level campaigns. While the 
results of the regressions have not been as definitive as expected, this may be due to the 
stringency of the model constructed, which underplays the impact of campaigning. Perhaps 
the reason that there are significantly fewer studies of constituency campaign effects on 
turnout in the UK indicates that the testing of this relationship is more complex. 
Turnout declined dramatically at the 2001 general election and has not recovered, despite 
increasing at the two subsequent elections. This chapter has considered a range of reasons for 
turnout variations, from local tenure to constituency demographics, with the aim of exploring 
whether low levels of campaigning have a detrimental impact on constituency turnout. 
Campaigning affects turnout by providing information which lowers the cost of voting to the 
constituency population, and existing evidence has indicated that higher levels of 
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campaigning can increase turnout in many cases. As part of examining the effectiveness of 
campaigning (and the potentially detrimental impact of low levels of campaigning) a model 
was constructed, drawing on existing literature and the data used here. Control variables, the 
selection of which has been based on existing research, have also been entered into the 
model. The next chapter takes this model and applies it to consider the detrimental impact of 





Low level campaigning and vote share: does absence make 
the heart grow fonder? 
 
There is much existing evidence in the UK that when a party campaigns intensely in a 
constituency, there is a beneficial effect upon their local vote share, whether it is spending 
more (Johnston and Pattie, 2008) or canvassing harder. The third sub-hypothesis explored in 
this thesis is whether low levels of campaigning have a detrimental impact on party vote 
share. Intense campaigning has a largely positive impact on vote share, and this chapter 
extends this to consider whether a relative lack of campaigning might actually reduce vote 
share. Important variations in the relationship between campaigning and vote share are also 
considered, in particular local incumbency. This will be explored by examining whether low 
level campaigns run by opposition parties have a greater negative impact on party vote 
share than those run by incumbents and if low levels of campaigning have a greater negative 
impact on vote share than on turnout. 
 
This chapter engages with vote share in some detail, exploring trends for the three main 
parties over the period. Drawing on existing literature, a range of variables with the potential 
to affect vote share, including tenure and demographics, are examined across the period. 
This analysis is conducted prior to examining the relationship between campaigning levels 
and vote share with a multivariate model largely based on that developed in the previous 
chapter. Maintaining the model offers both comparability between the chapters and a high 
level of explanatory power. The relationship between levels of campaigning and party vote 
share has been conducted in two stages; firstly by examining continuous measures of the 
campaigning variables used throughout this thesis and their impact on vote share changes. If 
intense campaigning is effective in boosting vote share, then by extension, a lack of 
campaigning in a constituency may have a harmful effect. However, these conclusions are 
only implicit in regards to this relationship, which needs to be measured explicitly in a 
second stage. By utilising the measure identifying low level campaigning as developed in 
chapter five, such an examination is possible. In many cases, a clear relationship can be 





Patterns in vote share 1987-2010  
 
Party vote share represents the votes received at the constituency level by each of the three 
parties studied here. Vote share is the determining factor behind marginality, as seen in 
chapter four, but the vote shares examined at this stage are those resulting from elections, 
although in many cases (where there have been no boundary changes) they form the 
marginality of a constituency at the following election. In safe constituencies where the 
locally incumbent party has a large majority, other parties will have smaller vote shares. As 
the smallest of the three parties, lower overall constituency vote shares are expected from the 
Liberal Democrats, who not only hold the smallest number of seats, but typically hold more 
marginal constituencies where the vote shares are more evenly split between parties. Labour 
should also have the higher overall local vote share of the three parties, as they have 
consistently held the safest of constituencies. It will be possible to clearly identify elections 
over the period at which there have been government changes, with an overall boost in vote 
shares for the nationally winning party (or parties in the case of 2010) and a decline in 
overall constituency vote share for the party losing national office. Larger standard 
deviations are also likely for the nationally winning parties, as to win the national 
incumbency parties will need to gain constituencies from other parties which may result in 
some smaller majorities. Graph 7.1 details the mean vote shares for the Conservatives, 
Labour and Liberal Democrats resulting from the six elections during the period. 
Graph 7.1: Patterns in vote share 1987-2010 
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
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There is a steep drop of over ten percentage points in the mean constituency vote shares for 
the Conservatives, from 40.97 in 1992 to just 30.19 in 1997, reflecting the Labour landslide. 
Over the following two elections Conservative vote shares recovered slightly, with slight 
increases of 0.85 and 0.39 points in 2001 and 2005 respectively. As expected, there was a 
boost in mean local Conservative vote shares in 2010 when they won enough seats to form a 
coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, but their average local vote share remains 
over five points lower than at the start of the period. The standard deviation figures (table 
7.1), which indicate the variation around the mean, vary across the period for the 
Conservatives, with a steep decline from 14.06 in 1992 to 12.17 in 1997 indicating, along 
with the drop in the mean, that there was a lot less variation overall.  
Table 7.1: Standard deviation figures for party vote share 
 
1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Conservative 14.51 14.06 12.17 13.21 13.96 14.57 
Labour 17.75 17.80 17.88 16.53 15.10 15.90 
Lib Dem 8.97 10.06 10.89 10.94 10.37 10.45 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
The standard deviations for 2010 are the highest of the entire period, with some Conservative 
candidates registering high vote shares and others very low. The lowest constituency vote 
share for the Conservatives was in 2001, when they gained just 2.8% of the vote share in 
Argyll and Bute; this is interesting as the lowest figures might have been expected in 1997 
with the steep decline in the mean. The figures for the maximum vote share demonstrate that 
there have been some extremely safe Conservative constituencies during the period, with the 
Conservatives having a 66.44% share of the vote in Bexhill and Battle in 1987.  
The patterns in vote share for Labour are almost a mirror image of those for the 
Conservatives, with a sharp increase in average Labour constituency vote share in 1997 and 
a steep drop in 2010. Mean Labour local vote share increased steadily by almost four 
percentage points between 1987 and 1992, but in 1997 saw a sharp rise of 8.91 percentage 
points; not as sharp a rise as the fall in Conservative vote share. This has steadily been 
eroded at the subsequent three elections, initially very slightly with drops of 2.03 and 0.10 
points in 2001 and 2005 respectively, with a sharper drop of 12.68 percentage points in 
2010, signifying the change of government; indeed, the result for 2010 is the lowest mean 
vote share for Labour over the entire period. The standard deviations of Labour vote shares 
remained fairly constant throughout the first three elections of the period at between 17.75 
and 17.88; in contrast to the Conservatives who saw a reduction in their standard deviation in 
1997, this year represents the highest figures for standard deviation for Labour of 17.88. The 
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subsequent decline in standard deviation indicates that there was a decreased amount of 
variation in Labour vote shares in constituencies during this period, due to a consolidation of 
the landslide victory in 1997 and the defensive electoral position in the elections that 
followed. It is interesting to compare these figures to the standard deviations for 
Conservative vote share which are consistently lower. Chapter four demonstrated that 
Labour have held the safest seat at each election over the period, indicating high vote shares. 
The figures certainly reflect this, with Labour having maximum vote shares at least nine 
percentage points higher than equivalent figures for the Conservatives; in 1997, whereas the 
maximum vote share for the latter was 55.3%, Labour’s was 27.6 percentage points higher at 
82.9%. 
 
The graph also shows that the Liberal Democrats have the lowest average vote share, with 
the highest value of 23.18% in 2010 coinciding with the change in government resulting in 
their entry into the Coalition; this value also represents their closest mean vote share to the 
other two parties, just 12.47 and 7.82 percentage points behind the Conservatives and 
Labour respectively. In contrast to the peaks and troughs of the Conservatives and Labour 
vote shares over the period, the average vote shares for the Liberal Democrats have 
remained more constant. The mean vote shares for the party declined between 1987 and 
1997, with the latter election recording the lowest average vote share for the period of just 
16.68%. It would appear that Labour’s victory in 1997 came not only at the expense of the 
Conservatives, but also the Liberal Democrats (Russell, Fieldhouse, 2005:158), which is 
perhaps unsurprising as tactical voting strategies between Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
used at this election could have depressed vote shares for the latter. At the last three 
elections of the period, there has been a slight recovery in vote share for the Liberal 
Democrats. The minimum vote shares for the party are lower than for the other two parties, 
with just 1.55% of the vote in Solihull in 1987. Compared to the other parties, the standard 
deviation figures are lower and more constant, rising from 8.97 in 1987 to 10.06 in 1992, 
varying by just 0.88 points over the following elections. These figures indicate that of the 
three parties, the Liberal Democrats not only have lower average vote shares, but there is a 
great deal less variation around these means. Over the six elections, there has been a gradual 
increase in the highest Liberal Democrat vote shares, from 53.62 to 61.97 percent of the 





Variations in vote share: stability and volatility 
 
The aim of exploring variables that explain both stability and change in party vote shares 
and their associations with party vote shares is to precede a multivariate model. Such a 
model can be used to effectively examine the relationship between low levels of 
campaigning and changes in party vote shares. Drawing on existing literature, constituency 
socio-demographics are investigated first which represent a source of stability in vote share. 
The discussion then turns to two variables which introduce volatility into examinations of 
party vote share: incumbency and campaigning. 
 
Constituency demographics and vote share  
 
Although the main premise of this thesis is a rational choice approach to campaigning and 
voter behaviour, it has also been informed by sociological theories of voter behaviour. Here 
the association between constituency demographics and varying levels of vote share for the 
three parties are examined. This draws on existing literature (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Clarke 
et al., 2004) linking support for parties with particular socio-demographic groups, in 
particular linking professional workers with support for the Conservatives (Whiteley, Seyd 
and Richardson, 1994) and routine workers with support for Labour (Syed and Whiteley, 
2002). This corresponds to the discussion of the origins of marginality in chapter four which 
saw clear links between support for parties and sources of traditional party support. The key 
demographic variable for studies of voter behaviour in the UK is that of social class, here 
measured using two occupational indicators detailing the proportion of professionals and 
routine workers in a constituency. However, the proportion of professional workers and 
routine workers were highly correlated, so only a measure of routine workers was utilised. 
There should be evidence of a negative association between higher levels of routine workers 
in a constituency and Conservative vote share, but in contrast, Labour vote shares are 
expected to show positive correlations with constituencies with higher levels of routine 
workers.   
Research has also linked high levels of owner occupiers and Conservative support (Heath et 
al., 1991: 106) most famously expressed by Margaret Thatcher who described the 
Conservatives in 1974 as ‘the owner-occupier’s party’ (Thatcher, 1974). Therefore, a 
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positive relationship is expected between the proportion of owner occupiers and 
Conservative vote share. The opposite should be true for Labour who traditionally see higher 
levels of support in constituencies with a large percentage of council housing tenants (Pattie, 
Whiteley, Johnston and Seyd, 1994:477).  
Other variables are likely to be associated with party vote share, although they are not 
available to study over the period. Constituencies with higher proportions of ethnic minority 
voters are likely to coincide with lower Conservative vote shares and higher Labour vote 
shares. Labour has positioned itself as a party acting in the interest of immigrants  (Heath et 
al., 2011; Heath et al., 2013; Saggar, 2000), particularly as Labour administrations were 
responsible for guiding legislation such as the Race Relations Act though parliament ‘as 
explicit vehicles for protecting ethnic minority rights and interests (Sanders et al., 2013:3). In 
contrast, the Conservative right wing has held back the party’s ability to appeal to ethnic 
minority voters (Saggar, 1998). This association between Labour and ethnic minority voters 
has been supported by empirical evidence (Heath and Khan, 2012) in contemporary 
elections. Seyd, Whiteley, and Billingshurst’s (2006:25)  investigation of Liberal Democrat 
membership also found that the party is ‘dominated by members who classify themselves as 
white/European, with these members making up 99 per cent of the total so high correlations 
between the white population and Liberal Democrat vote share might also be expected, were 
data available. 
 
To explore the link between constituency demographics and party vote share, bivariate 
correlations were conducted across the period and the results can be seen in table 7.2. These 
correlations offer an indication of whether any of the relationships between socio-
demographic variables and support for certain parties are significant over the whole period. 
If required any interesting significant relationships will be expanded upon in a more detailed 
analysis. For continuity between the two operationalisations of local electoral outcomes, the 







Table 7.2: Bivariate correlations between socio-demographics and party vote share 
1987-2010  
 Con vote share Labour vote share Lib Dem vote share 
Owner Occupiers .100** -.187** .159** 
Retired .007 .019 -.035* 
Routine workers -.306** .142** -.011 
Migrants .078** -.127** .133** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
What is clear from the table is that a surprising number of the relationships are significant for 
the entire period but weak. Despite the correlations across the period giving a general 
indication of constituency socio-demographics and party vote shares, some key associations 
may be extracted. Firstly, the correlations between party vote shares and the proportion of 
owner occupiers in a constituency is as expected; constituencies with higher levels are 
significantly and positively associated (albeit weakly) with Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat vote shares over the period. In contrast, the correlation for Labour over the period 
is significant and negative, indicating that higher levels of support for Labour are associated 
with lower levels of owner occupiers. While the results of the correlations for the retired 
population are positive for the Conservatives and Labour, neither is significant and the 
results are very weak; this is reflected by the significant but negative (and again weak) 
correlation result for the period between the percentage of retired people and Liberal 
Democrat vote share. 
Labour’s support has historically been strongly associated with the working class, often 
operationalized as routine workers and the results from the table seem to support this, with a 
positive and significant correlation between the routine workers and Labour vote share. The 
table also indicates that constituencies with higher levels of Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrat vote shares are negatively correlated with routine workers, although the result is 
stronger and only significant for the Conservatives (-.306 against -.011 for the Liberal 
Democrats). Constituencies with higher proportions of migrants are significantly associated 
with higher levels of vote shares for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, but for 
Labour the direction of the correlation (again significant) is negative, indicating that as the 
Labour vote share in constituencies increased, the proportion of migrants decreased. 
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Although this has given us a general picture of the correlations between constituency socio-
demographics and party vote shares, they can be explored in more detail by disaggregating 
two variables which have shown interesting results on an election-by-election basis: the 
proportion of owner occupiers and the proportion of routine workers, the results of which are 
shown in table 7.2.  
Table 7.3: Bivariate correlations between socio-demographics and party vote share 




.246** .394** .603** .576** .485** .610** 
Routine 
workers 




-.199** -.501** -.536** -.484** -.326** -.553** 
Routine 
workers 




.032 .361** .257** .133** .004 .093* 
Routine 
workers 
-.180** -.024 -.290** -.093 -.243** -.318** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
There is a consistently positive and significant correlation between Conservative vote share 
and the percentage of owner occupiers in a constituency, although this relationship varies 
greatly in strength. While the result for 1987 is the weakest of the period at .246, it 
strengthens in 1992 before reaching a highly moderate .603 in 1997. The strength does drop 
in 2001 and 2005 (.452 and .485 respectively), but peaks in 2010 at .610. These results 
indicate a generally moderate link between constituency owner occupiers and Conservative 
vote share, echoing the findings of the literature.  
A negative relationship between Conservative vote share and the percentage of routine 
workers can be observed, once again with the lowest value in 1992 (-.171) and with a strong 
correlation in 1997 (-.727); all results for the percentage of routine workers are also 
significant. In each election during the period, therefore, higher proportions of routine 
workers were significantly associated with lower levels of Conservative votes in 
constituencies. 
Correlations between Labour vote share and the proportion of owner occupiers were also 
disaggregated to examine the overall negative relationship in more detail. Existing literature 
links lower levels of owner occupiers and Labour vote shares, and this is supported when 
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looking at the results of the correlations at elections over the period although the strength 
does vary. Whereas the association is weak in 1987 at -.199, all other correlations are 
moderate with a slight strengthening in 1992, 1997 and a peak of -.553 in 2010. Labour vote 
share should also be significantly and positively correlated to the proportion of routine 
workers in a constituency at each election. The results of the election-specific correlations 
certainly support this, with positive and significant correlations between the two variables at 
all elections in the period. The strength does vary, with the weakest correlation of .117 in 
1992 and the strongest in 1997 at .602, which reflects similar patterns from the correlations 
examining Conservative vote share. 
Table 7.2 indicated certain similarities in the demographic profiles of constituencies with 
higher levels of Conservative and Liberal Democrat vote share, particularly owner occupiers 
and the occupational variable indicating class. When disaggregating the correlations between 
the proportion of owner occupiers and Liberal Democrat vote share, however, the results are 
less consistent than for the Conservatives; with significant correlations for four of the six 
elections (the results were insignificant in 1987 and 2005). For those years with significant 
results, even though they are all positive (indicating that constituencies with higher portions 
of such occupiers are associated with higher levels of Liberal Democrat vote share), there is 
a consistent decline from a high of .361 in 1992 to just .093 in 2010.  
Overall these results indicate support for associations between constituency demographic 
profiles and party vote share, particularly when considering variables measuring owner 
occupiers and those in routine occupations. The demographic differences between the parties 
were particularly strong at the 1997 election, the only landslide during the period covered. 
There are also certain implications that these results have for the multivariate model used at 
the end of this chapter. Firstly, as explored in chapter four, constituency socio-demographics 
provide a partial picture of constituency marginality, with several variables, particularly 
indicators of social class, associated with constituencies held more safely by the three 
parties. Also, there are links between demographic variables and campaigning levels, which 







Vote share and length of tenure 
 
Tenure length is an important source of change from election to election; it never remains the 
same as each election adds to the length of tenure of an incumbent, or in the case of seat 
change begins a new tenure. Existing literature from the USA (Holbrook and Tidmarsh, 
1991, Holbrook 1996) has also indicated the importance of tenure to the effectiveness of 
campaigning; even though Jacobson’s (1987) exploration of Congressional elections 
primarily focuses on the differences in campaign effectiveness between incumbent and 
opposition candidates, he also found evidence for the impact of tenure on vote share, with 
first-term incumbents receiving a boost of between 2.3 percentage points (1962 through 
1966) and 6.8 points (1968 through 1978). This boost (termed a ‘sophomore surge’ by 
Jacobson, 1987:29) did not extend either to those competing their first election or longer-
serving incumbents, with diminishing electoral returns the longer the incumbent held the 
local tenure.   
Norton and Wood (1990) applied this idea of a sophomore surge to the UK context by 
exploring the impact of first-term incumbents on constituency party vote shares at the 1983 
general election, finding that such MPs had a greater positive effect upon vote share than 
both non-incumbent candidates and MPs with longer tenures. This is likely to be due to the 
use of a first-term election as a chance to establish a personal vote in a constituency (Cain, 
Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987) prior to the ‘normal law of diminishing returns’ (Wood and 
Norton, 1992:229). These findings were echoed in their subsequent study (Wood and 
Norton, 1992) comparing first-term incumbents in both 1983 and 1987, once again finding 
beneficial effects. Existing evidence from both the US and UK suggests that candidates 
fighting an election as a first time incumbent are likely to increase their vote share when 
compared to other candidates, and also that the longer an MP’s tenure in a constituency is, 
the lower their vote share will be as the cushion established in their first-term is eroded.  
To explore the link between tenure and vote share, all three measures of seat tenure as used 
previously (two continuous measures of seat and career tenure and a binary variable 
identifying first-term incumbents) have been investigated, with the results of bivariate 
correlations between the two continuous measures seen in table 7.4. Constituencies were 
divided according to which of the three parties held the seat at the commencement of the 
election campaign. However, one important alteration to vote share has been made; tenure is 
a source of change in vote share, so instead of looking at overall vote share for the parties 
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over the period, a continuous measure of changes in vote shares between elections has been 
used. If the trends in the literature are to be reflected, a negative relationship is expected 
between the length of the incumbent’s tenure and changes in their party vote share as the 
personal vote established in their first term erodes. 
Table 7.4: Bivariate correlations between tenure measures and vote share according 









Seat -.060** .101** -.123** 
Career -.038 -.018 -.010 
Labour seats 
Seat -.111** .016 .028 
Career -.033 .010 .032 
Liberal Democrat seats 
Seat -.063 .099 -.064 
Career .027 .128 -.182** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
The results of the correlations between Conservative incumbent tenure and Conservative 
vote share change across the period are, as expected, negative. However, only seat tenure for 
Conservative incumbents is significantly correlated with vote share changes. This result 
indicates that longer career tenures for Conservative incumbents are associated with 
decreases in Conservative vote share, although the correlation is weak at .060. This is 
reflected by similar patterns for Liberal Democrat incumbents, with longer career and seat 
tenures again negatively correlated to changes in their vote share, although only the career 
tenure measure is significant. For Labour, in contrast, the results for both career and seat 
tenure are weakly positively correlated with changes in Labour vote share, although neither 
is significant. 
While the results for incumbent parties in constituencies are as expected for two of the 
parties, the picture for opposing parties and the association of tenure with changes in their 
vote shares is interesting. A positive correlation could suggest the erosion of the personal 
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vote of the incumbent as tenure increases, but the results of the correlations are mixed in this 
regard. In Conservative-held constituencies, rises in Labour vote shares were significantly 
associated with longer tenure in the seat, although the correlation is weak, yet longer career 
tenures of Conservative incumbents were negatively (but not significantly) associated with 
rises in Labour vote share. In Labour-held constituencies, while there were positive but 
insignificant correlations for rises in Liberal Democrat vote share and the two tenure 
measures, the correlations were negative for the Conservatives. 
These results, although not controlling for other factors, indicate that longer tenures for 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat incumbents are correlated with decreases in their party 
vote share, which suggests that people might dislike Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
incumbents. The final tenure measure is a binary measure identifying those incumbents who 
were fighting their first election as the incumbent. An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted between this binary variable and the corresponding party vote share change for 
constituencies held by each of the three parties; a first-term boost in vote share would be 
indicated by there being a significant difference in the mean vote share change between first-
term incumbents and others. 
The results are promising, and indicate that across the period there have been significant 
differences in vote share between first-term incumbents and other incumbents from the same 
party. For the Conservatives, first-term incumbents saw, on average, a boost of 1.1 points 
whereas other Conservative candidates saw an overall rise in their vote share of 0.25 
percentage points. This difference is also significant, with a t-test value of -3.048. Very 
similar and significant patterns can also be observed when comparing the differences in vote 
share changes between Labour first-term incumbents and other incumbents from the same 
party; first-termers saw an increase of .52 points, whereas other saw an average decrease in 
their vote share of 2.48 percentage points. The largest differences between the two types of 
incumbent can be seen for the Liberal Democrats, with first-termers receiving a significant 
boost of 5.13 percentage points against a reduction of 1.26 points for others. These results 
support the findings of existing research, indicating that not only did first-term incumbents 
for all three parties boost vote share when compared to other incumbents from the same 







Campaigning and vote share 
 
Research conducted in the USA (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Patterson and Caldeira, 
1984) ranging from studies of campaign expenditure, (Jacobson 1987; 2006) to experimental 
studies contrasting the effectiveness of different campaign methods (Bochel and Denver, 
1971; Gerber and Green, 2000) have linked campaigning and rises in vote share. The past 
twenty years have also seen studies repeatedly indicate that intense levels of campaigning are 
effective in raising party vote share in the UK context.  
To link campaigning and party vote shares in the period covered here, initial bivariate 
correlations were conducted between the three campaigning measures for each party and 
respective party vote shares (table 7.5). If the findings are to follow those indicated by the 
existing literature, positive and significant correlations are expected between constituency 
campaigning by a party and their resulting vote share.  









Spending    
Conservative .643** -.537** .216** 
Labour  -.241** .472** -.384** 
Liberal Democrat  .240** -.525** .672** 
Doorstep canvass    
Conservative  .339** -.236** .072* 
Labour doorstep  .107** .020 -.127** 
Liberal Democrat  .216** -.330** .318** 
Telephone canvass    
Conservative  .163** -.116** .032 
Labour .063 .116** -.215** 
Liberal Democrat .183** -.252** .244** 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N for spending = 3804, n for 
canvassing. Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
The results of these correlations do indeed support these findings, with consistently positive 
and significant correlations between spending by each of the three parties and their 
respective vote shares. These results indicate that higher levels of campaign spending are 
associated with higher levels of party vote share over the period, with the strongest 
correlations for the Liberal Democrats (.672) and the weakest for Labour at .472. These 
results are reflected by the positive correlations between the two canvassing measures and 
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the respective party’s vote share. Of the two canvassing variables, doorstep canvassing offers 
the most significant correlations, with higher levels of such campaigning by the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats positively associated with higher vote shares for the 
parties (.339 and .318 respectively); although Labour’s correlation is also positive, it is 
insignificant. All three correlations are positively and significant for telephone canvassing, 
with the Liberal Democrats having the strongest correlation at .224, then Labour on .116 and 
the Conservatives on .163. It is interesting to note that for the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats, telephone canvassing was more weakly correlated with vote share than doorstep 
canvassing, reflecting Gerber and Green’s findings that face-to-face methods of canvassing 
had a greater impact than more impersonal methods. 
 
The effect of campaign levels on party vote share 
 
The results of the bivariate correlations between campaigning and vote share are, of course, 
only initial indications for the relationship between the two variables and should be treated 
with caution, particularly as they take no other factors into account. To fully examine the 
impact of campaigning levels on vote share, a multivariate model is necessary, drawing on 
rival explanations for variation in vote share as explored earlier in this chapter. Alongside the 
independent variables (the three campaigning measures) and the dependent variable (party 
vote share) additional variables have been incorporated to ensure that the impact of the 
campaign levels can be accurately measured.  
The model constructed in the previous chapter will be retained here with minimal variation 
for two reasons; firstly this ensures that the results of the regressions examining both turnout 
and vote share can be compared. The use of two different operationalisations of the 
dependent variable of the thesis hypothesis means that it is appealing to ensure that the 
conclusions drawn from both these chapters are comparable. Secondly, nearly identical 
models have been maintained in existing research examining the impact of campaigning on 
both vote share and turnout (see Denver et al., 2004; Fisher and Denver, 2009).  
Drawing on the existing model, there are two groups of control variables which measure 
both continuity and change in vote share. The interaction between continuity and change is a 
key tension in this thesis, as in certain circumstances the causes of volatility may overwhelm 
the sources of stability, causing change. There are two sets of control variables in the model 
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accounting for stability in vote share: constituency demographics and previous vote share. 
The model created in the last chapter used four control variables based on socio-
demographic variables, controlling for the proportion of owner occupiers, retired people, 
routine workers and migrants in a constituency. Earlier in this chapter the variations in party 
vote shares according to the demographic profiles of constituencies were considered. 
Examining the results of these correlations, the variables offer a good level of correlation 
with vote share for all three parties across the period, although the results for the retired 
population are only significant for one party. Yet when correlations were conducted between 
the retired population and party vote share for individual elections, the majority of the results 
were significant, so it would appear that the cross-election correlations in table 7.1 underplay 
the significance of this variable. Therefore, all four socio-demographic variables used in the 
model from the last chapter have been maintained to examine vote share. 
A recent development in the modelling of constituency campaign effectiveness (Fisher and 
Denver, 2009 for example) has been the inclusion of previous measures of the dependent 
variable, leading to the inclusion of previous turnout in the model from the last chapter and 
the inclusion of previous vote share here. Actual vote shares from the preceding election 
have been used, supplemented by notional vote shares when boundary changes have 
occurred between elections. When exploring correlations between previous and resulting 
vote share, the results were strong and significant for all three parties, ranging from a 
correlation of .838 to .941 for the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives across the period 
respectively. The strength of these correlations for all parties emphasises how important it is 
to control for previous vote share when examining the effectiveness of campaigning on party 
vote share.  
The key issue here, as in the previous chapter, is how to combine socio-demographic 
variables with previous measures of vote share. Earlier studies into the effectiveness of 
constituency campaigning employed a range of socio-demographic measures as controls (see 
Pattie et al., 1994); Whiteley and Seyd’s (1994) study of Labour party campaigning 
controlled for a range of socio-demographic variables such as class, the proportion of council 
housing tenants and the unemployed. Yet the more recent studies have increasingly used 
previous vote share as a control for constituency demographics to take into account ‘the 
underlying, long-term, relatively unchanging geography of party support’ (Pattie and 
Johnston, 2003b:385). Interestingly, Seyd and Whiteley (1994) ran two models contrasting 
the explanatory power of previous vote share and socio-demographics in their study of the 
effectiveness of the Labour campaign in 1987; they found that by using the previous Labour 
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vote share in a constituency as a proxy for socio-demographic variables, the explanatory 
power of the model was raised considerably by 13 percentage points to 97%. The possibility 
of using previous vote share as a proxy for demographic variables is also raised by Denver et 
al. (2004:296) who suggest that if controlling for previous vote share there is no need to also 
control for constituency demographics; using this measure alone allows us to ‘effectively 
control for all the contextual constituency factors normally associated with variations in 
levels of party support’, offering a more parsimonious model. 
In regards to the present study, previous measures of the dependent variables in conjunction 
with the four socio-demographic variables were found to offer the better explanatory power, 
with previous turnout raising the explanatory power considerably. For vote share similar 
trials were conducted, using the same four socio-demographic variables as before, with three 
alternatives possible; using previous vote share exclusively as a control for the local social 
context, using the socio-demographic variables in isolation, or both sets of variables entered 
together. Thorough testing across the period indicated that a combination of the selected 
socio-demographic variables and a measure of previous vote share offered the greatest 
explanatory power, although previous vote share once again contributed most significantly.  
The previous chapter used a measure of the incumbent total length of the incumbent’s career 
tenure at each election, which was also used in the chapter exploring marginality. Three 
different measures of tenure and their association with party vote share have been considered 
earlier in this chapter, with most of the results for the career variable in the expected 
direction, although not all of them were significant. All three tenure measures were trialled 
in the multivariate model, and the career measure was found to repeatedly boost the 
explanatory power of the model, so this has been maintained. 
A final set of two variables was also entered into the model to control for marginality and 
interactions between other variables. Firstly, constituency marginality was controlled for, 
using actual or notional figures for the previous majority of a constituency going into an 
election. Marginality is of course an important variable, with well documented evidence that 
at the beginning of the period under investigation the Conservatives spent highly in their safe 
constituencies (Pattie and Johnston, 2003b), which of course would have high vote shares for 
the Conservatives. Although marginality is related to vote share in a different way to turnout, 
it is nonetheless an important variable to include, and in trials was found to boost the 
explanatory power. Secondly, multiplicative interaction terms between marginality and the 
campaigning variables were maintained from the previous chapter.  
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Here the potentially detrimental impact of low level campaigns in safe constituencies on vote 
share is tested by firstly examining the relationship between the two variables implicitly by 
using continuous measures of the campaigning variables. Secondly, the impact of such 
campaigns will be examined more directly by using the binary variable identifying low level 
campaigns as created in chapter five. Linear regressions were conducted between the 
campaign variables for each of the three parties and party vote shares, controlling for the 
additional factors detailed above. Spending for all three parties, including party-specific 
interaction terms with previous majority, was combined in a single model to control for the 
effect of spending by other parties in the constituency. If the results of the models are to 
confirm that campaigning is effective in raising vote share (and by extension less 
campaigning may have a detrimental impact), positive and significant results should be 
observed between the two variables, although this may not only vary between elections (due 
to increasingly rational party campaigning strategies) but also between parties. Table 7.6 
only details the unstandardized coefficients for the campaigning variables and the adjusted r
2
 
across the 1987 to 2010 period for simplicity.  
Table 7.6: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the effectiveness of 








.034** (.007) -.036** (.010) -.013 (.008) 
Labour spend 
-.039** (006) .122** (.008) -.059** (.007) 
Liberal Democrat 
spend -.014** (.005) -.002* (.007) .055** (.007) 
Adjusted r
2
 .917 .878 .796 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients for the selected variables only with 
standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
 
The results are interesting, with significant results not only between party spending and their 
resulting vote share, but also for the effects of other party spending.  The explanatory power 
of the models is good, with between 79.6 percent and 91.7 percent of variation in party vote 
shares explained. A single percentage point increase in the amount spent by a Conservative 
candidate led to a rise of .034 percentage points in Conservative vote share. The impact of 
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marginality on the relationship between Conservative candidate spending and vote share is 
interesting, with clear indications that the safer the constituency, the more positive the 
impact of spending upon vote share. The same increase in Labour candidate spending led to 
a more substantial increase of .122 percentage points in Labour vote share, with the Liberal 
Democrats boosting their vote share by .055 points for each percentage point of the legal 
maximum spent. As Liberal Democrat spending increases, so does the party’s vote share, 
particularly when the candidate spends above 69 percent of the legal maximum in a 
constituency. However, the impact of spending upon vote share depends upon the 
marginality of a constituency. In contrast to Conservative spending, the Liberal Democrats 
see the lowest impact of spending on vote share in constituencies with previous majorities of 
20 percentage points and above. Incumbency may play an important part here, with only 
3.65% of these constituencies held by the Liberal Democrats over the period. Of the three 
parties, the Conservatives have the smallest coefficient, which may be attributable to the 
already stated less rational spending patterns of the Conservatives in the early part of the 
period under examination. Labour’s coefficient is the largest of the three parties, which could 
be a consequence of the targeted campaigning and the subsequent Labour landslide of 1997. 
The interaction of marginality upon the relationship between Labour spending and vote share 
indicate that overall the party spent more in constituencies with majorities of over 20 
percentage points, although without knowing constituency incumbency it is difficult to 
suggest whether this may be evidence of expansionist spending in 1997 or more defensive 
spending in 2010. These coefficients offer clear support for campaign spending by a party 
having a positive effect on that party’s vote share. 
Considering the impact of spending by Labour and the Liberal Democrats on Conservative 
vote share, there are clear signs that as spending by these candidates rises, Conservative vote 
share falls, with Labour’s negative impact on Conservative vote share larger than the 
positive impact of Conservative spending. Therefore between 1987 and 2010, for every 
percentage point increase in spending by Labour candidates, Conservative vote share fell by 
.039 percentage points. Constituency marginality affects this relationship, with the negative 
impact of Labour spending on Conservative vote share increasing the safer a constituency is.   
The effect of Liberal Democrat spending had a greater impact in reducing Conservative vote 
share (by .014 percentage points) than on Labour vote share (.002 percentage points). 
However, both Conservative and Liberal Democrat spending reduced Labour vote share, 
with the negative impact increasing the safer constituencies became. When observing the 
coefficients for Liberal Democrat vote share, Labour spending has the greater negative 
224 
 
effect, with a .059 percentage point decrease in Liberal Democrat vote share for every 
percentage point increase in spending. Marginality affects the impact of both Conservative 
and Labour spending on Liberal Democrat vote share, with the negative impact decreasing 
the safer the constituency.  
These figures offer support for the positive impact of campaigning on party vote share, and 
implicitly indicate that low levels of campaigning might have a negative impact. Yet they do 
not give a great deal of information on variation between elections. Table 7.7 displays the 
election-by-election coefficients for the same model to examine trends in the relationship 
between campaign spending and vote share in more detail. 
Of the six coefficients for Conservative spending, all but 2001 are in the expected direction, 
with four of the six being significant. The model also offers a good fit, with between 73.5 
and 95% of variation in Conservative vote share explained. The negative coefficient between 
Conservative spending and vote share in 2001 may be related to the stringent nature of the 
model, although this would not explain why coefficients for the other years are positive. In 
this year, spending by Conservative candidates was positively and significantly related to 
Conservative vote share in the model until the control for previous vote share was added. It 
could be attributed to the landslide defeat of the Conservatives in 1997, meaning that 
spending at the subsequent election had more ground to make up before actually boosting 
vote share. It is also possible that the notable transition to a more rational spending 
distribution after the Conservative defeat in 1997 did not fully start to reap electoral rewards 
until 2005 (a finding echoed in Pattie and Johnston, 2009a).   
Despite the result for 2001, the coefficients for the other years offer good support for the 
effectiveness of spending by Conservative candidates in increasing their vote share, although 
the coefficients do vary in strength. As Pattie and Johnston (2003b) found, Conservative 
spending early in the period was ineffective in boosting Conservative vote share, largely due 
to the strong local associations in their safe constituencies. Excluding the 2001 result, the 
strength of the significant coefficients does indeed increase at elections from 1992 onwards, 
peaking in 2005 when a single percentage point increase in spending by Conservative 
candidates led to a significant increase of .129 percentage points in their vote share, even 
when controlling for spending by the other parties. The interaction effect of marginality on 
the relationship between Conservative spending and vote share is interesting as it indicates 
that at each election, the safer the constituency, the more positive the impact of Conservative 
spending on the party’s vote share. Conservative candidates spent most highly in ultra-safe 
constituencies, whereas in the latter three elections of the period, spending by the party in 
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these constituencies fell dramatically. Without looking at the incumbency of the constituency 
at this stage it is difficult to explain this fully, but it is likely to be due not only to less 
rational spending patterns for the party during the earlier period, but also the effect of the 
1997 Labour landslide. 
Table 7.7: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the effectiveness of 
campaign spending on vote share (full results in Appendix 13) 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
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 .663 .750 .878 .675 .832 .865 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients for the selected variables only with 




The model explains a very high level of variation in Labour vote share, ranging from 74.8% 
in 1987 to 95.3% in 1997. Positive coefficients were expected between party campaigning 
and party vote share, which is confirmed by the spending coefficients for Labour. However, 
of the six elections, two coefficients (in 1987 and 2001) are insignificant, which is in contrast 
to the findings of Pattie et al. (1994) and Denver et al. (2004), with both papers observing 
positive and significant results for Labour in 1987 and 2001 respectively; the reason for this 
deviation could be attributed to the stricter model employed here which supresses the 
campaigning variables. The result for 2001 may also be attributed to the national 
incumbency context of Labour; the landslide of 1997 had left the party with a large number 
of seats to defend in 2001. Such a large majority made it more difficult for Labour to target 
their campaigning at this election (Seyd, 2001), and also made increasing vote share in its 
constituencies less of a priority. As the model looks specifically at increases in vote share, it 
may be that it underplays the Labour campaign of 2001 which was more focused upon 
maintaining the majority, not increasing local vote shares. Support for this can be found in 
the interaction term which indicates that, in comparison to previous election years, 
constituency marginality had less of an impact upon the relationship between Labour 
spending and vote share in both 2001 and 2005. Labour campaign spending seems to be 
more effective where it is significant, with larger coefficients for those election years. The 
smallest significant result is in 2010, when a single percentage point increase in Labour 
candidate spending raised Labour vote share by .068 percentage points. This follows Fisher, 
Cutts and Fieldhouse’s findings (2011:822) that ‘given that there was a widespread 
expectation that the party would lose majority rule, that it was required to target so many 
seats, and that it was unpopular and on the defensive’, Labour actually ran a remarkably 
effective campaign in 2010.  
The largest coefficient for Labour came in 2005, with a .214 percentage point increase in 
vote share for every increase in candidate spending, which is in contrast to Pattie and 
Johnston’s (2009b: 431) conclusions that while Labour were still able to run efficient 
targeted campaigns, by 2005 their campaigning was less effective in altering their 
constituency vote shares. This difference could be attributable to the differing models and 
regression techniques employed.  
While the model explains between 66.3 and 87.8% of variation in Liberal Democrat vote 
share, this is slightly lower than for the other two parties. The most encouraging overall 
picture for the effectiveness of candidate spending is for the Liberal Democrats, with the 
coefficients all positive and significant at all elections during the period bar 1992. This, of 
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course, is to be expected, as the Liberal Democrats have historically been the most efficient 
party at targeting campaigning, largely out of necessity as the smallest of the three parties 
(Pattie and Johnston, 2003b; 2009). The lowest significant coefficient came in 2010, when a 
single percentage point increase led to a .069 point increase in vote share for the Liberal 
Democrats, with the highest in 2005, when for every percentage point rise in spending, the 
Liberal Democrat candidates saw a boost in their vote share of .165 percentage points, 
which reflects their success at this election, gaining ten constituencies. What is clear when 
exploring the interaction effect of marginality is how consistent the impact it has upon 
Liberal Democrat spending and vote share, which supports the notion that the party runs the 
most tactical campaigns. In all election years, spending by the party has a far greater impact 
on vote share the more marginal the constituency. In 1997, once a Liberal Democrat 
candidate had spent at least 22% of the legal maximum, a significant rise in vote share can 
be observed in all constituencies except for ultra-safe seats, where the impact was weaker.  
Table 7.8 displays summary results for the same model run across the period with the two 
canvassing variables as the independent variables. The coefficients show that doorstep 
canvassing by the Conservatives did not have a significant impact on Conservative vote 
share, although the impact is slightly positive. Marginality has little impact upon the 
relationship between Conservative doorstep canvassing and the party’s vote share until a 
constituency’s previous majority rises above 20 percentage points. Then, as canvassing 
increases, there is a corresponding rise in Conservative vote share. Doorstep canvassing by 
Labour was negatively related to Conservative vote share, although this was insignificant. 
The coefficients for the effect of telephone canvassing by the Conservative on the party’s 
vote share over the period are in the opposite direction to what was expected, with such 
canvassing being associated with a decline in Conservative vote share, although this was 
insignificant. The interaction effect of marginality on this relationship offers rather mixed 
results. However, in the safest constituencies, it appears that intense telephone canvassing 
increased Conservative vote share. Most (55%) of these constituencies were held by Labour, 








Table 7.8: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the effectiveness of 









Doorstep canvass    
Conservatives .017 (.016) .003 (.021) -.027 (.016) 
Labour -.021 (.016) .015 (.021) .009 (.017) 
Liberal Democrats .003 (.025) -.041 (.033) .000 (.027) 
Adjusted r
2
 .917 .926 .851 
Telephone canvass    
Conservatives -.063(.135) .027 (.056) -.040  (.052) 
Labour .025 (.122) .011 (.049) .013 (.047) 
Liberal Democrats -.139 (.700) -.062 (.280) -.172 (.271) 
Adjusted r
2
 .836 .953 .881 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients for the selected variables only with 
standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
The coefficients for the impact of doorstep canvassing by Labour candidates on Labour’s 
vote share are, like the Conservatives, positive, but also insignificant. However, once the 
previous majority of a constituency rises above 14.99 percentage points, the impact of 
doorstep canvassing on Labour vote share becomes negative. Telephone canvassing by 
Labour’s candidates is also positively related to Labour vote share, but once again 
insignificant. Confusingly, telephone canvassing by Labour candidates is positively related 
to party vote share for all three parties. Marginality has little impact on this relationship, 
although the positive impact of such campaigning upon Labour vote share lessens once a 
constituency’s previous majority rises above 19.99 percentage points. For canvassing by the 
Liberal Democrats, the results are mixed, with doorstep canvassing making no impact on 
Liberal Democrat vote share. However, the interactions indicate that the relationship is 
positive, although this lessens as the safety of the constituency rises.  It would appear from 
the results of the telephone canvassing by the party that it actually reduced Liberal Democrat 
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vote share, as well as having a negative impact on vote share of the other two parties. 
Constituency marginality had no impact in this case.  
It appears from these results that doorstep canvassing for all parties boosted their own vote 
share, although not significantly. However, it seems that telephone canvassing by both the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats actually decreased their vote shares, although these 
values are once again not significant, linking back to the findings of both Gerber and Green 
(2000) and to Fisher and Denver (2009).  
These results generally support the effectiveness of campaigning in boosting vote shares for 
the three main parties, particularly so for candidate spending. This is despite the use of a 
very stringent model including a control for previous vote share which is likely to reduce the 
size of the campaigning coefficient (Whiteley and Seyd, 1994). That any of the variables 
remain significant in such a stringent model offers clear evidence that campaign spending 
does affect party vote share. In addition, even though the increases in vote share caused by 
campaigning are relatively small, they represent the impact of a single percentage point 
increase in spending, when in reality spending varies considerably (the highest spend during 
the period was 170.39 percent of the legal maximum whereas in several constituencies at 
least one of the parties spent nothing at all). Lastly, some constituencies have extremely low 
majorities (the Conservatives had a majority of just 0.01% in Leicester South going into the 
1987 election), so even the slightest boost in vote share has the potential to have a dramatic 
impact. These results all indicate that campaign spending has a positive impact on party vote 
share, so by extension, less spending may lead to a smaller increase or indeed decline. Yet 
with the results above this cannot conclusively be decided: to do so the variable identifying 
low level campaigning needs to be entered into the model. 
 
The effect of low level campaigning on vote share 
 
Chapter five demonstrated the different ways in which (the limited) existing literature 
measures relative levels of campaigning, and drawing on these influences, two alternative 
measures of relative levels were developed; one party specific and the other combining the 
measures for the top two parties. The measure developed for this thesis draw largely on the 
influence of Denver et al. (2004), who examine the relative effectiveness of campaigning in 
different quartiles of campaign intensity. Like this study, they investigate the effectiveness of 
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relative levels of campaign activity upon both turnout and vote share by using direct 
measures of party activity (to investigate vote share) and measures for the top two parties (to 
investigate turnout). Interestingly, in terms of the implications for this study, they find that 
the results do vary according to the quartile into which the campaign activity score falls, with 
a consistently negative relationship between the campaigns in the first quartile and falls in 
vote share; for example, a low level Liberal Democrat campaign in 1992 reduced the party’s 
constituency vote share by 4.2 percentage points (Denver et al., 2004:298). These results 
offer support for the third sub-hypothesis of this thesis that low level campaigns have a 
detrimental impact on party vote shares.  
To examine whether low level campaigning has a detrimental impact on party vote shares, 
the model used in the previous section has been retained, but the independent variable 
becomes a binary variable identifying low level campaigns by each party. For each of the 
three campaigning measures (for each of the parties), two binary variables have been created, 
with one measuring low levels of campaigning amongst incumbents and the other amongst 
opposition candidates. The control variables remain as before to ensure constancy in the 
models (with slight adjustments to the interaction terms) and the models are expected to 
explain a high degree of variation in vote share due to the inclusion of previous vote share. 
To support the hypothesis that low level campaigns have a detrimental impact on party vote 
share, negative and significant coefficients should be observed for the campaigning 
variables; the results are also likely to vary considerably according to the incumbency of the 
candidate, with low level campaigning by opposition candidates expected to see greater 
detrimental effects. 
Looking firstly at the results for the spending regressions in table 7.9, the coefficients for 
Conservative incumbents are indeed negative from 1997 onwards. However, only 1997 is 
significant, with low level campaign spending by Conservative incumbents reducing 
Conservative vote share by 1.78 percentage points, compared to other levels of spending. 
The impact of marginality upon this relationship is not consistent over the period, and in 
1997 in particular it made no difference to the negative impact of low level campaigns on 
Conservative incumbent vote share. However in both 1987 and 1992, running such 






Table 7.9: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the Impact of low level 
spending campaigns on vote share by incumbent and opposition candidates (full 
results in Appendix 15) 
 Incumbent low level 
campaigns 
Opposition low level 
campaigns 
1987 
Conservative  2.779 (2.622) 5.247 (4.328) 
Labour  4.527 (4.062) 6.212* (3.015) 
Liberal Democrat  17.931* (5.870) -6.024 (3.204) 
1992 
Conservative  .947 (1.053) -1.788 (1.698)  
Labour  -2.326 (1.547) .535 (1.203) 
Liberal Democrat  -1.635 (4.710) 2.303 (2.252) 
1997 
Conservative  -1.780* (.777) -2.255* (.928) 
Labour  .275  -1.030 (1.588)  
Liberal Democrat  -2.563 (5.808) -14.354** (3.329) 
2001 
Conservative  -1.087 (2.267)  -5.405* (2.406) 
Labour  -3.438 (4.704) -4.129 (3.027) 
Liberal Democrat  26.115 (27.353) -6.081 (9.982) 
2005 
Conservative  -1.411 (1.340) -4.906** (1.608) 
Labour  -3.448* (1.405)  1.447 (2.325) 
Liberal Democrat  -4.300 (13.220) -3.987 (2.793) 
2010 
Conservative  -.646(1.240) -.001 (1.255) 
Labour  -.243 (1.359) -5.490* (2.169) 
Liberal Democrat  -4.657 (3.695) -6.127* (2.424) 
Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Only the 
unstandardized coefficients for campaigning variables are shown.  
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The coefficients for Conservative opposition candidates are more striking, with clearly 
negative results for all election years except 1987. In the three elections spanning 1997 to 
2005, low level campaign spending by Conservative opposition candidates was significantly 
related to a drop in the party’s vote share. Whereas in 1997, running such a campaign cost 
the Conservatives 2.25 percentage points of their vote share, in 2005 low level campaigns 
caused a drop of 4.91 percentage points in Conservative vote share. In 2001, when the 
Conservatives began to run more targeted campaigns than in previous elections, running low 
level spending campaigns in safe constituencies reduced Conservative vote share by 5.40 
percentage points. Marginality also has a greater impact on the relationship between low 
level campaigns and Conservative vote share for opposition candidates than incumbents. 
Running such campaigns in constituencies with previous majorities of 20 percentage points 
and above led to a consistently more detrimental impact on Conservative vote share than 
constituencies with lower majorities. Both the incumbent and opposition candidate 
coefficients for the Conservatives are negative in four elections (1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010) 
during the period, all of which offers good evidence that low level campaign spending by the 
Conservatives, particularly by opposition candidates since 1997 has a negative impact on 
party vote share. 
There are fairly similar results for the impact of low level campaign spending by Labour 
candidates. For incumbent Labour candidates, only two of the six elections show coefficients 
in the expected direction, with low level spending by Labour incumbents leading to a drop in 
Labour vote share of 2.33 and 3.45 percentage points in 1992 and 2005 respectively although 
only the latter is significant. Marginality has an interesting impact upon the relationship 
between low level incumbent campaigns and Labour vote share, with such campaigns having 
an increasingly detrimental impact as constituencies become more marginal. This is 
particularly strong in both 2005 and 2010 and may indicate more defensive campaigning by 
the party. There is a clear difference between the impact of low level campaign spending by 
Labour incumbent and opposition candidates; the coefficients for which reflect the expected 
results more closely. Indeed, in 1997, 2001 and 2010, low level campaign spending by 
Labour opposition candidates has reduced Labour vote share. In 2010, such campaigning 
significantly reduced Labour vote share by 4.85 percentage points. In this case, marginality 
clearly affects the impact of low level campaigns by Labour opposition candidates on party 
vote share. Consistently over the period, the safer a constituency becomes, the greater the 
detrimental impact of such campaigns on Labour vote share.  
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For the Liberal Democrats, Denver et al. (2004) saw the largest reductions in party vote 
share, a finding partly supported by the results in table 7.6. For Liberal Democrat 
incumbents, in 1992, 1997, 2005 and 2010 the coefficients are in the expected direction, 
although none are significant. Marginality has little consistent impact upon the relationship, 
although in 1997 there was a detrimental impact which increased as constituencies became 
safer. In contrast, at the 1992, 2005 and 2010 elections, the greatest negative impact of low 
level campaigns were seen in more marginal seats. The results for low level spending by 
Liberal Democrat opposition candidates are more consistent, with all coefficients, except 
1992, negative indicating that such campaigns had a detrimental impact on the party’s vote 
share. Of these five opposition coefficients, two (1997 and 2010) are significant, with the 
largest in 1997 when if a Liberal Democrat opposition candidate spent at a low level, the 
party’s vote share was significantly reduced by a considerable 14.34 percentage points. This 
is a substantial decrease in vote share for opposition candidates indicating that low level 
spending campaigns by Liberal Democrat opposition candidates have a significant negative 
impact on Liberal Democrat vote share. Indications suggest that, in four of the elections, 
such campaigns have a greater impact on Liberal Democrat vote share when they are run in 
constituencies with previous majorities of between 10 and 15 percentage points, than in seats 
where it is 20 percentage points and above. However, it appears that this did not hold in 
2010, where the detrimental impact of low levels of campaigning grew as constituencies 
became safer. 
Relatively few of the results in table 7.9 are significant, which is disappointing, but perhaps 
understandable when using a strict model measuring the direct impact of low level 
campaigns, and more detail is revealed by the interaction terms. Unlike the previous chapter 
which used a binary variable combining the levels of campaigning by the top two parties to 
examine the impact of low level campaigns on turnout, the model in table 7.8 only measures 
campaigning by the party whose vote share is being examined. Potentially the impact of low 
level campaigns on party vote share is not being accounted for by the model which could 
explain the lack of significant results. However, alternative models controlling for spending 
by other parties in the constituency were found to make no difference to the results. 
Despite the lack of significant results, an interesting pattern may be observed in the direction 
of the coefficients. From 1997 onwards, there is a shift from predominantly positive results, 
to more negative results. This coincides with an upsurge in strategic campaigning. It may be 
that in the earlier elections, negative results are not observed as often because there was less 
disparity in attention paid to constituencies of different marginalities, yet by 2010 when 
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incumbents and opponents of all three parties ran low level campaigns, they reduced their 
party’s vote share in a constituency. In short, low level campaigns may often have a 
detrimental impact on party vote share, particularly for the local opposition parties, but this 
impact is not necessarily a significant one.  
To examine the impact of low level canvassing by opposition and incumbent candidates, the 
regression models were rerun, this time with variables measuring the proportion of the 
constituency covered by both doorstep and telephone canvassing at all elections over the 
period.   
Table 7.10: Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of low level 





















.476 (.343) -.171 (.568) -1.083 (1.043) -2.257 (1.171) 









Note – relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Only the 
unstandardized coefficients for campaigning variables are shown. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. 
A summary of the unstandardized coefficients for each of the canvassing variables is 
displayed in table 7.10. As previously there is a lack of significant results, which could once 
again be attributable to the strictness of the model. The coefficient for low level doorstep 
canvassing campaigns run by Conservative incumbents is not in the expected direction; it 
appears that such campaigns actually increased Conservative vote share, although not 
significantly. This could be attributed to the strong local Conservative associations in their 
safe constituencies which, despite the low level of doorstep canvassing being conducted by 
the party, guaranteed a certain level of Conservative support. The coefficient for low levels 
of doorstep canvassing by Conservative opposition candidates is negative, although once 
again not significant. However, the interactions reveal that the detrimental impact of such 
campaigns on party vote share increases the safer the constituency, reflecting the findings for 
campaign spending. The results for low levels of telephone canvassing are a little more 
promising, with coefficients for both Conservative incumbents and opposition candidates 
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implying that such levels of campaigning are detrimental to Conservative vote share, 
although not significantly in either case. Once again, as constituencies become safer, the 
negative impact of low level campaigns grows. 
For Labour, the results for the impact of low level canvassing by opposition candidates on 
the party’s vote share fit more closely with expectations. The coefficients are negative for 
opposition candidates for both doorstep and telephone canvassing, although once again 
neither is significant and marginality does not interact with either. For incumbent candidates 
low levels of doorstep canvassing had a positive but insignificant impact on Labour vote 
share, no matter the constituency marginality. For incumbent and opposition Liberal 
Democrat candidates, low level doorstep canvassing led to a reduction (albeit insignificant) 
in the party’s vote share, which was not affected by the interaction of marginality. This is 
echoed by the findings for the impact of low level telephone canvassing by the party’s 
candidates, with opposition candidates running such campaigns seeing a significant drop of 
8.94 percentage points in their vote share. 
While the relationship between low levels of campaigning and reductions in vote share is not 
always as expected, clear trends can be seen in the tables. Firstly, low level campaigning by 
opposition candidates is more likely to have a significantly detrimental impact on the party’s 
vote share. This fits with the findings of chapter five which made clear that there was a 
disparity between opposition and incumbent candidate campaigning in safe constituencies, 
with opposition candidates running much lower level campaigns. Compared to the boosts in 
vote share seen when examining the continuous measures of campaigning, when low levels 
of campaigning are identified, they often have a much larger effect on vote share of several 
percentage points. It would appear that the detrimental impact of low level campaigns is not 
confined to a single party, with significant negative values for all three parties present. In 
many cases, the analysis has indicated that low level campaigning in safe constituencies, 
particularly by opposition candidates, reduces vote share; safe constituencies remain 
uncompetitive, with opposition parties increasing the gap between themselves and the 









With the increasing interest in the effectiveness of intense constituency campaigning, this 
chapter has explored what happens when parties run comparatively low level campaigns in 
safer seats. By firstly understanding party vote share and then by exploring reasons for 
stability and volatility, this chapter has maintained the multivariate model from the previous 
chapter with slight modifications. This was used to test the relationship between low level 
campaigns and vote share decline implicitly; the results indicated that campaign spending in 
particular was effective in raising vote share, so by extension lower levels of campaigning 
would either increase vote share less or even decrease it.  
To measure this explicitly, the measure identifying low levels of campaigning developed in 
chapter five from an existing measure by Denver et al. (2004) was entered into the model 
instead. In many cases there is a clear negative relationship, with low level campaigning 
reducing a party’s vote share, particularly when that party is in opposition. Low levels of 
spending offers a more persuasive case for the detrimental effect of low level campaigning, 
and there are significant differences once the incumbency position of the candidates is 
factored in. Compared to the earlier part of the period, low levels of campaign spending by 
opposition candidates can often reduce party vote share, and this effect is not confined to a 
single party. Rather, there is a spread of significant results across all parties, although the 
most significant results can be seen for the Liberal Democrats. Ironically for a party which 
targets its campaign resources carefully largely out of necessity, the Liberal Democrats 
suffer the most from spending at low levels.  Comparing these results to the findings of 
chapter six, it would appear that low levels of campaigning have a more harmful impact on 
vote share than on turnout, with a far higher proportion of significant negative effects 
observed in the present chapter. The results were clear; low level campaign spending by 
opposition candidates is often harmful to party vote share. The negative impact is also 
greatest in the safest constituencies. Parties need to win seats to win elections, and to win a 
convincing victory they need to be able to win safe constituencies, yet by running low level 
campaigns, they make the job even more difficult. Campaigning matters; where it is lacking, 
it can be harmful.  
The next chapter introduces a new measure to the study of constituency campaigning in the 
UK for the first time: leader visits. Such visits are widely publicised and reported, but there 
has been no extended study into the effect these visits have on constituency outcomes. Using 
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original data from 2010 it investigates whether leader visits were effective in increasing 
voter turnout and party vote share, reflecting the dimensions of local electoral outcomes 




Leader Visits at the 2010 General Election 
 
 
Party leaders in the UK spend much of the short election campaign – at significant cost to 
campaign finance and campaigning time - travelling around the country visiting 
constituencies, accompanied by a media and PR entourage. These visits ‘almost guarantee 
extended local and state media coverage’ (Holbrook, 2002:60) which can be seen clearly in 
reports of the 2010 election (see Beckford, 2010). While the potential effectiveness of party 
leaders during election campaigns encompasses many aspects, from television appearances 
(Bartels, 1993), to their importance in the campaign (Stevens, Karp and Hodgson, 2011), 
there has been no study of the impact of visits made by party leaders in boosting 
constituency results in the UK. This despite some evidence from the United States 
(Holbrook, 2002) and Canada (Carty and Eagles, 2005; Mintz, 1985) which suggests that 
such visits are ‘a valuable resource for the ground level mobilisation efforts of local 
organisations and their candidates’ (Carty and Eagles, 2005:99) and often boost party vote 
share. Of course, much electioneering takes place in local constituencies irrespective of 
whether they are visited by a party leader, and this thesis has explored the impact of 
spending and canvassing. In contrast, the potential of leader visits to affect local electoral 
outcomes is largely neglected in the study of local campaigns. During UK election 
campaigns, only a minority of constituencies are visited, which leads to the question of why 
party leaders bother visiting at all. Journalists collecting (incomplete) data on leader visits at 
the 2010 election were only able to conclude that ‘there may be sound psephological 
reasoning behind concentrating on certain areas over others’ (Torpey and Sax, 2010), but this 
chapter is the first to examine leader visits during UK election campaigns in detail. 
It begins by situating leader visits within existing literature on campaigning and leadership 
effects, and explores the studies exploring leader visit effectiveness from Canada and the 
USA. The frequency of leader visits and the type of visit strategies deployed during the 2010 
election campaign are investigated, alongside a typology of constituencies the three leaders 
visited. Drawing on the existing literature on campaign effectiveness, the chapter develops 
and tests three hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of leader visits. Echoing the studies 
conducted in the preceding two chapters of this thesis, this chapter is a case study of the 
effectiveness of this new campaigning in boosting the two dimensions of local electoral 
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outcomes used previously (party vote share and voter turnout) by analysing original data 
collected during the 2010 general election campaign. As such, and in order to ensure that the 
conclusions of this chapter are comparable to those of the previous two chapters, a common 
model has been retained; by using this the effectiveness of leader visits in boosting both 
voter turnout and party vote share both overall is explored. 
 
The political context of leader visits is examined, looking at the influence of incumbency, 
which as seen in chapter five has a dramatic impact on campaign levels. To examine whether 
the pattern of leader visits is reflective of a party’s electoral strategy (Bélanger, Carty and 
Eagles, 2003:450), the data will be analysed to uncover both the campaign context (such as 
the geography and date of the visits) and the political context (which party holds the 
constituency visited, constituency marginality) of leader visits.  
 
Leader visits and campaigning 
 
Some research indicates that leaders are increasingly important in contemporary elections, 
due to partisan dealignment, weakening of party resources and growth of the mass media. 
Although research is limited, what little there is suggests that leaders have an impact on the 
results, with leader effects in the UK proving ‘sufficient to alter the balance of votes by a 
few percentage points’ (Graetz and McAllister, 1987:502), while in 1987 leaders had 
‘sizable effects’ (Stewart and Clarke 1992:447) on vote choice. In the US, campaign 
appearances by presidential candidates on television have been positively correlated with 
their resulting vote share (Shaw 1999), whereas campaign events such as conventions and 
debates, which are deemed to generate interest are credited with moving public opinion polls 
up to 1.86 percentage points during the 1988 presidential election (Holbrook, 1996). 
Campaign events, particularly those involving leaders appear to have an effect on election 
results.  
While the existing literature on leader visits is limited to a few studies, there is support for 
their effectiveness. Mintz (1985), in one of the earliest investigations of leader visit 
effectiveness found that in the 1972 Canadian election, a visit by a party leader caused an 
‘above average change in the support level for that party’ (Mintz, 1985:53). Likewise, 
Holbrook suggested in his examination of the whistle-stop presidential campaign of 1948 
that ‘for every stop [Truman] made in a state he garnered .248 percentage points more of the 
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vote than would otherwise have been expected’ (Holbrook, 2002: 63). Focusing on the 2000 
federal election in Canada, Bélanger, Carty and Eagles (2003), found leader visits to be 
effective in increasing vote share, although this was small, at half a percent or below per 
visit. In a later, more detailed study of the same election, Carty and Eagles (2005) discovered 
that leader visits were effective in increasing the vote share for three of the five parties 
standing. Despite the relative lack of research into leader visits, there is positive evidence 
from most that leader visits can have a positive effect on party vote share. 
 
Demonstrating the effect of leader visits is one thing. A separate body of work seeks to 
demonstrate why leader visits might matter. One interpretation comes from the view of 
campaigns as information campaigns. Leader visits act as a provider of information to the 
constituency population; not only by those seeing the leader in person, but also reading about 
it in the press. These visits may act as an endorsement of the local candidate and draw the 
attention of the population to particular aspects of the local campaign. By providing 
information (Matsusaka, 1995) on party policies and (implicitly perhaps) on local candidate 
positions, leader visits lower the cost of participation for potential voters. The heightened 
attention in the local media to visits can also link the local contest to the national one, 
bringing local issues to national debates, thereby giving substance to elections for the local 
electorate. A visit to a constituency can therefore reduce the cost to voters of obtaining 
information and can make them more likely to vote. Visits are likely to enhance the standing 
of the local candidate - Carty and Eagles identify in particular the effect of visits by the 
incumbent Prime Minister visiting a constituency in ‘creat[ing] an impression of the local 
candidate’s personal proximity to the Prime Minister’ (2005:103-104).  
 
In comparison to vote share, the effectiveness of leader visits upon local turnout has been 
unstudied despite there being direct theoretical evidence that leader visits, under the remit of 
local campaigning, can positively affect turnout. Existing research, has provided good 
empirical evidence that local campaigning is effective in increasing local turnout and that 
local campaigns are more than the meaningless rituals that Butler and Kavanagh (1988) 
suggest. Fisher and Denver (2009), for example, examine the effect of campaigning on 
turnout over the 1992 to 2005 period finding that traditional methods in particular had a 
positive effect upon turnout. Similarly, Denver and Hands (1997b) in their study of the 1992 
election found that campaigning did have an effect, with local campaigning raising turnout 
by 2.9%. However, despite this evidence linking campaigning and turnout, to date the 
potential impact of leader visits upon turnout has remained unstudied. This chapter tests 
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three hypotheses: i) leader visits boost constituency turnout, ii) leader visits boost party vote 
share and iii) visits by governing leaders are less effective than those by opposition leaders. 
These hypotheses enable a more holistic picture of the potential effects of leader visits to be 
formed. 
 
If leader visits have the potential to affect whether people vote and how they vote, then the 
fact that they have remained relatively unstudied leaves something of a conceptual gap, 
particularly if they can be classified as elements of campaigning. After all, leader visits 
certainly fit well into Holbrook’s (1996) definition of campaign events alongside 
conventions and debates, as they are ‘directly related to the campaign, generate mass media 
interest and create a direction of effect (influencing opinion in favour of one candidate).  
Leader visits can be interpreted as part of the local campaign within the UK context, acting 
as ‘one of the ways in which a party’s national campaign can intersect with and reinforce the 
ground war waged by partisan activists at the grass roots.’ (Bélanger et al., 2003:440). 
Despite the fact that leader visits fit well under the remit of local campaigning, they have 
been largely neglected in the existing literature, leaving a gap in the understanding of 
campaigns. 
 
Leader visits can make a difference to both public opinion and party vote share. However, 
there has been no stand-alone study of the effectiveness of leader visits as part of the local 
campaign during a UK general election campaign. That the studies conducted in Canada 
have examined leader visits within a parliamentary system suggests that their techniques 
may be adapted in the examination of the same phenomena in the UK. The chapter also 
introduces new elements to the examination of leader visits which represents a real 
innovation. This study is the first to draw on Carty and Eagles’ (2005) research into the 
spillover effects of leader visits and the model has been adapted to better fit the UK context. 
The effectiveness of leader visits has also been disaggregated beyond the overall relationship 
by looking at relative effectiveness according to constituency incumbency and the stage of 







Leader visits in 2010 
 
Notwithstanding the increased attention given by parties and media to leader visits, they 
remain the exception rather than the rule. While the vast majority of constituencies (78%) 
were not visited by any of the leaders, 143 constituencies were visited at least once, which 
makes the study of such visits interesting; when so few seats are visited, there may be 
common characteristics amongst those that are visited, making it possible to discern visit 
strategies. Of those constituencies that were visited, the vast majority were visited once, 22 





These figures do not identify which leaders visited the constituencies; looking more closely 
at the frequency of visits made in table 8.1, all three leaders visited 10% or fewer 
constituencies during the election campaign. Gordon Brown made the highest proportion of 
visits, managing 63 over the short campaign, of which three of these were visited twice. 
David Cameron made slightly fewer visits (56 in total), although he made the highest 
proportion of repeat visits to six constituencies in total. Nick Clegg made the fewest visits of 




Table 8.1: Frequency of visits by individual party leaders to constituencies 
 
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630 
Note: n in parentheses. 
                                                          
12
 Birmingham Ladywood was the only constituency visited three times during the 




 April) and once by Gordon Brown on 
30
th
 April. The seat and its predecessors had been occupied by Claire Short since 1983; she 
retired prior to the 2010 election. The constituency was an ultra-safe Labour seat with a 
notional previous majority of 23.23 percentage points and had been in almost continuous 
occupation by the party sine the Second World War.  
 
 David Cameron Gordon Brown Nick Clegg 
No visit 
91.1 (575) 90.0 (568) 92.6 (584) 
1 visit 
7.9 (50) 9.5 (60) 7.1 (45) 
2 visits 
1.0 (6) 0.5 (3) 0.3 (2) 
Total 




The frequency of leader visits is an interesting point to investigate; it is possible that the 
visits may have some cumulative effect by maintaining local interest in the campaign and 
confidence in the local candidate, as well as lowering information costs further. Repeated 
visits to constituencies could be attributed to a variety of factors, such as the marginality of a 
constituency or fluctuations in local results. Exploring those constituencies that were visited 
twice (table 8.2), some common themes can be observed. Divided according to census 
regions, the highest frequency of repeat visits were made to the North West and Greater 
London; the latter is perhaps unsurprising due to the locational convenience to many media 
outlets and party headquarters. These seats were also typically held by Labour, with over 82 
percent held by the party going into the election, and largely based in large conurbations 
such as Manchester, Birmingham and Liverpool, with a mean previous majority of 14.34 
percent. 
 
Table 8.2: Number of times each region visited by each party leader  
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Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630 
Note: n of repeated visits in parentheses 
 
David Cameron’s repeat visits were predominantly to constituencies in the North West, 
Yorkshire and the West Midlands, not traditional sources of Conservative support, although 
he also made two visits to his home constituency (Witney) in the South East. This focus on 
areas with historically strong support for Labour is also supported by five of the six repeat 
visits David Cameron made to Labour-held constituencies; indeed if you exclude Witney all 
his repeated visits were to constituencies held by Labour. Similarly, both repeat visits made 
by Nick Clegg were to Labour-held constituencies (Glasgow North East and Liverpool 
244 
 
Wavertree). Gordon Brown only made three repeat visits to Hammersmith, Manchester 
Central and Westminster North, all of which were held by Labour going into the 2010 
campaign. Interestingly it was not necessarily the most marginal constituencies that were 
visited repeatedly; rather the previous majorities of the constituencies visited multiple times 
by the leaders ranged from 5.05 to 38.36.  
Both David Cameron and Gordon Brown appeared to be operating very similar geographic 
strategies, making the highest proportion of their visits to Greater London (12 and 13 visits 
respectively), followed by the West Midlands (9 and 10). Nick Clegg on the other hand made 
the highest proportion of his visits to constituencies in Yorkshire (8), which could be 
attributed to his representation of a constituency in the county. He made two visits to 
constituencies in Sheffield (one of which was Sheffield Hallam, his home constituency) 
although he also made significant numbers of visits to the West Midlands (7), the North 
West (6) and the South West (6). There was a massive concentration of effort on English 
constituencies, with all three leaders visiting Scotland twice (albeit in one case Gordon 
Brown was visiting his home constituency). All three leaders also visited their own 
constituencies, with Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath and 
Sheffield Hallam) visiting once, and David Cameron (Witney) visiting twice. This echoes 
the patterns seen in the constituencies visited twice by the leaders; the areas visited are 
generally sources of Labour support (although the Liberal Democrats are traditionally strong 
in the South West). 
Carty and Eagles (2005) found that the nationally incumbent Liberals included the entire 
country in their visit strategy in 2000 while the other parties focussed on specific areas. In 
the case of the UK in 2010, whilst Gordon Brown (as the incumbent Prime Minister) did 
indeed make visits to a higher proportion of UK constituencies as a whole, reflecting Carty 
and Eagles’ findings, the two opposing parties also made wide-ranging visits. This more 
even spread in the data for the UK than Canada is likely to be attributable to the size 
difference between the two countries– it is far more difficult in terms of resources and time 
for the Canadian Prime Minister to visit more widespread constituencies.  
There were considerable restrictions unique to the 2010 campaign on where the leaders could 
visit, particularly with the introduction of the leader debates. The Sunday prior to Election 
Day is also typically restrictive for leader visits due to media commitments in and around 
London. On these days all party leaders made single visits to constituencies in the same 
general geographic location as their obligation, so to an extent leaders were geographically 
restricted by the leader debates, but the fact that all three leaders made a single visit on the 
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day of the campaign implies careful targeting and maximisation of such restrictions rather 
than a random visit.  
It is interesting at this point to consider what exactly were providing the ‘dramatic visual 
backdrops’ (Carty and Eagles, 2005:99) for leader visits; to understand what the party 
leaders were doing in constituencies when they visited, the descriptions of the visits made at 
the time of data collection were sorted into seven categories ranging from visits to local 
businesses to charity visits. The visits were then divided according to party leader, with the 
results shown in table 8.3. There were some difficulties in the codification, for example it 
was not possible to codify an ‘education’ category; the purpose of a party leader visiting a 
school is very different to visiting a university (the main difference being the proportion of 
voters). While these initial codifications are an interesting subject for future analysis, they 
were complicated by the majority of visits being dual-purpose. 
Table 8.3: Leader visit categories in 2010 
 David Cameron Gordon Brown Nick Clegg 
Business 13 (22.81) 17 (26.98) 8 (17.02) 
School 6 (10.53) 6 (9.52) 4 (8.51) 
Social/community 
services 
3 (5.2) 7 (11.11) 2 (4.26) 
Charity visit/event 2 (3.51) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Healthcare services 6 (10.53) 1 (1.59) 3 (6.38) 
Further education 5 (8.77) 4 (6.35) 7 (14.89) 
Meet and greet 2 (3.51) 8 (12.70) 1 (2.13) 
Other 19 (35.09) 20 (31.75) 22 (46.81) 
Total 56 63 47 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630. Note: % of each 
leaders visits indicated by each category in parentheses. 
 
For all three parties, visits to business premises represented the highest proportion of visits 
with a single category allocation, comprising at least 17.02% of each leader’s visits to all 
constituencies. Some of these were local businesses (Nick Clegg made a visit to a small 
business in Bradford East on 13
th
 April) whereas others were local sites of national 
companies (on 7
th
 April Gordon Brown visited the headquarters of Innocent Smoothies in 
Hammersmith). For David Cameron, visits to school and healthcare services comprised the 
next largest percentage at 10.53%, followed by further education. However, the three next 
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largest proportions of Labour’s visits after business are completely different – meet and 
greets comprising 12.70%, followed by visits to social services and schools. Nick Clegg’s 
second most common visit type was to Further Education institutions which made up 
14.89% of his allocated visit total, drawing on the growth of Liberal Democrat popularity 
amongst university students due to their pledge to the National Union of Students to oppose 
tuition fee increases. Despite all subsequently elected Liberal Democrat MPs signing the 
pledge, it was abandoned within months of the Coalition (Prince and Porter, 2010). The link 
between the pledge and motivations to visit universities during the election campaign was 
drawn by Harriet Harman MP who accused Nick Clegg of ‘hawk[ing] himself around 
university campuses pledging to vote against tuition fees. By the time Freshers' week was 
over, he had broken his promise’ (Hansard, 2010).   
 
Placing leader visits in political context 
 
While the analysis so far has given some indications in regards to the frequency and 
geography of leader visits during the 2010 campaign, this section considers the political 
context of leader visits. An examination will be made of the frequency of visits by party 
leaders according to the stage of the campaign, disaggregating the data both daily and 
weekly. The relationship between constituency marginality and the likelihood of a visit will 
be examined with the expectation that marginal constituencies are most likely to be visited 
by leaders. The incumbency and battleground status of seats visited is also explored to 




The date of each visit was recorded during data collection, making it simple to identify the 
point in the campaign each visit was made, with table 8.4 disaggregating the data on a 
weekly basis. Instead of counting weeks from the date that campaigning commenced, full 
calendar weeks have been followed for simplicity. Therefore, the short campaign comprised 
five calendar weeks, with the first week of campaigning ran from Tuesday 6th April to 










Nick Clegg Total 
Week 1 10 8 8 26 
Week 2 12 12 11 35 
Week 3 10 11 8 29 
Week 4 11 14 9 34 
Week 5 13 18 11 42 
Total 56 63 47 166 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N=630 
Three full weeks followed before a fifth three-day campaigning week prior to Election Day 
on Thursday 5
th
 May. By examining the stage of the campaign at which visits are made, a 
sense can be gained of the growing momentum of the campaign towards the final week of 
campaigning. A heavy concentration of visits by all three leaders in the final three-day week 
of campaigning can be seen, with David Cameron making visits to six constituencies in the 
North of England and the Midlands the day prior to Polling Day alone; his highest daily 
frequency of the campaign. Interestingly, the most visits made by all three leaders during one 
day of campaigning (15 in total) were made on the Sunday prior to Election Day, with 
Gordon Brown making nine visits to London constituencies. This is likely to be due to the 
restrictions imposed by the round of the media outlets (based in London) on this day. 
David Cameron and Gordon Brown visited at least one constituency on every day of the 
short campaign, while Nick Clegg made visits on all but four days (three of which were at 
weekends), which indicates the importance of leader visits for parties. The frequency of 
visits for all three leaders peaked in the fifth week, with Gordon Brown visiting the most (18, 
compared to 13 for David Cameron and 11 for Nick Clegg). Whilst the range of visits over 
the first four weeks of campaigning is nine, the more intense campaigning of the final three-
day week increases the range to 16. In the final week, 42 visits were made by the party 




 of May alone.  
 
Marginality and leader visits 
 
 
Marginality is central in this thesis, with parties increasingly targeting their resources 
towards marginal constituencies. In considering leader visits as an alternative 
operationalisation of campaigning, the likelihood of a constituency being visited by the 
leaders would also be expected to be significantly related to constituency marginality. The 
concentration on marginal constituencies persisted during the 2010 campaign, with Fisher, 
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Cutts and Fieldhouse (2011) finding a clear link between marginality and levels of 
campaigning. Marginality is also linked to leader effects, with Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) 
observing that a single percentage point increase in closeness increases efforts made by 
leaders.  
Carty and Eagles (2005) drew initial links between marginality and leader visits, finding that 
the three longest established Canadian parties at the 2000 election were most likely to visit 
safer constituencies, whereas the only party that visited a higher proportion of marginal 
constituencies (Bloc Quebecois) did badly in the results. Holbrook’s research into Truman’s 
campaign (2002:62) also discovered that closeness held for both Dewey and Truman’s visits. 
Following this existing evidence, and coupled with the wider literature on the association 
between campaigning and marginality, leaders should be more likely to visit marginal 
constituencies. A cross tabulation was produced (table 8.5) between the five categories of 
marginality and a binary variable for each leader indicating if they had visited a 
constituency. The binary leader visit variable did not, of course, account for multiple visits, 
only indicating that the constituency had been visited at least once during the campaign.  















5 (8.9) 12 (21.4) 14 (25.0) 11 (19.6) 14 (25.0) 56 
Gordon 
Brown 
18 (28.6) 14 (22.2) 8 (12.7) 11 (17.5) 12 (19.0) 63 
Nick Clegg 10 (21.3) 14 (29.8) 6 (12.8) 9 (19.1) 8 (17.0) 47 
Total 33 40 28 31 33  
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N=630 
Note: figures refer to n of visits with percentage of leader’s visits in parentheses. 
 
If the expectation that leaders were more likely to visit marginal constituencies is to be 
confirmed, a concentration of visits by the party leaders in the ultra-marginal and fairly 
marginal categories should be observable. The table roughly supports this relationship, but 
David Cameron visited comparatively few ultra-marginal constituencies. It also reveals that 
the two categories of constituency representing the largest proportion of his leader visits 
(50% in total) were made to fairly safe (those with majorities of 10 to 14.99%) and ultra-safe 
constituencies (majorities of 20% and above). This does not appear to support the 
hypothesised relationship between marginality and visit likelihood, especially as his lowest 
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proportion of visits (8.9% of the total) were made to ultra-marginal constituencies where the 
highest figures might have been expected. The relationship does appear to be supported for 
Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg, as for each leader their highest proportions of visits were 
found in ultra-marginal and fairly marginal seats. Whereas Gordon Brown paid most his 
visits (28.6%) to ultra-marginal constituencies, Nick Clegg made the highest proportion of 
his visits (29.8%) to fairly marginal constituencies.  
While the table offers mixed support for the association between marginality and leader 
visits, to examine whether these differences were significant, four independent sample t-tests 
were conducted, with the results shown in table 8.6.  
Table 8.6: T-test results comparing previous majority with leader visits 
















20.43 (12.56) 6.643** 279.480 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N=630 
The grouping variables were the binary variables indicating visits by party leaders, as well as 
a binary variable measuring whether any leader had visited; the test variable in each case was 
the constituency majority at the previous election. In every scenario, the previous majority 
varied significantly between constituencies visited by the leaders and those that were not 
visited. In all cases the direction of this significant difference was as expected, with visited 
constituencies having a significantly lower average previous majority than those not visited. 
Even the non-party specific measure of whether a constituency was visited by any leader has 
highly significantly different means. The results include the leader’s visits to their home 
constituencies, all of which are safe, with majorities of 27.68% (Witney), 43.5% 
(Cowdenbeath and Kilmarnock) and 16.17% (Sheffield Hallam); interestingly, for those 
constituencies visited, the standard deviations of the means were smaller than for those 
constituencies not visited. The results are remarkably similar between the parties, with the 
mean previous majority of constituencies visited ranging from 12.75 (for Labour) to 14.97 
(for the Conservatives); for those constituencies not visited the mean previous majorities are 
even closer, ranging from 19.28 to 19.58. It would therefore appear that constituency 
marginality is significantly related to visit likelihood, with constituencies receiving visits 




Defensive and offensive targeting 
 
Canadian party leaders typically visited constituencies that they already held (Carty and 
Eagles, 2005); the one party (Bloc Quebecois) that did not do so at the 2000 election did 
badly. Defensive and offensive leader visits can be identified according to constituency 
incumbency, with defensive visits counted as those in which the constituency was held by 
their own party, and offensive visits as those not held by that leader’s party. Applying this to 
the 2010 UK election, a defensive strategy might be expected from Labour, with the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats adopting offensive strategies to gain seats and thereby 
gain power. To explore this, a crosstab between party incumbency going into the 2010 
campaign (based on either actual or notional results) and visits made by the three leaders was 
conducted, with the results in table 8.7. 
 














8.93 (5) 80.36 (45) 10.71 (6) 0 56 
Gordon 
Brown 
7.94 (5) 87.30 (55) 3.17 (2) 1.59 (1) 63 
Nick 
Clegg 
14.89 (7) 59.57 (28) 25.53  (12) 0 47 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N=630 
Note: figures refer to percentage of leader’s visits with n in parentheses. 
 
These strategies are confirmed by the results, with the Conservatives operating a clearly 
offensive visit strategy to constituencies held by other parties (91.07% of David Cameron’s 
total visits). Of these visits, 80.36% were to Labour-held constituencies. An offensive 
strategy is also evident on the part of the Liberal Democrats, albeit on a slightly lesser scale. 
Nick Clegg visited seats where the Liberal Democrats were not the incumbents for 74.16% 
of his visits. A striking contrast can be seen for Gordon Brown, who visited Labour-held 
seats for 87.30% of all his visits, indicating a clear defensive strategy. Clearly an offensive 
strategy is less possible for the leader of a party with a large majority. Of the three party 
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leaders, Gordon Brown was the only leader to visit a constituency held by a minor party; this 






The analyses into the local political context and leader visits so far has demonstrated that 
defensive and offensive strategies can easily be discerned from the data and that the lower 
the percentage majority going into the 2010 election, the more likely a constituency was to 
be visited. To look in more detail at the local political context of constituencies visited by 
party leaders, the data have been codified according to their battleground status; enabling the 
identification of the parties in first and second place. Battleground constituencies are 
marginal seats (Gimpel, Kaufmann and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2007); the key difference 
between the two classifications is that battleground seats detail which parties are in 
contention, whereas marginal constituencies quantify the distance between the two. 
Although these data had been included in the dataset covering 1992 to 2005 (Norris 2009) 
that formed the basis for the dataset constructed for this thesis, the later dataset covering 
2010 (Norris 2010) did not; therefore battleground codification was added in. To explore 
types of battle (or competition) in constituencies visited in 2010, a cross tabulation was run 
against the binary variable codifying whether each leader had visited the constituency or not.  
 
Table 8.8: Battleground status of constituencies and leader visits 
 
 David Cameron Gordon Brown Nick Clegg 
 No visit Visit No visit Visit No visit Visit 
Con/Lab 25 0 24 1 25 0 
Con/LD 15 0 15 0 11 4 
Lab/Con 44 14 38 20 58 0 
Lab/LD 5 0 3 2 1 4 
LD/Con 13 2 15 0 12 3 
LD/Lab 7 0 6 1 5 2 
3 way marginal 39 1 33 7 29 11 
Other 5 0 4 1 5 0 
Safe 422 39 430 31 584 23 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N=630 
Note: figures refer to percentage of leader’s visits with n in parentheses. 
 
By enabling us to identify parties in second place, these results offer more detail than table 
8.7. Looking firstly at David Cameron’s visits, the offensive strategy can still clearly be 
seen. The highest number of visits made by David Cameron to battleground constituencies 
were to Labour seats where the Conservatives were in second place, followed by 
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constituencies where the Conservatives were second to the Liberal Democrats. The 
Conservatives also concentrated their efforts on safer constituencies, with David Cameron 
visiting the highest proportion out of the three leaders, indicating an expansionist strategy – 
to gain enough seats for a parliamentary majority it was vital that the Conservatives could 
gain safer constituencies. As indicated previously, a markedly different strategy can be seen 
in Gordon Brown’s visits; he made the highest number of visits to Labour-held seats where 
the Conservatives were in second place, echoing David Cameron’s concentration on this seat 
type, but from a defensive instead of an offensive position. Of the 22 Labour-held marginal 
constituencies visited by Gordon Brown, 20 of those were where the Conservatives were in 
second place, indicating that the threat posed by the Conservatives was perceived of as 
greater than that of the Liberal Democrats. The battleground status of seat most likely to be 
visited by Nick Clegg were three-way marginal constituencies; equally with four visits each 
were constituencies where the Liberal Democrats were in second place to both Labour and 
the Conservatives. The only other constituency type that was visited were Liberal Democrat-
held marginal constituencies; the spread of visits across battlegrounds is also markedly more 
even than for the other parties. 
Not all constituencies are visited, and this section has explored key characteristics of those 
that were. While visit frequency remains fairly constant throughout much of the campaign, 
there is a distinct increase over the final weekend and last week of the short campaign; 
Gordon Brown visited nine (geographically close) constituencies in a single day alone! 
Visited constituencies were also significantly more marginal than those which were not 
visited. Strategies can be seen in the pattern of visits, with David Cameron and Nick Clegg 
concentrating the majority of their visits on constituencies held by other parties, whereas 
Gordon Brown operated a distinctively defensive strategy, concentrating largely on Labour-
held seats. So far, the new data collected has enabled the first detailed picture of leader visits 
made during an election campaign in the UK to be created; however the data do not yet tell 
us anything about whether leader visits are effective, if at all. This requires the use of a 
model incorporating the data on leader visits alongside other variables. 
 
 
The effectiveness of leader visits 
 
Leader visits are widely reported in the media, whether national or local, during the election 
campaign and it is via this exposure that leader visits, like the other forms of campaigning 
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explored so far in this thesis, have the potential to have an effect on constituency outcomes. 
This reporting, particularly in the local media, increases the amount of information provided 
to voters in the constituency by the campaign, enabling undecided voters to vote and 
mobilising existing supporters. While the limited existing literature has concentrated solely 
on the impact of visits by party leaders upon their party’s vote shares, this chapter reflects 
the dual dimensions of local electoral outcomes used in this thesis by also considering the 
potential impact of leader visits on boosting constituency turnout. This section models and 
tests the impact of leader visits in raising both vote share and turnout; as leader visits are 
here being presented as an addition to existing measures of campaigning, their effect on 
these two variables will be modelled in the same way as in the previous two chapters.  
 
Data on leader visits during the 2010 campaigns were collected at the constituency level, 
which provides a detailed view of where the leaders have visited, but disperses the data more 
widely than if examining visits per county or region. This means that, as seen in table 8.1, 
during the 2010 general election only 22% of constituencies were visited at all, and the vast 
majority of those that were visited were only visited once: the data are not distributed 
normally. To counter this skew, binary measures indicating whether each of the three leaders 
had visited a constituency were used. These are the independent variables of the model, with 
measures of both vote share and turnout as the dependent variables. Here the multivariate 
models created in the previous two chapters are brought together; by retaining these models 
leader visits are treated in the same way as the spending and activity measures used 
previously in this thesis, making the results comparable. 
 
As a reminder, the model contains two sets of variables which have links to variations in 
both vote share and turnout; one set controlling for the political context in constituencies, 
and the other controlling for the social context. The first control is constituency marginality, 
to isolate the impact of the visits from the independent effect of marginality on the dependent 
variable. The second control variable is a continuous measure of the career tenure of the 
local incumbent. The third control is an interaction term between leader visits and 
marginality, and the fourth is a previous measure of the dependent variable. Four socio-
demographic variables were also included to control for the proportion of retired people in 
the constituency, the percentage of owner occupiers, routine workers and migrants; all of 




One slight modification was made to the models used in previous chapters by including a 
control for average campaign spend in the constituency to isolate the effect of leader visits 
from the rest of the campaign. There is good evidence (see chapter seven) that party 
expenditure at the constituency level is effective in increasing party vote share. However, no 
existing studies of leader visits include any additional measures of campaigning other than 
the visit variable. Although there are many shortcomings in the sole application of campaign 
spending (see Gordon and Whiteley 1980 for an account), it is the only measure of 
campaigning  available for the 2010 election that can be attributed to specific constituencies. 
A measure of the average spend by the three main parties was entered into the equations to 
control for other campaign activity, as if party spending is positively related to party vote 
share, then it follows that it can depress the vote share of other parties. The appropriateness 
of including the average spend control instead of spending measures specific to parties was 
tested by two pilot models; in all three cases, the model which incorporated the average 
spending measure had higher adjusted r-square figures. An interaction term between average 
spend and marginality was also controlled for, as per the previous models. 
 
The effectiveness of leader visits in boosting constituency turnout was explored by running 
the regressions with turnout at the 2010 election as the dependent variable, and three binary 
measures (one for each of the three individual leaders) as the independent variables (run 
together to control for the effects of visits made by other leaders), controlling for the political 
and social context. For the vote share models run for each party, the dependent variable 
became the 2010 vote shares for that party and the control variables were re-entered into the 
equation.  In the place of previous turnout a specific control for the notional or actual vote 
share for the party under examination at the 2005 election was entered. The results of the 
four models summarised in table 8.9 indicate a good explanatory power for all three leaders 
in both turnout (85.1%) and vote share (83.7%-94.8%). None of the binary leader visit 
variables boost constituency turnout when controlling for all other factors; indeed the 
unstandardized coefficients for visits made by all three leaders are negative. These results 
would appear to reject the hypothesis that leader visits, even those made by the national 
opposition leaders have a positive effect on voter turnout. David Cameron’s visits had the 
greatest negative impact in ultra-marginal constituencies: of those he visited, all were held 
by Labour. In contrast, Gordon Brown’s visits reduced turnout most in ultra-safe 
constituencies, which were held almost exclusively by his own party. Of the three leaders, 
Nick Clegg’s visits reduced turnout the least, yet in constituencies where the previous 















Marginality .015 (.020) -.044 (.032) -.035 (.049) -.019 (.040) 
David Cameron 
visit 
-.366 (.307) 1.495** (.474) -.390 (.714) -2.143** (.605) 
Gordon Brown 
visit 
-.290 (.302) .356 (.466) .341 (.710) -.929 (.597) 
Nick Clegg visit -.238 (.351) -.639 (.554) -.061 (.818) 2.667** (.712) 
Average spend .031** (.010) .006 (.015) -.009 (.023) .009 (.019) 
Career tenure -.013 (.010) .003 (.015) .011 (.023) -.014 (.019) 
Marginality/spend 
interaction 
-.001 (.000) .000 (.001) .000 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Owner .071** (.013) .043* (.021) -.326** (.028) .117** (.023) 
Retired -.168** (.042) -.124* (.062) .025 (.098) .076 (.081) 
Routine -.440** (.037) .199** (.059) -.513** (.092) .117 (.071) 
Migrants -.157** (.037) .001 (.057) -.482** (.087) .427** (.074) 
Previous 
turnout/vote share 
.614** (.022) 1.004** (.014) .932** (.020) .842** (.019) 
Adjusted r
2
 .851 .948 .902 .837 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
The table also shows the unstandardized coefficients for the regressions between party leader 
visits and the effect they have on their party’s vote share at the 2010 general election, 
controlling for visits made by other leaders. As hypothesised, the relationship between a 
party’s leader visiting the constituency during the campaign and that party’s 2010 vote share 
is positive for all three parties, although only significant for the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats. 
 
For the Conservatives, in a constituency visited by David Cameron, the party’s vote share 
increased 1.49 percentage points, a significant rise against those constituencies which were 
not visited. This increase was particularly steep in ultra-safe constituencies. In seats visited 
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by David Cameron, not only did the Conservatives see a boost in their vote share, but there 
was a significant reduction in Liberal Democrat vote share of 2.14 percentage points, 
particularly when the seat was ultra-marginal. 
 
The Liberal Democrats received a significant boost to their vote share from Nick Clegg’s 
visits of 2.67 percentage points, and the coefficients for other parties indicate that his visits 
also reduced vote share for both the Conservative and Labour in these constituencies, 
although neither is significant. The boost in Liberal Democrat vote share was not consistent 
across constituency marginalities, however, and was far lower in constituencies with 
majorities of 20 percentage points and above. Despite the coefficient for the impact of 
Gordon Brown’s visits on Labour vote share being positive (although far smaller than that 
for the two other leaders) the value was not significant. The positive impact of his visits grew 
the safer constituencies became, although this reduced once the previous majority of a 
constituency had risen above 20 percentage points. His visits fractionally increased 
Conservative vote share, but depressed Liberal Democrat vote share, although neither value 
is significant. It would appear from these results that leader visits were indeed effective in 
increasing party vote share – as long as you were not Gordon Brown.  
 
 
Leader visits and neighbouring constituencies 
 
It is possible that leader visits also have an impact outside a constituency’s boundary. Carty 
and Eagles (2005) argue that the impact of leader visits to urban ridings has a spillover effect 
into neighbouring (adjacent) ridings (the Canadian equivalent of constituencies). When a 
party leader had visited a riding, they recorded 0.5 of a visit to the neighbouring ridings as 
more than one riding ‘is likely to feel the impact of the resulting media coverage’ (Carty and 
Eagles, 2005:103). However, they did not analyse these data in detail. As such, data on 
leader visit spillover in the UK were collected for the 2010 election, but this time they have 
been tested in a multivariate model to examine their impact on party vote share. Each visit to 
a neighbouring constituency was registered as 0.5; these constituencies were identified using 
the interactive map available on the BBC Constituency Finder (BBC, 2010b), and 
cumulative scores were calculated for individual leaders.  
Rather than limiting spillover to neighbouring urban constituencies as Carty and Eagles do, 
spillover scores for both rural and urban constituencies have been calculated. This is because 
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the UK is small in comparison to Canada, and therefore the potential reach of spillover to 
neighbouring constituencies in rural areas is likely to be far greater. To examine the 
effectiveness of leader visit spillover in boosting vote share in neighbouring constituencies, 
the model used in table 8.9 was rerun, this time with the continuous measure of the 
cumulative visit spillover by each leader as the independent variable. 









Marginality -.049 (.032) -.048 (.047) .013 (.040) 
David Cameron 
spillover 
.761* (.339) -.373 (.500) .291 (.436) 
Gordon Brown 
spillover 
-.039 (.349) -2.013** (.514) .899* (.449) 
Nick Clegg spillover .157 (.448) -.356 (.659) .521 (.577) 
Average spend .005 (.015) -.014 (.022) .020 (.019) 
Career tenure .004 (.015) .017 (.022) -.025 (.020) 
Marginality/spend 
interaction 
.000 (.001) .000 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Owner .042* (.021) -.345** (.028) .137** (.024) 
Retired -.132* (.063) -.027 (.097) .121 (.083) 
Routine .221** (.060) -.584** (.093) .157* (.073) 
Migrants .004 (.057) -.524** (.085) .472** (.075) 
Previous vote share 1.007** (.014) .941** (.019) .868** (.019) 
Adjusted r2 .948 .905 .832 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
David Cameron’s visits had a significant impact on Conservative vote share in neighbouring 
constituencies even when controlling for spillover visits by other leaders. The coefficients in 
table 8.10 reveal that for every visit made by David Cameron, the Conservatives received a 
significant boost of .761 percentage points to their vote share. His visits also boosted Liberal 
Democrat vote share and reduced Labour vote share in neighbouring constituencies, but not 
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significantly. It is interesting to note that the coefficient for David Cameron’s spillover visits 
is a dampening of the coefficient measuring the direct impact of leader visits in table 8.9. It 
is possible that this is a result of counting the visits as 0.5, or that the effect is actually 
halved. 
In contrast to table 8.9, Gordon Brown’s visits do not reflect the pattern seen in the direct 
measure. While visits by Gordon Brown made no significant impact on Conservative vote 
share in neighbouring constituencies, the results in table 8.10 indicate that his visits 
significantly reduced Labour vote share in these constituencies. For every spillover visit 
recorded, Labour vote share in neighbouring constituencies dropped by 2.01 percentage 
points. It is possible that this is an effect of which parties were holding the constituencies; if 
neighbouring constituencies to Gordon Brown’s visits tended to be Conservative-held this 
could explain the drop. In total, 73 Conservative constituencies recorded at least one 
neighbouring visit from Gordon Brown, with one constituency having three. In contrast, 
Labour held 140 neighbouring constituencies to Gordon Brown’s visits, a factor enhanced by 
Gordon Brown’s visits being made largely to urban constituencies with plenty of opportunity 
of spillover. Possibly the Labour leader’s visits just did not travel well. Visits by Gordon 
Brown also boosted Liberal Democrat vote share in neighbouring constituencies with a 
single visit leading to a rise of .899 percentage points. Surprisingly, considering the 
significant impact Nick Clegg’s visits had on vote share in constituencies visited, his visits 
had no significant impact on any party’s vote share in neighbouring constituencies.  
As this is the first time that the impact of leader visits in neighbouring constituencies has 
been examined, there are a few issues in regards to these conclusions. Firstly, visit spillover 
may not be neatly confined to adjacent constituencies; Carty and Eagles collected data on 
visit spillover in relation to the potential of media coverage in neighbouring constituencies. 
As a modification, perhaps the geography of visit spillover in the UK should be based on the 
coverage of local media (regional news, local newspapers etc.).  Also, the allocation of 0.5 to 
spillover constituencies seems a little arbitrary; it assumes that a visit to a neighbouring 
constituency has half of the effect of a constituency visit; in reality the impact of spillover 
may vary. The concept of campaign spillover and how far it extends is difficult and requires 
further study; however as an initial investigation into its potential impact these results do 





The effectiveness of differing campaign strategies 
 
The data on leader visits have so far demonstrated that the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats conducted offensive leader visit campaigns, in comparison to the more defensive 
strategy adopted by Gordon Brown. These differing strategies were of course necessitated by 
the different national positions of each party – Labour were the nationally incumbent party 
holding the greatest number of constituencies, whereas the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats needed to conduct a more offensive campaign to place themselves closer to 
power. By isolating the incumbency of constituencies visited according to which party held 
the seat going into the 2010 campaign (notional figures were used where boundary changes 
had applied), the relative effectiveness of these strategies can be contrasted.  
The same controls as used in testing the overall effectiveness of leader visits were re-entered 
into the regression, with the unstandardized coefficients for the leader visit variables and the 
adjusted r
2
 figures for each model represented in table 8.11. Some caution should be taken in 
reading the results as splitting the data according to incumbency reduces the n for each 
regression. As such, the margin of error is increased, particularly in the case of the Liberal 
Democrats, who held 62 constituencies prior to the 2010 election. In constituencies held by 
the Conservatives, visits made by both David Cameron and Gordon Brown boosted 
Conservative vote share, although neither was significant. This implies that in such 
constituencies, Gordon Brown’s visits may have helped to consolidate Conservative support 
in reaction. This is reflected by the impact of visits to Conservative constituencies on Labour 
vote share. Once again, when David Cameron visited these constituencies, the Labour vote 
share increased, albeit insignificantly. Nick Clegg’s visits to these seats indicate that his 
visits significantly reduced Conservative vote share. The effect of visits on Liberal Democrat 
vote share in these seats is interesting. When David Cameron visited a Conservative-held 
constituency, he significantly reduced Liberal Democrat vote share by 3.57 percentage 
points, whereas Nick Clegg significantly boosted his own support in Conservative-held seats 






Table 8.11: Leader visit coefficients for linear regression model examining the 











David Cameron  .602 (1.493) 1.688 (1.392) -3.566*(1.647) 
Gordon Brown  .736 (1.517) 1.386 (1.410) -2.659 (1.653) 
Nick Clegg  -2.463 (1.295) -.961 (1.236) 4.350** (1.453) 
Adjusted r
2
 .617 .837 .781 
Labour-held 
David Cameron  1.598** (.488) -1.093 (.808) -1.294* (.617) 
Gordon Brown  .602 (.464) -.007 (.784) .021 (.586) 
Nick Clegg  -1.048 (.718) .179 (1.102) 3.632** (.913) 
Adjusted r
2




David Cameron  2.149 (2.210) .917 (1.297) -2.766 (2.700) 
Gordon Brown  .812 (3.601) -.737 (2.059) -.375 (4.392) 
Nick Clegg  .339 (1.904) -.810 (1,088) .564 (2.344) 
Adjusted r
2
 .835 .944 .204 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients for the selected variables only with 
standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
In Labour-held constituencies, David Cameron’s visits significantly boosted Conservative 
vote share by 1.6 percentage points, whereas Nick Clegg’s visits significantly boosted his 
party’s vote share by 3.62 percentage points. Once again there is evidence of David 
Cameron’s visit effectiveness coming at the expense of Liberal Democrat vote share, with 
his visits to Labour-held constituencies significantly reducing Liberal Democrat vote share 
by 1.29 percentage points. Unluckily for Gordon Brown, visits to constituencies held by his 
own party not only made no significantly difference to his party’s vote share, but the 
coefficient is slightly negative.  
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Lastly, looking at the effectiveness of leader visits in Liberal Democrat-held constituencies, 
no party leader’s visits had a significant impact on any party’s vote share. Nick Clegg’s 
visits to his own constituencies, like the other two party leaders, did not significantly boost 
the party’s vote share. This lack of significant results for visits to constituencies already held 
by the leader’s parties is interesting and suggests that defensive campaign visits are less 
effective. Unfortunately for Gordon Brown, the majority of his visits were to Labour-held 
constituencies, which might help explain why his visits have had an insignificant effect 
throughout this chapter. In contrast, visiting constituencies held by other parties not only 
boosts the visiting leader’s vote share, it can also help to decrease the vote share of other 
parties. Of the three parties, the Liberal Democrats ran the most effective leader visit strategy 
in terms of raising vote share. A visit by Nick Clegg to Conservative and Labour-held 
constituencies raised Liberal Democrat vote share by between 3.6 and 4.3 percentage points 
respectively. David Cameron’s visits proved to be significant in raising Conservative vote 
share only in Labour-held constituencies, with a visit increasing Conservative vote share by 
1.59 percentage points. However, even in Labour-held constituencies, visits by David 






Leaders have become an important element of modern election campaigns in the UK, 
perhaps increasingly so with the adoption of leader debates.  They make often highly-
publicised visits to constituencies throughout the election campaign, and this study is the 
first to use substantial data to explore the impact of such visits in the UK, taking cues from 
existing research in Canada and the USA. Most constituencies are not visited at all, while 
those that are visited are typically more marginal and visits increase in frequency as Election 
Day draws closer. The patterns of leader visits reveal distinctive strategies, with Labour 
adopting a defensive pattern of visits while the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats made 
the majority of their visits to constituencies held by other parties. Exploring the effectiveness 
of leader visits on boosting both turnout and vote share, the results were mixed, with visits 
                                                          
13
 Two further disaggregations of leader visit effectiveness were also investigated: their 
effectiveness according to the marginality of the constituency and the stage of the campaign 
when the visits were made. Very few significant results were observed, so the analysis was 
excluded from this chapter. 
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making no significant impact on constituency turnout, but visits by David Cameron and Nick 
Clegg significantly boosting their respective party vote shares. 
Disaggregating the leader visits according to the local incumbent party, the results have 
demonstrated that electoral rewards for these parties came from their visits to Labour-held 
constituencies. Offensive visits appear to be more effective than Labour’s defensive strategy, 
although it should be taken into account that even if Labour had adopted an offensive pattern 
of leader visits, it is questionable whether Labour would have reaped the same rewards; a 
matter which would require further testing in a range of circumstances. Nevertheless there is 
a great deal of scope for the future study of leader visit effectiveness, not only in 
Westminster elections, but also in the devolved institutions of the UK. 
This is only the first substantial investigation into the effectiveness of leader visits on local 
electoral outcomes in the UK and offers plenty of scope for future research. This analysis has 
the potential to be repeated during future election campaigns and to be expanded to 
incorporate other party leaders. It would be interesting to incorporate Plaid Cymru and the 
SNP into the general election analysis (controlling of course for where they stand), but there 
is also potential to explore the effectiveness of leader visits in elections to the Welsh 






This thesis has explored whether low levels of campaigning in safe constituencies had a 
harmful effect on local electoral outcomes between 1987 and 2010. Intense campaigning in 
marginal constituencies has a positive effect on turnout and vote share. This can be extended 
to examine whether less intense campaigns have a harmful impact. The first of three sub-
hypotheses engaged with marginality, drawing on two alternate arguments explaining its 
origin; looking firstly at the role of class support, and secondly at population stability. The 
second hypothesis considered the role of marginality in affecting levels of campaigning; as 
part of this question a new way of measuring relative levels of campaigning was developed. 
The final sub-hypothesis considered the impact that low levels of local campaigning had on 
local electoral outcomes, which also measured the effects of a new campaigning variable. By 
considering the implication of party leader visits for the first time in the UK, the thesis 
makes a clear and complementary contribution to the existing literature. 
This conclusion considers the findings of the analysis contained in the previous chapters, 
concentrating on the contributions made in understanding marginality as a concept, drawing 
a link between marginality and campaigning, and providing an alternate view of the impact 
of low level constituency campaigns. All analysis is considered within the theoretical and 
empirical literature, as introduced in chapter two. The chapter ends by reflecting upon key 
avenues for future research. 
 
Summary of key findings 
 
Class offers a better explanation of the origins of marginality than population 
stability 
 
Marginality is an increasingly important concept in studies of British elections, with parties, 
the media and researchers being drawn to marginal constituencies. In rational choice theories 
of voter behaviour, marginality is an important concept affecting the cost and benefit 
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calculations associated with voting. As Downs (1957) explores in the key study of rational 
choice theories of voter behaviour, marginality plays an important role in the voting decision 
by affecting the likelihood of casting the crucial vote. It is a source of variety in 
constituencies, and the investigation of the first sub-hypothesis in chapter four engages with 
the causes of such variation. While the origins of marginality have been hinted at in existing 
research (Denver, Hands and McAllister 2003), this thesis creates a substantive examination 
of the concept originating from population characteristics.  
Drawing on two theoretical explanations linking social groups and marginality, chapter four 
investigated the first sub-hypothesis of this thesis, breaking it down into two nested 
hypotheses which examine the role of i) traditional party support bases and ii) population 
stability as explanatory factors for marginality. Beginning with theories of party support, the 
chapter argued that constituency marginality relied upon the proportion of social groups with 
traditional ties to particular parties. The most immediate tie between social groups and 
political parties in the UK is class, which despite a degree of partisan dealignment of the 
1960s onwards (Franklin, 1985), continues to remain an important explanatory variable in 
UK voter behaviour.  The clearest ties are between routine workers and Labour, and 
professional workers and support for the Conservatives. By arguing that higher proportions 
of these groups result in safer constituencies for the respective parties, this chapter clearly 
links population characteristics and marginality. The chapter compared traditional 
occupational measures of class and the proportion of owner-occupiers to support for the 
three largest parties over the entire 1987 to 2010 period. The results indicated that traditional 
bases of class support are important explanatory factors in determining constituency 
marginality. While the hypothesis works well for the Conservatives and Labour, it is less 
powerful for the Liberal Democrats. As an alternative, the chapter applies Putnam’s (1966) 
theory of population stability to investigate whether stability of the local population is a key 
determinant of marginality. The link between the two concepts is appealing; marginality is 
fundamentally based on the likelihood of (seat) change, with clear indications that marginal 
seats were significantly more likely to change hands than safer constituencies. Where the 
local population is unstable it is less possible to build up strong sources of support for 
parties, making a constituency more likely to be marginal.  
In practice, there is a clear mismatch between this intuitively appealing application of 
Putnam’s theory to the UK context, as the sources of stability clash with party support in the 
UK. Particularly problematic is the inclusion of the proportion of owner occupiers as an 
indicator of stability; the argument being that this group have invested in the constituency 
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and are less likely to move than those who rent. Yet this clashes with the findings of the 
previous hypothesis examining class indicators as the origins of marginality: owner 
occupiers were significantly associated with lower levels of support for Labour. However, 
the party has consistently held very safe constituencies; including the safest constituency at 
all six elections. There is also a fundamental question raised in equating safe constituencies 
with stability; as chapter four demonstrated, even in seats where there have been no 
boundary changes, marginality changes often.  
Of these two potential explanations for the origins of constituency marginality, the presence 
of traditional bases of party support offers a more convincing foundation than population 
stability in the UK. Safe Conservative constituencies have higher portions of professionals, 
whereas safe Labour constituencies are more likely to have higher proportions of routine 
workers. Yet despite socio-demographics explaining elements of marginality, they offer only 
a partial picture of why some constituencies are marginal. Understanding why some 
constituencies are more or less marginal than others is important in understanding not only 
how their marginality may evolve, but also how best to campaign in them.  
 
Safe constituencies see lower levels of campaigning, with incumbency 
playing a central role 
 
Exploring the hypothesis that constituency marginality affects the level of campaigning in a 
constituency, chapter five argues that the two are clearly linked, with measurably lower 
levels of campaigning in safe constituencies This echoes and extends existing literature on 
the subject by drawing on four measures of campaigning to investigate the link: campaign 
spending, doorstep canvassing, telephone canvassing and leader visits. There is much 
evidence that levels of constituency campaigning vary across the period, with growing 
standard deviations, indicating that there is some disparity in constituency campaigning. 
Drawing on existing literature, the most likely explanation for this is marginality. Although 
there has long been a link between marginality and levels of campaigning, there has been an 
increase since 1997 when Labour won a landslide victory with a campaign targeted on key 
marginal seats. Campaigning in such constituencies has received a great deal of attention 
with members being bussed to neighbouring constituencies and specifically targeted election 




To explore the link between low levels of campaigning and safe constituencies, two 
approaches were taken. The first was an implicit association, exploring the links between 
marginality and continuous measures of campaigning (those which were available for 
multiple elections): the results demonstrated two sets of relationships. Firstly, as the previous 
majority of a constituency rose, overall campaign spending declined. Disaggregating this by 
party proved interesting, with Labour’s defence of their landslide victory impacting their 
targeting capabilities and the increasing concentration of Conservative campaign strategy on 
marginal constituencies from 2001 onwards. Marginality also significantly affects overall 
levels of canvassing in constituencies; when disaggregating telephone and doorstep 
canvassing by party, the results indicate that marginality significantly affected telephone 
canvassing by the Conservatives and Labour. Chapter eight also indicated that there were 
significant differences in marginality between constituencies visited and those that were not 
for all party leaders, with marginal constituencies most likely to be visited. As constituencies 
become more marginal, levels of campaigning increase, echoing the findings of existing 
research. By extension this provides implicit support for the second sub-hypothesis that safer 
constituencies see less campaigning.   
The fifth chapter also considered the role that local incumbency plays in affecting the 
relationship between marginality and campaigning, finding clear differences between 
incumbent and opposition candidates. Incumbent campaigning is often less affected by 
marginality than opposition campaigning, even in safer constituencies. However, there were 
significantly lower levels of campaign spending by opposition candidates in marginal and 
safe constituencies, with the most significant falls in ultra-safe constituencies. When using 
the explicit measure identifying low levels of campaigning, there was a clear link between 
the incumbency status of the local candidate and the amount of campaigning they conducted, 
with opposition parties significantly more likely to run low level campaigns than 
incumbents. 
A clear contribution that this thesis has made to existing literature examining the relationship 
between marginality and campaigning is the refinement of an explicit low level campaigns 
measure. This originated in a study by Denver, Hands and McAllister (2004), but has been 
modified in this study, not only building on the findings in regards to variations in campaign 
levels between parties, but importantly taking local incumbency positions into account. 
Building on the basic quartile-based measure of levels of campaigning from the earlier study, 
modifications were made by producing party-specific measures of relative levels. More 
importantly, and building on earlier findings, I have made an innovative adjustment to the 
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measure by incorporating incumbency. This enables the identification of relative levels of 
campaigning according to whether a candidate was the incumbent or in opposition, 
eliminating the underestimation of opposition campaign levels. Such a measure offers a way 
to actively identify constituencies which are receiving relatively low levels of campaigning; 
although continuous measures work well, they give little indication of the relative levels of 
campaigning between constituencies and parties.  
The case study of leader visits made during the 2010 general election in chapter eight also 
reveals how incumbency altered the relationship between marginality and campaigning. The 
chapter was able to disaggregate leader visits into distinctly defensive and offensive patterns. 
The results clearly show that Gordon Brown was operating a series of defensive visits to 
Labour-held constituencies whereas the two other leaders were focusing their visits on 
constituencies not held by their parties. This application of a measure to the UK context for 
the first time offers an important insight into the strategy involved in contemporary 
campaigning.  
 
Low level campaigns can be harmful 
 
The third sub-hypothesis explored the impact of low levels of campaigning on local electoral 
outcomes, operationalised as turnout and party vote share. This extends the conventional 
hypothesis in constituency campaigning studies, which focus on the effectiveness of intense 
campaigns. Campaigning matters, and the analysis demonstrates that where it is at a low 
level (i.e. in safe constituencies), it often reduces turnout and vote share. Chapters six, seven 
and eight explored this by using the available campaigning variables alongside the explicit 
measure identifying low levels of campaigning developed in chapter five. In this my thesis 
marks a departure from existing studies by considering what happens when campaigning is 
relatively lacking, in contrast to existing studies which look at impact of intensity. Yet my 
thesis also complements these studies by clearly demonstrating that campaigning matters; 
indeed it matters so much that in constituencies where parties campaign at a relatively low 
level it can often have a harmful impact on turnout and vote share figures. 
As previously, the impact of low level campaigns was explored both implicitly through the 
use of continuous measures of campaigning, and explicitly using the measure of low levels 
of campaigning. The implicit study echoes existing literature by examining the effectiveness 
of intense campaigning on outcomes, but is interpreted in a different way by extending it; if 
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intense campaigning boosts turnout and vote share, then a relative lack of campaigning may 
reduce it.  
Chapter six analysed the effect of campaigning on turnout, with indications that in many 
cases campaigning boosts turnout. This was extended in chapter eight by exploring the 
effectiveness of leader visits in boosting levels of turnout, a progression from existing 
studies which have so far only considered their role in boosting vote share. If, as the studies 
suggest, such visits can boost vote share, then the mechanisms may act in the same way to 
boost turnout, bringing the constituency campaign to the attention of local voters. However, 
it appears that this is not the case, with none of the leaders making a significant impact on 
turnout through their visits, regardless of incumbency. 
As part of the explicit examination of the impact of low level campaigns on vote share and 
turnout, the measure of low level campaigns was utilised. For turnout, although not many of 
the results were significant, there were negative results in the majority of elections for low 
level spending campaigns run by both incumbent and opposition, although the results were 
less persuasive for the two canvassing variables. Incumbency once again is central, 
mediating in the relationship between campaigning and turnout when either the incumbent or 
opponent spent at a low level. When such campaigns were run by opposition parties, there 
was a more significant impact on turnout than when incumbent spend at a low level. 
When exploring the impact of campaigning on vote share, a rise in campaigning had a 
significant impact on at least one party’s vote share at each election during the period. 
Opposition candidates who ran low level campaigns had a greater negative impact on their 
party’s vote share than when incumbent candidates ran such campaigns. This was echoed by 
the results of the examination of the effectiveness of leader visits in boosting party vote 
share, with significant boosts received from visits by David Cameron and Nick Clegg. No 
leader made a significant impact on their party’s vote share in constituencies they already 
held, whereas offensive visits reaped electoral rewards for David Cameron and Nick Clegg. 
It would appear that offensive leader visits are more effective in boosting party vote share 
than defensive visits, with Gordon Brown’s largely defensive campaign showing no 
significant impact on Labour vote share at all. Comparing the impact of campaigning on vote 
share with the results from turnout, there are clear indications that low levels of campaigning 
have a greater negative impact on vote share than turnout. 
By exploring the potentially detrimental impact of low levels of campaigning on local 
electoral outcomes, this thesis adds to the literature by explicitly engaging with the full 
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impact of constituency campaigning. It not only considers what happens when parties 
campaign intensely, but also what happens in safer seats when they do not. This has 
implications on research and party electoral strategy in three respects. Firstly, it presents a 
case for researchers to consider what the impact of the increasing redirection of resources to 
marginal constituencies is on other constituencies. Secondly, it integrates the new variable of 
leader visits into constituency campaigning studies in the UK, situating it alongside 
conventional measures of campaigning. Lastly, there are implications for political parties in 
future elections, drawing attention to the harmful effect that low level campaigning has on 
their own vote share in safer constituencies, but also on voter turnout. While there have been 
many strategies to boost turnout, it may be that campaigning slightly harder in safe 
constituencies helps. 
 




Care has been taken to produce conclusions that are both reliable and valid from the analysis 
conducted here. All conclusions in regards to the three thesis sub-hypotheses have only been 
drawn from carefully constructed multiple regression models. Although bivariate 
relationships have been run in each chapter, they have served as a way of identifying valid 
control variables and thereby increasing the explanatory power of the multivariate models. 
 
The multiple regression models have been produced from testing alternative relationships 
suggested by literature, and extensive trials were conducted to ensure that they provide the 
best possible account of the relationship between the independent and dependant variables. 
The inclusion of control variables is also central to the internal validity of the conclusions 
(Yin, 2003) and as hypothesised causality cannot be estimated directly using statistical tests 
(Cook and Campbell, 1979; Popper, 1972) these variables eliminate plausible rivals. In 
incorporating controls into the regression equation two aims must be counterbalanced; 
controlling for sufficient variables for the causal relationship to be established, and 
producing the most parsimonious model. To address these two aspects, all control variables 
were correlated with each other and any with correlations over .60 were removed.  
 
 
Internal validity is clearly demonstrated by the clear delineation of cause and effect 
throughout this thesis. The conclusions of this thesis offer validity at the face level because 
270 
 
it follows the example of other authors in the field of constituency campaigning (Fisher and 
Denver, 2009) by beginning with an initial study into the variable of interest before moving 
on to trialling alternative multiple regressions. Following the example of Fisher and 
Denver’s article, many alternative regressions were considered prior to the final model, but 
only the results for the final version have been displayed for reasons of space. The reliability 
of the conclusions appears good for two reasons; accuracy and coverage.  To improve the 
accuracy of the data, extensive data cleaning was conducted prior to analysis. This is 
particularly important as it allowed the identification of any erroneous results which may 
have occurred particularly in the case of data sources which were typed into SPSS. Typing 
errors were identified at the point of data collection by running frequencies and descriptive 
analysis on each variable; this identified several errors which were easily checked and 
rectified, enhancing the accuracy of the data.  Lastly, the results of the data analysis are a 
reliable foundation to base the thesis conclusions on because data are used from a range of 
data sources.  
 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
The first key limitation has been the availability of data from the party agent surveys. This 
thesis uses data from three party agent surveys which took place after the 1992, 1997 and 
2001 general elections. However, data were available for five out of the six elections over 
the period, but there were issues of access and constituency attribution. The data from the 
2005 party agent survey were, unlike the surveys for other years, not available on the Data 
Archive. To obtain the data for this year the project organisers were contacted, but were not 
forthcoming. The data for 2010 were available on the Data Archive, but only in a format that 
did not identify which constituency the data pertained to, making it impossible to reconcile 
with the existing dataset. Again, the survey organisers were contacted, but there was no 
response. This has some implications for the study, as party agent data on canvassing was 
only available for three of the six elections. As a result, the main focus of the study was 
shifted to campaign expenditure which was available throughout the period, with the 
canvassing variables as additional sources for those years for which they were available. 
Leader visits have not been explored in any depth in the UK context. The data used in 
chapter eight are the first comprehensive account of such visits to constituencies during UK 
election campaigns, influenced by several existing studies in the USA and Canada. 
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However, space and time considerations have meant that in the present study, leader visits 
have been examined only as part of the 2010 election campaign. There is the potential to 
research leader visits historically in party and newspaper archives to build a more 
comparative set of data on leader visits. It may be that the 2010 campaign was unique in that 
expansionist leader visits had a significant impact on party vote share, and it will be 
interesting to examine the role that electoral context plays in altering the impact of leader 
visits in future campaigns. Data collection will be repeated in 2015, with the intention of 
forming a more comparative study over time, including sourcing historical data.   
A key limitation of this study has been the inconclusiveness of many of the findings, which 
may be attributed to two factors: direct effects and simplicity of the model. Firstly, the 
measure of relative levels of campaigning in this thesis has been created as a binary variable 
which only examines the direct impact of such visits. It is possible that this is not the most 
effective way of measuring low level campaigns. As an alternative option rather than using 
the binary measures indicating low levels of campaigning as the independent variables in the 
regression models, they could be used as filters. By filtering the data in this way, continuous 
measures of the campaigning variables could be retained. As an example, a dataset could be 
created which pulls out all constituencies with Labour opponents running low level spending 
campaigns; this is accomplished by using the relevant binary low level campaign measure 
(LOQ1). Consequently, a regression model can be run in this dataset, but with continuous 
measures of campaigning (here spending) as the independent variable. 
Lastly, this thesis could have explored in more detail the implications of low levels of 
campaigning in different categories of safe constituencies. There are five categories of 
marginality, and when levels of campaigning are examined across them, there is a 
significant drop in campaigning in ultra-safe seats. However, the regression models 
exploring the impact of campaigning on local electoral outcomes have not disaggregated the 
impact of low level campaigns according to these categories. An avenue for future research 








Recommendations for future research 
 
The present study offers three clear directions for future research: refinement and repetition 
of the campaign neglect measure, an examination of the reasons for continued campaigning 
in safe constituencies and repetition of the leader visit study. All would substantially increase 
not only the understanding of local campaigning in the UK, but also contribute to electoral 
strategies. This study has been the first to engage in depth with the issue of campaign neglect 
and examine the potential impact it has across multiple elections. The measure of low levels 
of campaigning as has been proposed here is a refinement of an existing measure, but there is 
the potential to adapt it further or alter it completely. One alternative may be the further 
distillation according to the five categories of marginality to measure relative levels of 
campaigning in constituencies from ultra-safe to ultra-marginal. There is certainly potential 
in the measure, but whatever adaptations are introduced, incumbency should remain a 
significant element. 
The evidence presented here has also indicated that campaigning in safe constituencies is 
significantly lower than that in marginal constituencies, and can be potentially harmful when 
at a low level, particularly for opposition candidates.  As Pattie and Johnston (2003b) argue, 
a concentration of resources on marginal seats is a rational distribution. After all, parties 
have limited resources and by concentrating them on those (marginal) constituencies which 
are most likely to change hands, they maximise their returns. Yet parties still expend 
resources in safe constituencies – even the very safest ones. A key area which could be 
progressed is the consideration of the motivations for continued campaigning in the safest 
constituencies.   
There are three directions for future research into continued campaigning by incumbents; the 
first being security. Parties may continue to spend because they need safe constituencies as 
the backbone of their vote. Campaigning motivates existing supporters, and whilst there is 
not such urgency to do this in safe constituencies as there is in marginal constituencies, 
continued campaigning can maintain the vote. The second strand is the exploration that such 
campaigning is a result of resources: incumbent parties in safe constituencies are likely to 
have higher numbers of party members than in marginal constituencies, so more traditional 
methods (lost cost forms – i.e. doorstep canvassing) of campaigning are continued in safe 
constituencies simply because the capacity is there. Finally, continued campaigning may be 
conducted as part of maintaining party (and candidate) prestige and avoiding high profile 
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casualties at election time. To sufficiently test these theories, further qualitative analysis 
would have to be conducted, but they offer some ideas for the rationale behind campaigning 
in safe seats. 
The study of leader visits represents an exciting opportunity for future research, as this study 
is the first time it has been collected nationwide and analysed in detail.  It would be easily 
replicable during future election campaigns, with a future study by the author to collect new 
data in 2015 and compare visit effectiveness over the two elections. In time this data will 
accumulate, enabling longitudinal studies of leader visit effectiveness; data could even be 
gathered historically by using party archives. It could also be extended to cover more parties, 
perhaps examining the effectiveness of leader visits by leaders of the Scottish National Party 
or Plaid Cymru during general election campaigns. There is also the potential to extend the 
analysis to other electoral contexts, perhaps examining the effectiveness of leader visits 
during Scottish Parliamentary or Welsh Assembly election campaigns. This is a flexible 
variable with the potential to be explored in a variety of contexts, offering a great deal of 
scope for future research. 
Constituency campaigning is effective; with this thesis supporting this by considering what 
happens when parties run relatively low level campaigns. The detrimental impact on both 
vote share and turnout may not appear large, but in an era of public disengagement with 
politics and low turnout, small factors can make a difference. After all, even safe seats are 
vulnerable – with more than fifty ultra-safe constituencies changing hands over the 1987 to 
2010 period, causing some high-profile casualties (such as Michael Portillo in 1997). It is 
perhaps ironic that consistent evidence has demonstrated the effectiveness of opposition 
campaigns, yet this thesis has shown it is the opposition who are most likely to run low level 
campaigns in safe constituencies and to negatively impact local electoral outcomes. If 
opposition parties continue to neglect safe constituencies, their vote share is likely to decline. 
If the top two parties neglect safe constituencies, turnout will often fall. Either way, 
campaigning is effective and elections can be unpredictable. Resources have been redirected 
away from safe constituencies, with no real understanding of the potential harm this can have 
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Appendix 1:  
Descriptive statistics for canvassing variables 1992-2001 (page p130) 
 1992 1997 2001 
Doorstep canvassing 
Mean 30.53 21.98 18.59 
Maximum 66.33 60.00 63.33 
Minimum 1.67 .00 .00 
Standard Deviation 14.79 14.36 12.31 
Telephone canvassing 
Mean - 14.67 7.44 
Maximum - 36.67 38.67 
Minimum - 1.67 .00 
Standard Deviation - 10.20 8.28 













Tukey post-hoc ANOVA testing of campaigning measures and marginality categories 
(table 5.4, p140) 
Campaign spending 
 Mean Difference Standard Error 
Ultra-marginal   
Fairly Marginal 1.741 1.101 
Fairly Safe 5.151** 1.084 
Very Safe 8.841** 1.072 
Ultra-safe 17.488** .877 
   
Ultra-marginal -1.741 1.101 
Fairly Marginal   
Fairly Safe 3.410* 1.066 
Very Safe 7.100** 1.054 
Ultra-safe 15.747** .855 
   
Ultra-marginal -5.151** 1.084 
Fairly Marginal -3.410* 1.066 
Fairly Safe   
Very Safe 3.690** 1.036 
Ultra-safe 8.647** .833 
   
Ultra-marginal -8.841** 1.072 
Fairly Marginal -7.100** 1.054 
Fairly Safe -3.690** 1.036 
Very Safe   
Ultra-safe 8.647** .818 
   
Ultra-marginal -17.488** .877 
Fairly Marginal -15.747** .855 
Fairly Safe -12.337** .833 
Very Safe -8.647** .818 
Ultra-safe   
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 3804 





















Appendix 2 (cont.) 
 
Doorstep canvassing 
 Mean Difference Standard Error 
Ultra-marginal   
Fairly Marginal 2.745 2.59 
Fairly Safe 3.245 2.76 
Very Safe 2.838 2.53 
Ultra-safe 6.573* 2.16 
   
Ultra-marginal -2.745 2.59 
Fairly Marginal   
Fairly Safe .501 2.64 
Very Safe .093 2.40 
Ultra-safe 3.828 2.00 
   
Ultra-marginal -3.245 2.76 
Fairly Marginal -.501 2.64 
Fairly Safe   
Very Safe -.408 2.59 
Ultra-safe 3.327 2.22 
   
Ultra-marginal -2.838 2.83 
Fairly Marginal -.093 2.40 
Fairly Safe .408 2.59 
Very Safe   
Ultra-safe 3.735 1.93 
   
Ultra-marginal -6.573* 2.16 
Fairly Marginal -3.828 2.00 
Fairly Safe -3.327 2.22 
Very Safe -3.735 1.93 
Ultra-safe   
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 1911 












Appendix 2 (cont.) 
Telephone canvassing 
 Mean Difference Standard Error 
Ultra-marginal   
Fairly Marginal .514 2.38 
Fairly Safe 1.610 2.51 
Very Safe 6.588* 2.33 
Ultra-safe 8.544** 1.97 
   
Ultra-marginal -.514 2.38 
Fairly Marginal   
Fairly Safe 1.096 2.38 
Very Safe 6.074* 2.19 
Ultra-safe 8.030** 1.81 
   
Ultra-marginal -1.610 2.51 
Fairly Marginal -1.096 2.38 
Fairly Safe   
Very Safe 4.979 2.33 
Ultra-safe 6.935** 1.97 
   
Ultra-marginal -6.588* 2.33 
Fairly Marginal -6.074* 2.19 
Fairly Safe -4.979 2.33 
Very Safe   
Ultra-safe 1.956 1.73 
   
Ultra-marginal -8.544** 1.97 
Fairly Marginal -8.030** 1.81 
Fairly Safe -6.935** 1.97 
Very Safe -1.956 1.73 
Ultra-safe   
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 1911 












Appendix 3:  
Descriptive statistics for party-specific canvassing variables 1992-2001, p151. 
Doorstep 
 
1992 1997 2001 
Doorstep 
Conservative 
Mean 41.58 27.45 27.00 
Standard Deviation 25.29 23.25 24.66 
 
Labour 
Mean 34.60 26.11 18.08 
Standard Deviation 26.79 23.37 19.98 
 
Liberal Democrat 
Mean 12.66 11.85 7.86 
Standard Deviation 16.40 17.07 12.04 

















Standard Deviation  
10.13 4.15 











Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationship between marginality and 




1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 













































































































 .304 .090 .083 .528 .528 .526 .442 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 











Appendix 4 (cont.) 
Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationship between marginality and 


















































































































 .095 .271 .092 .318 .101 .138 .259 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 











Appendix 4 (cont.) 
Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationship between marginality and 














































































































 .113 .080 .062 .249 .202 .170 .221 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 













Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationship between marginality and 
canvassing on a party-by-party basis, table 5.9 p159 
 Conservative door Labour Door Liberal Democrat Door 
Previous majority 
-.140 (.102) -.085 (.096) -.028 (.063) 
Career tenure 
.192 (.217) .470* (.203) .089 (.138) 
Marginality/career 
tenure interaction -.006 (.008) -.013 (.007) .001 (.005) 
Owner 
-.168** (.042) -.149** (.037) .048 (.025) 
Retired 
.219* (.094) .140 (.099) .175** (.061) 
Routine workers 
-.665** (.195) -.797** (.294) -.608** (.155) 
Migrants 
.053 (.207) -.028 (.197) .244 (.134) 
Adjusted r
2







Previous majority -.312** (.079) -.317** (.102) -.012 (.051) 
Career tenure -.212 (.174) -.178 (.219) -.042 (.116) 
Marginality/career 
tenure interaction 
.010 (.006) .000 (.008) .000 (.004) 
Owner .047 (.089) -.110 (.109) -.041 (.060) 
Retired .257 (.214) -.176 (.284) .258 (.150) 
Routine workers .081 (.351) -1.110** (.392) -.214 (.203) 
Migrants -.312 (.379) -.547 (.441) .455 (.242) 
Adjusted r2 .059 .089 .052 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 







Appendix 6:  
Standard deviations for graph 5.3 (p164) 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Incumbent 
 13.44 19.33 15.32 17.45 18.48 19.75 
Opposition 
 25.64 28.65 26.87 28.91 29.56 33.62 





















ANOVA results comparing variation in campaign spending across categories of 
marginality, divided according to incumbency, p164. 
 Mean SD n F 
Conservative     
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 88.79 15.28 191 6.661** 
Fairly Marginal 88.09 14.10 204  
Fairly Safe 84.76 15.79 224  
Very Safe 84.75 14.86 257  
Ultra-safe 83.05 18.82 762  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 86.12 14.21 201 189.246** 
Fairly Marginal 84.42 15.78 217  
Fairly Safe 79.47 19.79 224  
Very Safe 72.41 22.76 208  
Ultra-safe 50.13 27.17 792  
Labour 
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 77.38 25.68 185 31.936** 
Fairly Marginal 84.74 17.76 214  
Fairly Safe 77.17 23.24 222  
Very Safe 71.44 25.79 219  
Ultra-safe 67.39 22.98 1040  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 80.62 23.03 142 16.052** 
Fairly Marginal 71.89 28.84 149  
Fairly Safe 65.14 31.59 136  
Very Safe 58.56 32.35 149  
Ultra-safe 59.93 27.95 258  
Liberal Democrat 
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 85.83 28.56 50 6.706** 
Fairly Marginal 84.71 27.65 37  
Fairly Safe 80.53 27.85 40  
Very Safe 75.80 28.21 38  
Ultra-safe 59.80 38.15 69  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 72.39 31.87 79 27.647** 
Fairly Marginal 75.90 28.62 86  
Fairly Safe 70.83 30.37 121  
Very Safe 64.35 31.12 147  
Ultra-safe 51.35 30.00 708  
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=3801. Relationships where 







Appendix 7 (cont.) 
ANOVA results comparing variation in doorstep canvassing across categories of 
marginality, divided according to incumbency, p164. 
 Mean SD n F 
Conservative     
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 40.10 23.86 62 .646 
Fairly Marginal 34.41 23.09 81  
Fairly Safe 37.95 21.19 62  
Very Safe 39.82 26.71 66  
Ultra-safe 37.62 25.07 221  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 33.58 24.01 55 5.658** 
Fairly Marginal 32.87 22.60 62  
Fairly Safe 27.30 22.89 46  
Very Safe 35.45 25.99 58  
Ultra-safe 20.15 22.24 212  
Labour 
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 39.72 28.68 36 5.292** 
Fairly Marginal 29.91 21.74 67  
Fairly Safe 25.92 24.68 60  
Very Safe 26.78 20.98 60  
Ultra-safe 22.25 24.27 337  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 34.07 22.37 55 .576 
Fairly Marginal 27.75 24.89 51  
Fairly Safe 28.64 26.48 45  
Very Safe 29.73 22.48 45  
Ultra-safe 31.63 25.19 87  
Liberal Democrat 
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 19.28 14.11 18 .735 
Fairly Marginal 24.83 23.34 6  
Fairly Safe 26.83 19.80 12  
Very Safe 22.40 26.14 10  
Ultra-safe 12.63 17.89 8  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 15.40 9.58 15 .707 
Fairly Marginal 16.61 18.61 23  
Fairly Safe 16.97 19.74 35  
Very Safe 21.03 19.79 38  
Ultra-safe 16.01 16.48 206  
 
 Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=1911. Relationships where 






Appendix 7 (cont.) 
ANOVA results comparing variation in telephone canvassing across categories of 
marginality, divided according to incumbency, p164. 
 Mean SD n F 
Conservative     
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 16.68 14.50 37 1.373 
Fairly Marginal 13.40 14.99 55  
Fairly Safe 10.44 9.03 32  
Very Safe 12.26 14.35 38  
Ultra-safe 11.44 12.05 104  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 18.12 18.57 42 7.567** 
Fairly Marginal 15.91 16.50 47  
Fairly Safe 18.83 15.45 29  
Very Safe 13.32 13.76 31  
Ultra-safe 6.92 13.91 130  
Labour 
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 20.86 18.18 22 6.556** 
Fairly Marginal 23.30 26.30 45  
Fairly Safe 19.75 18.78 40  
Very Safe 23.38 23.99 29  
Ultra-safe 11.26 16.63 208  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 24.45 18.82 38 4.865** 
Fairly Marginal 24.86 22.90 35  
Fairly Safe 24.57 24.36 28  
Very Safe 13.63 16.99 26  
Ultra-safe 11.13 13.95 52  
Liberal Democrat 
Incumbents     
Ultra-Marginal 11.38 12.91 13 1.661 
Fairly Marginal .00 .000 2  
Fairly Safe 3.00 4.95 9  
Very Safe 4.13 4.45 8  
Ultra-safe 6.00 8.94 5  
Opposition 
Ultra-Marginal 6.20 6.65 5 .587 
Fairly Marginal 6.90 7.85 10  
Fairly Safe 4.33 5.31 18  
Very Safe 5.80 10.06 20  
Ultra-safe 3.61 8.22 61  
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=1911. Relationships where 







Appendix 8:  
T-testing low level campaign spending (single measure) and previous majority, table 
5.11, p169-70. 
 Low level Other levels T df 
1987     








17.30 (11.80) -2.769** 208 













22.37 (8.74) -8.043** 310 
1992 

























24.12 (10.73) -3.300** 254 
1997 

























21.78 (10.25) -6.847** 169 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=3804. Relationships where 





Appendix 8 (cont.) 





























17.22 (14.41) -6.504** 36.401 
2005 

























21.16 (14.28) -4.508** 113 
2010 

























19.71 (10.76) -8.460** 183 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=3804. Relationships where 







Appendix 8 (cont.)  
T-testing low level doorstep canvassing (single measure) and previous majority, table 
5.11, p169-70. 
1992 




















































































































Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=1911. Relationships where 




Appendix 8 (cont.)  
T-testing low level telephone canvassing (single measure) and previous majority, 
table 5.11, p169-70. 
 
1997 





















14.10 (11.04) -2.818** 108 
Lib Dem 35.48 24.41 (10.56) -1.054 43 
2001 








26.95 (16.19) -7.248** 141.580 













18.70 (14.93) -3.522** 61.829 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=1911. Relationships where 












Appendix 9:  
Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship between party-
specific doorstep canvassing and turnout, p199. 
 1992 1997 2001 
Marginality .126 (.086) -.019 (.024) -.085* (.040) 
Conservative canvassing .009 (.032) -.019 (.017) -.002 (.017) 
Labour canvassing .019 (.023) .011 (.015) .044 (.030) 
Liberal Democrat canvassing .101* (.045) .060* (.024) -.009 (.033) 
Career tenure .065 (.043) -.015 (.022) -.020 (.038) 
Marginality/ Conservative canvass 
interaction -.001 (.001)  .001 (.001) .000 (.001) 
Marginality/Labour canvass 
interaction .000 (.001) .000 (.001) -.002 (.001) 
Marginality/ Liberal Democrat 
canvass interaction -.003 (.002) -.001 (.001) .002 (.001) 
Owner Occupiers .254** (.068) .046 (.029) -.058 (.044) 
Retired .087 (.071) .042 (.054) .271** (.082) 
Routine -.377 (.258) -.562** (.167) -.032 (.102) 
Migrants .040 (.034) .134 (.104) -.052 (.125) 
Previous turnout .582** (.080) .715** (.057) .676** (.092) 
Adjusted r
2
 .731 .828 .832 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=1911. Note – the table 
displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Relationships 











Appendix 9 (cont.)  
Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship between party-
specific telephone canvassing and turnout (p199) 
 1997 2001 
Marginality .207 (.076) -.068*  (.028) 
Conservative canvassing -.194 (.077) .070* (.029) 
Labour canvassing .342 (.087) -.040 (.028) 
Liberal Democrat canvassing .073 (.251) -.095 (.084) 
Career tenure -.494 (.125) -.031 (.041) 
Marginality and Conservative 
canvass interaction 
.008 (.003) -.004* (.002) 
Marginality and Labour 
canvass interaction 
-.025 (.007) .000 (.002) 
Marginality and Liberal 
Democrat canvass interaction 
-.015 (.012) .015 * (.007) 
Owner Occupiers .139 (.087) -.026 (.045) 
Retired .004 (.130) .259* (.101) 
Routine -1.654 (.609) -.043 (.111) 
Migrants 1.466 (.342) -.068 (.141) 
Previous turnout .169 (.290) .724** (.091) 
Adjusted r
2
 .927 .847 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010, n=1911.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 










Appendix 10:  
Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship between low levels 
of spending and turnout, table 6.11, p201. 
I1O1 – both running low level 
























































































































2    .727    .623    .837    .855    .766    .847 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 










Appendix 10 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of spending and turnout, table 6.11, p201. 
I1O2 
























































































































2    .727    .624    .840    .856    .767    .847 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 









Appendix 10 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of spending and turnout, table 6.11, p201. 
I1O3 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 























































































































2    .724    .631    .835    .855    .767    .847 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 









Appendix 10 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of spending and turnout, table 6.11, p201. 
I1O4 


























































































































2 .725 .622 .835 .856 .786 .849 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 









Appendix 10 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of spending and turnout, table 6.11, p201. 
I2O1 
























































































































2 .727 .626 .836 .855 .767 .847 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 









Appendix 10 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of spending and turnout, table 6.11, p201. 
I3O1 

























































































































2 .724 .623 .836 .857 .767 .847 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 









Appendix 10 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of spending and turnout, table 6.11, p201. 
I4O1 
 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 

























































































































.835 .857 .766 .848 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients. Relationships where significant are 




















Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the relationship between low levels 
of canvassing and turnout, table 6.12 p203. 
 
I1O1 – both running low level 
                                   Doorstep Telephone 






































































































.703 .817 .834 .648 .849 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 








Appendix 11 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of canvassing and turnout, table 6.12 p203. 
I1O2 
                                   Doorstep Telephone 





























































































.698 .816 .834 .650 
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 









Appendix 11 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of canvassing and turnout, table 6.12 p203. 
 
I1O3 
                                   Doorstep Telephone 






































































































.699 .819 .834 .677 .849 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 









Appendix 11 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of canvassing and turnout, table 6.12 p203. 
I1O4 
                                   Doorstep Telephone 






































































































.702 .817 .837 .648 .850 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 










Appendix 11 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of canvassing and turnout, table 6.12 p203. 
I2O1 
                                   Doorstep Telephone 



































































































.701 .818 .834 .650 .850 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 










Appendix 11 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of canvassing and turnout, table 6.12 p203. 
I3O1 
                                   Doorstep Telephone 
 1992 1997 2001 1997 2001 


































































































.702 .816 .833 .647 .849 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 









Appendix 11 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
relationship between low levels of canvassing and turnout, table 6.12 p203. 
I4O1 
                                   Doorstep Telephone 




































































































.817 .833 .652 .852 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients. Relationships where significant are 













Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the effectiveness of campaign 











.034** (.007) -.036** (.010) -.013 (.008) 
Labour proportion -.039** (006) .122** (.008) -.059** (.007) 
Lib Dem  proportion -.014** (.005) -.002* (.007) .055** (.007) 
Marginality -.075** (.023) .220** (.033) -.101** (.025) 
Career tenure .012 (.010) -.021 (.014) .009 (.011) 
Marginality/ Con 
prop interaction 
.001* (.000) -.001 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Marginality/Lab prop 
interaction 
.000 (.000) -.001** (.000) .001** (.000) 
Marginality/ LD prop 
interaction 
.000 (.000) -.001** (.000) .000* (.000) 
Owner .028** (.004) -.120** (.006) .090** (.005) 
Retired -.045** (.012)  -.023 (.097) -.032 (.013) 
Routine .061** (.023) -.291** (.032) .138** (.027) 
Migrants .128** (.023) -..085** (.032) -.003 (.025) 




.917 .878 .796 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients. Relationships where significant are 





Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the effectiveness of campaign 
spending on vote share, table 7.7, p225. 
Conservative vote share 

















































































































































































 .735 .872 .950 .804 .879 .950 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix 13 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
effectiveness of campaign spending on vote share, table 7.7, p225. 
Labour vote share 
























































































































































































 .748 .857 .953 .847 .885 .917 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix 13 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 
effectiveness of campaign spending on vote share, table 7.7, p225. 
Liberal Democrat vote share 
























































































































































































 .663 .750 .878 .675 .832 .865 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 




Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the effectiveness of canvassing on 











.017 (.016) .003 (.021) -.027 (.016) 
Labour doorstep -.021 (.016) .015 (.021) .009 (.017) 
Lib Dem  doorstep .003 (.025) -.041 (.033) .000 (.027) 
Marginality -.011 (.028) .011 (.036) -.007 (.028) 
Career tenure .022 (.025) .010 (.033) .008 (.026) 
Marginality/Con door 
interaction 
3.711E-5 (.001) -.001 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Marginality/ Lab 
door interaction 
-6.438E-5 (.001) -.001 (.001) 3.224E-5 (.001) 
Marginality/LD door 
interaction 
.000 (.001) .001 (.001) .000 (.001) 
Owner .027* (.011) -.089** (.014) .077** (.010) 
Retired .034 (.027) -.031 (.035) -.026 (.026) 
Routine -.120 (.094) .061 (.116) .132 (.083) 
Migrants -.001 (.035) -.024 (.45) .013 (.036) 






Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients. Relationships where significant are 




Appendix 14 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the 












-.063 (.083) .027 (.056) -.040 (.052) 
Labour telephone .025 (.070) .011 (.049) .013 (.047) 
Lib Dem  telephone -.139 (.422) -.062 (280) -.172 (.271) 
Marginality -.072 (.069) -.015 (.050) .006 (.043) 
Career tenure -.084 (.115) -.028 (.075) .033 (.070) 
Marginality/Con tel 
interaction 
.007 (.005) .001 (.003) .001 (.003) 
Marginality/Lab tel 
interaction 
-.011* (.005) -.003 (.003) .001 (.003) 
Marginality/ LD tel 
interaction 
.014 (.022) -.006 (.014) .003 (.013) 
Owner -.008 (.103) -.160* (.067) .003 (.062) 
Retired .258 (.245) -.081 (.181) -.012 (.160) 
Routine .123 (.370) -.288 (.250) -.156 (.231) 
Migrants .218 (.503) -.052 (.330) -.471 (.316) 
Previous vote share .845 (.084) .938** (.044) 1.059** (.066) 
Adjusted r
2
 .836 .953 .881 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010.  
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients. Relationships where significant are 






Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of low level spending 
campaigns on vote share by incumbent and opposition candidates, table 7.9, p231. 
Conservative Incumbent 


























































































































.392 .723 .811 .238 .423 .594 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 


















Appendix 15 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of 
low level spending campaigns on vote share by incumbent and opposition 
candidates, table 7.9, p231. 
 
Labour Incumbent 



























































































































.385 .638 .780 .340 .749 .683 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 




















Appendix 15 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of 
low level spending campaigns on vote share by incumbent and opposition 
candidates, table 7.9, p231. 
 
Liberal Democrat Incumbent 



























































































































.662 .581 .636 .125 .232 .203 
 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 



















Appendix 15 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of 
low level spending campaigns on vote share by incumbent and opposition 
candidates, table 7.9, p231. 
Conservative Opponent 







































































.131     
(.076) 


















































.813 .755 .847 .798 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 













Appendix 15 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of 
low level spending campaigns on vote share by incumbent and opposition 
candidates, table 7.9, p231. 
Labour Opponent 



























































































































.492 .663 .835 .575 .496 .700 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 













Appendix 15 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of 
low level spending campaigns on vote share by incumbent and opposition 
candidates, table 7.9, p231. 
 
Liberal Democrat Opponent 



























































































































.468 .577 .693 .233 .655 .623 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 










Appendix 16:  
Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of low level canvassing 











    












-.042         
(.091) 
-.011   
(.067) 




.053         
(.064) 








.025          
(.037) 
.042   
(.047) 




.034          
(.092) 
-.051   
(.033) 




-.043         
(.118) 
.176   
(.125) 
Routine  .054         
(.066) 
-.021   
(.097) 
.351          
(.334) 
.113   
(.135) 
Migrants -.013        
(.052) 
.109    
(.098) 
.079          
(.239) 
-.080   
(.152) 













Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 
unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where 


















Appendix 16 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of 















.944 (.650) -.725 (.433) 1.070 (1.915) -1.220 (.905) 
% Majority 
2005 








.022 (.020) -.021 (.019) .000 (.055) .043 (.041) 
Owner 
-.088** (.014) -.128** (.009) -.129** (.041) -.094** (.032) 
Retired 
.125 (.064) .076 (.050) .278 (.166) .057 (.065) 
Routine  
-.254** (.096) -.084* (.038) -.238 (.151) -.040 (.113) 
Migrants 
-.009 (.040) -.187** (.067) -.142 (.189) -.138 (.092) 
Previous vote 





          .874 
.718 .910 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 
unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where 






Appendix 16 (cont.): Unstandardized regression coefficients examining the impact of 















-5.878   
(9.373) 








.188       
(.234) 
-.018      
(.041) 
.918     
(1.207) 
-.014      
(.089) 
Career Tenure 
-.174       
(.333) 
-.006      
(.033) 
.189       
(.738) 





.463        
(.485) 
-.030      
(.028) 
1.230   
(5.545) 
.197       
(.101) 
Owner 
.045       
(.108) 
 
.082**     
(.013) 
1.013     
(.708) 
-.047      
(.134) 
Retired 
.367       
(.332) 
.064       
(.052) 
1.051   
(1.302) 
-.288      
(.169) 
Routine  
.760       
(.874) 
-.095      
(.071) 
2.645   
(1.516) 
.137       
(.323) 
Migrants 
1.318    
(1.177) 
.348**      
(.126) 
3.623    
(3.839) 
.333       
(.338) 
Previous vote 
.563       
(.294) 
.806**      
(.074) 
.508       
(2.180) 




 .104 .620 .084 .644 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. Note – the table displays the 
unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Relationships where 




Leader visit coefficients for linear regression model examining the effectiveness of 










-.033 (.092) .118 (.078) -.050 (.091) 
David Cameron visit 
.602 (1.493) 1.688 (1.392) -3.566* (1.647) 
Gordon Brown visit 
.736 (1.517) 1.386 (1.410) -2.659 (1.653) 
Nick Clegg visit 
-2.463 (1.295) -.961 (1.236) 4.350** (1.453) 
Average spend 
-.030 (.031) .060* (.029) .026 (.034) 
Career tenure 
.038 (.022) -.006 (.021) .012 (.025) 
Marginality/ spend 
interaction -.002 (.022) -.004* (.001) .003 (.002) 
Owner 
-.048 (.002) -.092 (.047) .087 (.056) 
Retired 
-.183* (.050) .129 (.082) .060 (.095) 
Routine 
-.255* (.086) -.407** (.103) .365** (.121) 
Migrants 
-.025 (.109) -.194 (.128) .389* (.152) 
Previous vote share 
.864** (.096) .740 (.030) .702** (.036) 
Adjusted r
2 
.617 .837 .781 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 










Appendix 17 (cont.): Leader visit coefficients for linear regression model examining 










-.012 (.035) .102 (.080) .036 (.044) 
David Cameron visit 
1.598** (.488) -1.093 (.808) -1.294* (.617) 
Gordon Brown visit 
.602 (.464) -.007 (.784) .021 (.586) 
Nick Clegg visit 
-1.048 (.718) .179 (1.102) 3.632** (.913) 
Average spend 
.034 (.020) -.130** (.033) .051* (.025) 
Career tenure 
-.011 (.019) .052 (.032) -.044 (.024) 
Marginality/spend 
interaction .000 (.001) .002 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Owner 
.024 (.023) -.240** (.037) .076** (.028) 
Retired 
.023 (.093) -.012 (.155) -.140 (.118) 
Routine 
.327** (.327) -1.027** (.127) .392** (.097) 
Migrants 
-.008 (.066) -.450** (.110) .373** (.085) 
Previous vote share 






Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 











Appendix 17 (cont.): Leader visit coefficients for linear regression model examining 
the effectiveness of leader visits in different incumbency contexts, table 8.11, p259. 
 









-.430 (.328) .153 (.187) .369 (.410) 
David Cameron visit 
2.149 (2.210) .917 (1.297) -2.766 (2.700) 
Gordon Brown visit 
.812 (3.601) -.737 (2.059) -.375 (4.392) 
Nick Clegg visit 
.339 (1.904) -.810 (1.088) .564 (2.344) 
Average spend 
-.010 (.099) -.121* (.055) .052 (.120) 
Career tenure 
-.094 (.096) -.078 (.056) .187 (.121) 
Marginality/spend 
interaction .009 (.006) .001 (.003) -.010 (.007) 
Owner 
.072 (.103) -.148* (.060) .050 (.119) 
Retired 
-.198 (.297) .282 (.177) .280 (.369) 
Routine 
.321 (.338) -.820** (.191) .066 (.422) 
Migrants 
.078 (.224) -.389** (.131) .379 (.278) 
Previous vote share 




.835 .944 .204 
Source: Local Campaigning and Election Results 1987-2010. N = 630 
Note – the table displays the unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Relationships where significant are marked ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
